THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

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OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


BY    THE   SAME  AUTHOR 

RACIAL  PROBLEMS  IN  HUNGARY.  By 
Scotus  Viator.      1908. 

CORRUPTION  AND  REFORM  IN  HUN- 
GARY: A  Study  of  Electoral  Practice.  141 1 
(Enlarged  German  edition,  1912,  Leipzig.) 

THE  SOUTHERN  SLAV  QUESTION  AND 
[*HE  HABSBURG  MONARCHY.  19". 
(Greatly     enlarged     German      edition,     191?,, 

Berlin.) 

ABSOLUTISM    IN    CROATIA.     1912. 

THE  WAR  AND  DEMOCRACY.  Jointly 
with  A.  E.  Zimmern,  J.  Dover  Wilson,  and 
A.  Greenwood.  1914.  (Swedish  edition, 
1915) 

ROUMANIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR. 
[915. 

THE     BALKANS,     ITALY     AND     THE 

ADRIATIC.    2nd  Edition,     1916. 

GERMAN,  SLAV  AND  MAGYAR.   A 

Study  in  the  Origins  of  the  Great  War.     1916. 
(French  edition  in  the  Press.) 


THE 

RISE  OF  NATIONALITY 
IN  THE  BALKANS 


)tr  by 

R.    W.    SETON-WATSON    D.Litt. 


LECTURER    IN    EAST   EUROPEAN    HISTORY,    KINGS    COLLEGE, 
UNIVERSITY   OF    LONDON. 


WITH  FOUR  MAPS. 


NEW    YORK 

E.   P.    DUTTON    AND    COMPANY 

1 918 


DRSL 

■a 


TO 

MY   WIFE 


25   March,    1917. 


NOTE 

Owing  to  his  departure  from  London  on  military 
service  the  author  has  not  been  able  to  finish  this  book  : 
it  is,  therefore,  not  the  true  fulfilment  of  his  intention. 
But,  as  the  substance  of  it  is  in  its  final  form  and 
nothing  is  wanting  except  a  preface  and  the  statement  of 
general  conclusions,  his  publishers  believe  that  the  value 
of  the  book  as  a  guide  to  critical  affairs  in  the  Balkans  is 
in  no  way  impaired.  They  therefore  present  it  to  the 
British  reading  public  with  full  confidence  that,  alike  in 
its  intrinsic  worth  and  by  the  acknowledged  authority  of 
its  author,  it  will  help  to  serve  the  great  purposes  of  the 
War. 

25  March,   1917. 


CONTENTS 


PACK 

CHAPTER 

BYZANTIUM    AND   STAMBUL I 


CHAPTER    II 

TURKEY   IN    DECLINE II 

CHAPTER    III 

THE    BALKAN   CHRISTIANS   AND  THE   RISE   OF   NATIONALITY  .  21 

CHAPTER    IV 

THE   SERBS   AND  THEIR   STRUGGLE   FOR   INDEPENDENCE  .  2$ 

CHAPTER   V 
THE   GREEK   REVOLUTION 44 

CHAPTER    VI 
MODERN    ROUMANIA ■  ....  56 

CHAPTER   VII 

BULGARIA   UNDER   THE   TURKISH   YOKE 69 

CHAPTER    VIII 

AUSTRO-RUSSIAN    RIVALRY    IN   THE    BALKANS        ...  "85 


viii  CONTENTS 

PAGH 

CHAPTER    IX 
THE  CONCERT   OF    EUROPE    VND   THE    NEAR    EAST       ...  94 

CHAPTER   X 

THE   BERLIN    SETTLEMENT    AND     ITS    CONSEQUENCES    ( 1 878- 

1908) 113 

CHAPTER    XI 
THE   YOUNC    TURKISH    REVOLUTION 1 34 

PART    II 

CHAPTER   XII 
THE   BALKAN    LEAGUE 143 

CHAPTER   XIII 

THE   TURCO-BAI.KAN    WAR 166 

CHAPTER    XIV 

THE   SECOND    PHASE   OF   THE    WAR 204 

CHAPTER   XV 
THE    DISPUTE   AMONG   THE  ALLIES 230 

CHAPTER   XVI 

THE    BREAK-UP   OF   THE    BALKAN    LEAGUE     .         .  .        240 

CHAPTER   XVII 

THE   SECOND    BALKAN    WAR 257 

BIBLIOGRAPHY .  285 

INDEX 299 


THE   RISE   OF   NATIONALITY  IN 
THE    BALKANS 


CHAPTER    I 

BYZANTIUM    AND    STAMBUL 

The  master  of  Constantinople,  said  Napoleon,  will 
rule  the  world,  and  his  reputation  for  political  prophecy 
has  given  an  unnatural  lease  of  life  to  what  is  merely 
a  dangerous  half-truth.  In  a  conjunction  of  circum- 
stances such  as  ten  centuries  may  not  bring,  and  under 
the  guidance  of  some  universal  genius  of  peace  and 
war,  Byzantium  may  resume  that  supremacy  which  it 
enjoyed  under  its  Imperial  founder  and  to  a  lesser 
degree  under  the  great  Justinian.  But  even  then  it  will 
be  for  the  future  historian  to  consider  whether  other 
causes,  such  as  undermined  the  fighting  powers  of 
Rome  and  diverted  the  trade  routes  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
were  not  the  main  factors  in  the  revival  with  which  he 
will  be  concerned,  and  whether  Constantine  would  have 
been  any  the  less  supreme  had  he  refrained  from  found- 
ing a  New  Rome  upon  the  shores  of  the  Bosphorus. 
That  it  may  in  the  future  dominate  the  European  situa- 
tion none  would  be  rash  enough  to  deny ;  to  assert  that 
it  must  of  necessity  do  so  would  be  little  short  of  an 
open  defiance  of  the  past.     For  history  shows  us  that, 

B 


2     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

despite  its  commercial  importance  and  its  ancient  tradi- 
tions of  culture,  Constantinople  has  for  many  centuries 
played  a  purely  negative  part  in  the  politics  of  Europe, 
and  that  even  under  such  great  and  war-like  sovereigns 
as  Basil  II.,  Mohammed  II.,  and  Suleiman  the  Mag- 
nificent, Europe,  though  it  rang  with  their  victories, 
was  never  the  tool  of  their  policy.  To-day,  more  than 
ever,  the  straits  between  Europe  and  Asia  possess  a 
potential  rather  than  an  actual  importance,  which  is 
intimately  connected  with  the  fate  of  the  territory 
separating  them  from  the  Balkans  and  the  Taurus.  On 
the  other  hand,  for  purposes  of  defence,  communica- 
tion, and  administration,  its  strategic  position  is  un- 
rivalled and  bears  witness  to  the  genius  of  its  founder. 
Geography,  indeed,  goes  far  to  explain  alike  the 
stubborn  survival  of  the  Eastern  Empire  as  a  trunk- 
less  head  and  the  frequent  recoveries  of  the  Sick  Man 
from  a  seemingly  hopeless  illness.  In  a  word,  Con- 
stantinople is  a  key  which,  in  the  right  hands,  may  work 
wonders,  but  which  only  acquires  full  value  when  key 
and  lock  are  in  the  same  possession.  For  the  past  two 
years  history  has  been  writing  the  proof  of  this  asser- 
tion in  letters  of  fire  across  Europe,  and  the  fate  of 
Constantinople  is  one  of  the  most  decisive  issues  of  the 
Great  War.  The  definite  establishment  of  German 
control  would  at  once  convert  the  dream  of  "Berlin  to 
Bagdad"  into  the  most  practical  of  realities,  while  its 
acquisition  by  Russia  would  change  the  whole  centre 
of  gravity  in  Eastern  Europe  by  assuring  to  the  greatest 
of  Slavonic  Powers  its  access  to  the  sea  and  removing 
the  chief  incentive  to  political  activity  in  Persia  or  the 
Middle  East. 

The  victories  of  Belisarius  and  Narses  in  Italy  and 
Africa  (533-554)  were  the  last  serious  acts  of  aggression 
in  the  West  committed  by  the  so-called  "Byzantine" 
Empire.     Henceforward     its     military     resources    were 


BYZANTIUM  AND   STAMBUL  3 

devoted  on  the  one  hand  to  retaining  or  reasserting  its 
hold  upon  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  on  the  other  to 
holding  back  the  advancing  tide  of  Islam  from  its 
Asiatic  provinces.  For  ten  centuries  after  the  fall  of 
the  West  before  the  repeated  onslaughts  of  the  bar- 
barians (476),  the  East  held  Asia  at  bay.  While  the 
rest  of  Europe  was  sunk  in  the  depths  of  barbarism  and 
anarchy,  Constantinople  preserved,  with  much  that  was 
corrupt  and  decadent,  many  of  the  great  traditions  of 
the  ancient  world.  Recent  research  and  a  wider  con- 
ception of  history  have  restored  it  to  its  place  as  the 
true  centre  of  culture  during  the  Dark  Ages.  Indeed, 
for  a  long  time  the  Moorish  Court  of  Cordova  was  its 
only  serious  rival  as  a  repository  of  learning  and 
science ;  it  was  only  later  that  the  great  scholastic 
centres  of  Bologna  and  Paris,  of  Oxford  and  Prague, 
began  to  assume  a  real  importance  in  the  history  of 
thought  and  civilisation. 

It  is  true  that  in  the  sultry  atmosphere  of  Byzantine 
ceremonial  all  initiative  had  long  been  stifled ;  but  the 
West  was  now  ready  to  receive  the  treasures  so  long 
hoarded  on  the  Bosphorus,  and  it  is  hard  to  exaggerate 
the  impetus  which  their  dispersal  after  the  Turkish 
conquest  gave  to  the  Italian  renaissance,  and  the  con- 
sequent revival  of  art  and  learning  throughout  Europe. 

Internal  decay  and  stagnation  had  rendered  the  fall 
of  the  Byzantine  State  inevitable,  nor  need  its  dissolu- 
tion have  been  a  cause  for  regret,  had  its  conquerors 
possessed  either  the  inclination  or  the  capacity  to  accept 
its  great  traditions  and  transfuse  them  with  their  own 
fierce  virility.  Unhappily,  the  very  opposite  occurred. 
Religious  fanaticism  and  military  prowess  combined  to 
inspire  the  Turk  with  contempt  for  the  conquered 
Greeks.  By  a  glorious  death  the  last  Constantine 
vindicated  his  own  honour,  but  could  not  conceal  the 
craven   spirit  of  his   subjects,   while   the  corruption   of 

b  2 


I     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

the  Eastern  Church  served  to  render  the  art  and  culture 
which  centred  round  it  peculiarly  abhorrent  to  a  race 
which  followed  the  purer  tenets  of  Mohammed. 

By  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century  the  collapse 
of  the  Empire  had  become  a  mere  question  of  time,  and 
in  the  year  1355  we  find  a  Venetian  diplomat  treating 
it  as  the  certain  prey  of  the  Turks.1  Yet  the  great 
strength  of  its  strategic  position  enabled  the  imperial 
city  to  postpone  its  downfall  for  a  whole  century  after 
the  Turks  had  gained  their  first  foothold  in  Europe. 
The  additional  respite  afforded  by  the  onslaught  of  the 
Mongols  on  the  Turkish  rear  came  too  late  to  save 
either  the  Empire  itself  or  the  loosely-knit  Slavonic 
states  of  the  peninsula,  to  whom  the  triumph  of  the 
Crescent  meant  national  ruin.  In  the  ninth  and  tenth 
centuries  (807-1018)  the  Bulgars,  under  the  leadership 
of  the  savage  Krum  and  his  great  successors,  Boris  and 
Simeon,  had  seemed  more  than  once  on  the  point  of 
sweeping  all  before  them,  but  the  ferocious  energy  and 
military  prowess  of  Basil  II.  reduced  them  to  complete 
subjection  for  170  years.  The  second,  or  Roumano- 
Bulgar,  Empire  of  the  Asenid  dynasty,2  and  the  still 
more  formidable  Serb  Empire  of  Stephen  Dushan,  both 
proved  unequal  to  the  task  of  uniting  the  peninsula 
against  the  infidel.  The  fatal  battle  of  Kosovo  (1389) 
— the  Flodden  of  the  Southern  Slavs — which  has  been 
immortalised  by  a  wonderful  cycle  of  popular  ballads, 
assured  to  the  Turks  a  dominant  position  in  the  Balkans. 
It  was  followed  in  a  few  years  by  the  subjection  of 
Bulgaria  (1393),  while  Serbia  and  Bosnia  were  reduced 
to  the  defensive,  and  were  only  permitted  to  survive  in 
uncertain  vassalage,  until  .the  Sultan,  after  planting  the 
Crescent  upon  the  Golden  Horn,  was  ready  for  an 
advance   into   the    heart  of    Europe.     Even   to-day   the 

1  Marino  Falieri,  cit.     Hopf,  Gcschichte  Griechenlands,  p.  488. 

2  See  Chapters  III  and  VI. 


BYZANTIUM  AND  STAMBUL  5 

claims  of  rival  propagandists  are  based  upon  the 
doubtful  and  fluctuating  frontiers  of  mediaeval  times. 
Each  race  naturally  tends  to  exaggerate  the  achieve- 
ments of  its  ancestors  and  to  ignore  the  claims  of  its 
neighbours.  But  even  upon  a  perfectly  sound  historical 
basis  it  is  possible  to  make  out  a  good  case  for  at 
least  three  mutually  exclusive  and  irreconcilable  pro- 
grammes. Meanwhile,  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that 
none  of  the  three  states  referred  to  was  so  exclusively 
national  in  character  as  those  who  read  the  present  into 
the  past  would  have  us  believe.  During  the  fifteenth 
century  the  indifference  and  disunion  of  Christendom 
favoured  Turkish  ambitions.  The  disastrous  battles  of 
Nicopolis  (1396)  and  Varna  (1444)  crushed  what  were 
at  best  isolated,  if  gallant,  efforts.  In  the  West,  Pius 
II.  alone  showed  some  perception  of  the  issues  at  stake; 
but  his  noble  enthusiasm  and  personal  example,  while 
shedding  a  dying  lustre  upon  the  pre-Reformation 
Papacy,  produced  no  tangible  result.  For  a  whole 
century  the  Magyars  and  Roumanians  were  left  virtu- 
ally unaided  to  stem  the  Turkish  tide.  Their  heroic 
leaders,  John  Hunyady  and  Stephen  the  Great,  proved 
in  manv  a  desperate  battle  that  the  Crescent  was  not 
invincible;  but  their  efforts  would  have  been  more 
effectual  had  Stephen  been  a  contemporary,  not  a  suc- 
cessor, of  the  great  Roumanian  voivode,  and  had  the 
two  nations  acted  conjointly  instead  of  on  parallel  lines. 
Even  Hunyady's  son,  King^  Matthias  Corvinus, 
admittedly  one  of  the  greatest  figures  of  the  fifteenth 
century,  would  seem  to  have  under-estimated  the 
Turkish  danger,  for  his  campaigns  in  the  south  were 
mere  spasmodic  efforts  compared  with  the  energy  and 
resources  squandered  in  repeated  aggression  against 
Austria  and  Bohemia. 

The     writers     of     historical     text-books     have     often 
selected  purely  arbitrary  dates  for  the  opening  of  some 


6     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

new  era,  but  it  was  a  sure  instinct  which  fixed  upon  the 
fall  of  Constantinople  in  1453  as  a  decisive  landmark 
in  European  history.  Henceforth  a  barbarous  Asiatic 
Power,  to  whom  law  and  administration  were  a  sealed 
book  and  the  argument  of  the  sword  the  sole  reality, 
was  to  make  its  capital  in  the  city  of  Constantine  and 
Justinian.  The  Imperial  tradition  of  the  Caesars,  which 
had  survived  within  narrower  limits,  but  in  a  more 
recognisable  form,  in  Byzantium  than  in  the  shadowy 
Empire  of  the  West,  was  rudely  shattered  by  the  might 
of  the  Crescent.  The  fragments  of  its  literary  treasures 
were  transferred  to  Italy  and  Germany,  and  gave  added 
strength  and  a  new  direction  to  the  humanistic  current 
which  is  known  as  the  Renaissance,  and  which,  on  its 
spiritual  side,  was  to  merge  in  the  reforming  movement 
of  Luther,  Calvin,  and  Knox. 

The  destruction  of  the  Eastern  Empire  involved  the 
establishment  of  an  essentially  barbarous  Power 
cemented  by  military  organisation  and  an  insatiable 
lust  of  conquest.  The  records  of  Turkish  rule  in 
Europe  are  one  long  catalogue  of  bloodshed  and  rapine, 
at  first  directed  by  the  genius  of  one  of  the  most  remark- 
able dynasties  which  the  world  has  seen,1  but  never 
from  first  to  last  inspired  by  the  faintest  traditions  of 
culture.  In  marked  contrast  to  other  Moslem  Powers, 
the  Turks  have  never  shown  a  trace  of  creative  genius; 
when  not  actively  engaged  in  the  cause  of  destruction, 
they  have  remained  sunk  in  the  lethargy  of  fatalism. 
The  learning  and  culture  of  Bagdad  and  Cordova,  the 
architectural  and  artistic  triumphs  of  the  Indian  Moguls 
or  the  Fatimite  Caliphs  of  Egypt,  were  never  rivalled 
by     the     Turks.     Even     their     literature,     despite     its 

1  From  Osman  (  +  1325)  to  Suleiman  I.  (  +  1566)  are  ten 
generations  in  lineal  descent ;  and  with  the  possible  exception  of 
the  two  Bayezids,  all  were  men  of  commanding  ability,  and  at 
least  two  of  real  genius. 


BYZANTIUM   AND   STAMBUL  7 

numerous  votaries,  is  in  the  main  an  imitation  of 
Persian  and  Arabic  models.1 

The  Turks  entered  Europe  endowed  with  the  savage 
virtues  of  the  primitive  warrior ;  confronted  with  so 
utterly  alien  a  civilisation  as  that  of  Byzantium,  they 
could  only  assimilate  its  worst  qualities,  which  acted 
upon  their  martial  spirit  as  a  slowly  corroding  poison. 
Their  apologists  are  fully  entitled  to  extol  the  dignity 
and  the  virtues  of  the  individual  Turkish  peasant,  and 
even  to  contrast  them  with  the  unlovely  qualities  of  the 
enslaved  rayah ;  but  no  effort  can  conceal  the  supremely 
negative  nature  of  the  Turkish  character,  the  utter  in- 
capacity for  constructive  work  or  probity  of  adminis- 
tration displayed  by  the  governing  class.  The  essential 
distinction  between  Islam  and  the  Turks  cannot  be 
emphasised  too  strongly  in  a  book  dealing  with  Balkan 
problems,  for  there  is  at  the  present  day  a  foolish  and 
unfounded  tendency  to  assume  that  severe  criticism  of 
the  latter  necessarily  involves  hostility  towards  the 
former. 

The  final  and  unanswerable  condemnation  of  Turkish 
rule  in  Europe  consists,  not  in  recounting  the  periodic 
massacres  and  outbreaks  which  its  discontented  sub- 
jects have  provoked,  but  in  contrasting  the  material  and 
moral  condition  of  the  various  provinces  before  and 
after  the  conquest,  and  still  more  their  condition  a 
generation  before  and  a  generation  after  the  expulsion 
of  the  Turks.  Every  province  which  they  have  held 
has  become  a  desert  under  their  blighting  influence,  and 
has  only   blossomed  again   when   the  blight   has  been 

1  Even  the  historian,  Hammer-Purgstall,  who  in  his  monu- 
mental work  on  Ottoman  poetry  introduces  over  2,000  "  poets 
and  versifiers"  to  the  West,  has  to  admit  that  the  Turks  "are 
not  inspired  by  any  native  and  peculiar  poetical  genius,  like  the 
Arabs  and  Persians,"  though  they  have  assimilated  the  literary 
treasures  of  those  two  peoples.  See  Gesch.  des  osmanischen 
Reiches,  Bd.  II.,  S.683. 


8     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

removed.  The  rose  garden  replaces  the  dung  hill,  and 
flourishing  modern  cities  the  foul  and  mouldering  ham- 
lets of  a  century  ago.  Whether  it  be  Hungary,  Croatia, 
Serbia,  Greece,  Roumania,  Bosnia,  or  Bulgaria,  the 
story  is  invariably  the  same.  The  proverb  which 
declares  that  grass  does  not  grow  where  the  Ottoman 
hoofs  have  trod,  merely  gives  poetical  expression  to  a 
fact  which  is  as  indisputable  as  the  law  of  gravity. 

With  the  triumph  of  the  Turks  the  Eastern  Question 
— which  has  its  root  in  the  secular  rivalry  of  Europe 
and  Asia — assumed  a  new  phase,  in  the  course  of  which 
there  was  a  faint  revival  of  the  old  conception  of  Euro- 
pean solidarity,  which  the  Crusades  had  kindled  into 
flame  but  which  the  decay  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire 
had  done  so  much  to  obscure.  But  it  was  only  with 
the  decline  of  Ottoman  power  that  it  entered  upon  the 
stage  which  has  been  so  familiar  to  recent  generations, 
and  which  ended  amid  the  cataclysms  of  191 2. 

A  period  of  550  years  separates  the  day  on  which  the 
Turks,  still  flushed  with  their  conquest  of  Adrianople, 
routed  the  allied  Serb  and  Bulgar  armies  on  the  Maritza 
near  that  city  (1371),  and  the  day  on  which  Adrianople 
surrendered  to  the  victorious  Bulgars  and  their  Serbian 
Allies.  This  period  falls  naturally  into  two  divisions  : 
one  of  expansion  and  aggrandisement  (1357— 1595)»  m 
which  the  capture  of  the  Dardanelles  was  the  first  and 
the  conquest  of  Cyprus  (157 1)  the  last  of  an  unbroken 
series  of  military  triumphs,1  and  one  of  slow  but  con- 
stant decline  (1595-191 2),  in  which  province  after 
province  was  severed  from   the  decaying  trunk  of  the 

1  A  further  period  of  expansion  occurred  under  the  great  Viziers 
of  the  later  seventeenth  century.  The  conquest  of  Crete  from 
the  Venetians  (1669),  and  of  Podolia  and  the  Ukraine  from 
Poland  (1676)  marked  the  high  water  line  of  Turkish  conquest. 
This  revival  closed  dramatically  with  the  unsuccessful  siege  of 
Vienna  in   1683. 


BYZANTIUM    AND   STAMBUL  9 

Ottoman  state.  At  the  height  of  its  power  Turkish 
pashas  ruled  in  Buda,  Belgrade,  Sarajevo,  and  Athens; 
Wallachia,  Moldavia,  Transylvania,  and  Ragusa  paid 
annual  tribute  to  the  Porte;  while  the  Empire  and 
Poland  felt  the  menace  of  the  Sultan's  power. 

The  strength  of  the  Turks  lay  in  their  skilful  com- 
bination of  the  military  and  feudatory  systems,  in  the 
still  more  ingenious  adaptation  of  slavery  by  the  blood 
tax,  and  in  the  position  of  the  Sultan  as  the  spiritual 
head  of  Islam.1  From  the  very  first  the  whole  organ- 
isation of  the  conquering  race  rested  on  a  military  basis ; 
war  was  their  true  profession,  and  foreign  aggrandise- 
ment was  the  surest  road  to  fame  and  advancement. 
The  child  tribute,  by  which  the  famous  corps  of  Janis- 
saries was  recruited,  Mas  a  double  source  of  strength, 
for  on  the  one  hand  it  made  good  the  comparative 
sterility  of  the  Turks,  and  on  the  other  drained  the  best 
forces  of  the  subject  population.  Thus,  by  a  refinement 
of  cruelty,  the  unhappy  Christians  saw  the  flower  of 
their  youth  converted  into  the  deadliest  instrument  for 
prolonging  their  subjection.  It  was  only  when,  towards 
the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  Janissaries  were 
permitted  to  marry,  and  under  the  degenerate  successors 
of  the  great  Suleiman  were  appeased  at  each  fresh 
accession  by  extravagant  largesse,  that  the  first  symp- 
toms of  decay  became  apparent.  When  marriage  was 
once  allowed  to  them,  the  admission  of  their  children 
to  service  in  the  same  corps  became  a  mere  question  of 
time ;  and  from  the  moment  that  this  practice  became 
common,  the  blood  tax  inevitably  fell  into  disuse,  and 
the  drain  upon  the  Christian  population  ceased.  The 
growing  lack  of  discipline  among  the  Janissaries 
coincided  with  the  transformation  of  the  old  military 
tenure  of  the  Timars  :  the  luxury  and  extravagance  of 

1  Cf.  Ranke,  Fiirstai  unci  Yolkcr  Siideuropas  im  XV I.  u. 
XVII.  Jahrhundcrt,  cursim. 


10     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

the  Court  kept  pace  with  the  rapacity  of  the  troops. 
The  incapacity  of  the  later  Sultans  naturally  increased 
the  influence  of  the  harem,  and  all  these  causes  com- 
bined to  deplete  the  Treasury  and  thus  weaken  the 
offensive  power  of  the  Empire. 

Like  a  vampire,  the  Ottoman  state  could  only  flourish 
by  draining  the  life  blood  of  its  victims;  and  this  process 
still  further  whetted  its  appetite,  until  at  length  the 
overgrown  body  fell  an  easy  prey  to  decay  and  corrup- 
tion. The  art  of  government  has  always  been  a  sealed 
book  to  the  Turks,  whose  peculiar  talent  has  been 
strictly  limited  to  war  and  diplomacy;  and  nothing  illus- 
trates this  more  strikingly  than  the  circumstance  that 
so  many  of  their  greatest  statesmen  have  been  of  other 
than  Turkish  origin,  owing  their  advancement,  not  to 
race,  but  to  the  unifying  bond  of  Islam. 


CHAPTER    II 


TURKEY    IN    DECLINE 


That  the  inevitable  process  of  Turkish  dissolution 
has  been  prolonged  over  several  centuries  is  due,  not  so 
much  to  the  patient's  powers  of  resistance  (though  these 
must  not  be  underestimated)  as  to  the  mutual  distrust 
and  animosities  of  the  Christian  States  of  Europe.  The 
same  short-sighted  indifference,  the  same  selfish  calcu- 
lation on  their  part  which  permitted  the  fall  of  Con- 
stantinople, left  the  Turks  in  undisturbed  possession  of 
their  prey,  and  on  more  than  one  occasion  actively  sup- 
ported their  designs  of  aggression.1  It  is  an  unhappy 
fact  that  one  of  the  central  events  of  European  progress, 
the  German  Reformation,  should  have  contributed 
materially  to  this  result.  The  clash  of  warring  religious 
systems  and  the  bigotry  displayed  on  both  sides  gave 
rise  to  the  conviction  that  the  Papacy  was  a  deadlier 
enemy  than  the  Turk,  and  led  for  the  first  time  to  co- 
operation between  a  Protestant  and  a  Mohammedan 
Power.  Nowhere  was  this  more  marked  than  in 
Hungary,  where  the  opponents  of  the  Habsburg 
dynasty  and  its  Jesuit  allies  often  preferred  the  rule  of 
Islam  to  that  of  a  rival  Christian  sect.  During  the  late 
sixteenth    and    early    seventeenth    centuries    their    very 

1  Cf.  the  encouragement  given  by  Francis  I.  to  Suleiman's 
invasion  of  Hungary,  inspired  by  the  French  King's  desire  to 
injure  the  House  of  Habsburg. 


12     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

zeal  for  the  Catholic  faith  proved  to  be  the  chief  handi- 
cap of  the  Habsburgs  in  their  great  designs  for  the 
recovery  of  Christian  territory  from  the  Turks.  The 
Thirty  Years'  War,  in  which  the  Protestant  North 
linked  hands  with  Gabriel  Bethlen  and  the  Calvinists 
of  Hungary,  served  as  a  diversion  in  favour  of  the  Turks 
and  delayed  the  Christian  advance  for  at  least  two 
generations.  But  if  the  Bethlens,  the  Tokolis,  and  the 
Rak6czys,  instead  of  following  their  ancestors'  example 
as  the  foremost  champions  of  Christendom,  were  con- 
tent to  remain  the  vassals  of  the  Porte,  this  is  to  be 
explained  and  condoned  by  the  gross  intolerance  and 
persecuting  zeal  displayed  by  the  House  of  Habsburg 
towards  the  Hungarian  Protestants — a  frame  of  mind 
which  coincided  with  a  despotic  tendency  to  override 
all  constitutional  traditions.  Despite  this  stain  upon  its 
scutcheon,  however,  it  is  to  the  House  of  Habsburg  that 
we  must  assign  the  chief  glory  in  the  task  of  turning 
the  tide  against  the  Turks.  For  a  century  and  a  half 
(1526-1687)  the  great  central  plains  of  Hungary 
remained  in  Turkish  possession,  and  for  the  greater 
part  of  that  period  the  Habsburgs  were  forced  to  act 
upon  the  defensive.  The  exigencies  of  German  politics, 
involving  the  future  of  the  dynasty  and  of  the  Roman 
Church,  and  at  the  same  time  Magyar  hostility  to  a 
foreign  king  and  the  strategic  value  of  Transylvania  as 
a  focus  of  national  resistance,  all  combined  to  render 
an  aggressive  policy  virtually  impossible.  But  defence 
at  least  was  not  neglected,  and  the  sixteenth  century 
saw  the  organisation  of  the  Croatian  Military  Frontiers, 
which  at  once  stemmed  back  the  Turks  from  the 
hereditary  provinces  and  threatened  their  flank  in  the 
open '  Hungarian  plain.  This  frontier  work  was  an 
essential  preliminary  to  the  task  of  reconquest,  and  its 
success  was  demonstrated  by  the  gradual  extension  of 
the  system  of  soldier-settlers  along  the  whole  northern 


TURKEY   IN   DECLINE  13 

bank  of  the  Save  and  Danube  as  far  east  as  the  Transyl- 
vanian  Alps. 

The  famous  siege  of  Vienna  in  1683  marks  the  last 
serious  effort  of  the  Turks  at  European  conquest.  The 
danger  was  averted  by  the  joint  efforts  of  the  Imperialists 
and  their  Polish  allies  under  the  great  Sobieski,  and  the 
moment  of  extreme  peril  was  immediately  followed  by 
the  heroic  era  of  Habsburg  advance.  In  a  series  of 
glorious  campaigns  under  the  Duke  of  Lorraine  and 
Stahremberg,  and  their  still  greater  successor,  Prince 
Eugene,  the  Imperialist  armies  drove  back  the  Turks 
from  the  greater  part  of  Hungary  and  Transylvania 
(1685-1699),  and  at  length — after  an  interval  caused  by 
European  and  Hungarian  opposition  1 — not  merely  ex- 
pelled them  from  their  last  foothold  on  Hungarian  soil, 
the  Banat  of  Temesvar,  but  also  occupied  the  fortress 
of  Belgrade  and  large  portions  of  the  modern  Serbia 
and  Roumania  (1716-1718).2 

The  designs  entertained  by  the  Court  of  Vienna  for 
the  extension  of  Austrian  power  in  the  Balkans  took 
practical  form  in  the  manifesto  addressed  in  1690  to  the 
Christian  subjects  of  the  Porte,  and  as  a  result  the  Serb 
Patriarch  Arsenius  abandoned  the  ancient  metropolitan 
see  of  Ipek  and  settled  with  many  thousand  Serb 
families  in  the  Southern  plains  of  Hungary  under  the 
protection  of  a  special  Imperial  charter.  Nine  years 
later  the  Treaty  of  Karlowitz  recognised  the  Emperor's 
right  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  the  Christian  subjects  of 
the  Porte,  who  in  their  turn  looked  more  and  more  to 
Vienna  for  their  political  salvation.  In  the  Eastern 
policy  of  Leopold  I.  an  almost  equal  share  may  be 
assigned     to     the     traditional     theories     of     the     Holy 

1  The  War  of  Spanish  Succession  (1702-1713),  and  the  rising 
and  prolonged  resistance  of  Francis  Rak6czy  (1703-1711). 

2  The  north  of  Serbia  as  far  as  the  Morava,  Drina  and  Una 
rivers,  and  Little  Wallachia  as  far  as  the  Aluta  (Olt)  river. 


14     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Crown  of  St.  Stephen  and  to  the  fanatical  desire  for  the 
advancement  of  Catholicism.  The  ambitious  dream  of 
Leopold's  counsellors,  who  set  Constantinople  as  the 
goal  of  their  endeavour,  appeared  to  be  no  longer  so 
fantastic  under  Prince  Eugene  as  in  the  preceding 
century.  The  Treaty  of  Passarowitz1  (171 8)  seemed  to 
render  Austria's  complete  absorption  of  Serbia  and 
Bosnia  a  mere  matter  of  time.2  But  the  fatal  dual 
tendency  which  has  so  often  paralysed  Austria's  action 
— the  sure  outcome  of  her  geographical  position  between 
east  and  west — prevented  more  than  a  very  partial 
fulfilment  of  these  designs.  The  double-headed  Eagle, 
facing  both  ways,  had  already  become  the  symbol  of 
Habsburg  rule.  The  mirage  of  universal  dominion — 
the  tradition  of  their  ancestor,  Charles  V. — fascinated 
the  gaze  of  Leopold  I.  and  his  successors,  and  tempted 
them  to  waste  the  favourable  moment  when  a  determined 
concentration  might  have  crushed  the  Ottoman  power 
in  Europe,  and  when  there  was  as  yet  no  serious  rival 
to  dispute  the  spoils.  The  Spanish  War  of  Succession 
had  left  its  legacy  of  exhaustion,  financial  embarrass- 
ment, and  the  fear  of  Western  complications;  and  the 
Treaty  of  Passarowitz,  though  it  marked  the  farthest 
point  of  Austrian  advance  to  the  south,  bore  no  relation 
to  the  expectations  which  had  been  aroused. 
The   incapable  successor  of  Prince  Eugene  failed  to 

1  Pozarevac. 

2  It  is  instructive  to  note  the  claims  put  forward  by  Austria 
as  the  result  of  her  victorious  campaign  with  her  actual  achieve- 
ment. She  demanded  Serbia  with  Ni§  and  Vidin,  Western  Bosnia 
as  far  as  the  Una  river,  all  Wallachia  and  the  greater  part  of 
Moldavia.  She  actually  acquired  the  Banat  of  Temesvar,  Bel- 
grade with  the  western  districts  of  Serbia,  a  frontier  revision  in 

Bosnia,  and  Little  Wallachia.  In  1736  Austria  hoped  to  acquire 
all  Bosnia  and  Albania  to  the  river  Drin,  Wallachia  as  far  as 
Braila  and  Moldavia  as  far  as  "the  Pruth !  Cf.  Beer,  Die 
Orientalische   Politik   Oesterreichs,  p.    16. 


TURKEY    IN    DECLINE  15 

hold  what  he  had  won,  and  the  shameful  Treaty  of 
Belgrade  (1739)  restored  to  the  Turks  all  the  territory 
south  of  the  Danube.  But  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  position  would  have  been  retrieved  but  for  the  cruel 
diversion  created  by  Frederick  the  Great's  invasion  of 
Silesia  and  the  desperate  struggle  which  alone  preserved 
Maria  Theresa's  throne.  As  so  often  in  their  subsequent 
history,  events  in  the  West  afforded  respite  to  the  rapidly 
decaying  Ottoman  state.  The  history  of  Austria  is  a 
record  of  wasted  opportunities.  The  brief  period  in 
which  expansion  to  the  south  could  have  been  effected 
almost  without  a  challenge  was  destined  never  to  recur. 
Parallel  with  the  decline  of  Turkey  came  the  rise  of  a 
new  Colossus  in  the  North ;  the  two  great  historical  pro- 
cesses which  were  to  transform  the  political  system  of 
Europe  interacted  more  and  more  closely  upon  each 
other.  While  Austria,  France,  and  Prussia  filled  the 
middle  of  the  century  with  their  rivalry,  Russia,  build- 
ing upon  the  sure  foundations  laid  by  the  genius  of 
Peter  the  Great,  consolidated  her  power  under  Anne 
and  Elizabeth,  and  by  the  time  Maria  Theresa  had 
finally  assured  her  dynastic  position,  was  already  firmly 
established  as  a  dangerous  rival  in  what  is  now  known 
as  the  Near  East,  but  then  seemed,  save  to  our  empire- 
builders  in  India,  "the  East"  par  excellence. 

The  Eastern  Question,  which  for  the  first  quarter  of 
the  eighteenth  century  seemed  to  be  a  monopoly  of 
Austria,  enters  upon  a  new  stage  in  the  year  1726. 
For  the  remainder  of  the  century  Austria  is  content  to 
seek,  in  alliance  with  Russia,  what  she  had  lacked  the 
energy  to  secure  single-handed,  and,  indeed,  only  too 
often  to  leave  all  initiative  to  her  Ally.  The  Austro- 
Russian  alliance  of  that  year  was  renewed  on  four 
separate  occasions,1  but  for  the  greater  part  of  the  reign 

1  1756  against  Prussia,  1772  against  Poland,  1781  against 
Turkey,    1795  against  the   French   Revolution. 


1C     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

of  Maria  Theresa — indeed,  until  the  influence  of  her  son 
upon  public  affairs  became  apparent — its  motive  power, 
so  far  as  Austria  is  concerned,  is  directed  northwards 
and  westwards  rather  than  southwards.  Kaunitz,  who 
towards  the  middle  of  the  century  described  Turkey  and 
Prussia  as  the  two  worst  enemies  of  the  House  of  Habs- 
burg,1  appears  to  have  soon  come  to  regard  the  former 
as  more  or  less  innocuous.  Indeed,  his  neglect  of  Near 
Eastern  problems  in  favour  of  Germany  and  Italy  set 
an  example  which  many  of  his  successors  in  office  have 
imitated. 

Characteristic  of  the  negative  policy  adopted  by 
Austria,  under  Maria  Theresa  and  her  Chancellor,  was 
the  indifference  which  they  showed  alike  towards  the 
Swabian  and  the  Serbian  settlers  in  the  Banat  andBacka. 
The  latter  especially  had  to  face  the  double  hostility  of 
the  Magyars,  who  regarded  their  reception  as  a  viola- 
tion of  the  Hungarian  Constitution,  and  of  the  Ultra- 
montanes,  who  actively  disapproved  of  the  favoured 
position  secured  to  the  Orthodox  Church.  But  even 
though  Austria  failed  to  realise  the  potential  value  of 
her  new  Serb  subjects  as  a  weapon  of  central  authority, 
the  Habsburg  dominions  remained  for  over  a  century 
to  come  the  centre  of  such  Southern  Slav  culture  as  had 
survived  the  Turkish   flood.     Nowhere  was  the   Habs- 

1  Cf.  Beer,  op.  cit.  p.  17.  In  a  long  and  highly  interesting 
memorandum  submitted  to  the  Empress  in  1776  Kaunitz  lays  down 
as  the  first  of  27  "  speciale  Staatsgrundsalze"  the  axiom  that 
Prussia  "is  in  the  meantime  the  most  dangerous  neighbour  and 
secret  enemy "  (dermalen  der  gefahrlichste  Nachbar  und  heim- 
liche  Feind),  who  is  "never  and  under  no  circumstances  to  be 
entirely  trusted  "  (niemalen  und  in  keinem  Fall  vollkommen  zu 
trauen).  "According  to  this  system  our  entire  state  system  is 
to  be  weighed."  See  Denkschriften  des  Fursten  Kaunitz,  in 
Archiv  fur  osterreichische  Geschichte,  vol.  48,  p.  78.  This  con- 
viction  Kaunitz  carried  to  his  grave.  How  different  is  the  atti- 
tude of  Austrian   Statesmen   towards   Berlin   to-day  I 


TURKEY   IN  DECLINE  17 

burg  tradition  stronger  than  in  the  Croat,  Serb,  and 
Roumanian  Military  Frontiers,  where  a  system  of  mili- 
tary land-tenure,  organised  on  remarkably  democratic 
lines,  gave  rise  to  numerous  fighting  families  inspired 
from  generation  to  generation  by  keen  personal  devo- 
tion to  the  Emperor  and  his  house. 

The  process  of  historic  evolution  to  which  we  have 
alluded  above — the  decline  of  Turkey  and  the  corre- 
sponding rise  of  Russia — brought  with  it  as  one  of  its 
chief  symptoms  the  destruction  of  the  Polish  "Repub- 
lic." For  many  generations  the  policy  of  the  Porte 
had  been  deliberately  to  encourage  the  growing  anarchy 
in  Poland,  with  a  view  to  paralysing  a  probable  ally  of 
the  Imperialists  in  their  advance  southwards.  The 
success  of  Russian  intrigue  at  the  Court  of  Warsaw, 
and  the  dominant  position  acquired  by  Catherine  II. 
through  the  election  of  her  lover  Stanislas  to  the  Polish 
throne,  at  length  aroused  the  Turks  to  a  belated  sense 
of  the  intimate  connection  of  their  own  fate  and  that  of 
Poland.  But  Turkey's  espousal  of  the  cause  of  Polish 
independence  led  to  the  war  with  Russia  (1768),  and 
precipitated  the  very  catastrophe  which  it  had  sought  to 
avert. 

The  alarm  with  which  Vienna  regarded  the  first 
appearance  of  a  Russian  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean 
(1769-70),  the  ineradicable  distrust  with  which 
Frederick  the  Great  inspired  Maria  Theresa  and 
Kaunitz,  and  Frederick's  insistent  view  that  the  survival 
of  Turkey  was  Prussia's  best  guarantee  against  Russian 
or  Austrian  aggression — these  three  main  threads  of 
policy  and  the  numerous  complications  introduced  by 
the  attitude  of  the  Western  Powers  seemed  to  many 
observers  to  be  the  precursors  of  a  fresh  European 
struggle.  But  common  dynastic  interests  overshadowed 
national,  religious,  and  economic  jealousies,  and  Poland 
was  sacrificed  to  avert  a  rupture.     At  the  first  partition 

c 


18     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

(1772)  Catherine  the  Great  consoled  herself  with  the 
lion's  share  and  with  a  knowledge  that  a  further  parti- 
tion had  been  rendered  inevitable. 

The  policy  of  Kaunitz  at  this  eventful  period  of 
European  history  was  rather  that  of  the  professional 
diplomat  than  of  the  far-sighted  statesman.  His  enmity 
towards  Prussia,  and  the  designs  which  he  entertained 
for  the  recovery  of  Silesia  and  for  the  reversion  of 
Bavaria,1  made  him  deaf  to  the  overtures  of  Russia.  In 
1769  we  find  Count  Panin  suggesting  a  triple  alliance 
against  the  Turks,  "who  had  survived  so  long  solely 
because  of  the  jealousies  of  the  Christian  Powers." 
But  the  extinction  of  Turkey  did  not  suit  Frederick  the 
Great,  who  looked  to  the  Sublime  Porte  to  create  a 
useful  diversion  in  favour  of  Prussia  in  the  event  of  any 
possible  coalition  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd.  He 
therefore  spared  no  effort  to  impress  upon  Joseph  II., 
during  their  famous  interview  at  Neisse  (1769),  the  grave 
dangers  which  the  growth  of  Russian  power  involved 
for  Europe.  His  arguments  carried  weight  even  with 
his  old  enemy  the  Austrian  Chancellor.  Needless  to 
say,  Kaunitz  never  acted  save  upon  well-considered 
motives,  and  in  this  case  there  were  weighty  arguments 
in  favour  of  an  attitude  of  reserve.  Prussia's  consent 
to  Austrian  and  Russian  aggrandisement  against  the 
Turks  could  only  be  secured  by  granting  her  a  free 
hand  to  annex  the  northern  provinces  of  Poland ;  and 
while  their  possession  would  immensely  strengthen 
Prussia's  economic  and  strategic  position,  there  would, 
Kaunitz  contended,  be  no  corresponding  increase  of 
strength  for  Austria  as  the  result  of  annexing  territory 
which  had  been  desolated  and  exhausted  by  two  centuries 
of  Turk'ish   misrule.     But   in   allowing  such  considera- 

1  On  the  extinction  of  the  elder  branch  of  the  House  of  Wittels- 
bach.  This  event,  when  it  at  length  occurred  in  1777,  led  to 
the  war  of  Bavarian  Succession. 


TURKEY   IN  DECLINE  19 

tions  to  control  his  policy  he  was  assuredly  playing  the 
game  of  Prussia.  In  resisting  Russia's  invitation  (1768) 
he  wasted  a  highly  favourable  opportunity  for  terri- 
torial expansion  south  of  the  Danube.  In  accepting  the 
Porte's  advances  and  contracting  the  first  Austro- 
Turkish  alliance  (1771)  he  displayed  to  the  full  his  talent 
for  diplomatic  intrigue,  but  at  the  same  time  aroused 
general  resentment  in  Europe,  isolated  Austria,  and  thus 
directly  paved  the  way  for  Russia's  greatest  triumph, 
the  Treaty  of  Kutchuk  Kainardji  (1774).  The  Turks  on 
their  part  soon  had  cause  to  regret  their  action.  The 
victories  of  the  Russian  Army  had  forced  them  to  look 
about  for  fresh  allies,  and  in  their  eagerness  to  secure 
Austria  they  bated  their  hook  with  a  proposal  for  the 
dismemberment  of  Poland,  which  till  then  had  met  with 
genuine  disapproval  at  Vienna.  Thus  the  war  which 
had  begun  in  defence  of  Polish  Independence  was  the 
signal  for  the  first  partition,  in  which  Austria,  as  a 
result  of  her  half-measures,  gained  less  than  either  of  her 
fellow-conspirators.  For  the  moment,  however,  she 
succeeded  in  diverting  Russian  aggression  from  the 
south  to  the  west,  since  in  order  to  gain  a  decisive  control 
over  the  Polish  situation  it  was  necessary  for  Catherine 
to  relax  the  vigour  of  her  assault  upon  the  Turks. 

Balkan  history  in  the  eighteenth  century  is  over- 
shadowed by  the  relations  of  Austria  and  Russia,  some- 
times in  jealous  rivalry,  but  quite  as  often  in  amicable 
partnership  for  aggression.  After  the  middle  of  the 
century  it  became  a  question  of  parallel  spheres  of 
influence,  of  Austria  on  the  west  and  Russia  on  the 
east  of  the  peninsula.  Russia  had  two  notable  points 
in  her  favour — her  racial  kinship  with  the  Balkan  Slavs 
and  her  ecclesiastical  position  as  the  stronghold  of 
Orthodoxy  and  the  Byzantine  Church  tradition ;  but 
Austria  still  preserved  the  advantage  of  closer  contact. 

The  age  whose  crowning  infamy  was  the  Polish  Parti- 

c  2 


20     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

tion  was  full  of  similar  projects  for  the  partition  of  the 
Ottoman  dominions.  But  in  all  these  complicated 
actions  dynastic  interests  and  ambitions  were  the  deter- 
mining- factors  :  the  benevolent  despots  of  whom  that 
age  of  polite  scepticism  was  so  prolific  reckoned  with 
nations  and  provinces  as  with  pawns  upon  a  chessboard. 
At  length,  as  the  century  drew  to  a  close,  the  stately 
castle  on  the  sand,  erected  at  the  pleasure  of  a  few 
monarchs  and  diplomats,  began  to  crumble  before  the 
incoming  tide  of  a  great  idea.  The  principle  of  Nation- 
ality was  leavening  the  dead  mass  of  the  Balkan  popula- 
tion, and  was  soon  to  complete  the  ruin  with  which 
internal  corruption  was  already  threatening  the  Turkish 
state. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE  BALKAN  CHRISTIANS  AND  THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY 

There  is  one  factor  of  capital  importance  to  the 
student  of  national  movements  in  the  Balkans — the  posi- 
tion of  Christianity  under  the  Turks.  One  of  the  most 
striking  characteristics  of  the  Byzantine  state  had  been 
the  subordination  of  the  ecclesiastical  to  the  civil  arm  ; 
the  long  struggle  between  Empire  and  Papacy  had  no 
counterpart  in  the  East.  The  victorious  Sultan  allowed 
the  Patriarchate  to  linger  on  in  a  condition  of  precarious 
vassalage,  which  speedily  led  to  utter  spiritual  stagna- 
tion. The  monk  Gennadios,  whom  Mohammed  II. 
installed  as  Patriarch  a  few  days  after  his  entry  into 
Constantinople,  really  enjoyed  a  position  which  was  in 
many  respects  far  more  authoritative  than  that  of  his 
predecessors  under  the  Eastern  Emperors.  In  Islam 
the  twin  conceptions  of  State  and  Church  are  completely 
intertwined,  and  the  very  idea  of  their  separation  is 
utterly  alien  to  the  Mohammedan  mind.  Mohammed 
II.,  then,  saw  in  the  conquered  Christians  of  his  new 
dominions  another  "millet"  or  religious  community, 
and  was  entirely  disinclined  to  distinguish  between  the 
various  shades  of  national  feeling.  To  him  Greek  and 
Slav  were  alike  Christians  and  rayahs.  Hence  the 
Patriarch  became  the  intermediary  between  the  Sultan 

and  his  Christian  subjects,  the  visible  expression  of  their 

21 


22     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

religious  life,  and  not  least  of  all  the  individual  upon 
whom  pressure  could  be  conveniently  exercised  when  it 
was  necessary  to  bring  them  to  reason.  The  Patri- 
archate, the  real  focus  of  the  Eastern  Church  at  that 
period,  and  with  it  the  whole  ecclesiastical  framework, 
fell  entirely  into  Greek  hands,  with  the  result  that  a 
veneer  of  Greek  language  and  culture  was  spread  over 
the  whole  Christian  population  of  Turkey.  In  the  West 
there  grew  up  the  highly  inaccurate  habit  of  referring 
to  all  branches  of  the  Orthodox  or  Eastern  Church  as 
"the  Greek  Church,"  and  more  than  one  distinguished 
historian  and  traveller  was  guilty  of  the  most  ludicrous 
errors.  Even  a  Kinglake  could  describe  his  journey 
through  what  is  now  the  kingdom  of  Bulgaria  without 
making  a  single  allusion  to  the  existence  of  the  Bul- 
garian race.  From  the  fifteenth  to  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century  Western  Europe  had  virtually  lost 
sight  of  all  the  Balkan  races  save  the  dominant  Turk 
and  the  pliant  Greek. 

With  a  foreign  conqueror  as  absolute  master  in  the 
state,  and  w-ith  Greek  influence  supreme  in  the  Church, 
the  wretched  Slav  rayah  seemed  doomed  to  national 
extinction.  There  were,  indeed,  two  fragmentary  survi- 
vals from  a  happier  era — the  autocephalous  Bulgarian 
and  Serbian  churches  of  Ohrida  and  of  Ipek ;  but  the 
former  had  become  entirely  Hellenised  even  before  the 
Turkish  conquest,  while  the  latter,  on  the  initiative  of 
the  Patriarch  Arsenius  himself,  transferred  itself  with 
thousands  of  its  adherents  to  the  Habsburg  dominions. 
The  last  fragments  of  Serb  and  Bulgar  Church  autonomy 
were  destroyed  by  decree  of  the  Sultan  in  the  year  1767. 
For  several  generations  after  this  event  the  influence  of 
the  Phanariot  clergy — so-called  from  the  Phanar  or 
Lighthouse  quarter  of  Constantinople,  in  which  the 
Greek  Patriarch  resides — was  paramount.  There  was 
the  same  corrupt  traffic  in  episcopal  sees  and  even  in 


THE  BALKAN   CHRISTIANS  23 

less  important  Church  offices  as  in  the  case  of  the  vassal 
thrones  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  to  obtain  whose 
precarious  tenure  the  Greek  patrician  families  of  the 
Phanar  outbribed  each  other  at  the  Sublime  Porte. 
Greek  was  the  language  of  culture  and  of  fashion  among 
the  Balkan  Christians,  just  as  it  was  the  language  of  the 
liturgy  and  of  commerce.  The  Slav  and  Latin  dialects 
of  the  peninsula  were  despised  as  barbarous  jargons. 
National  feeling  seemed  to  be  virtually  extinct,  or  at 
best  flickered  here  and  there — in  the  monasteries  of 
Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  in  a  few  prosperous  Vlach 
towns  on  the  fringe  of  Albania,  in  the  Serb  centres  of 
Karlowitz  and  Neusatz  (Novi  Sad)  on  the  Danube,  and 
in  the  tiny  Slav  republic  of  Ragusa  (Dubrovnik). 

The  events  of  the  nineteenth  century  were  to  show- 
that  nationality,  though  long  latent  and  seemingly 
extinct,  was  capable  of  truly  volcanic  outbursts.  It  is 
this  new  factor  which  is  destined  to  transform  so 
radically  what  many  generations  have  known  as  the 
Eastern  Question.  In  its  earlier  form  it  may  be  defined 
as  the  never-ending  problem  of  rivalry  between  Europe 
and  Asia,  aggravated  by  the  same  religious  and  economic 
causes  which  were  to  lead  at  a  later  date  to  the  colonisa- 
tion of  America  and  the  partition  of  African  territory. 
But  with  the  decline  of  Ottoman  power  it  assumed  the 
form  of  an  acute  and  increasingly  complex  competition 
for  the  legacy  of  the  Turk.  After  this  competition  had 
lasted  for  well-nigh  two  centuries,  the  appearance  of  new 
and  hitherto  despised  competitors  in  the  field  seemed  to 
promise  a  worthier  solution  of  the  problem  on  the  basis 
of  the  famous  catchword,  "The  Balkans  for  the  Balkan 
peoples."  Unhappily,  the  conflict  of  interests  was  too 
great  to  permit  of  a  solution  without  interference  from 
without,  and  thus  sowed  the  seed  of  a  mightier  con- 
flagration. 

Balkan  history,  then,  during  the  last  two  centuries  is 


24     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

dominated  by  three  central  facts — facts  so  obvious  as 
almost  to  be  commonplace.  The  first  is  the  long  and 
apparently  hopeless  struggle  of  the  subject  Christian 
races  against  an  alien  rule  of  the  most  savage  and  in- 
competent kind.  The  second  is  the  perpetual  interfer- 
ence of  the  Great  Powers  in  Balkan  affairs  in  their  own 
purely  selfish  interests,  and  the  consequent  formation 
of  a  thick  network  of  intrigue  and  counter-intrigue  with 
one  main  thread  running  through  it  all — the  rivalry  of 
Austria  and  Russia.  The  third  is  the  rise  of  national 
feeling  steadily  leavening  the  dead  mass  until,  in  the 
Balkan  wars  of  191 2-13,  the  final  stage  of  liberation  was 
reached,  only  to  be  succeeded  by  partial  disillusionment 
and  a  transference  of  the  struggle  to  other  fields. 


CHAPTER    IV 

THE   SERBS   AND   THEIR   STRUGGLE    FOR   INDEPENDENCE 

Of  all  the  nations  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  the  first 
among  whom  national  sentiment  revived  and  took  a 
practical  form  was  the  Serbian,  nor  can  it  be  emphasised 
too  strongly  that  the  movement  among  the  Serbs  was 
spontaneous,  that  its  success  was  due  in  the  main  to 
their  heroism  and  endurance,  and  that  they  received  far 
less  external  help  than  any  of  their  neighbours.  The 
centre  of  the  movement  was  the  Sumadija,  the  wooded 
upland  district  south  of  the  Save,  which  to-day  forms 
the  backbone  of  the  little  kingdom.  But  it  is  well  to 
note  at  the  very  outset  two  peculiar  features  of  Serbian 
history.  Not  merely  have  the  frontiers  of  the  Serbian 
state  changed  more  frequently  in  the  course  of  the  last 
1,000  years  than  perhaps  those  of  any  other  European 
state,  but  they  have  never  included,  and  do  not  even 
to-day  include,  the  whole  of  the  race;  indeed,  the  fact 
that  they  do  not  is  one  of  the  causes  of  the  present  war. 

The  two  kindred  tribes,  Serbs  and  Croats,  trace  their 
mythical  descent  to  two  brothers,  who  led  their  invading 
hordes  in  the  seventh  century  into  the  territory  still  in 
the  possession  of  the  race.  But  almost  from  the  first 
geography  acted  upon  them  as  a  centrifugal  force  and 
shaped  their  fate  into  varying  channels.  The  rival 
cultures  of  Rome  and  Byzantium  tore  them  in  two  oppo- 


26     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

site  directions  and  moulded  their  outlook,  alike  in  matters 
civil  and  ecclesiastical.  The  great  Slav  apostles,  Cyril 
and  Methodius,  themselves  natives  of  Salonica,  were  the 
decisive  influence  in  the  conversion  of  both  Serbs  and 
Croats.  But  their  memorable  missionary  efforts  had 
taken  place  at  a  period  when  the  Eastern  and  Western 
Churches  were  once  more  in  communion.  When  the 
conflict  again  broke  out,  and  this  time  became  final,  the 
western,  or  Croat  branch,  of  the  race  naturally  fell  under 
the  influence  of  Rome,  while  the  eastern,  or  Serb  branch, 
remained  attached  to  Byzantium,  whose  power  had  very 
markedly  revived  under  the  great  emperors  of  the 
eleventh  century. 

The  breach  was  all  the  more  effectual  because  the 
ecclesiastical  schism,  confirming  existing  geographical 
tendencies,  coincided  roughly  with  a  period  when  the 
kingdom  of  Croatia  was  on  the  eve  of  the  extinction  of 
its  independence,  and  when  the  young  and  vigorous 
kingdom  of  the  Serbs  was  steadily  rising  into  promin- 
ence under  the  guidance  of  the  Nemanja  dynasty.  The 
eighth  and  ninth  centuries  saw  the  rise  of  these  two 
shadowy  states,  and  the  scanty  fragments  which  survive 
in  the  little  museum  of  Knin  (in  the  hinterland  of 
northern  Dalmatia)  show  that  the  Croatian  Court  at  a 
period  contemporaneous  with  William  the  Conqueror 
and  Robert  Guiscard  was  not  devoid  of  the  first  elements 
of  culture.  After  a  brief  interlude  of  glory,  in  which 
Zvonimir,  the  greatest  of  the  Croatian  kings,  was 
crowned  in  Spalato  by  a  legate  of  Pope  Gregory  VII. 
(1076),  Croatia  fell  under  the  sway  of  the  Magyars 
(1102),  and  although  it  has  always  succeeded  in  pre- 
serving an  autonomous  existence,  its  fortunes  have  for 
the  last  eight  centuries  been  in  the  main  dependent  upon 
those  of  Budapest.  Meanwhile,  the  rise  of  the  Serbian 
state  represents  a  natural  growth  from  a  primitive  com- 
munity, in  which  the  family,  in  its  widest  sense,  was  the 


SERBIA  27 

unit  and  the  Zadruga,  or  communal  association,  the 
superstructure.  The  power  of  the  elder  (or  Starjesina) 
developed  into  that  of  the  zupan,  or  clan  chief,  and  an 
ever-expanding  group  of  Zupans  came  to  centre  round 
the  Great  2upan  (veliki  zupan),  whose  office,  after  pass- 
ing from  one  great  family  to  another,  at  length  crystal- 
lised into  an  effective  overlordship  for  the  Nemanja 
family.  It  is  essential  to  remember  that  the  foundation 
upon  which  the  Serbian  state  rested,  even  in  its 
mediaeval  form,  was  the  free  peasant  community. 

In  early  centuries  the  rivalry  of  the  Byzantine  and 
Bulgarian  Empires  had  been  successfully  exploited  by 
the  Serbs  to  secure  relative  immunity  from  attack.  After 
the  fall  of  the  latter  the  young  Serbia  had  to  reckon 
with  the  powerful  mediaeval  kingdom  of  Hungary, 
which,  stretching  out  across  Croatia,  established  a  some- 
what shadowy  and  varying  claim  to  Bosnia  and  portions 
of  Dalmatia,  both  peopled  since  the  seventh  century  by 
a  purely  Croat  and  Serb  population.  The  Serbian 
rulers  of  the  thirteenth  century  found  it  necessary  to 
enter  upon  closer  dynastic  and  political  engagements 
with  the  Hungarian  kings,  and  even  to  court  the  favour 
of  the  Papacy  and  hold  out  serious  hopes  of  a  conversion 
to  Catholicism.  Stephen  Prvencani,  or  "the  First- 
Crowned,"  whose  father,  Nemanja,  had  ended  his  days 
in  the  garb  of  an  Orthodox  monk,  allowed  himself  in 
12 1 7  to  be  crowned  by  a  Papal  legate  with  the  high- 
sounding  titles  of  "king  of  Serbia,  Diocletia,  Travunia, 
Dalmatia,  and  Chum."  Zealous  monkish  chroniclers 
record  the  story  of  a  second  coronation  in  the  year  1222, 
by  which  his  brother,  the  Metropolitan  Sava,  reclaimed 
him  for  the  Eastern  Church  :  but  modern  research  rejects 
this  as  an  invention  of  religious  bigotry.  St.  Sava,  who 
established  his  archiepiscopal  see  at  Uzice — the  Serbian 
Mecca,  as  Ranke  has  called  it — is  the  true  founder  of 
the  Serbian  National  Church  and  cne  of  the  greatest 


28     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

figures  in  the  history  of  the  nation.  His  influence 
effectively  checked  the  overtures  made  by  Innocent  III. 
to  the  Serbian  king,  and  finally  identified  the  cause  of 
the  National  Church  with  Constantinople  rather  than 
Rome. 

The  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries  represent  the 
golden  era  of  the  Serbian  national  state.  After  steadily 
gaining  strength  under  a  series  of  able  rulers,  it  reached 
its  zenith  in  the  twenty-four  years'  reign  of  Stephen 
Dusan  (1331-55).  Those  who  may  distrust  the  natural 
enthusiasm  of  Serbian  historians  will  find  ample 
evidence  of  his  military  power  and  governing  capacity 
in  contemporary  Greek  chronicles.  His  Court  became 
a  centre  of  dawning  art  and  literature;  the  southern  dis- 
tricts of  the  present  kingdom  of  Serbia  are  studded  with 
remarkable  examples  of  Serbian  ecclesiastical  architec- 
ture,1 due,  for  the  most  part,  to  the  munificence  of  Dusan 
and  his  father,  and  from  the  battered  fragments  of 
fresco  and  mosaic  which  have  survived  four  centuries  of 
Turkish  barbarism  it  is  easy  to  trace  the  influence  of 
those  Italian  artists  who  were  welcomed  to  the  Balkans 
when  the  Sienese  and  Florentine  schools  were  still  in 
their  infancy.  The  rich  mines  of  mediaeval  Serbia  were 
exploited  by  the  merchants  of  the  Ragusan  Republic, 
and  formed  a  growing  commercial  link  with  Italy. 
Above  all,  Dusan's  famous  code  reveals  the  fact  that 
law  and  administration  were  already  passing  from  the 
primitive  stage  and  giving  promise  of  a  new  culture. 

In  the  thirteen  campaigns  which  he  waged  against 
Byzantium  he  reduced  the  greater  part  of  the  modern 
Macedonia,  Albania,  and  Montenegro  to  his  sway,  and 
penetrated  as  far  as  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  on  the  south, 
the  Bocche  di  Cattaro  on  the  west,  and  almost  to  the 

1  Notably  the  beautiful  marble  churches  of  Decani  (near  Ipek) 
and  Studenica,  and  those  of  Gra6anica  and  Ravanica,  both 
equally  famous  in  Serbian  ballad  poetry. 


SERBIA  29 

gates  of  Adrianople  on  the  east.  Belgrade  and  its  terri- 
tory were  wrested  from  Hungary,  and  Bosnia  reduced 
to  the  condition  of  a  vassal  state  (1350).  In  1348  he 
had  assumed  the  title  of  "Tsar  of  the  Serbs  and  Greeks," 
and  wore  the  tiara  and  other  Imperial  insignia.  The 
crown  of  the  East  was  his  acknowledged  aim,  and  pre- 
parations for  the  conquest  of  Constantinople  were  made 
upon  the  most  formidable  scale.  His  armies  were 
already  in  sight  of  the  Bosphorus  when  the  great  Dusan 
succumbed  to  a  sudden  illness  (1355),  which  suspicious 
contemporaries  ascribed  to  poison,  but  which  the  more 
sober  historians  of  our  own  day  attribute  to  natural 
causes. 

Unhappily,  Dusan 's  greatness  died  with  him,  and  his 
loosely-knit  dominions  became  the  prey  of  warring  feudal 
lords,  and  soon  dissolved  into  their  component  parts. 
Only  a  generation  later,  on  June  28th,  1389,  Lazar,  the 
last  of  the  Serbian  Tsars,  and  with  him  the  Serbian 
Empire,  perished  in  the  great  battle  of  Kosovo,  the  fatal 
Field  of  the  Blackbirds,  which  lives  in  countless  national 
ballads  of  equal  beauty  and  originality,  and  keeps  the 
memory  of  ancient  glories  aflame  even  to-day  throughout 
the  entire  peasantry,  not  merely  of  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro, but  also  of  kindred  Croatia,  Bosnia,  and  Dalmatia. 
The  victorious  Turkish  Sultan,  Murad  I.,  shared  the 
fate  of  his  rival  Lazar,  and  was  buried  on  the  field  of 
battle.  But  Serbia  fell  rapidly  under  Turkish  vassalage, 
and  in  1459  her  conquest  was  completed  by  the  redoubt- 
able Mohammed  II. 

Finally,  in  1463,  the  Serb  princes  of  Bosnia  were  also 
reduced  to  subjection ;  their  last  despairing  effort  to 
secure  Western  aid  by  the  adoption  of  Catholicism  drove 
the  population,  Orthodox  adherents  of  Byzantium  and 
heretic  Bogomil  sectaries  alike,  to  welcome  the  rule  of 
Islam  rather  than  that  of  the  Roman  Cardinal  whom 
the  dynasty  were  prepared  to  welcome.     In  Bosnia  the 


30     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

nobility  saved  their  lands  by  apostasy  from  the  Christian 
faith,  and  for  long  intervals  of  time  remained  virtually 
undisturbed  by  their  new  rulers.  But  in  Serbia  no  such 
local  concessions  were  possible.  The  nobility  ceased  to 
exist,  and  the  valleys  of  the  Morava  and  Vardar,  like 
that  of  the  Marica  further  east,  had  to  submit  to  the 
Turkish  system  in  all  its  severity.  Just  as  to-day  Serbia 
is  coveted  by  the  Central  Powers  as  a  route  to  the  East, 
the  key  to  the  possession  of  Salon ica  and  Constantinople, 
so  for  centuries  she  was  held  in  the  brutal  grasp  of  suc- 
cessive Turkish  conquerors  as  the  route  to  the  West. 
For  the  success  of  their  almost  annual  campaign  in 
Hungary  the  utter  subjection  of  the  Serb  and  Bulgar 
countries  was  an  essential  preliminary.  In  short,  the 
real  cause  of  their  national  extinction  lies,  not  in  any 
racial  inferiority,  but  in  their  unfavourable  geographical 
position,  which  assigned  to  them  the  front  rank  in  the 
defence  of  Christendom  against  the  inroads  of  the  Cres- 
cent. In  the  words  of  a  French  historian,  "they  were 
the  victims  of  a  tragic  calamity  analogous  to  that  which 
in  1914  condemned  Belgium  to  atrocious  devastation." 
The  Serb,  Bulgar,  and  Roumanian,  each  in  his  own  way 
and  in  his  own  degree,  suffered  centuries  of  national 
extinction  in  order  that  Western  Europe  might  pursue 
undisturbed  its  task  of  civilisation. 

From  1463  to  1804  the  national  life  of  the  Serbs  lay 
utterly  crushed.  The  rayah,  the  enslaved  Christian 
peasant,  was  exploited  by  heavy  taxation,  cowed  by 
restrictions,  and,  above  all,  by  the  horrible  child-tribute 
to  which  the  renowned  corps  of  the  Janissaries  so  long 
owed  its  recruits.  The  relations  between  conqueror  and 
conquered  are  best  characterised  by  the  single  fact  that 
a  Christian  who  failed  to  dismount  from  his  horse  on 
meeting  a  Turk  was  liable  to  be  killed  on  the  spot.  Two 
things  alone  kept  alive  the  Serb  tradition — the  splendid 
popular  ballads,  unsurpassed  in   Europe  for  directness 


SERBIA  31 

and  imagination,  and  the  stubborn  spirit  of  the  Orthodox 
clergy,  who,  amid  ignorance,  neglect,  and  oppression, 
remained  the  repositories  of  the  nation's  conscience. 
Only  at  two  points  did  the  flame  of  liberty  continue  to 
burn — in  the  tiny  mountain  eyrie  of  Montenegro  and 
in  the  maritime  Republic  of  Ragusa  (Dubrovnik). 

The  history  of  the  Black  Mountain  (Crnagora)  is  in 
many  respects  the  most  romantic  in  all  the  chequered 
annals  of  the  peninsula.  Its  barren  rocks  and  precipices 
became  a  rallying-place  for  the  Serb  survivors  from  the 
fatal  carnage  of  Kosovo;  and  under  Ivo  Crnojevic, 
renowned  in  many  an  ancient  ballad  as  Ivo  the  Black  or 
Ivo  Beg,  this  remnant  of  a  warlike  nation  defended 
itself  desperately  against  all  comers.  Ivo's  descendants 
proved  unworthy  of  him,  and  the  little  country  was 
reduced  during  the  seventeenth  century  to  pay  occa- 
sional tribute  to  the  Sultan,  and  even  to  provide  fighting 
men  for  the  Turkish  service.  But  the  spirit  of  the 
mountaineers  was  never  wholly  broken,  and  on  Christ- 
mas Eve,  1702,  at  the  instance  of  their  vladika,  or 
bishop,  they  rose  and  massacred  every  Turk  within  their 
reach.  This  ferocious  incident  lives  in  history  as  the 
Slavonic  version  of  the  Sicilian  Vespers ;  from  it  dates 
the  final  independence  of  the  Black  Mountain.  The 
Vladika  Danilo,  of  the  family  of  Petrovfc-Njegos, 
became  the  founder  of  the  dynasty  which  still  occupies 
the  throne;  the  succession  passed  from  uncle  to  nephew 
until  a  second  Danilo,  the  uncle  of  King  Nicholas, 
separated  the  princely  from  the  priestly  calling  and 
placed  the  dynasty  on  a  purely  secular  footing. 

With  the  exception  of  the  Turks  and  the  Venetians, 
Europe  had  hitherto  been  ignorant  of  the  very  existence 
of  Montenegro.  But  the  exploits  of  Danilo  found  an 
echo  in  distant  Russia.  When  war  broke  out,  in  17 10, 
between  Russia  and  Turkey,  a  certain  Vladisavic,  a 
Herzegovinan  Serb  in  the  Russian  service,  proposed  to 


32     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Peter  the  Great  that  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  raise 
Herzegovina  and  Montenegro  against  the  Turks. 
Another  Serb  soldier  of  fortune  in  Russia  was  accord- 
ingly sent  to  Danilo  with  a  proclamation  of  Peter, 
couched  in  grandiloquent  terms,  denouncing  the  alliance 
between  the  barbarous  Turks  and  the  heretic  king  of 
Sweden  against  Russia,  and  proclaiming  the  lively 
concern  of  the  Tsar  for  the  "Slav  nation  "  and  his  deter- 
mination "to  liberate  the  oppressed  Orthodox  Christians 
from  the  yoke  of  the  infidel."  1  The  proclamation  pro- 
duced a  deep  impression  upon  the  Montenegrins,  and 
this  was  but  the  first  of  many  occasions  on  which  the 
influence  of  Petrograd  goaded  them  into  action  against 
the  Turks.  It  became  a  tradition  among  the  Vladikas 
to  visit  Russia,  and  so  implicit  and  unreasoning  was  the 
faith  of  the  mountaineers  in  their  distant  kinsmen,  that 
in  1768  an  impostor,  known  to  history  as  Stephen  the 
Little,  was  able  for  a  time  to  usurp  the  government  of 
the  Black  Mountain  by  posing  as  the  murdered  Tsar  of 
Russia,  Peter  III.  The  renewed  outbreak  of  hostilities 
between  Russia  and  Turkey  in  the  same  year  induced 
Catherine  II.  in  her  turn  to  prepare  a  manifesto  "to  all 
Christian  communities  of  the  Greek  and  Slav  Orthodox 
nation,  our  co-religionists  of  the  Holy  Eastern  Church," 
inviting  their  aid  if  they  wished  to  "shake  off  the 
oppressive  yoke  of  the  infidels."2  Subsequent  events, 
however,  showed  that  Russian  policy  as  yet  regarded 
these  peoples  as  convenient  pawns  in  a  game  of  which 
Constantinople  and  Santa  Sofia  were  to  be  the  reward. 

Very  different  was  the  development  of  Montenegro's 
near  neighbour,  the  republic  of  Dubrovnik,  better  known 
by  its  Italian  name  of  Ragusa.  Originally  founded  by 
Roman  refugees  from  the  neighbouring  town  of  Epi- 
daurum,  it  acquired  a  Slavonic  character  as  early  as  the 
seventh  century,  and  has  throughout  its  history  played 

1  Milakovic\  Storia  del  Montenero,  p.  8S.       2  Ibid.,  pp    124-7. 


SERBIA  33 

a    unique    part    as    interpreter   between    the    Latin    and 
Slavonic  worlds.      Save  for   a   century    and   a   half    of 
Venetian  rule  (1205-1358),  the  little  town  continued  to 
defend  its  independence  against  all  comers,  and  acquired 
a  commercial  position  of  the  first  importance  throughout 
the  Levant.    In  the  fourteenth  century  the  republic  had 
special  trading  centres  in  Sarajevo,  Skoplje,  Prizren,  Bel- 
grade, Sofia,  Vidin,  Bucarest,  and  Adrianople,  and  leased 
three  Serbian  gold  mines  for  an  annual  rent  of  300,000 
ducats,  which,  according  to  the  calculations  of  Sir  Arthur 
Evans,   amounted  to   half   the   total    revenue   of   Queen 
Elizabeth  two  centuries   later.     As  an  example   of  the 
enlightened   policy  of   the   Ragusans    may   be   cited   a 
decree  issued  by  the  Grar*i  Council  in  14 16,  by  which 
all   traffic    in   slaves   was   forbidden    to   citizens   of   the 
republic.      Ragusan    territory     became    an     important 
centre   of   the   shipbuilding   trade,   and   the   "argosies" 
which  figure  in  the  poetry  of  the  Elizabethan  era  derive 
their  name  from  that  of  Ragusa.     Ragusan  galleys  took 
part  in  the  battle  of  Lepanto  and  shared  the  disasters  of 
the  Spanish  Armada.     The  republic  reached  its  zenith 
in  the  early  seventeenth  century,  when  Ivan  Gundulic 
formed  the   centre   of   a   brilliant   group   of   poets   and 
dramatists  and  laid  the  foundations  of  Serbo-Croat  as  a 
modern    literary    language.     The    great    earthquake    of 
1667  ushered  in  a  period  of  decline;  but  when  at  last 
Ragusan  independence  was  destroyed  by  Napoleon  in 
1808  the  national  spirit  was  once  more  awake  among  the 
Serbs.     Dubrovnik,  so  long  the  solitary  torchbearer  of 
Southern  Slav  culture,  sank  exhausted  under  the  rule 
of  the  Habsburgs  (1S14)  to  await  in  fitful  slumber  the 
hour  of  national  resurrection. 

Montenegro  and  Ragusa  were  but  faint  and  isolated 
beacons  amid  the  deep  gloom  of  the  Turkish  era.  Mean- 
while the  great  mass  of  the  Serbian  race,  to  whom 
Russia  was  still  unknown,   naturally  turned  with  eyes 

D 


34     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

of  hope  towards  the  north.  Until  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century  the  world,  so  far  as  the  ignorant  Serb 
peasant  was  concerned,  fell  into  two  halves — Carska 
Zemlja,  the  land  of  the  Tsar  or  Emperor  (in  other  words 
Turkey,  for  in  every  Slav  tongue  Constantinople  is 
Tsarigrad,  the  city  of  the  Tsar)1,  and  Cesarija-Zemlja, 
Austria,  the  land  of  the  Caesar  in  Vienna.  Even  as  early 
as  the  fifteenth  century  many  Serbs  flying  from  Turkish 
rule  had  settled  in  the  southern  plains  of  Hungary  and 
along  the  banks  of  the  Danube,  as  far  north  as  Buda- 
pest. After  the  defeat  of  Mohacs  and  the  Turkish  Con- 
quest of  Central  Hungary,  these  Serb  settlers  shared 
the  fate  of  their  Magyar  neighbours  in  the  Alfold,  and 
depopulation  and  ruin  was  the  fate  of  some  of  the  most 
fertile  provinces  in  all  Europe. 

In  the  first  period  of  chaos  which  succeeded  Mohacs 
the  territory  between  Drave  and  Save  was  guarded  by 
an  army  supported  by  the  Styrian  Estates,  while  the  dis- 
tricts lying  between  the  river  Kulpa  and  the  Adriatic 
were  left  to  the  care  of  the  Estates  of  Carniola.  In  the 
course  of  time  a  special  province,  subject  to  the  direct 
authority  of  the  Emperor,  was  formed  under  the  title  of 
"The  Military  Frontiers"  (Vojna  Krajina).  It  was 
divided  into  two  "generalates,"  the  Slavonian  and  the 
Croatian,  organised  and  governed  on  a  purely  military 
basis.  Every  Granicar,  or  Frontiersman,  was  liable  to 
military  service  from  his  eighteenth  year,  and  must  at 
all  times  be  ready  to  bear  arms  against  the  invader;  but 
in  return  for  this  duty,  successive  emperors  granted 
substantial  privileges,  and  the  Granicari  were  justly 
famous,  not  only  for  their  military  prowess,  but  also  for 
their  sturdy  independence  of  character.  Every  com- 
mune elected  its  head,  and  all  the  communes  of  a  capi- 
tanate  their  joint  judge,  the  election  in  each  case  requir- 

1  Hence    the    title    "Tsar,"    invariably    applied    to    the    Sultan 
in  the  old  Serb  ballads. 


SERBIA  35 

ing  the  sanction  of  the  commanding  officer.  The  Ortho- 
dox Church  enjoyed  the  same  privileges  as  Catholicism, 
in  striking  contrast  to  the  more  northerly  countries.  In 
the  course  of  time  the  military  frontiers  were  both  modi- 
fied and  extended,  and  there  grew  up  a  race  of  heredi- 
tary soldiers  and  officers,  holding  their  land  on  a  mili- 
tary tenure  but  otherwise  organised  on  strictly  demo- 
cratic lines  and  inspired  by  a  tradition  of  personal  devo- 
tion to  the  Imperial  idea  such  as  not  even  the  long 
chain  of  errors  and  crimes  committed  by  Vienna  and 
Budapest  in  their  recent  dealings  with  the  Southern 
Slavs  have  wholly  availed  to  efface. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  tide 
turned  very  definitely  in  favour  of  the  Christians.  In 
1686  the  Turks  were  expelled  from  Buda,  where  a  Pasha 
had  ruled  for  160  years,  and  during  the  next  twenty-five 
years  the  armies  of  the  Duke  of  Lorraine,  Stahremberg, 
Louis  of  Baden,  and  above  all  Prince  Eugene,  reclaimed 
Central  Hungary  and  even  large  tracts  of  Serbia  itself. 
It  was  under  the  impression  of  the  earlier  of  these 
splendid  victories  that  the  chief  Serbian  exodus  into  the 
Habsburg  dominions  took  place.  In  1690  the  Patriarch 
of  Ipek,  Arsen  Crnojevic,  with  many  thousand  Serb 
families,  migrated  to  Hungary  and  Slavonia,  on  the 
direct  invitation  of  the  Emperor  Leopold  himself,  and 
occupied  some  of  the  territory  which  Turkish  rule  had 
reduced  to  desolation.  The  Imperial  charters  of  1690 
and  1691  assured  to  Leopold's  new  subjects  their  full 
recognition  as  a  nation,  the  free  exercise  of  their  religion, 
national  customs,  and  Church  calendar,  and  the  right  to 
elect  their  patriarch  and  voivode  and  to  control  their 
own  administration.  These  privileges  were  repeatedly 
confirmed,  but  Jesuit  influences  at  Court  and  the  hostility 
of  the  Hungarian  Estates  combined  to  prevent  their 
due  execution.  The  consequent  discontent  provoked  a 
rising  in  1735,  which  led  to  a  further  curtailment  of  Serb 

D  2 


ft 


36     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

rights  and  to  the  re-emigration  of  large  numbers  of  the 
settlers  to  the  south  of  Russia,  where  they  have  long 
since  become  merged  in  the  surrounding  population. 
None  the  less,  large  numbers  remained  behind  and 
flourished  exceedingly. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  Treaty  of  Karlowilz  (1699) 
secured  for  the  Emperor  the  formal  right  to  intervene 
on  behalf  of  the  Balkan  Christians,  who  in  their  turn 
looked  more  and  more  to  Vienna  for  their  political  salva- 
tion. The  Treaty  of  Pozarevac  (1718),  which  crowned 
the  victorious  campaigns  of  Prince  Eugene,  not  merely 
expelled  the  Turks  from  their  last  foothold  on  Hungarian 
soil,  but  secured  the  fortress  of  Belgrade,  northern 
Serbia,  and  western  Wallachia  for  Austria.  This  seemed 
to  render  Austria's  complete  absorption  of  Serbia  and 
Bosnia  a  mere  rhatter  of  time.  But  the  fatal  dual 
tendency  which  has  so  often  paralysed  Austria's  action 
■ — the  sure  outcome  of  her  geographical  position  between 
east  and  west — prevented  a  fulfilment  of  the  designs 
which  some  of  her  statesmen  harboured.  In  the  Balkans 
Austria  had  a  start  of  several  generations  over  any  of 
her  rivals,  but  she  failed  to  use  it,  and  her  history  is  a 
record  of  wasted  opportunities.  The  successors  of 
Prince  Eugene  proved  incompetent  to  defend  his  con- 
quests, and  the  ignominious  Peace  of  Belgrade  (1739) 
restored  Serbia  and  Wallachia  to  the  Turks.  The 
Austrian  occupation  left  many  memories  among  the 
Serbs,  whose  intercourse  with  their  kinsmen  on  Habs- 
burg  territory  it  had  strengthened.  But  it  was  followed 
by  nearly  fifty  years  of  negative  policy  in  the  Balkans. 
Throughout  that  period  the  whole  attention  of  Maria 
Theresa  and  her  advisers  was  concentrated  upon  the 
long  struggle  against  Frederick  the  Great,  and  all  their 
surplus  energy  was  devoted  to  that  elaborate  series  of 
administrative  reforms  by  which  the  survival  and  evolu- 
tion    of     modern     Austria     was     rendered     possible. 


SERBIA  37 

Catherine  the  Great's  first  war  against  Turkey  was 
undertaken  without  Austrian  co-operation,  and  Maria 
Theresa  was  a  reluctant  accomplice  in  the  partition  of 
Poland.  But  her  son,  Joseph  II.,  despite  his  preoccupa- 
tion with  agrarian,  linguistic,  and  ecclesiastical  innova- 
tions, fell  more  and  more  under  the  spell  of  Balkan 
adventure.  In  combination  with  Catherine  II.  he 
worked  out  an  ambitious  scheme  for  the  partition  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  and  in  the  pursuit  of  this  aim  Laudon 
succeeded  in  planting  for  a  brief  period  the  Imperial 
Standard  on  the  citadel  of  Belgrade  (1789).  But  the 
death  of  Joseph  transformed  the  situation.  Leopold  II. 
was  more  concerned  for  the  fate  of  the  Netherlands,  his 
relations  with  Prussia  were  extremely  difficult,  and  the 
growing  complications  and  unrest  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion paralysed  his  Balkan  policy.  When  peace  came 
Belgrade  was  restored  once  more  to  the  Turks,  and  the 
Serbs  were  left  to  their  own  resources. 

The  joint  action  of  Austria  and  Russia  against  the 
Turks  had  aroused  great  expectations  in  Serbia,  and 
when  the  war  ended  in  a  virtual  restoration  of  the  status 
quo,  the  disillusionment  and  bitterness  were  unbounded. 
A  very  characteristic  outburst  was  that  of  the  Serbian 
leader  Aleksa  Nenadovic,  who  roundly  declared:  "The 
Emperor  has  deserted  me  and  the  whole  Serbian  nation, 
just  as  his  ancestors  deserted  ours.  I  will  go  from 
cloister  to  cloister  and  bid  every  monk  and  priest  take 
note  of  it,  so  that  in  future  no  single  Serb  may  ever 
believe  the  Germans."  National  feeling  had  been  so 
thoroughly  aroused  that  the  Turks,  when  taking  over 
one  of  the  fortresses  evacuated  by  the  Austrians,  called 
out  to  the  latter:  "Neighbours,  what  have  you  done 
with  our  rayahs  ? "  Henceforth  the  Serbs  relied  upon 
themselves,  and  happily  fortune,  in  teaching  them  the 
bitter  lesson  of  self-reliance,  also  provided  them  with 
peasant  leaders  of  real  genius.     The  insubordination  of 


38     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

the  Janissaries,  which  already  seriously  menaced  the 
Sultan's  power,  was  especially  flagrant  in  the  distant 
province  of  Belgrade;  and  their  arrogance  and  depreda- 
tions, culminating  in  1804  m  tne  massacre  of  a  number 
of  Serbian  notables,  provoked  a  serious  insurrection. 
George  Petrovic,  better  known  as  Black  or  "Kara" 
George,  was  the  son  of  a  prosperous  peasant  in  the 
central,  or  Sumadija,  district  of  Serbia,  following  the 
national  profession  of  pig-breeding.  He  was  a  man  of 
commanding  figure,  indomitable  resolve,  and  fierce 
passions,  ignorant  and  even  barbaric  as  the  world  counts 
wisdom,  but  endowed  with  those  qualities  of  leadership, 
personal  magnetism,  torrential  bravery,  and  diplomatic 
skill  which  in  times  of  crisis  are  needed  to  rally  a  nation 
behind  an  individual.  Among  the  first  leaders  of  revolt 
there  was  no  idea  of  asserting  independence;  their  only 
desire  was  to  shake  off  the  oppressive  rule  of  the  Dahis 
and  to  secure  from  the  Sultan  the  sure  guarantee  of  local 
privileges.  It  is,  however,  well  to  note  the  part  played 
by  the  Orthodox  clergy  in  the  movement  for  liberty; 
not  content  with  merely  encouraging  their  flocks,  many 
of  them  were  foremost  in  the  ranks  of  the  combatants. 
In  the  whole  career  of  Kara  George,  Katie,  Jakob  Nena- 
dovic,  Luka  Lazarevic  and  others  of  their  comrades  it 
is  easy  to  trace  something  of  the  spirit  with  which  the 
peasant  bards  of  Serbia  have  for  centuries  past  clothed 
their  national  heroes.  Under  Kara  George,  as  Supreme 
Chief,  "every  tree  became  a  soldier";  the  flower  of  the 
Turkish  Army  was  more  than  once  defeated  by  the 
Serbs,  and  Belgrade  fell  into  their  hands.  A  first  primi- 
tive senate  was  formed,  and  the  rudiments  of  an  adminis- 
trative and  educational  system  were  introduced.  But 
after  a  heroic  resistance  of  nine  years  there  followed  a 
sudden  collapse,  accentuated  by  internal  dissensions 
among  the  Serbian  chiefs  and  by  the  complications  to 
which  foreign,  and  especially  Russian,  intervention  gave 


SERBIA  39 

rise.     Turkish  rule  was  restored,  and  Kara  George  was 
forced  to  take  refuge  on  Austrian  territory. 

The  liberation  of  Serbia  was  to  be  completed  by  a 
rival  leader,  Milos  Obrenovic,  a  man  of  equal  energy 
and  superior  statecraft,  and  unquestionably  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  rulers  of  his  age.  On  Palm  Sunday, 
1815,  Milos  unfurled  anew  the  standard  of  revolt,  and 
speedily  won  the  entire  country  to  his  side.  Within 
two  years  he  was  the  undisputed  ruler  of  Serbia,  was 
proclaimed  as  "supreme  prince"  (Vrhovni  Knez),  and 
found  himself  free  to  organise  the  administration  on 
purely  national  lines.  Unhappily,  his  triumph  was 
stained  by  the  treacherous  murder  of  his  rival,  Kara 
George,  whose  head  was  dispatched  as  a  hideous  trophy 
to  placate  the  Sublime  Porte  (181 7) .  Thus  originated 
the  fatal  dynastic  feud  between  the  Obrenovic  and 
Karagjorgjevic  families,  which  has  embittered  modern 
Serbian  history  and  done  so  much  to  retard  the  country's 
progress. 

It  was  not  till  1830  that  the  Sultan  could  be  induced 
to  recognise  Milos  as  Prince.  But  despite  the  uncer- 
tainty of  the  preceding  decade,  the  growth  of  Serbian 
independence  was  sure  and  steady.  None  the  less,  the 
need  of  a  strong  military  organisation  was  so  obviously 
the  sole  means  of  maintaining  the  liberties  which  they 
had  won  that  the  Knezes,  or  district  leaders,  were  very 
soon  compelled  to  submit  to  the  personal  domination  of 
a  single  man.  Milos  made  the  most  of  his  double  posi- 
tion as  the  acknowledged  chief  of  the  nation  and  as  the 
accredited  representative  of  the  Porte.  He  soon  came 
to  disregard  the  advice  and  complaints  even  of  his 
most  influentiaf  followers.  While  concentrating  all 
administrative  and  judicial  power  in  the  "supreme 
national  court,"  which  continued  the  traditions  of  Kara 
George's  short-lived  Senate,  he  at  first  insisted  upon 
its  following  him  whenever  he  changed  his  residence, 


40     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

and  reserved  to  himself  the  right  of  pronouncing  the 
death  sentence.  MiloS  was  a  truly  patriarchal  ruler,  such 
as  is  only  possible  in  a  primitive  form  of  society;  while 
his  wife,  the  Princess  Ljubica,  cooked  for  him  as  Pene- 
lope may  have  cooked  for  Odysseus,  kept  order  in  his 
semi-Oriental  establishment,  and  occasionally  resorted 
to  very  drastic  measures  to  rid  herself  of  rivals  in  her 
husband's  graces.  In  private  intercourse  Milos  treated 
the  Knezes  as  his  equals,  but  unhesitatingly  declined  to 
accept  their  control  in  public  affairs.  "Am  I  the 
master,"  he  would  exclaim  (using  the  word  "Gospodar," 
by  which  he  was  most  widely  known  to  his  countrymen), 
"and  shall  I  not  be  at  liberty  to  do  as  I  please?  "  After 
the  advent  of  the  Orleans  dynasty  in  France  he  was 
even  heard  to  declare  that  Charles  X.  would  never  have 
lost  his  throne,  had  he  understood  how  to  govern  as  he 
himself  did  in  Serbia.1  Unhappily,  his  uncontrollable 
temper  and  greed  of  money  led  to  many  scandalous 
abuses,  the  most  notorious  of  all  being  his  control  of  the 
salt  monopoly  and  of  certain  articles  of  export.  By 
degrees  his  autocratic  leanings  caused  general  discon- 
tent and  estrangement,  and  in  1835  he  saw  himself  forced 
to  introduce  a  Constitution  and  to  allow  the  Skupstina, 
or  popular  assembly,  to  meet  and  express  itself.  The 
interference  of  foreign  Powers  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Serbia  began  to  gain  in  strength,  and  by  a  curious  irony 
Britain  and  France,  whose  consuls  were  very  active  at 
this  period  in  Belgrade  and  Kragujevac,  favoured  the 
extension  of  the  Prince's  absolutist  powers,  while  auto- 
cratic Russia  contended  for  a  restriction  of  his  authority.2 
The  numerous  restrictions  which  the  charter  of  1838 
imposed  upon  the  Prince  proved  intolerable  to  Milos, 
and  led  inevitably  and  rapidly  to  his  abdication  and  exile 
(1839).  A  month  later  his  eldest  son  Milan  succumbed 
to  a  protracted  illness  without  ever  having  been  able  to 
1  Ranke,   pp.    252,   256.  '  Ranko,   op.   cit.,   p.   264. 


SERBIA  41 

assume  office,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  younger  brother 
Michael.  But  the  politicians  who  had  engineered  the 
movement  against  the  father  did  not  feel  secure  with  the 
son  as  their  ruler,  and,  having  secured  the  approval  of 
the  Porte  for  their  plans,  started  a  military  revolt  which 
forced  Michael  in  his  turn  to  take  refuge  on  Austrian 
territory  (1842).  Michael  was  replaced  by  Alexander 
Karagjorgjevic,  son  of  the  murdered  Kara  George. 
Russia's  opposition  to  the  change  naturally  forced  the 
new  Prince  into  the  Austrian  sphere  of  influence,  and 
this  tendency  was  strengthened  by  the  events  of  1848. 
The  Serbs  of  the  Banat  and  Slavonia,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  the  Patriarch  Rajacic,  eagerly  espoused  the 
Habsburg  cause  against  the  Magyars;  and  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Serbian  Voivodina  and  the  further  con- 
cessions promised  to  them  by  the  Emperor  won  for  him 
and  for  Austria  the  sympathies  of  the  Serbs  of  the  prin- 
cipality also,  many  of  whom  crossed  the  Save  and 
Danube  as  volunteers  in  the  Austrian  Army. 

During  the  Crimean  War  Russian  influence  upon  the 
Prince  and  his  Court  declined  still  further;  but  his  feeble 
and  vacillating  policy  alienated  the  masses,  which  had 
never  ceased  to  be  Russophil.  In  1858  Alexander,  who 
had  hitherto  governed  through  the  Senate,  for  the  first 
time  ventured  to  summon  the  national  assembly,  which 
promptly  voted  his  deposition  and  the  recall  of  the 
veteran  Prince  Milos.  His  long  exile  had  failed  to  curb 
Milos's  autocratic  leanings,  and  he  celebrated  his  return 
by  the  expulsion  or  imprisonment  of  several  of  the  lead- 
ing Serbian  statesmen.  But  his  death  in  September, 
i860,  restored  Michael  to  power  and  marked  the  close  of 
what  may  be  described  as  the  patriarchal  era  of  Serbian 
history. 

Michael  was  in  many  wavs  the  wisest  ruler  whom 
Serbia  has  produced,  combining  the  native  untrained 
wit  of  the  founder  of  his  dynasty  with  the  education  and 


42     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

wider  outlook  of  a  new  generation.  The  arbitrary  and 
slipshod  methods  of  his  father  were  superseded  by  a 
genuine  zeal  for  constitutional  procedure.  Numerous 
administrative  reforms  were  introduced,  a  national 
militia  was  created  under  French  officers,  and  the  old 
semi-Turkish  Constitution  of  1830  was  remodelled  on 
Western  lines.  Serbia  found  in  Michael  a  jealous 
guardian  of  her  rights  against  any  encroachments  on 
the  part  of  the  suzerain  Powers.  In  1862,  as  the  result 
of  an  affray,  the  Porte  consented  to  the  demolition  of 
the  Turkish  quarter  of  Belgrade  and  to  the  dismantling 
of  the  Turkish  fortresses  of  Sokol  and  Uzice.  Finally, 
in  1867,  as  the  result  of  Michael's  firm  attitude,  the  few 
remaining  garrisons  were  withdrawn,  and  on  May  6th 
the  last  Turkish  soldier  quitted  Serbian  soil. 

To  Michael's  far-sighted  view  Serbia  was  but  the 
advance  guard  of  Balkan  unity.  Her  liberation  of 
Bosnia  from  Turkish  rule  was  to  be  the  first  stage 
towards  the  emancipation  of  her  Bulgarian  kinsmen, 
whose  eyes  in  those  days  were  still  turned  towards  Bel- 
grade with  hope  and  sympathy.  The  growing  percep- 
tion of  kinship  among  all  branches  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  was  eloquently  expressed  by  Michael's  contem- 
porary, Danilo  of  Montenegro,  who  addressed  him  with 
the  words:  "Form  the  kingdom  of  Serbia,  and  I  shall 
gladly  be  the  first  to  mount  guard  before  your  palace." 
No  less  cordial  were  Michael's  relations  with  the  great 
Bishop  Strossmayer.  The  first  germs  of  a  Balkan 
League  may  be  traced  in  Michael's  relations  with  Prince 
Alexander  Couza  of  Roumania  and  his  youthful  suc- 
cessor, Charles  of  Hohenzollern,  with  the  Bulgarian 
Committee  in  Bucarest,  and  with  Kossuth,  the  exiled 
Governor  of  Hungary.  But  with  all  his  enthusiasm  for 
the  Jugoslav  ideal  he  did  not  go  far  enough  for 
Garasanin,  the  most  audacious  and  speculative  of 
Serbian    statesmen  :     and    the    conflict    which    ensued, 


SERBIA  48 

coupled  with  his  relapse  in  internal  affairs  into  the  auto- 
cratic habits  which  he  had  avoided  earlier  in  his  reign, 
aroused  the  enmity  of  the  younger  generation,  and 
above  all  of  the  Omladina,  an  active  society  which  had 
its  headquarters  in  Southern  Hungary  and  dabbled  in 
secret  revolutionary  propaganda.  On  June  ioth,  1868, 
he  was  assassinated  by  a  group  of  partisans  of  the  rival 
dynasty,  and  though  their  conspiracy  proved  abortive, 
infinite  harm  was  done  to  the  cause  of  Serbia  by  the 
removal  of  so  wise  a  statesman  and  by  the  accentuation 
of  the  fatal  dynastic  feud. 

Michael  was  succeeded  by  his  cousin  Milan,  then  a 
boy  of  fourteen.  The  Regency,  presided  over  by  Jovan 
Ristic,  may  be  said  to  have  inaugurated  constitutional 
government  in  Serbia,  though  on  distinctly  oligarchical 
lines.  The  Constitution  of  1869  created  a  single 
chamber  based  upon  almost  universal  suffrage,  but 
modified  by  the  Prince's  powers  to  nominate  one-quarter 
of  the  assembly.  Its  members  had  no  powers  of  initia- 
tive; the  introduction  of  new  laws,  and  the  convocation 
and  dissolution  of  the  Chamber,  lay  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  the  Prince.  The  only  definite  advance  upon  earlier 
practice  was  the  establishment  of  Cabinet  responsibility. 

Prince  Milan  typifies  a  class  of  which  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  has  been  only  too  prolific  during  the  past 
century — a  class  which  has  discarded  the  primitive 
virtues  of  the  peasant  and  imitated  the  more  superficial 
vices  of  the  West  without  its  more  solid  virtues. 
Heredity  and  education  were  alike  against  him.  Excess 
had  plunged  his  father  into  an  early  grave,  while  his 
mother  was  notorious  as  the  mistress  of  Prince  Alex- 
ander Couza  of  Roumania.  He  himself  grew  up  in  an 
atmosphere  of  intrigue  and  flattery  such  as  might  have 
undermined  far  stronger  characters  than  his,  and  proved 
quite  unequal  for  the  difficult  problems  with  which  the 
years  1875-78  were  to  confront  him 


CHAPTER    V 


THE   GREEK    REVOLUTION 


The  Serbs  were  the  first  Balkan  people  to  shake  off 
the  Turkish  yoke,  but  the  Greeks  were  not  far  behind. 
The  two  races  present  a  striking  contrast.  The  former 
were  a  peasant  community,  land-locked  and  isolated 
among  their  upland  mountain  ranges,  though  their  Croat 
kinsmen  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  are  among  the  finest 
seamen  in  Europe.  The  latter  fall  mainly  into  two 
categories — seafaring  and  commercial.  The  JEgean 
was  for  many  centuries  before  the  Christian  era  a  Greek 
sea;  but  leave  the  coast,  and  to-day,  as  in  the  time  of 
Philip  and  Alexander  of  Macedon,  Greek  influences  are 
soon  left  behind.  The  Byzantine  Empire,  for  the  last 
eight  centuries  of  its  existence,  was  essentially  Greek 
in  spirit  as  in  form.  But  its  character  was  seriously 
modified  by  the  Latin  conquest  of  the  thirteenth  century 
— that  famous  Fourth  Crusade  which  set  out  from  Venice 
to  replace  the  Cross  upon  the  Holy  Places  of  Jerusalem, 
but  which  rapidly  degenerated  into  a  freebooters'  cam- 
paign, marked  by  the  crowning  incidents  of  the  sack  of 
Zara  and  the  conquest  of  Constantinople  (1204-5).  The 
disintegrating  effects  of  that  conquest  soon  became 
apparent  in  the  crop  of  pettv  feudal  states  which  were 
sown  all  over  the  Near  East,  and  struck  deepest  root  in 
what  to-day  is  once  more  Greece.     With  the  romantic 


THE   GREEK   REVOLUTION  45 

and  parochial  annals  of  Achaia  and  Athens,  of  Thessa- 
lonica,  Euboea,  and  Naxos  we  need  not  concern  our- 
selves.1 They  are  of  little  importance  save  as  a  symptom 
of  decay  and  approaching  dissolution.  But  it  is  worth 
noting  that  the  Byzantine  nobility— 'Pcofxaloi,  to  use  their 
own  name — when  they  returned  from  two  generations  of 
exile  at  Nicaea,  assumed  a  more  avowedly  Greek 
character  than  before. 

The  coming  of  the  Turk  reduced  the  Greeks  to  the 
same  dead-level  of  enslavement  as  their  Christian 
neighbours;  all  alike  groaned  under  the  haratch  (poll 
tax)  and  the  blood  tribute.  But  in  the  Morea  there  was 
an  interlude  which  did  not  come  to  the  Slavs  farther 
north.  From  1684  to  17 18  the  Venetians  succeeded  in 
expelling  the  Turks,  and  the  accounts  which  they  have 
left  us  of  their  new  possessions  afford  eloquent  proof 
of  what  Turkish  rule  meant,  even  within  a  measurable 
distance  of  time  from  the  great  days  of  Ottoman  power. 
Under  Venice  there  were,  of  course,  opportunities  of 
education  and  culture,  even  though  the  fortresses  of 
Morea,  like  the  ports  of  the  Dalmatian  coast,  were  held 
on  the  old  colonial  basis  as  objects  of  economic  exploita- 
tion and  strategic  advantage,  with  no  share  in  the  privi- 
leges of  the  republic. 

The  gradual  decay  of  Venice  which  followed  the  loss 
of  her  Morean  conquests  coincided  with  a  noticeable 
revival  of  Greek  commerce  in  the  Levant,  and  there  were 
numerous  Greek  settlements  in  Wallachia  and  Moldavia. 
There  was  also  a  growing  connection,  mainly  ecclesi- 
astical, with  Russia.  Monks  from  Mt.  Athos  and 
occasional  Greek  and  Roumanian  bishops  visited  the 
Court  of  the  Tsar ;  and,  indeed,  in  1657  tne  Patriarch 
Parthenius  of  Constantinople  was  hanged  for  plotting 

1  There  are  three  standard  English  works  on  this  subject — 
Finlay's  "History  of  Greece,"  W.  Miller's  "The  Latins  in  the 
Levant,"  and  Sir  R.   Rodd's  "The  Princes  of  Achaia." 


46     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

with  the  Tsar  and  with  the  Cossacks  of  the  Ukraine, 
then  an  independent  state.  This  sharp  lesson  intimi- 
dated the  Greek  clergy,  and  for  a  whole  century  to  come 
Russia's  relations  with  the  peninsula  were  mainly  con- 
fined to  Montenegro  and  the  Danubian  principalities. 
But  corruption  contributed  as  much  as  fear  to  this 
result.  The  Phanariot  regime  l  consisted,  on  its  ecclesi- 
astical side,  in  the  shameless  sale  of  bishoprics,2  whose 
holders  recouped  themselves  by  virtually  holding  up 
minor  Church  offices  to  auction.  The  Patriarchate  had 
been  degraded  to  a  mere  instrument  of  the  Sublime 
Porte,  and  was  deeply  infected  by  simony  and  similar 
malpractices.  The  parishes  were  burdened  by  all  kinds 
of  dues  and  tithes;  there  was  a  regular  traffic  in 
marriage  dispensations,  burial  permits,  and  similar 
unjust  perquisites  of  the  priestly  office.  Monks  entirely 
alien  to  the  people  and  sunk  in  the  crassest  ignorance 
were  intruded  upon  the  villagers,  and  often  called  in 
the  Turkish  soldiery  to  enforce  their  extortions.  Such 
a  system  was  especially  iniquitous  in  its  working  in 
Bosnia  and  Macedonia,  where  Greek  prelates  wrought 
their  will  upon  the  Slav  peasantry.  The  Church  was 
sunk  in  ignorance  and  materialism;  only  here  and 
there  a  few  humble  parish  priests  and  a  handful 
of  recluses  in  Mt.  Athos  kept  the  national  flame 
burning. 

Meanwhile,  the  rich  Greek  families  of  the  Phanar  rose 
to  high  ofice  at  the  Porte,  and,  as  flourishing  bankers  or 
even  usurers,  bought  from  the  Grand  Vizier  or  his  col- 
leagues as  blank  forms  the  firmans  of  nomination  to 
various  provincial  posts  and  resold  them  at  exorbitant 
figures,  after  filling  in  the  payees'  names.  Their  posi- 
tion  brought   them   almost   unlimited   opportunities   of 

1  See  pp.  22  and  6i. 

'  The  price  is  estimated  to  have  varied  from  10,000  to  250,000 
piastres. 


THE   GREEK   REVOLUTION  47 

exaction.  The  office  of  Dragoman  of  the  Fleet,  which 
came  to  be  held  almost  invariably  by  a  Greek,  was 
especially  lucrative,  influential,  and  corrupt.  Yet,  in  the 
apt  phrase  of  a  native  historian,  Greeks  and  Turks  have 
remained  distinct  for  centuries,  like  water  and  oil  in  the 
same  jar.1 

One  section  of  the  Greek  population  had  always  pre- 
served some  fragments  of  liberty — the  islanders  and 
mountaineers  of  what  is  now  western  Greece  and 
southern  Albania.  The  Klephts  were  wild  brigands 
corresponding  with  the  Slavonic  Haiduks,  who  had 
defied  the  Turkish  authorities  and  taken  refuge  in  the 
hills ;  and  in  the  ballads  and  legends  of  the  Greek  people 
"Klepht"  (thief)  and  "Palikar"  (hero)  came  to  be 
almost  interchangeable  terms.  In  certain  districts  the 
Turks  had  found  it  necessary  to  recognise  the  forma- 
tion of  a  rough  Greek  militia  with  national  commanders, 
the  so-called  Armatoli ;  and  these  formed  a  nucleus  of 
revolt  when  Russian  agents  appeared  in  the  Morea 
during  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1769-74,  and  were 
backed  up  by  the  arrival  of  a  Russian  fleet  in  the 
Mediterranean.  It  is  true  that  the  Greeks  were  left  to 
their  fate  when  it  suited  Catherine  the  Great  to  make 
peace  with  the  Sublime  Porte.  But  at  last  the  dry  bones 
had  been  stirred,  and  the  silence  of  the  charnel  house 
had  been  finally  dispelled. 

A  long  succession  of  degenerate  Sultans  had  reduced 
the  machine  of  state  to  real  chaos,  and  before  the  close 
of  the  eighteenth  century  the  fate  of  Turkey  seemed  to 
be  sealed.  She  was  rescued  by  the  outbreak  of  the  French 
Revolution  and  the  European  upheaval  to  which  it  led. 
But  though  there  was  a  breathing  space,  internal  dis- 
integration continued.  The  Janissaries  were  completely 
out  of  hand,  military  insubordination  became  steadily 

1  Paparrigopoulos,  "History  of  Hellenic  Civilisation,"  cit. 
Cahuet,  La  Question  d' Orient,  p.  21. 


48     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

more  acute,  and  local  pashas  acted  more  and  more 
according  to  their  own  good  pleasure.  Of  these  pro- 
vincial tyrants  none  is  more  famous  than  Ali  Pasha,  the 
Lion  of  Janina,  who  began  as  an  outlaw  and  a  robber, 
but  at  the  heyday  of  his  fame  negotiated  on  equal  terms 
with  Napoleon  and  other  European  Governments  of  the 
day.  A  considerable  romantic  literature  has  gathered 
round  his  name;  Byron  and  other  travellers  introduced 
him  to  the  notice  of  the  West.  The  wily  pasha  played 
with  the  various  envoys,  fastened  a  tricolour  cockade  to 
his  turban,  and  posed  as  a  believer  in  the  principles  of 
the  French  Revolution,  which  in  reality  were  about  as 
effective  a  proof  of  his  conversion  to  Western  culture  as 
the  top  hat  on  the  head  of  a  Nigerian  chief.  In  short, 
he  was  a  mediaeval  Oriental  tyrant  of  the  approved  style. 
Ali's  fierce  and  prolonged  feud  with  the  Suliotes — a 
tribe  of  Christian  Albanians  forming  a  rude  and  ill- 
defined  republic  on  the  Epirote  coast — was  one  of  the 
most  notable  incidents  which  led  up  to  the  war  of  Greek 
independence.  He  also  exterminated  some  of  the  most 
flourishing  Vlach  colonies  of  the  Pindus  and  Albania, 
notably  the  town  of  Moscopolis,  or  Moskopolje,  from 
which  more  than  one  wealthy  Roumanian  family  of 
Austria-Hungary  traces  its  origin.1  At  that  period,  it 
is  to  be  remembered,  the  main  line  of  distinction  in  the 
Balkans  was  still  between  Christian  and  Moslem. 
Vlachs  and  Albanians  were  at  one  with  the  Greeks  in 
regarding  the  Orthodox  Church,  in  its  Greek  garb,  as 
the  chief  champion  of  the  enslaved  rayah,  and  supplied 
the  national  movement  among  the  Greeks  with  many  of 
its  leaders.  Rhigas,  the  forerunner  of  the  revolution, 
the  author  of  the  Greek  "Marseillaise"  and  many 
stirring  songs  of  battle,  was  a  Vlach  ;  and  it  is  interest- 
ing to  note  that  as  early  as  the  year  1798  he  was  trying 

1  E.g.,  that  of  Dr.   Dumba,  the  late  Austro-Hungaiian  Ambas- 
sador in  Washington. 


THE  GREEK   REVOLUTION  49 

to  concert  joint  action  between  Greeks  and  Serbs,  and 
paid  for  his  rashness  on  the  scaffold  at  Belgrade. 

The  movement  among  the  Greeks  was  far  more  com- 
plex than  among  the  Serbs,  for  there  were  Greek 
emigrants  on  every  Mediterranean  coast  imbibing  the 
ideas  of  the  various  Western  countries  at  a  moment 
when  political  thought  was  more  than  usually  volatile. 
The  island  of  Chios  became  a  centre  of  Greek  learning, 
maintaining  fourteen  professors  and  other  subsidiary 
teachers.  The  influence  of  the  French  Revolution  upon 
these  men  and  upon  their  pupils  was  very  great,  and 
there  was  a  rapid  revival  of  national  Hellenic  sentiment. 
Parallel  with  this  there  was  an  equally  rapid  commercial 
expansion  in  the  JEgean,  due  to  the  decay  of  the  French 
Navy  and  of  French  commercial  establishments  in  the 
Levant.  The  islands  of  Hydra,  Spetsai,  and  Psara 
became  flourishing  shipping  centres.  Fortunes  were 
made  on  all  sides,  and  wealthy  Greek  traders  in  close 
touch  with  France  and  England  educated  their  sons  in 
Western  ideas. 

As  Hellenic  sentiment  spread,  its  devotees  came  to 
look  more  and  more  to  the  Holy  Alliance  for  deliver- 
ance. Fifteen  thousand  Greeks  are  believed  to  have 
joined  the  standard  of  the  Allies.  But  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  soon  undeceived  them.  Dynastic,  not  national, 
interests  ruled  the  day,  and  so  far  as  the  Eastern  Ques- 
tion was  concerned  only  Turkey  and  the  Great  Powers 
were  considered.  To-day  the  chief  task  which  will  con- 
front the  democracies  of  France  and  Great  Britain  after 
the  war  will  be  to  prevent  the  formation  of  a  new  Holy 
Alliance  for  the  deception  of  those  small  nations  who 
set  their  faith,  as  one  hundred  years  ago,  in  the  high- 
sounding  phrases  of  European  statesmen. 

For  some  years  after  1S15  the  Greek  movement  was 
forced  underground;  the  flame  crept  slowly  over  a 
double  trail  until  the  powder  magazine  was  reached.    On 

E 


50     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

the  one  hand,  the  corruption  of  literary  form,  which 
had  in  the  course  of  centuries  so  effectually  divorced  the 
modern  Greek  rayah  from  the  glories  of  ancient  Hellas, 
was  repaired  by  linguistic  reforms  and  the  publication 
of  popular  versions  of  the  classics.  Korais  and  other 
learned  Greeks  laboured  unremittingly  and  successfully 
to  restore  the  lost  continuity,  and  thus  accomplished  a 
process  such  as  is  vital  to  all  national  movements,  and 
found  its  parallel  in  contemporary  Hungary,  Bohemia, 
and  Roumania.  But  the  men  of  letters,  though  they 
prepared  the  ground  for  the  future,  lacked  the  courage 
or  initiative  for  political  action.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Philike  Hetairia,  a  secret  society  founded  by  three 
Greeks  at  Odessa  in  1814  with  the  object  of  promoting 
a  Greek  rising  against  the  Turks,  struck  rapid  root  in 
the  Danubian  principalities,  notably  in  Bucarest,  Jassy, 
and  Galatz.  Its  organisation  honeycombed  the  Morea 
and  the  islands,  and  within  three  years  it  already  counted 
17,000  adherents  in  Constantinople  alone.  About  the 
same  time  a  Greek  educational  society  was  founded  in 
Vienna. 

The  Philhellene  movement  in  the  west  of  Europe  kept 
pace  with  the  organisation  of  the  Hetairia,  and  a  fresh 
focus  for  Greek  feeling  was  provided  by  the  Ionian 
Islands,  which  formed  an  autonomous  unit  under  a 
British  protectorate,  and  were  granted  a  Constitution  in 
the  year  1817.  In  1820  the  Hetairia  found  a  leader  in 
Alexander  Ypsilanti,  the  member  of  a  noble  Greek  family 
which  had  ruled  both  in  Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  and 
a  personal  aide-de-camp  of  the  Tsar  Alexander  I.  It  is 
typical  of  his  visionary  and  unpractical  outlook  that  he 
talked  wildly  of  reviving  the  Eastern  Empire,  and  that 
he  decided  to  raise  the  standard  of  revolt,  not  in  the  real 
Hellas,  but  in  the  Danubian  principalities.  He  entirely 
failed  to  realise  that  the  population  loathed  the  Greeks 
as  representing  the  corrupt   Phanariot  regime.     From 


THE  GREEK   REVOLUTION  51 

the  lips  of  the  Roumanian  peasant  leader  Vladimirescu, 
who  headed  a  national  movement  in  Wallachia  at  this 
very  moment,  he  received  a  blunt  reminder  that  "Greece 
belongs  to  the  Greeks  and  Roumania  to  the  Rou- 
manians." In  182 1  Ypsilanti  issued  a  high-faluting 
proclamation  beginning  :  "Hellenes,  the  hour  has  struck. 
It  is  time  to  avenge  our  religion  and  our  country."  He 
then  crossed  the  river  Pruth  at  the  head  of  a  few 
followers,  but  found  no  support,  and  soon  had  to  fly 
to  Hungarian  territory,  where  he  was  thrown,  by  orders 
of  Metternich,  into  the  fortress  of  Munkacs.1  Ypsilanti's 
adventure  was  the  spark  which  fired  the  powder,  but  any 
other  spark  might  have  done  the  task  equally  well. 
Indeed,  his  action  really  had  more  effect  on  Roumania 
than  on  Greece;  for,  even  without  him,  Greece  was 
already  in  the  throes  of  a  revolutionary  movement.  Ali 
Pasha,  after  years  of  intrigue  and  massacre,  had 
definitely  revolted  against  the  Sultan  and  invited  the 
Greeks  to  make  common  cause  with  him.  In  the  spring 
of  1 82 1  the  rising  became  general  throughout  the  Morea, 
and  the  capture  of  some  strongholds  was  followed  by 
the  massacre  of  Moslems.  The  Klepht  song,  "Not  a 
Turk  shall  remain,"  was  acted  upon  only  too  well.  And 
here,  in  passing,  it  is  well  to  refer  to  the  patriotic  sacri- 
fices made  by  prominent  Greeks,  some  of  whom  devoted 
their  entire  fortunes  to  the  national  cause.  Since  then 
private  beneficence  has  become  a  tradition,  and  there  is 
no  portion  of  the  Near  East  where  so  many  public  and 
charitable  institutions  are  due  to  individual  initiative. 

The  rising,  and  the  excesses  which  it  evoked,  met  with 
a  drastic  answer  from  the  Turks.  Mohammed  II.,  in  his 
rage,  ordered  the  execution  of  the  Greek  Dragoman  and 
other    leading    Phanariots;    and    the    Greek    Patriarch 

1  His  captivity  at  Munkacs  was  the  subject  of  a  well-known 
poem  by  the  German  poet  Wilhelm  Muller,  father  of  the  Oxford 
Orientalist   Max   Muller. 

E   2 


52    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Gregory  V.  was  hanged  from  the  gate  of  his  palace. 
The  body,  after  hanging  for  three  days,  was  flung  into 
the  sea  by  the  rabble  of  Stambul.  Such  an  event  only 
roused  the  insurgents  to  fresh  efforts,  and  their  cause 
seemed  to  prosper.  In  January,  1822,  a  Constitution 
was  proclaimed  for  all  Greece.  But  the  Turks  sent  crush- 
ing reinforcements,  overpowered  and  killed  "the  Lion 
of  Janina"  in  his  lake  fortress,  and  then  prepared  to 
overwhelm  the  Greeks  in  their  turn.  The  crowning 
horror  of  the  war  was  the  massacre  of  Chios,  during 
which  the  entire  Greek  population  was  either  put  to  the 
sword  by  the  Turkish  soldiery  or  sold  as  slaves  or 
driven  into  exile.  Utter  ruin  fell  upon  the  most  cultured 
and  prosperous  Greek  community;  the  population  sank 
from  113,000  to  1,800.  It  lies  outside  the  scope  of  the 
present  volume  to  recount  in  detail  the  story  of  the 
Greek  revolution — the  heroic  guerilla  warfare,  the  fierce 
discussions  between  the  rival  Klepht  leaders,  Botzaris, 
Kolokotrones,  Odysseus,  and  others,  the  thrill  which  ran 
through  Europe  at  the  news  of  Byron's  death  at  Misso- 
longhi.  Its  dramatic  episodes  may  be  read  in  the  classic 
pages  of  Finlay  and  Gordon  and  in  other  more  recent 
works  of  historical  research.  In  1825  the  war  entered 
upon  a  new  stage  with  the  arrival,  as  Turkish  general- 
issimo, of  Ibrahim  Pasha,  the  famous  soldier  son  of 
Mehemet  Ali  of  Egypt.  The  two  main  incidents  of  his 
campaigns  were  the  fall  of  Missolongbi  and  the  capture 
of  the  Acropolis.  Finally,  the  brawls  of  rival  chiefs 
ended  in  the  selection  of  two  foreigners  to  command  the 
naval  and  military  forces  of  Greece — Admiral  Cochrane 
(afterwards  Lord  Dundonald),  one  of  the  greatest  sailors 
the  British  Navy  has  produced,  and  Sir  Richard  Church, 
who  had  already  made  his  mark  by  the  extirpation  of 
brigandage  in  Southern  Italy.  The  turning-point  of  the 
war  came  in  1827,  when  Count  Capo  dTstria,  a  Corfiote 
Greek  born  under  Venetian  rule,  and  a  strong  Russo- 


THE   GREEK   REVOLUTION  58 

phil,  was  elected  President  of  Greece,  and  when  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia  concluded  a  Treaty  for  mediation 
between  Turks  and  Greeks. 

The  armistice  which  they  tried  to  impose  upon  both 
parties  was  accepted  by  the  insurgents,  but  disregarded 
by  the  Sublime  Porte,  and  when  their  naval  squadrons 
were  fired  upon  by  the  Turks,  action  inevitably  followed. 
In  the  memorable  battle  of  Navarino  (October  20th)  the 
Turkish  Fleet  was  annihilated  by  the  Allies  under 
Admiral  Codrington.  Thus  the  three  Powers  who  after 
an  interval  of  eighty  years  are  once  more  operating  in 
Greek  territory  may  be  said  to  have  put  the  crown  upon 
Greek  independence.  Canning's  opponents  in  Parlia- 
ment might  describe  as  an  "untoward  event"  what  most 
people  regarded,  and  still  regard,  as  a  "great  victory"; 
but  the  essential  fact  is  that  Greece  was  saved.  When 
in  1829  war  broke  out  between  Russia  and  Turkey,  the 
Ottoman  troops  had  to  be  withdrawn  from  Greek  soil, 
and  the  last  retreating  army  was  routed  in  September 
by  Demetrius  Ypsilanti,  the  brother  of  the  man  whose 
action  eight  years  earlier  on  the  banks  of  the  Pruth  had 
begun  the  war. 

In  1830  the  protecting  Powers  drew  up  a  Protocol 
regulating  the  status  of  the  new  Greece,  but  the  frontiers 
were  drawn  -upon  so  niggardly  a  scale  that  Prince 
Leopold  of  Coburg,  afterwards  Leopold  I.  of  Belgium 
and  grandfather  of  King  Albert,  declined  to  accept  the 
new  throne  when  it  was  offered  to  him.  The  kingdom 
of  Greece  was  finally  created  bv  the  Treaty  of  1832, 
under  the  guarantee,  not  of  the  Concert  of  Europe,  but 
of  the  three  Entente  Powers — a  fact  which  is  highly 
significant  in  view  of  the  events  of  the  present  day.  It 
is  difficult  to  praise  the  new  creation  ;  it  was  notoriously 
incomplete,  Epirus  and  Thessaly  being  omitted,  and 
Samos  and  Crete  expressly  excluded — the  latter  to 
remain  a  festering  sore  for  two  more  generations.     The 


54     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

austere  but  autocratic  Capo  d'Istria  had  been  assassin- 
ated in  1831,  and  his  death  had  been  followed  by  faction 
fighting.  At  last,  in  1832,  the  crown  was  offered  to 
Prince  Otto,  the  second  son  of  King  Louis  I.  of  Bavaria 
— an  ardent  Philhellene,  whose  artistic  and  archaeo- 
logical leanings  are  known  to  every  visitor  to  modern 
Munich.  Under  the  new  regime  the  three  Powers  pro- 
vided a  joint  loan,  and  troops  were  supplied  from 
Bavaria.  At  first  Nauplia  was  the  capital,  but  by  an 
inevitable  process  it  was  transferred  ere  long  to  Athens. 

It  was  only  to  be  expected  that  Greece,  after  long 
centuries  of  subjection,  followed  by  those  party  feuds 
to  which  the  race  has  always  been  too  prone,  would  fail 
at  first  to  develop  proper  constitutional  government. 
The  National  Assembly  proved  to  be  a  mere  farce,  and 
the  administration  was  in  a  state  of  virtual  anarchy.  By 
degrees  administrative,  judicial,  and  educational  reforms 
were  introduced  under  the  Bavarian  Regents,  and  a 
national  University  was  founded.  But  there  were 
periodical  local  risings,  and  the  tactlessness  of  Otto's 
German  advisers  led  at  last,  in  1843,  to  a  revolution  and 
to  the  promulgation  of  a  new  Constitution,  with  a  Parlia- 
ment of  two  Chambers.  One  episode  of  Otto's  reign 
deserves  special  notice.  During  the  Crimean  War 
attempts  were  made  to  raise  revolt  in  Thessaly  and  to 
extend  that  national  unity  which  Greeks  of  to-day  seem 
afraid  to  carry  to  its  final  stage.  The  high-spirited 
Queen  was  the  leader  of  the  war  party,  but  Otto  himself 
was  no  less  keen  a  nationalist.  Greek  action,  however, 
was  paralysed  by  a  Franco-British  occupation  of  the 
Piraeus,  which  lasted  from  1854  to  1857,  and  remains 
one  of  the  most  humiliating  memories  of  the  Crimean 
War — that  futile  war  in  which  we  helped  the  Turks  to 
repress  nationality  and  liberty  throughout  the  Near  East. 

The  two  vices  of  Greece  were  financial  disorder  in  its 
acutest  form  and  local  brigandage,  due  very  largely  to 


THE  GREEK  REVOLUTION  55 

economic  causes.  The  next  five  years  saw  a  rapid 
decline  in  Otto's  popularity.  Though  not  a  vicious  ruler, 
he  was  quite  unequal  to  so  difficult  a  task  as  presiding 
over  the  infancy  of  a  new  state.  While  appearing 
unduly  arbitrary  to  his  own  subjects,  he  lost  the  sup- 
port of  the  Powers,  in  very  large  measure  because  he 
was  too  good  a  patriot  and  too  devoted  to  the  ideal  of 
"Greater  Greece."  In  1862  a  revolution  drove  him  from 
the  throne,  and  the  upheaval  was  duly  sanctioned  by  the 
British  Government,  in  whose  name  Lord  Russell 
affirmed  Greece's  "right  to  change  its  governing  dynasty 
upon  good  and  sufficient  cause."  During  the  inter- 
regnum the  Duke  of  Edinburgh  became  the  popular 
candidate  in  Greece,  but  in  1863  the  throne  was  finally 
offered  to  Prince  William  of  Denmark,  who  took  the 
title  of  George  I.  The  new  arrangement  took  the  form 
of  a  Treaty  between  the  three  protecting  Powers  and  the 
King  of  Denmark,  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  once 
more  appearing  in  the  role  of  godparents.  The  new 
King  brought  with  him  as  a  present  the  Ionian  Isles, 
which  were  made  over  by  Gladstone  as  a  contribution 
to  Greek  National  Unity.  Thus,  if  our  behaviour  in 
1854  had  gone  some  way  towards  effacing  the  effect  of 
Navarino,  this  act  may  certainly  be  said  to  have  restored 
the  balance  in  our  favour.  The  long  rein  of  King 
George  opens  a  new  era  in  Greek  history — an  era  of 
growing  pains  in  the  body  politic,  not  unlike  those  which 
affect  our  early  childhood. 


CHAPTER    VI 

MODERN   ROUMANIA 

While  Greek,  Serb,  and  Bulgar  lay  crushed  under 
the  heel  of  the  Turkish  conqueror,  the  Roumanian  was 
saved  by  his  geographical  situation  from  complete 
national  extinction,  though  even  his  fate  was  far  from 
enviable.  During  the  dark  centuries  of  barbarian 
invasion  from  the  north-east  no  country  suffered  more 
severely  than  what  is  now  Roumania;  but  when  the 
chief  menace  came  from  the  south-east  with  the  Otto- 
man advance,  the  great  natural  obstacle  of  the  Danube 
afforded  protection,  and  to  some  extent  diverted  tin- 
stream  of  invasion.  The  fate  of  Serbia  and  Bulgaria 
was  decided  by  the  fact  that  they  blocked  the  Turkish 
line  of  advance  westwards,  just  as  to-day  Serbia  had  to 
be  crushed  by  the  Central  Powers  because  she  lay  across 
the  path  of  the  victorious  German  Drang  nach  Osten. 
These  elementary  facts,  so  lightly  ignored  by  the  states- 
men in  whose  hands  our  fate  as  an  Empire  rests,  spring- 
to  the  eyes  of  every  intelligent  student  of  the  Near  East. 

The  origin  of  the  Roumanian  race  has  formed  the 
subject  of  much  speculation  and  heated  discussion.  A 
purely  academic  question  has  been  distorted  to  serve  the 
purpose  of  rival  parties  and  to  prove  or  disprove  the 
claims  of  racial  supremacy.  Certain  points  cannot,  and 
never  will  be,  cleared  up  for  lack  of  evidence,  but  the 
main  lines  are  absolutely  clear,  and  no  amount  of  poli- 


MODERN  ROUMANIA  57 

tical  special  pleading  can  succeed  in  distorting  them. 
The  modern  Roumanians  are  the  descendants  of  those 
Roman  colonists  whom  Trajan  planted  for  the  defence 
of  the  Empire  against  the  northern  barbarians.  After 
the  first  conquest,  which  has  been  immortalised  in  the 
reliefs  of  Trajan's  Column  at  Rome,  Dacia  rapidly 
became  a  flourishing  province,  and  included  the  greater 
part  of  the  modern  Roumanian  kingdom  and  of  Tran- 
sylvania— its  chief  town,  Apulum,  being  in-  the  latter 
(now  Karlsburg  or  Gyulafehervar).1 

In  the  year  270  the  colony  was  abandoned  by  the 
Emperor  Aurelian,  and  for  a  thousand  years  this  whole 
tract  of  country  has  nothing  which  can  even  be  remotely 
described  as  history.  It  can  boast  an  almost  unique 
record  of  anarchy  and  chaos,  with  practically  no 
memorials  of  literature,  architecture,  or  art.  The  whole 
period  is  shrouded  in  impenetrable  obscurity,  and  it  is 
not  till  the  thirteenth  century  that  the  veil  is  lifted.  By 
that  time  we  find  the  country  racially  what  it  is  to-day 
— Roumanian.  This  fact  is  not  disputed;  but  there  are 
two  rival  explanations,  each  worked  out  on  the  ground 
of  a  political  thesis.  The  one  view  is  that  the  native 
population  preserved  its  identity  virtually  unimpaired 
through  a  thousand  years  of  invasion  and  disturbance ; 
the  other  that  the  population  was  withdrawn  to  the  south 
of  the  Danube,  remained  there  for  a  thousand  years,  and 
only  began  to  return  in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth 
centuries.  By  putting  forward  this  latter  theory,  Magyar 
controversialists  have  established  to  their  own  satisfac- 
tion, but  certainly  not  to  that  of  any  external  observer, 
the  right  of  one  race  wrhich  has  been  nine  or  ten  centuries 
in  a  country  to  destroy  the  national  identity  of  another 
race  which  has  only  been  seven  centuries  in  the  same 
place.      As    usual,    the   truth    is   to    be    found    half-wav 

1  Perhaps  best  known  under  its  mediaeval  name  of  Alba  Julia  or 
Alba  Regia. 


58     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

between  the  two  rival  theories.  The  Roumanians  are 
unquestionably  descended  from  the  Roman  colonists  of 
Dacia.  Their  Latin  origin  is  obvious  to  anyone  who 
walks  through  the  streets  of  Bucarest,  still  more  to  any- 
one who  visits  the  remoter  villages  of  Transylvania  and 
sees  the  pure  Roman  types  among  the  peasantry. 
Above  all,  the  Roumanian  language  is  an  unanswerable 
proof  of  linguistic  continuity,  its  grammar  and  syntax 
being  predominantly  Latin.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
is  a  considerable  admixture  of  Slavonic  words  in  the 
vocabulary  such  as  clearly  proves  the  presence  of  other 
elements  in  the  race. 

Perhaps  the  best  proof  that  the  Roumanian  tide  did 
not  set  from  south  to  north,  as  Magyar  apologists  argue, 
but  from  north  to  south,  is  supplied  by  the  position  of  the 
various  capitals.  In  Wallachia,  the  original  centres 
were  Campulung  and  Curtea  de  Arges,  which  were 
superseded  first  by  Targovistea  and  finally  by  Bucarest, 
while  the  capital  of  Moldavia  was  transferred  from  its 
original  seat  in  Suceava  (in  what  is  now  Bukovina)  to 
Jassy.  In  each  case  it  is  a  gradual  descent  from  the 
northern  mountains  into  the  plains  of  the  Danubian 
system. 

Not  all  the  efforts  of  modern  scientific  research  have 
availed  to  throw  light  upon  this  extremely  obscure 
period  of  history.  For  our  present  purpose  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  point  out  that  by  the  thirteenth  century  the 
kernel  of  modern  Roumania  was  forming  in  the  two 
principalities  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia;  1290  and  1349 
are  the  dates  usually  assigned  for  their  emergence  as 
national  States.  The  whole  territory  lying  east  and 
north-east  of  the  Iron  Gates  consisted  of  a  number  of 
loosely-knit  voivodes  or  principalities — each  owning  a 
varying  and  ill-defined  allegiance  to  the  Hungarian 
Crown,  and  living  a   precarious  existence  between   the 


MODERN   ROUMANIA  59 

second  Bulgarian  Empire  now  tottering  to  its  fall  and 
the  rising  kingdom  of  Hungary.  By  the  reign  of  Louis 
the  Great  (1340-1382)  the  northern  voivodes  had  been 
assimilated  by  the  Magyar  nobility,  while  the  sister  states 
of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia  had  taken  definite  shape 
between  the  Carpathians,  the  Dnjester  and  the  Danube. 
But,  unhappily  before  the  consolidation  could  be 
achieved,  the  Turks  had  made  their  first  appearance 
upon  the  scene,  and  the  greater  part  of  five  centuries 
were  to  be  consumed  in  a  struggle  for  existence  such  as 
rendered  progress  or  culture  well-nigh  impossible. 

The  part  played  by  the  Roumanians  in  the  defence  of 
Europe  against  the  Turks  has  not  received  sufficient 
recognition  in  the  West.  To  their  race  belonged  the 
famous  hero,  John  Hunyady,  who  led  the  armies  of  Hun- 
gary to  repeated  victory,  and  whose  son,  Matthias  Cor- 
vinus,  occupied  the  Hungarian  throne  during  the  period 
of  furthest  Magyar  expansion.  Nor  should  we  pass  over 
the  exploits  of  another  Roumanian  hero  who  ascended 
the  throne  of  Moldavia  within  a  year  of  the  great 
Hunyady's  death.  For  almost  half  a  century  (1457-1504) 
Stephen  the  Great  held  the  Turks  at  bay,  and  amply 
earned  a  place  with  Hunyady,  Sobieski  and  Eugene  as 
one  of  the  four  chief  bulwarks  of  Christendom.  "The 
high  deeds  which  thou  hast  accomplished,"  wrote  Pope 
Sixtus  IV.  to  Stephen,  "against  the  infidel  Turks,  our 
common  enemies  .  .  .  have  rendered  thy  name  so 
glorious  that  all  of  one  accord  sing  thy  praises."  In  the 
chaotic  annals  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia  Stephen 
stands  head  and  shoulders  above  all  other  rulers  :  Mircea 
the  Old,  Alexander  the  Good,  Vlad  the  Impaler  do  not 
deserve  more  than  a  local  fame  or  notoriety. 

The  death  of  Stephen  the  Great  ushers  in  a  period  of 
steady  decline  from  warlike  independence  to  abject  vas- 
salage.    Yet     the     Principalities,     as     Wallachia     and 


60     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Moldavia  came  to  be  called,  never  succumbed  to  Turkish 
rule  with  the  same  completeness  as  Serbia  and  Bulgaria, 
or  even  as  Hungary  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries.  Instead  of  imposing  Turkish  pashas,  the 
Sultan  had  been  content  with  exacting  a  heavy  tribute 
as  the  recognition  of  his  suzerainty.  While  in  Serbia 
the  native  aristocracy  was  exterminated,  and  in  Bosnia 
adopted  the  faith  of  Islam  as  a  means  of  saving  its  lands, 
the  Roumanian  boyars  remained  well-nigh  undisturbed, 
and  the  native  princes  continued  to  be  elected  by  the 
joint  influence  of  the  boyars  and  the  higher  Orthodox 
clergy.  The  nation  was  enslaved  and  neglected,  but 
never  annihilated  like  its  neighbours.  Indeed  we  are 
confronted  by  the  strange  paradox  that  at  the  very 
moment  when  Buda  was  the  capital  of  a  Turkish  pasha, 
a  Roumanian  prince,  Michael  the  Brave,  laid  for  a  brief 
space  of  time  the  foundations  of  a  "Greater  Roumania," 
comprising  Wallachia,  Moldavia,  Bessarabia,  Transyl- 
vania and  Bukovina  (to  use  the  nomenclature  of  our  own 
century — ere  long,  we  hope,  to  be  dismissed  to  the  his- 
torical lumber  room),  and  till  his  death  in  1601  held 
Turks,  Magyars,  Poles  and  his  own  rebellious  subjects 
alike  at  bay.  His  exploits  not  unnaturally  fired  the 
imagination  of  the  race,  and  to-day  his  statue  in 
Bucarest  is  to  Roumania  what  Nelson's  Column,  in 
Trafalgar  Square,  is  to  London — the  scene  of  political, 
and,  above  all,  of  patriotic  demonstrations. 

But  Michael's  reign  was,  in  the  words  of  Roumania's 
latest  historian,  nothing  more  than  "a  brilliant  inter- 
mezzo." During  the  seventeenth  century  the  two 
principalities  lay  between  the  upper  and  the  nether  mill- 
stones, and  their  degenerate  rulers  became  the  victims 
of  Turkish,  Austrian  and  Polish  rivalry.  In  17 16,  even 
the  election  of  native  princes,  powerless  phantoms  as 
they  were,  was  ignominiously  forbidden  by  the  Porte, 
and  for  the  next  century  the  thrones  of  Wallachia  and 


MODERN   ROUMANIA  61 

Moldavia  were  shamelessly  put  up  for  auction  to  tht 
highest  bidder.  The  Phanariot  princes,  to  whom  mora 
than  one  distinguished  family  of  modern  Roumania 
traces  its  origin,  were  for  the  most  part  rich  Greeks  re- 
sident in  that  quarter  of  Stambul  which  took  its  name 
from  the  great  Phanar  or  lighthouse.  There  was  no 
lack  of  competition  for  an  office  which,  however  lucrative, 
was  precarious  and  indeed  not  without  its  dangers ;  and, 
as  on  the  one  hand  almost  all  the  successful  candidates 
sought  to  recover,  by  means  of  rapacious  exactions  from 
their  new  subjects,  the  money  spent  in  bribing  the  Porte, 
and,  as  on  the  other,  the  Porte  found  an  obvious  interest 
in  satisfying  a  new  bidder,  there  were  continual  changes 
of  ruler,  and  between  the  years  1716  and  1821  no  fewer 
than  thirty-seven  and  thirty-three  Hospodars  occupied 
the  thrones  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia  respectively. 

The  outward  and  visible  signs  of  this  shameful  period 
in  a  slumbering  nation's  history  was  the  transference,  at 
the  hands  of  the  Turkish  suzerain,  of  two  Roumanian 
provinces  to  alien  rule — Bukovina  to  Austria  in  1775, 
and  Bessarabia  to  Russia  in  181 2.  It  is  but  just  to  point 
out  that  the  Hospodar  of  Moldavia,  Gregory  Ghika, 
vigorously  protested  against  this  surrender  of  Bukovina, 
and  with  it  of  the  ancient  capital  of  Moldavia,  Suceava  ; 
but  even  his  threats  of  alliance  with  Russia  failed  to 
alarm  the  Porte,  who  knew  only  too  well  its  vassal's  im- 
potence. At  that  period,  moreover,  Russia  and  Austria 
were  marching  hand  in  hand,  and  the  latter's  acquisition 
of  Bukovina,  following  upon  the  first  partition  of  Poland, 
filled  only  a  small  place  in  Joseph  II. 's  ambitious  designs 
for  the  partition  of  the  Sultan's  dominions,  by  which  he 
h'imself  should  obtain  Belgrade  and  the  Danubian  pro- 
vinces (in  addition  to  the  Dalmatian  coast-line,  then  in 
Venetian  hands),  while  Crimea  and  Bessarabia  should 
fall  to  Russia  and  the  remnants  of  Turkey  should  be 
guaranteed  by  the  Great  Powers.       The  war  of   1789, 


62     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

with  its  crowning  incident,  the  capture  of  Belgrade  by 
Laudon,  seemed  to  be  the  forerunner  of  such  a  partition, 
but  the  death  of  Joseph  II.  and  the  outbreak  of  the  re- 
volutionary wars  soon  put  an  end  to  all  idea  of  Austria's 
expansion  to  the  Black  Sea.  Indeed,  so  far  from  being 
free  to  acquire  fresh  provinces,  Austria  ere  long  found 
her  own  existence  at  stake,  and  in  1809,  as  the  result  of 
Napoleon's  victorious  campaigns,  had  to  submit — in 
common  with  her  future  rival,  Prussia — to  a  serious  cur- 
tailment of  territory,  and  even  to  her  exclusion  from  the 
Adriatic.  The  influence  of  Napoleon  throughout  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  was,  as  everywhere  else  in  Europe, 
that  of  an  awakener,  but  the  immediate  result  of  the 
Napoleonic  era  was  disastrous  to  the  Danubian  princi- 
palities. While  endeavouring  to  exploit  Polish  national 
feeling  for  his  own  ends,  Napoleon  treated  Wallachia 
and  Moldavia  merely  as  useful  pawns  in  the  game  of 
setting  Austria  and  Russia  by  the  ears  :  and  in  1812  the 
Tsar,  whose  army  of  occupation  had  governed  the  pro- 
vinces for  the  past  six  years,  received  from  Turkey  as 
the  price  of  evacuation  the  eastern  portion  of  Moldavia, 
known  as  Bessarabia. 

In  the  fifty  years  which  preceded  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  the  Principalities  had  been  exposed  to  equal 
danger  from  Vienna  and  from  Petrograd;  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  the  dominant  factor  which  determined 
their  fate  still  continued  to  be  the  rivalry  of  Austria  and 
Russia  for  influence  upon  the  Lower  Danube.  Each 
time  that  Russia  went  to  war  with  the  Turks  she  occupied 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  both  as  an  obvious  milestone 
on  the  road  of  territorial  advance,  and  as  a  convenient 
hostage  to  bargain  with  at  the  close  of  hostilities.  In 
less  than  sixty  years  there  were  no  fewer  than  five  foreign 
occupations,  four  Russian  and  one  Austrian.  Thus  the 
Tsar's  troops  held  Jassy  and  Bucarest  from  1806  to 
1 81 2,  from   1828  to  1834,  from   1848  to  1849,  and  from 


MODERN  ROUMANIA  63 

1853  t0  1854,  their  place  being  filled  during  the  Crimean 
War  by  the  Austrian  army.  The  solitary  advantage 
which  accrued  to  the  inhabitants  was  the  Reglement 
Organique,  a  Constitution  which  the  Russians  left  be- 
hind them  on  their  withdrawal  in  1834,  and  which,  inade- 
quate as  it  was,  at  least  showed  some  slight  improvement 
upon  its  predecessors  and  contained  the  germs  of  future 
liberty. 

This  perpetual  recurrence  of  foreign  intervention  not 
unnaturally  gave  a  further  impetus  to  reviving  national 
feeling.  Under  the  influence  of  the  French  Revolution 
the  idea  of  nationality  had  made  its  entry,  not  only  into 
Italy  and  Hungary,  but  also  into  the  Balkans.  The 
Serbs  were  the  first  Balkan  people  to  assert  their  liberty.1 
But  in  Roumania  also  a  popular  movement  broke  out  in 
182 1  under  the  peasant  leader,  Tudor  Vladimirescu,  and 
though  the  insurrection  proved  abortive,  it  none  the  less 
ended  the  Phanariot  regime  and  secured  for  the  two 
Principalities  the  right  to  elect  their  own  rulers. 

From  1 82 1  till  the  outbreak  of  the  Crimean  War  Rus- 
sian influence  was  really  all-powerful  in  the  Principali- 
ties, which  continued,  as  before,  under  the  ban  of  Austro- 
Russian  rivalry.  But  it  was  neither  in  Petrograd  nor 
in  Vienna,  but  in  Paris,  that  the  young  Roumanians  of 
the  early  nineteenth  century  sought  the  training  and 
inspiration  necessary  to  regenerate  their  country.  The 
French  influence,  which  for  good  or  for  evil  has  done  so 
much  to  mould  modern  Roumania,  owes  its  origin  to  the 
Phanariot  princes,  whose  families,  amid  the  barbarous 
atmosphere  of  Stambul,  sought  to  link  themselves  with 
Western  culture  by  a  study  of  the  French  language. 
This  outward  veneer  of  civilisation  followed  them  to  their 
courts   in    Bucarest   and   Jassy.     At  first  adopted   as  a 

1  Incidentally,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  the  movements  for 
Greek,  and  later  for  Bulgarian,  freedom  were  organised  on 
Roumanian  soil,  Bucarest  being  the  centre  of  the  imigris. 


64     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

mere  social  pose  by  the  young  and  wealthy  boyars, 
French  ideas  began  to  strike  root  among  the  small 
educated  class,  and,  as  the  spirit  of  nationality  raised  its 
head,  were  fostered  by  a  grovning  consciousness  of  the 
Latin  origin  of  the  race.  All  the  young  Roumanian 
patriots  made  Paris  their  headquarters,  and  fell  under 
the  influence  of  the  French  Liberals  and  of  Mazzini  and 
his  school.  The  revolution  of  1848 — "a  stray  spark  from 
Paris,"  as  it  has  been  called — failed  by  reason  of  the 
inexperience  of  its  promoters,  their  lack  of  any  practical 
programme  and  the  apathy  of  the  masses,  in  whose  mind 
the  land  was  the  all-absorbing  question.  But  it  brought 
to  the  front  the  future  makers  of  Roumania,  men  like 
Kogalniceanu,  Bratianu  and  Rosetti,  and  taught  them 
the  need  for  united  effort. 

The  Russian  armies  which  in  1849  crushed  Magyar 
resistance  to  the  House  of  Habsburg  had  no  difficulty  in 
restoring  the  status  quo  in  Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  and 
in  imposing  the  Tsar's  will  upon  the  new  Hospodars. 
Thus  the  annus  mirabilis,  as  was  only  natural,  did  not 
leave  the  same  impress  upon  the  east  as  upon  the  west  of 
Europe.  The  first  vital  change  in  the  situation  was 
caused  by  the  Russian  evacuation  in  1854,  rendered 
necessary  by  the  attitude  of  the  Western  Powers  in 
espousing  the  Turkish  cause.  No  sooner  had  the  Rus- 
sians withdrawn  than  their  place  was  taken  by  an 
Austrian  army  of  occupation,  which  remained  in  posses- 
sion until  long  after  the  close  of  the  Crimean  War.  The 
Congress  of  Paris  (1856),  like  its  famous  predecessor  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  and  its  successor  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  showed  but  little  consideration  for  the  wishes  of 
the  peoples  whose  fate  depended  upon  its  decisions.  One 
of  its  endeavours  was  to  repress  the  growing  movement 
in  favour  of  union  between  the  two  Principalities.  In- 
deed it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  each  of  the  Great 
Powers  in  turn— notably  Great  Britain,  which  in  those 


MODERN  ROUMANIA  65 

days  upheld  as  a  dogma  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire — ran  counter  to  Roumanian  aspirations,  and 
assumed  the  attitude  of  a  domineering  schoolmaster  rather 
than  that  of  a  powerful  friend  and  mentor.  Napoleon 
III.  alone  showed  genuine  sympathy  and  under- 
standing for  the  Roumanian  cause.  When,  in  1857,  a 
secret  Anglo-Austrian  agreement  led  to  a  flagrant 
"cooking"  of  the  elections  in  a  sense  hostile  to  the  union, 
Napoleon  compelled  the  Porte  to  declare  them  invalid, 
and  in  the  same  year  his  skilful  diplomacy  won  over  the 
vanquished  Tsar  to  his  own  modified  interpretation  of  the 
Eastern  Question.  The  Conference  in  Paris,  which  re- 
sulted from  the  meeting  of  the  two  Emperors  at  Stuttgart, 
was  the  prelude  to  the  birth  of  a  new  state  in  south-east 
Europe.  The  farce  of  separate  legislatures,  each  electing 
its  own  prince,  was  still  solemnly  maintained,  but  a  Joint 
Commission  and  a  Supreme  Court  were  instituted,  and 
the  paradoxal  title  of  "the  United  Principalities"  was 
conceded.  Such  an  arrangement  could  only  be  provi- 
sional ;  the  efforts  of  the  Powers  were  of  no  avail  to  dam 
up  the  rising  tide  of  popular  feeling,  and  early  in  1858 
the  two  assemblies  in  Bucarest  and  Jassy  elected  almost 
simultaneously  one  and  the  same  person  as  their  prince. 
"We  have,"  said  Kogalniceanu,  speaking  in  the  name  of 
Moldavia,  "the  same  origin  as  our  brothers  (of  Wal- 
lachia),  the  same  name  and  language,  the  same  faith  and 
history,  the  same  institutions,  laws  and  customs  ;  we  share 
the  same  hopes  and  fears ;  the  same  frontiers  are  placed 
under  our  care.  In  the  past  we  have  suffered  the  same 
eriefs,  and  we  now  have  to  assure  for  ourselves  the  same 
future." 

At  first  the  new  prince,  Alexander  Cuza,  was  exposed 
to  grave  danger  of  intervention,  and  was  obliged  to  sub- 
mit to  a  double  investiture  and  to  maintain  two  separate 
ministries,  but  the  outbreak  of  war  between  Austria  and 
Napoleon  III.,  by  paralysing  all  opposition  from  Vienna, 

F 


66     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

considerably  strengthened  Cuza's  position.  In  1861  the 
Porte  conceded  the  union  of  the  two  assemblies,  and  on 
December  23rd  of  that  year  the  prince  was  able  to 
address  to  his  people  a  proclamation  which  culminated 
in  the  words,  "The  Roumanian  nation  is  founded." 

The  eight  years  of  Cuza's  rule  (1858-1866)  were 
marked  by  many  internal  reforms — notably  the  seques- 
tration of  Church  lands;  the  foundation  of  the  two 
Roumanian  universities;  the  severance  of  the  Church 
from  the  corrupt  and  numbing  influence  of  the  Greek 
Patriarchate,  and  the  emancipation  of  the  peasantry,  if 
not  from  all,  at  any  rate  from  the  worst,  of  their  feudal 
grievances.  But  his  virtues  and  his  faults  alike — on  the 
one  hand  his  genuine  zeal  for  national  progress,  and  on 
the  other  the  scandals  of  his  private  life  and  his  contempt 
for  constitutional  forms — aroused  the  antagonism  of  the 
great  families,  who  had  hitherto  enjoyed  and  were 
anxious  to  retain  a  monopoly  of  government.  The  coup 
d'etat  of  1864  was  an  attempt  on  Cuza's  part  to  follow 
in  the  footsteps  of  his  patron  Napoleon  III.;  but  the 
prince,  who  owed  his  election  precisely  to  the  fact  that 
he  did  not  belong  to  what  might  be  called  the  papabill 
families,  lacked  the  prestige  and  endurance  necessary  to 
impose  his  will  upon  the  country.  Moreover,  the  liberal 
nature  of  his  innovations  was  counter-balanced  by  .the 
suspension  of  Press  freedom — a  measure  all  the  more 
reactionary  in  a  country  where  the  Press  was  still  in  its 
first  childhood.  In  short,  he  attempted  to  play  at  benevo- 
lent despotism  tempered  by  universal  suffrage,  though  he 
was  fully  conscious  that  the  latter  must  be  a  mere  farce 
among  a  population  so  unripe  in  political  training.  His 
wholesale  imitation  of  French  institutions  and  methods 
of  government  showed  too  little  regard  for  the  social  and 
economic  needs  of  his  fellow-countrymen.  It  is  not 
without  reason  that  Professor  Xenopol  has  described  the 
Roumanian  state  as  "the  creation  of  France"  :  but  there 


MODERN   ROUMANIA  67 

can  be  no  doubt  that  Cuza's  over-haste  led  to  a  slavish 
reproduction  of  French  ideas,  without  any  real  effort  to 
winnow  the  good  from  the  bad. 

In  February,  1866,  the  dissatisfaction  came  to  a  head; 
Cuza  was  forced  to  abdicate  and  to  cross  the  frontier,  and 
disappeared  completely  from  the  scene.  The  vacant 
throne  was  somewhat  hurriedly  offered  to  the  Count  of 
Flanders— the  father  of  King-  Albert  of  Belgium — 
and  on  his  refusal  to  accept  a  position  which  seemed 
so  precarious,  the  unanimous  choice  of  the  Roumanian 
Chamber  fell  upon  Prince  Charles,  a  younger  son 
of  the  Catholic  and  South  German  branch  of  the 
House  of  Hohenzollern.  Strangely  enough,  while 
King  William  of  Prussia  showed  scruples  in  sanctioning 
his  young  kinsman's  acceptance,  his  candidature  was 
eagerly  approved  by  the  same  Napoleon  III.,  who  four 
years  later  vetoed,  with  such  disastrous  effects,  the  can- 
didature of  Prince  Charles's  brother  Leopold  for  the 
crown  of  Spain.1  "Accept,"  Bismarck  had  said  to  the 
hesitating  prince,  "it  will  at  any  rate  be  an  agreeable 
souvenir  for  your  old  age."  The  support  of  France 
more  than  counter-balanced  the  disapproval  of  Austria, 
and  for  the  second  time  within  a  decade  all  possibility 
of  active  interference  from  Vienna  was  frustrated  by  the 
outbreak  of  war,  this  time  between  Austria  and  Prussia. 
Prince  Charles,  in  the  disguise  of  a  bespectacled  com- 
mercial traveller,  passed  down  the  Danube  on  an  Austrian 
river  steamer,  and  was  welcomed  on  Roumanian  terri- 
tory by  the  Liberal  leader,  Ion  Bratianu,  whose  active 
intervention  in  Paris  had  been  one  of  the  decisive  factors 
in  his  selection.  For  many  years  the  incident  of  his  first 
entry  supplied  his  enemies  with  a  cheap  gibe  against 
"Bratianu's  lackey." 

The  accession  of  Prince  Charles  may  be  regarded  as  the 

1  Charles's  mother,   it  should   be   remembered,   was   related   to 
the  Bonaparte  and  Beauharnais  families. 

F    2 


68     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

chief  turning  point  in  all  Roumanian  history.  His  long 
reign  of  forty-eight  years  has  completely  transformed 
Roumania  from  a  corrupt  and  backward  dependency  of 
the  Turks  to  much  the  most  powerful  independent  state 
in  south-east  Europe,  and  a  very  large  share  of  the  credit 
for  this  transformation  falls  to  King  Charles  himself, 
alike  as  statesman,  as  soldier  and  as  organiser.  At  first 
hampered  by  the  unfriendly  attitude  of  the  Powers,  and 
by  the  strained  resources  of  an  undeveloped  country,  the 
new  sovereign  found  it  necessary  on  more  than  one 
occasion  to  submit  to  humiliating  treatment  from  the 
Porte.  For  ten  years  his  entire  efforts  were  devoted  to 
organising  the  Roumanian  army  on  Prussian  models, 
and  to  introducing  order  into  the  country's  finances.  It 
was  to  take  twenty  years  before  the  chronic  deficit  dis- 
appeared :  but  a  reform  of  the  coinage,  the  sale  of  state 
lands,  and  the  creation  of  a  tobacco  monopoly  paved  the 
way  for  that  brilliant  financial  revival  which  was  to  mark 
the  opening  years  of  the  twentieth  century.  At  the  same 
time,  in  circumstances  of  extreme  difficulty,  and  in  spite 
of  many  a  scurrilous  attack,  Prince  Charles  consistently 
adhered  to  the  principle  of  constitutional  government. 
His  natural  sympathy  with  Bratianu  and  the  Liberal 
party  rendered  him  not  a  whit  the  less  loyal  in  his  sup- 
port of  their  Conservative  rivals  when  the  Chamber 
brought  them  into  power.  Thus  for  a  whole  generation, 
while  Serbia  was  the  scene  of  repeated  coups  d'etat  and 
political  scandals,  while  in  Bulgaria,  despite  wonderful 
progress,  the  representative  idea  has  always  been  ruth- 
lessly subordinated  to  the  will  of  the  sovereign,  while 
Turkey  groaned  under  the  Hamidian  despotism  and 
Greece  still  waited  for  the  statesman  who  was  to  free  her 
from  the  ban  of  political  anarchism,  Roumania,  alone  of 
all  the  Balkan  states,  could  boast  of  an  uninterrupted 
constitutional  development. 


CHAPTER  VII 

BULGARIA    UNDER    THE    TURKISH    YOKE 

The  last  of  all  the  Balkan  races  to  regain  its  liberty 
was  the  Bulgarian;  yet  even  this  is  scarcely  an  accurate 
statement,  since  the  freedom  of  Bulgaria  was  in  the 
main  won  for  her  by  others,  not  by  herself.  In  approach- 
ing Bulgarian  history,  and,  above  all,  the  relations  of 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the  two 
nations  are  to-day  in  very  much  the  same  stage  of  de- 
velopment as  England  and  Scotland  in  the  four- 
teenth or  fifteenth  centuries.  In  that  period  and  even 
much  later — as  the  result  of  the  fatal  policy  of  the  first  of 
England's  "lawyer  statesmen,"  Edward  I. — the  fierce 
mutual  hatred  of  the  two  neighbours  could  hardly  be 
exaggerated.  And  yet  their  eventual  union  was  abso- 
lutely inevitable,  though  we,  who  are  wise  after  the 
event,  must  be  careful  not  to  reproach  our  ancestors  un- 
duly for  their  national  blindness.  The  same  principle 
applies  to  the  rival  branches  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  who 
have  no  real  future  unless  and  until  they  agree  among 
themselves.  Just  as  Scotland  was  too  weak  and  poor 
ever  to  attain  unaided  to  national  greatness,  but  was 
always  strong  enough  to  hamper  and  endanger  Eng- 
land's movements  at  every  turn  by  an  alliance  with  the 
French,  so  Serb  and  Bulgar  by  their  internedine  warfare 
have  enabled  alien  Powers  to  overwhelm  or  in  modern 
times  to  control  the  destinies  of  the  Balkan   Peninsula. 


70     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Just  as  the  real  greatness  of  England  begins  with  the 
period  when  her  relations  with  Scotland  were  at  last  put 
upon  a  tolerable  footing,  so  a  definite  accord  between 
Serb  and  Bulgar  would  obviously  be  the  prelude  of  a 
new  era  in  the  history  of  Balkan  independence.  Just  as 
Prussia's  predominant  position  in  Central  Europe  is 
very  largely  due  to  fomenting  the  Russo-Polish  quarrel, 
so  Austria-Hungary  has  tried  to  gain  a  foot-hold  in  the 
Balkans  by  fomenting  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  feud,  and 
only  reconciliation  between  the  two  kinsmen  can  per- 
manently redeem  the  situation. 

The  Bulgars  are  the  most  easterly  of  the  four  branches 
of  the  Southern  Slavs.  A  certain  school  of  modern 
writers  claims  descent  from  the  ancient  Thracians,  who, 
they  argue,  were  a  Slavonic  tribe;  but  this  thesis  cannot 
be  proved  for  lack  of  evidence.  A  number  of  Slavonic 
tribes  did,  it  is  true,  invade  the  peninsula  between  the 
third  and  seventh  centuries,  and  doubtless  some  of  their 
blood  still  flows  in  the  veins  of  some  modern  Bulgarians. 
But  the  real  Bulgarians  were  a  Turanian  race,  related  to 
the  long  since  vanished  Avars  and  Petchenegs  and  to 
the  still  surviving  races  of  Taitars,  Huns,  Finns,  Mag- 
yars and  Turks.1  Their  original  home  lay  between 
the  Ural  Mountains  and  the  River  Volga,  from  which 
the  name  "Bolgar"  is  generality  derived.  At  first  form- 
ing a  savage  nomad  state,  warlike  and  polygamous,  they 
moved  slowly  westward  under  their  native  Khans.  In 
the  year  679  they  crossed  the  Danube  and  defeated  the 
Emperor  Constantine,  while  other  hordes  remained  be- 
hind in  the  Volga  districts  and  yet  others  penetrated  into 
the  southern  plains  of  Hungary. 

In  the  course  of  the  next  two  centuries  the  Bulgars  did 

1  Much  controversy  has  raged  over  Bulgarian  origins.  The 
reader  may  still  be  referred  to  the  works  of  two  great  Slavonic 
scholar^;  SafcSrik,  Slawische  Altertumer,  and  Jirecek,  Geschichlr 
der  Bidgaren. 


BULGARIA  UNDER  THE  TURKISH  YOKE   71 

what  the  Normans  did  in  England  and  in  Sicily,  though 
they  undoubtedly  formed  the  larger  portion  of  the  popu- 
lation. After  conquering  the  country  and  giving  it 
their  name,  they  adopted  its  language  and  at  last 
became  completely  assimilated.  Even  in  the  eighth 
century  we  read  that  the  Bulgarian  prince  had  among  his 
counsellors  men  who  spoke  "Greek,  Bulgarian  and 
Slav."  A  certain  parallel  may  perhaps  be  drawn  be- 
tween the  Bulgars  and  the  band  of  Scandinavian  adven- 
turers in  Russia,  who  imposed  upon  a  group  of  scattered 
and  disorganised  tribes  a  definite  state  organisation  and 
a  national  name,  and  then  became  merged  in  the  sub- 
jected population. 

During  the  eighth  century  we  find  the  Bulgarians  in- 
volved in  repeated  and  bloody  conflicts  with  Byzantium, 
of  which  the  most  notable  were  the  seven  campaigns  of 
Constantine  V.  With  the  dawn  of  the  ninth  century 
there  arose  the  mightiest  of  all  Bulgarian  rulers,  the 
shadowy  figure  of  Krum,  whose  kingdom  stretched  from 
the  Carpathians  far  into  Thrace  and  included  portions 
of  Southern  and  Eastern  Hungary.  In  811  Krum  de- 
feated and  killed  the  Emperor  Nicephorus  after  fearful 
carnage,  and  conquered  Adrianople;  but  for  his  death 
three  years  later  Byzantium  itself  might  have  become  his 
prey.  Scarcely  less  remarkable  as  a  ruler  was  Bori? 
(852-888),  whose  reign  coincided  with  the  epoch-making 
activity  of  the  Slav  apostles,  Cyril  and  Methodius.  These 
two  men,  the  sons  of  a  high  officer  in  Thessalonica,  who 
was  probably  of  Slav  birth,1  were  the  inventors  of  the 
so-called  Glagolitic  alphabet,2  and  thus  the  real  founders 
of  "Old  Slavonic,"  the  parent  language  of  Slav  litur- 
gies and  literatures.  At  this  distance  of  time  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  determine  what  language  they  took  as  the 

1  Jirecek,  Gesch.  der  Bulgaren,  p.  151. 

2  Based   on   Greek   minuscule    characters,   but   adapted   to    Slav 
phonetics. 


72     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

basis  of  their  alphabet,  but  it  is  probable  that  they  used 
the  Slav  dialect  then  spoken  in  Eastern  Macedonia,  add- 
ing various  linguistic  ingredients  which  we  should  to- 
day call  Slovak,  Slovene,  and  Wend.  It  is  a  matter  of 
common  knowledge  that  their  chief  labours  were  among 
the  Pannonian  Slavs,  and  in  the  powerful  but  short-lived 
Moravian  Empire,  whose  capital,  Nitra,  was  Methodius's 
archiepiscopal  scat ;  and  the  chief  Slavistic  authorities  of 
the  present  day  are  inclined  to  reject  the  theories  which 
identify  "Old  Slavonic"  with  "Old  Bulgarian"  or 
"Old  Slovene,"  but  rather  to  treat  it  as  a  composite  and 
theoretical  language.1 

The  exact  connection  of  the  Slav  apostles  with  Bul- 
garia is  not  known  ;  but  emissaries  from  the  Court  of 
Rastislav  of  Moravia  appear  to  have  brought  Chris- 
tianity to  the  Court  of  Boris,  who,  like  many  pagan  chiefs 
before  him,  found  its  adoption  to  be  indispensable  if  he 
was  to  hold  his  own  against  his  Christian  neighbours, 
and  who  eventually  died  in  the  odour  of  sanctity  as  a 
Christian  monk. 

Yet  another  name  is  worthy  of  mention  among  the 
early  rulers  of  Bulgaria.  Simeon  (893-927)  nearly  suc- 
ceeded in  destroying  the  Eastern  Empire,  and  gave  public 
proof  of  his  intentions  by  himself  assuming  the  title  of 
Emperor  and  proclaiming  a  Bulgarian  Patriarchate.  He 
thus  aspired  to  make  of  his  capital,  Preslav,  a  town 
situated  some  30  miles  west  of  Varna,  both  the  civil 
and  ecclesiastical  rival  of  Byzantium. 

Under  Simeon's  successors  Bulgaria  fell  into  two 
halves,  the  eastern,  corresponding  to  the  Bulgaria  of 
1908,  weakened  by  Russian  invasions  and  finally  crushed 
in  971  by  the  Byzantines;  the  western,  corresponding  to 
the  Macedonia  and  Southern  Albania  of  modern  times. 
After  the  fall  of  the  former  the  Bulgarian  centre  of 
gravity  was  transferred  to  Prespa  and  Ohrida,  which 
1  See  Jagic,  Zur  Entstehungsgeschichte. 


BULGARIA  UNDER  THE  TURKISH  YOKE   73 

became  the  capitals  of  a  new  dynasty.  Samuel,  during 
his  long  reign  (976-1014),  extended  his  frontiers  as  far 
as  Durazzo  and  the  future  Montenegro,  and  was  engaged 
in  almost  perpetual  war  with  the  reviving  power  of 
Byzantium.  Finally  his  enemy,  Basil  II.,  won  a  decisive 
victory  at  the  battle  of  Belasica,  north-east  of  Salonica, 
and  earned  for  himself  the  title  of  "Bulgaroktonos,"  by 
a  deed  of  unexampled  horror  even  in  that  cruel  age.  By 
his  orders  the  15,000  Bulgarian  prisoners  were  blinded, 
every  hundredth  man  being  left  with  one  eye,  that  he 
might  serve  as  a  guide  to  his  helpless  comrades;  and  it 
is  recorded  that  when  this  mutilated  remnant  of  an 
army  reached  Ohrida,  the  old  Tsar  died  of  mingled  grief 
and  fury.  From  1018  to  1186  Bulgaria  lay  under  the 
yoke  of  the  Greeks ;  the  dynasty  came  to  an  end,  the  Pat- 
riarchate was  suppressed,  though  other  essential  features 
of  the  Bulgarian  ecclesiastical  organisation  were  allowed 
to  survive.1  But  though  the  death  of  Basil  was  followed 
by  growing  corruption  and  inanition  in  the  body  politic, 
it  was  not  till  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century  that  the  Bul- 
garians were  again  able  to  raise  their  heads  as  an  inde- 
pendent people. 

Throughout  this  early  period  there  was  a  remarkable 
spread  of  the  mysterious  Manichagan  heresy  known  as 
Bogomilism.  Its  founder,  Bogomil  (beloved  of  God), 
was  a  ninth-centurv  mystic,  who  in  the  solitude  of  his 
cell  had  assimilated  and  developed  the  strange  doctrines 
which  he  imbibed  on  his  travels  in  the  East.  His  theory 
of  the  duality  in  religious  life,  of  the  struggle  between 
a  Good  and  an  Evil  Deity,  is  obviously  Oriental  in  its 
origin.  In  the  course  of  time  his  teachings  were  modi- 
fied by  his  pupils.  Satan  was  no  longer  regarded  as 
a  rival  being  to  God  since  the  beginning  of  time,  but 

1  The  Church  of  Ohrida  remained  autocephalous,  but  generally 
with  a  Greek  prelate  at  its  head.  See  Jire£ek,  op.  cit.,  p.  201, 
and  Gelzer,  Der  PatriarcJiat  von  Aclirida. 


74     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

as  a  fallen  angel  whose  power  was  not  yet  exhausted. 
The  zeal  with  which  the  enemies  of  this  sect  destroyed 
their  manuscripts  leaves  us  to-day  in  some  doubt  as  to 
their  exact  tenets,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  their 
ascetic  enthusiasm  for  Christianity  in  its  most  primitive 
form,  and  as  to  their  advanced  views  on  social  matters. 
Their  influence  spread  rapidly  through  the  Balkan  Penin- 
sula, taking  especial  root  in  Bulgaria  and  Bosnia,  and 
finally  perpetuating  itself  in  the  west  in  the  form  of  the 
Albigensians,  Patarines,  Cathars  and  Waldensians.  It 
was  above  all  the  brutal  persecutions  to  which  they  were 
subjected  in  Bosnia  that  were  responsible  for  the  collapse 
of  that  kingdom  before  the  Turks  and  for  the  wholesale 
conversions  to  Islam  which  followed. 

The  second  Bulgarian  Empire,  or,  as  modern  writers 
more  accurately  describe  it,  the  Bulgaro-Rouman  Em- 
pire (i  186-1398)  was  founded  by  two  brothers  who  were 
almost  certainly  Vlachs  by  race,  though  they  claimed 
descent  from  the  ancient  Bulgarian  Tsars.  The  greatest 
of  all,  Kalojan  (Calojoannes)  made  Trnovo  his  capital, 
and  in  the  year  1204  allowed  himself  to  be  crowned  by 
a  Cardinal  Legate  sent  by  the  greatest  of  the  Popes, 
Innocent  III.  This  was,  of  course,  a  purely  political 
move,  intended  to  strengthen  his  position  against  Byzan- 
tium. How  little  he  cared  about  the  respective  merits  of 
Rome  and  Byzantium  was  very  clearly  shown  by  the  atti- 
tude to  the  Latin  onslaught  upon  Constantinople,  when  he 
played  very  much  the  same  game  as  his  astute  successor, 
Ferdinand  of  Coburg,  and  remained  watchfully  neutral 
until  Latins  and  Greeks  had  weakened  each  other.  In 
1205  he  fell  upon  Baldwin,  the  first  Latin  Emperor,  and 
captured  him  at  the  battle  of  Adrianople ;  rumour,  but 
not  history,  records  the  victim's  subsequent  fate.  Under 
Kalojan's  successor  John  Asen  II.  (1218-1241)  Bulgaria 
reached  its  zenith  and  established  herself  upon  the  three 
seas— the  Black,  the   ^Egean,  and  the  Adriatic— to  the 


BULGARIA  UNDER  THE  TURKISH  YOKE   75 

possession  of  which  Sofia's  modern  patriots  aspire. 
Macedonia,  Belgrade  and  Durazzo  recognised  his 
authority,  and  Trnovo,  as  capital  of  the  Tsar  and  seat 
of  the  Patriarch,  defied  the  anathemas  of  both  Rome  and 
Byzantium.  But  the  later  rulers  of  the  Asenide  dynasty 
were  no  longer  worthy  of  its  founder.  Bulgaria  soon 
lost  Thrace  and  Macedonia  once  more,  waning  in  the 
west  before  the  rising  power  of  mediaeval  Serbia  and 
driven  back  in  the  east  by  the  Greeks  after  the  expulsion 
of  the  degenerate  Latin  conquerors.  Serbia,  as  we  have 
seen,  reached  its  height  in  the  fourteenth  century  under 
Stephen  Dusan,  who  was  actually  threatening  Con- 
stantinople at  his  death.  But  that  event  had  been  pre- 
ceded by  a  fatal  quarrel  between  Serbs  and  Bulgars,  cul- 
minating in  the  battle  of  Velbuzd  in  1330.  In  it  the 
Bulgarian  Tsar  lost  his  life,  Serbian  supremacy  was 
assured  for  the  moment  and  Bulgaria  sank  to  the  level 
of  a  vassal  State.  But  the  feud  led  inevitably  to  the 
undoing  of  both  races,  and  made  the  entry  of  the  Turks 
possible,  just  as  to-day  the  old  quarrel,  fomented  by  Turk, 
German  and  Magyar  in  alliance,  threatens  to  destroy 
Balkan  independence  once  more.  The  desperate  appeal 
of  the  Byzantine  Emperor  was  disregarded  by  both  Serb 
and  Bulbar,  though  he  is  said  to  have  warned  them  that 
they  would  rue  the  day  when  they  left  him  unsupported. 
The  jealousies  of  the  small  Christian  Powers  directly 
furthered  the  Turkish  conquest,  just  as  those  of  the  Great 
Powers  retarded  time  after  time  the  day  of  deliverance, 
and  just  as  since  1912  the  jealousies  of  the  Balkan  Allies, 
skilfully  played  upon  from  without,  have  restored  dis- 
cord, weakness  and  misery  to  the  reviving  peninsula. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  Serbian  Empire  perished 
at  the  memorable  battle  of  Kosovo  (1389) ;  and  that  event 
was  followed  four  years  later  by  the  fall  of  Trnovo,  the 
death  of  the  last  Bulgarian  Tsar,  Sisman,  on  the  battle- 
field,  the   removal  of  the  Bulgarian   Patriarch  to   Asia 


76     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Minor  and  the  subjection  of  his  Church  to  the  Greek 
Patriarchate  in  Constantinople  (1393).  A  few  last  frag- 
ments of  independence  still  lingered  in  the  peninsula. 
King  Marko  ruled  in  Prilep  as  a  periodic  vassal  of  the 
Turks,  and  has  gone  down  to  history  as  the  hero  of 
countless  ballads,  Serb,  Croat,  Bulgarian,  and  even  Al- 
banian. King  Tvrtko  of  Bosnia  for  a  brief  space  of 
time  seemed  about  to  create  a  new  Slav  state  upon  the 
Adriatic;  but  his  death  in  1391  left  no  one  to  carry  on 
his  ideas.  Mircea  the  Old,  as  Prince  of  Wallachia 
(1386-1418),  drove  out  the  invading  Turks  and  colla- 
borated with  the  Magyars  in  their  gallant  attempt  to  save 
Bulgaria.  But  Sigismund  suffered  a  crushing  defeat  at 
Nicopolis  in  1396  and  only  with  difficulty  made  his  A\ay 
back  to  Hungary.  One  final  attempt  was  made  to  rescue 
the  fast  disappearing  Balkan  kingdoms  from  the  Turkish 
flood;  but  Vladislav,  who  as  King  of  both  Hungary  and 
Poland  represented  a  really  powerful  combination, 
perished  on  the  fatal  field  of  Varna  (1444).  The  last 
effort  of  Europe  had  failed,  and  only  nine  years  later  the 
victorious  Sultan  rode  his  charger  into  the  church  of 
Agia  Sofia.  Lack  of  unity  and  co-operation  had  de- 
livered the  Christians  into  the  hands  of  the  Turks.  The 
last  to  fall  was  the  celebrated  Albanian  Prince,  George 
Castriota,  better  known  as  Scanderbeg,  who  is  still  the 
chief  hero  of  a  race  which  has  fewer  historical  records 
and  less  traces  of  culture  than  any  other  in  Europe. 
After  his  death  in  146S  the  old  obscurity  descends  upon 
their  mountain  fastnesses,  and  seems  to  cling  there 
without  a  single  break  until  the  second  decade  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

The  causes  of  Bulgaria's  fall  are  to  be  found  mainly 
in  the  corrupting  influence  of  Byzantium,  in  the  Bogo- 
mil  heresy  and. its  corrosive  force  (corresponding  to  that 
anarchical  trait  which  may  be  noticed  in  varying  degree 
among  all  Slavs,  but  which  is  especially  marked  among 


BULGARIA  UNDER  THE  TURKISH  YOKE      77 

the  Bulgars  and  Ukrainians),  and  in  the  short-sighted 
selfishness  of  the  great  feudal  nobles,  playing  for  their 
own  hands  and  failing  to  realise  that  they  were  working 
their  own  destruction.  Turkish  rule  in  Bulgaria  did  not 
differ  in  any  essential  feature  from  Turkish  rule  in  Serbia 
or  elsewhere,  but  nowhere  was  it  so  grinding  and  oppres- 
sive. This  is,  of  course,  due  to  the  fact  that  it  lay  nearest 
to  Stambul  and  formed  the  inevitable  route  of  every 
Turkish  advance  westward. 

One  positive  merit  the  Turkish  regime  can  boast ;  it 
preserved  more  fully  than  any  other  state  to  all  its  sub- 
jects that  career  open  to  the  talents  which  opens  the  road 
to  true  genius.  There  was  one  absolute  condition,  the 
acceptance  of  Islam,  but  that  step  once  taken,  all  doors 
were  open  to  the  newcomer,  just  as  in  modern  Hungary 
the  renegade  Slovak  or  Roumanian  can  always  be  sure  of 
a  smooth  political  career.  Nothing  is  more  remarkable 
than  the  spread  of  Slav  influences  in  the  Turkey  of 
Suleiman  the  Magnificent  and  his  successors.  In  1531, 
the  historian,  Paulus  Jovius,  tells  us  that  almost  the  en- 
tire corps  of  Janissaries  spoke  Slav.  The  Turkish  privi- 
leges granted  to  Ragusa  during  the  fifteenth  and  six- 
teenth centuries  and  all  correspondence  of  the  Sublime 
Porte  and  with  the  Republic  were  written  in  the  Ser- 
bian language.  John  Zapolya1  corresponded  with  the 
Grand  Vizier  in  Serb,  and  Sultan  Selim  II.  spoke  it 
fluently.  More  than  one  of  Turkey's  greatest  Viziers 
was  of  Slav  parentage,  notably  Mohammed  Sokolovic 
of  Bosnia,  and  Mohammed  Beg  of  Kosovo.  Baron 
Ungnad,  who  established  flourishing  Protestant  printing 
presses  at  Urach  and  Tubingen  for  the  publication  of 
books  in  Slovene,  and  in  the  Cyrilline  and  Glagolitic 
alphabets,  seriously  hoped  by  such  means  to  spread  Pro- 
testantism  among   the   Turks.     Indeed   it   is   hardly  an 

1  His  great  predecessor,  Matthias  Corvinus,  also  frequently  used 
Slav,  even  in  the  Hungarian  Diets. 


78     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

exaggeration  to  say  that  at  one  time  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire  bade  fair  to  become  Sla vised.1 

In  Bulgaria  the  only  remnants  of  ancient  liberty  that 
were  allowed  to  survive  were  the  "Vojnik"  villages, 
occupied  according'  to  a  rude  military  tenure  and  exempt 
from  taxation.  The  most  notable  of  these  was  Kopriv- 
stica.  Trade  was  concentrated  mainly  in  the  hands  of 
the  Vlachs,  whose  most  flourishing  centres  were  Mosco- 
polis  in  the  Pindus,  Arbanasi,  near  Trnovo,and  Krusevo, 
and  of  the  Ragusans,  who  for  centuries  maintained  colo- 
nies in  every  Balkan  town  of  any  importance — notably 
in  Skoplje,  Sofia,  Belgrade,  Novibazar  and  Sarajevo. 
Meanwhile  the  Phanariot  regime  dominated  ecclesiastical 
life;  Greek  influence  and  the  Greek  liturgy  were  every- 
where. After  a  precarious  existence  the  two  autoce- 
phalous  Serb  and  Bulgar  Churches,  of  Pec  (Ipek)  and 
Ohrida,  were  destroyed  in  1767,  as  the  result  of  Greek 
intrigue  at  the  Porte.  Hellenism  sought  more  and  more 
(and  for  a  long  time  succeeded  in  the  effort)  to  identify 
creed  and  nationality,  with  the  result  that  the  ignorant 
Bulgar  peasant,  when  questioned  as  to  his  nationality, 
would  answer  with  the  misleading  confession  that  he  was 
a  "Greek."  It  is  this  attitude  which  explains  the  failure 
of  superficial  travellers  to  detect  the  presence  of  Bul- 
garians in  Bulgaria  as  late  as  the  forties  of  last  century  ! 
A  phenomenon  familiar  to  all  students  of  Balkan  and 
Austro-Hungarian  problems  is  the  extraordinary  levity 
with  which  many  writers  have  placed  themselves  in  the 
hands  of  only  a  single  race  of  some  extremely  polyglot 
country,  and  have  sometimes  emerged  from  their  travels 
almost  without  perceiving  the  very  existence,  far  less 
recognising  the  national  traditions  and  aspirations,  of  the 
others. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  anarchy 
seemed  to  have  reached  its  height  in  the  Ottoman  Em- 

1   Jirccek,  op.   cit.,   pp.    jb<j,   451. 


BULGARIA   UNDER   THE  TURKISH   YOKE      79 

pire,  and  speedy  dissolution  was  regarded  on  many  sides 
as  inevitable.  Grave  symptoms  were  noticeable  in  the 
repeated  outbreak  of  disorder  in  the  provinces — the  mis- 
rule of  the  Dahis  in  Serbia,  which  provoked  Kara 
George's  rising,  the  depredations  of  Ali  Pasha,  and  the 
rise  of  other  local  tyrants  at  Skutari  and  Damascus,  at 
Acre  and  in  Egypt.  Next  to  Ali  Pasha  none  attained  to 
such  renown  in  his  day  as  Pasvan  Oglu,  a  Mohammedan 
Serb  from  Bosnia,  who  ruled  as  Pasha  of  Vidin,  on  the 
Danube.  Bulgaria  was  at  this  time  infested  by  the 
so-called  "  Kurdjalias,"  J  who  played  a  somewhat  similar 
role  to  the  Haiduks  and  Klephts  of  Serb  and  Greek  his- 
tory and  to  the  more  modern  Komitadjis,  and  whose  mis- 
deeds and  terrorism  are  still  a  living  memory  among  the 
Bulgarian  peasantry.  Pasvan  Oglu  actively  encouraged 
them  and  with  their  aid  defied  the  Porte ;  but  at  the  same 
time  he  always  took  care  to  pose  as  the  enemy,  not  of 
the  Sultan,  but  of  his  evil  counsellors.  In  1796  the 
Turks  besieged  Vidin  with  40,000  men,  but  without  suc- 
cess;  and  in  1798  the  siege  was  resumed  with  an  army  of 
twice  that  size.  But  after  six  months  the  expedition 
ended  in  disaster,  and  the  Sultan  soon  afterwards  found 
it  necessary  to  send  a  Pasha's  horse-tails  to  Pasvan  Oglu. 
The  latter's  arrogance  was  now  unbounded,  and  his 
prestige  enormous  throughout  the  Moslem  world.  The 
French  traveller,  Pouqueville,  records  that  in  1799  he 
heard  a  Turkish  sailor  openly  chanting  a  song  in  honour 
of  Pasvan,  in  the  presence  of  a  Turkish  officer  with  two 
executioners  at  his  side.  It  ran  as  follows:  "After 
100,000  bombs  have  been  thrown  at  Vidin,  I,  Pasvan 
Oglu,  the  Sultan's  hound,  the  slave  of  the  Sultana 
Valide,  have  raised  the  standard  of  revolt.  I,  Pasvan 
Oglu,  the  hound  of  the  Grand  Seignor,  I  bark  at  his 
Ministers.  I  will  do  homage  to  my  lord,  I  lick  the 
dust  from  his  feet,  I,  Pasvan  Oglu."-    Pasvan  remained 

1  A  Turkish  word  for  "robbers." 

3  Pouqueville,   Voyage  en  Grecc,  Vol.  I.,  522. 


80     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

undisturbed  until  his  death  in  1807.  His  career  had  con- 
tributed very  considerably  to  the  anarchy  in  Serbia  and 
to  the  consequent  insurrection.  Graphic  descriptions  of 
the  terrible  misery  inflicted  upon  Bulgaria  by  these 
repeated  conflicts  are  to  be  found  in  the  memoirs  of 
Bishop  Sofronij  of  Vraca,  one  of  the  earliest  Bulgarian 
patriots  and  writers. 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  an  outstanding 
feature  of  all  the  various  national  movements  in  the  Bal- 
kans and  in  Austria-Hungary — namely,  the  achievement 
of  a  few  philologists  and  historical  students,  in  reviving 
a  dead  mass  and  kindling  a  whole  nation  into  flame. 
This  was  especially  marked  in  Bohemia,  Hungary  and 
Croatia,  but  it  is  scarcely  less  true  of  Serbia,  Greece  and 
Roumania;  and  if  Bulgaria  has  produced  no  name  which 
can  be  placed  beside  Vuk  Karadzic,  Rhigas,  Korais  and 
Radulescu,  it  would  none  the  less  be  a  grave  error  to 
under-estimate  the  part  played  by  literary  effort  in  Bul- 
garia's awakening. 

In  1762,  Paisi,  a  Bulgarian  monk  on  Mt.  Athos, 
composed  "A  History  of  the  Bulgarian  Peoples,  Tsars 
and  Saints,"  which,  though  of  no  great  historical  value, 
was  of  immeasurable  influence  by  reason  of  its  fiery 
patriotism,  its  enthusiasm  for  a  great  past  and  a  long- 
neglected  dialect.  Copies  of  his  manuscript  soon  found 
their  way  through  all  Bulgarian  lands.  His  most  ardent 
pupil  and  the  perpetuator  of  his  tradition  was  Bishop 
Sofronij,  who  suffered  terribly  at  the  hands  of  the  Turks 
and  died  at  Bucarest  in  the  year  18 16.  The  chief  aim 
of  these  two  men  was  to  restore  the  mother  tongue  to 
the  place  usurped  by  Greek,  especially  in  the  Church, 
and  to  combat  the  unspeakable  corruption  of  the  Phana- 
riot  regime  both  in  ecclesiastical  and  civil  life.  It  was 
a  difficult,  uphill  fight,  for  Hellenism  had  its  claws  deep 
in  the  Bulgarian  Church.  The  liturgy,  the  schools  and 
the  clergy  alike  were  Greek;  and  not  content  with  this, 


BULGARIA  UNDER  THE  TURKISH  YOKE   81 

the  Church  authorities  adopted  a  grossly  reactionary 
and  intolerant  view,  systematically  tried  to  root  out 
everything  Slavonic  and  wrought  deliberate  havoc 
among  the  monuments  and  above  all  the  manuscripts 
of  the  historic  past.  In  this  vandalism  it  was  the  bishops 
who  set  the  example.  In  i8!25,  Ilarion,  the  Greek  Metro- 
politan of  Trnovo,  made  a  bonfire  of  the  old  library  of 
the  Bulgarian  Patriarchate,  which  till  then  had  survived 
all  the  vicissitudes  of  the  Turkish  era.  It  is  perhaps  only 
fair  to  add  that  these  habits  of  destruction  and  the  kin- 
dred practice  of  forging  historical  documents  or  monu- 
ments have  been  adopted  by  every  race  in  the  peninsula 
at  one  time  or  another.  Only  the  Turks  were  either  too 
lazy  or  too  contemptuous  to  indulge  in  such  competition. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  is  hardly  to  be  wondered 
at  that  even  the  most  celebrated  scholars  of  the  Slavonic 
world,  the  founders  of  Slav  philology,  on  a  modern  basis, 
men  like  Miklosich,  Kopitar  and  even  Safafik  himself, 
knew  very  little  of  the  Bulgarian  language.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  note,  however,  that  the  real  pioneer  of  literary 
effort  among  the  Bulgars  was  the  Slovak  scholar  Vene- 
lin,  whose  books  on  Bulgarian  history  prompted  the 
description  on  his  tomb  at  Odessa  as  "the  Awakener  of 
Bulgaria." 1  They  were  directly  responsible  for  the 
foundation  in  1835  of  the  first  Bulgarian  school 
at  Gabrovo,  now  the  chief  industrial  centre  of  the  modern 
kingdom.  Since  then  schools  have  multiplied  fast;  for 
the  Bulgar  has  in  modern  times  shown  a  greater  passion 
for  education  than  any  other  Balkan  race,  save  perhaps 
the  Greek.  A  little  earlier  a  Bulgarian  version  of  the 
New  Testament  was  printed  in  Bucarest. 

The  national  revival  naturally  took  two  forms.     The 

first,  or  more   peaceful,   expressed   itself   in   educational 

work  and  in  the  demand  for  a  national  episcopate.     In 

1848  the  first  Bulgarian  church  was  erected  in  Constan- 

1  Miller,  Ottoman  Empire,  p.  340. 


82     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

tinople,  and  its  clergy  omitted  the  name  of  the  Greek 
Patriarch  from  their  prayers.  Shortly  after  the  Crimean 
War  certain  Bulgarians  made  overtures  to  Rome,  in- 
spired, of  course,  by  purely  political  motives,  and  tempted 
by  the  eclipse  of  Russia  to  look  towards  the  west. 
Cankov  visited  Rome  and  induced  Pius  IX.  to  consecrate 
Sokolski,  an  ex-brigand  turned  monk,  as  the  first  arch- 
bishop of  the  Uniate  Church  of  Bulgaria.  That  this 
movement  was  stillborn  of  course  finds  its  explanation 
in  the  course  which  events  took  during  the  two  following 
decades.  Meanwhile,  there  was  a  growing  revolutionary 
movement  underground,  on  very  similar  lines  to  the 
Greek  Hetairia.  Bucarest  became  the  centre  of  the  Bul- 
garian political  emigration,  from  which  occasional  dis- 
turbances were  fomented  in  Bulgaria  itself.1  The  real 
founder  of  this  secret  propaganda  was  George  Rakovsky, 
poet,  journalist,  and  guerilla  leader,  who  published 
Bulgarian  newspapers  in  Belgrade  and  in  Novi  Sad 
(Neusatz),  was  the  friend  of  Jovan  Ristic  and  Ion 
Bratianu  and  eventually  died  at  Bucarest  in  1867. 

These  patriots  in  exile  tended  to  fall  into  two  groups, 
the  merchants  and  business  men,  who  concentrated  their 
financial  efforts  upon  educational  work,  and  the  students, 
who  followed  the  more  subversive  ideas  of  the  Carbon- 
arist  Societies,  the  Hetairia,  and  the  Serbian  Omladina. 
Even  among  them  there  were  two  rival  tendencies,  one 
favouring  a  Southern  Slav  federation,  with  Prince 
Michael  of  Serbia  as  its  natural  head,  the  other  wishing 
to  see  the  Sultan  proclaim  himself  as  Tsar  of  the  Bul- 
garians. 

In  1864  Midhat  Pasha,  himself  a  native  of  Rustchuk, 
was  appointed  Governor  of  Bulgaria,  and  under  him 
the  country  enjoyed  for  the  first  time  a  period  of  calm 

1  Perhaps  one  day  a  historian  will  trace  for  us  the  part  played 
by  Bucarest  as  a  home  for  political  refugees  from  Greece,  Bulgaria, 
Serbia,   Albania,   and   Hungary. 


BULGARIA   UNDER  THE  TURKISH   YOKE      88 

and  prosperity.  But  the  founder  of  Turkish  Liberalism 
stood  almost  alone  among  Turkish  statesmen,  and  even 
he  held  views  on  racial  questions  which  accorded  better 
with  Magyar  than  with  Western  ideas.  With  the  steady 
growth  of  national  feeling  in  the  Balkans,  the  Turks 
tended  to  modify  their  attitude  towards  the  Christians. 
The  method  of  Mohammed  II.  had  been  to  recognise  the 
Greek  Patriarch  and  treat  him  as  a  medium  between  the 
Porte  and  all  the  Christian  races.  This  worked  admir- 
ably from  the  Turkish  point  of  view,  so  long  as  Serb, 
Bulgar  and  Roumanian  were  sunk  in  drowsy  apathy. 
When  they  awoke,  the  obvious  policy  was  to  play  off  one 
race  against  the  other  and  to  adopt  the  well-worn  Habs- 
burg  motto,  "Divide  et  Impera."  In  1870  a  firman  of 
the  Sultan  created  a  special  Bulgarian  Exarchate,  com- 
prising almost  all  the  Bulgarian  territories  and  Nis  and 
Pirot  as  well.  Other  places  were  free  to  transfer  them- 
selves to  its  authority,  if  two-thirds  of  the  inhabitants 
voted  for  the  change.  The  Exarch  was  to  mention  the 
Patriarch  in  his  prayers  and  to  receive  the  holy  oil  from 
him.  But  the  Greeks  opposed  this  innovation  by  every 
means  in  their  power,  and  after  blocking  the  appointment 
for  two  years,  excommunicated  the  new  Exarch  and  his 
clergy  as  schismatics.  Ecclesiastical  unity  was  at  an 
end  among  the  Christians  of  the  Turkish  dominions ;  and 
there  followed  an  acute  racial  struggle  under  the  thinnest 
of  religious  veneers,  and  above  all  a  war  to  the  knife  be- 
tween Greek  and  Bulgar,  waged  at  times  with  every 
weapon  of  political  intrigue  and  social,  economic  or 
ecclesiastical  terrorism. 

Each  race  at  once  realised  the  deep  significance  of  the 
struggle,  but  the  Bulgarian  revolutionaries  were  far  from 
satisfied  with  what  many  acclaimed  as  a  national  gain. 
In  1870  a  secret  congress  was  organised  in  Bucarest 
under  Ljuben  Karavelov  and  Levski,  the  chief  of  the 
wandering  apostles,  and  it  was  roundly  proclaimed  that 

G  2 


84     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

"Bulgaria's  freedom  needs  not  an  Exarch,  but  a  rebel 
leader."  Levski  was  a  true  prophet  of  subversion,  who 
travelled  tirelessly  in  every  kind  of  disguise,  till  at  length 
he  was  captured  and  executed  by  the  Turks  (1873).  A 
monument  to  the  national  "martyr"  marks  the  scene  of 
his  death  on  the  outskirts  of  Sofia.  Dissensions  arose 
amongst  his  successors,  Botjov  and  other  active  con- 
spirators, and  the  insurrection  which  broke  out  at  Stara 
Zagora  in  1875  proved  to  be  a  tragic  fiasco.  In  the  fol- 
lowing year  a  new  revolutionary  committee  repeated  the 
rising  with  equal  lack  of  success.  The  Turks  stamped 
out  the  Bulgarian  resistance  in  the  hideous  massacre  of 
Batak,  where  over  12,000  perished.  The  British  Com- 
missioner, Mr.  Baring,  in  his  report,  describes  this  event 
"as  perhaps  the  most  heinous  crime  that  has  stained  the 
history  of  the  present  century."  He  wrote  in  1876.  The 
twentieth  century  has  outstripped  the  wildest  dreams  of 
Turkish  savagery  :  in  Armenia  the  Turk  has  learnt 
method  from  the  bearers  of  German  Kultur. 

The  Bulgarian  massacres  of  1876,  first  exposed  by  Mr. 
(still  with  us  as  the  veteran  Sir  Edwin)  Pears,  inspired 
the  famous  philippic  of  Mr.  Gladstone  and  roused  the 
indignation  of  civilised  Europe.  The  events  to  which 
they  and  the  contemporary  Bosnian  rising  gave  rise  can 
only  be  fully  understood  in  their  connection  with  the 
policy  pursued  by  the  Great  Powers  in  the  Near  East. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  RIVALRY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

There  are  two  ways  of  approaching  Balkan  history — 
from  within  and  from  without — from  the  national  and 
from  the  international  angle.  The  former  method  treats 
of  the  rise  and  development  of  the  various  nations  of  the 
peninsula,  both  in  each  individual  case  and  in  their  rela- 
tions to  each  other;  the  latter  lays  special  emphasis  on 
their  relations  with  the  outer  world.  According  to  this 
second  method  each  unit  becomes  a  mere  pawn  in  the 
vast  diplomatic  game  which  has  come  to  be  described  as 
the  Eastern  Question.  This  has  hitherto  been  the 
favourite  method  of  studying  Balkan  history,  and  also 
the  prime  cause  of  the  almost  complete  failure,  on  the  part 
of  Western  public  opinion  and  Western  diplomacy,  to 
fathom  the  somewhat  turbid  depths  of  Balkan  psycho- 
logy. Such  a  method  is  of  course  a  survival  of  the  old 
method  of  history,  which  dealt  mainly  in  treaties,  battles 
and  genealogies,  and  perhaps,  too,  the  unconscious  sur- 
vival of  the  atmosphere  which  prevailed  under  Frederick 
the  Great,  Catherine,  Metternich  and  Castlereagh,  and  in 
which  dynastic  and  family  claims  and  the  traditions  of 
historic  "state  right"  or  ecclesiastical  privilege  pre- 
dominated to  the  almost  entire  exclusion  of  the  rights,  in- 
terests and  aspirations  of  the  European  nations,  historic 
and  "unhistoric"  alike.  In  any  historical  survey  of  the 
Balkan  problem  it  is  essential  to  emphasise  the  need  for 


86     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

shaking  oft'  this  habit  of  mind  :  for  it  still  lingers  in  the 
most  unexpected  places.  Even  in  ultra-democratic  news- 
papers which  are  proclaiming  the  necessity  for  consulting 
the  people  and  the  crime  of  compelling  it  to  do  anything 
which  may  not  suit  its  momentary  convenience,  such 
phrases  as  "compensation,"  "territorial  division," 
"access  to  the  sea,"  and  many  others  are  continually 
allowed  to  crop  up;  and  it  is  charitable  to  assume  that 
their  authors  fail  to  realise  that  the  phrases  which  they  so 
glibly  employ  are  in  fact  borrowed  from  the  language  of 
the  reactionaries  of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  of  the  sworn 
enemies  of  all  democratic  ideas. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  I  have  adhered  to  the  first 
of  these  two  alternative  methods,  and  have  tried  to  show 
as  briefly  as  possible  how  national  life  again  dawned  after 
the  long  Turkish  night.  But  in  order  to  present  the 
whole  subject  in  its  due  perspective,  it  is  equally  essential 
to  apply  the  second  method  also,  before  we  can  under- 
stand the  most  recent  period  of  Balkan  history.  It  will 
sometimes  be  necessary  to  cover  portions  of  the  same 
ground  as  that  of  previous  chapters;  but  this  is  both 
inevitable  and  deliberate,  for  it  is  always  instructive  to 
approach  the  same  facts  from  different  angles. 

That  the  Eastern  Question  is  no  new  question,  is 
clearly  shown  by  its  very  name,  which  could  only  date 
from  days  when  Asia  was  still  only  very  partially  and 
imperfectlv  known  to  Europe.  Indeed,  in  our  own  day  it 
has  been  found  necessary  to  make  good  the  deficiencies 
of  the  name  by  distinguishing  between  the  Near,  the 
Middle,  and  the  Far  East.  The  Eastern  Question,  then, 
dates  back  for  many  centuries;  in  the  Middle  Ages  it 
took  the  form  of  the  crusades  :  and  both  then  and  later 
its  very  essence  has  consisted  in  the  perennial  rivalry 
between  Europe  and  Asia,  between  the  Western  and 
Eastern  outlook  upon  life.  The  crusades  were  very 
largely  inspired  by  the  old  mediaeval  conception  of  Euro- 


AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  RIVALRY  IN  THE  BALKANS    87 

pean  solidarity,  of  Christendom  as  a  united  whole,  under 
the  dual,  half-mystical,  guidance  of  Emperor  and  Pope. 
The  only  modern  conception  which  can  even  remotely  be 
compared  with  this,  is  the  wretched  Concert  of  Europe, 
which  is  in  theory  as  admirable  as  it  has  proved  futile 
and  unsound  in  execution,  but  which,  if  Europe  is  to  have 
any  future  except  that  of  the  Apocalypse,  it  must  be  the 
endeavour  of  her  statesmen  to  erect  upon  some  solid  base 
after  the  present  war. 

With  its  mediaeval  form  we  are  not  at  present  con- 
cerned. But  with  the  arrival  of  the  Turks  it  assumed  a 
new  phase,  and  it  was  only  with  the  decline  of  Ottoman 
power  in  Europe  that  it  entered  upon  the  stage  which  was 
popularly  known  to  our  fathers  and  grandfathers  as  that 
of  "the  Sick  Man,"  and  which  seemed  to  have  ended  in 
the  cataclysm  of  1912,  but  which,  little  as  our  simple- 
minded  rulers  realised  it,  was  already  even  then  leading 
inevitably  to  the  far  greater  cataclysm  of  1914-15. 

The  attitude  of  the  European  Powers,  and  notably  of 
Austria  and  Russia,  to  the  Turkish  problem  up  to  the 
close  of  the  eighteenth  century  has  already  been  briefly 
summarised,1  and  we  have  seen  that  Austria  weakly 
squandered  the  advantages  which  both  geography  and 
history  had  conferred  upon  her.  Save  for  occasional  inci- 
dents, the  relations  of  Russia  with  the  peninsula  were 
mainly  ecclesiastical  until  the  reign  of  Catherine  the 
Great;  at  least  she  only  began  to  be  a  serious  rival  to 
Austria  when  the  Crimea  and  the  Black  Sea  fell  into  her 
hands.  Her  relations  with  Montenegro  have  already 
been  referred  to.  Her  relations  with  Greece  date  from 
the  appearance  of  a  Russian  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean 
in  1770.  Her  relations  with  Roumania  were  determined 
by  the  simple  geographical  fact  that  Russian  armies  in 
fighting  Turkey  had  to  pass  through  Bessarabia  and 
Moldavia ;  while  so  far  as  Serbia  is  concerned  it  is  im- 
1  Chapter    II. 


88     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

portant  to  note  that  the  Serbs  only  turned  to  Russia 
after  Kara  George  had  appealed  to  Francis  I.  for  protec- 
tion and  had  asked  for  an  Austrian  Archduke  as  Viceroy 
without  avail.  The  first  official  Russian  agent  appeared 
at  Belgrade  in  1807,  three  years  after  the  first  rising. 
Curiously  enough  the  first  serious  Serb  overture  to  Rus- 
sia came  in  1804  from  the  Serbs  in  Austrian,  not  in 
Turkish,  territory,  and  took  the  form  of  a  memorandum 
of  the  Metropolitan  Stratimirovic,  sent  to  the  Russian 
Foreign  Minister,  in  favour  of  "the  erection  of  a  Slavo- 
Serb  Kingdom  "  under  a  Russian  Grand  Duke.  Thus 
for  the  first  time  were  ideas  expressed  which  were  to 
bear  fruit  later  in  political  asp'irations  with  which  public 
opinion  in  the  West  is  only  gradually  becoming  familiar 
under  the  stress  of  a  world-war. 

The  war  of  1788  was  based  upon  the  confident  belief, 
shared  equally  by  Joseph  II.  and  by  Catherine  the  Great, 
that  Turkey  would  rapidly  collapse,  and  in  the  latter 
sovereign's  case  upon  the  dream  of  restoring  the  Eastern 
Empire  in  favour  of  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine.  But 
the  course  taken  by  the  war  for  the  first  time  clearly 
revealed  the  fact  that  the  issue  was  not  a  simple  one,  but 
inextricably  interwoven  with  the  whole  fabric  of  the  Euro- 
pean state  system.  The  joint  Austro-Russian  offensive 
produced  very  disappointing  results,  and  the  outbreak  of 
the  French  Revolution  and  the  endless  complications  to 
which  it  led  in  the  West,  compelled  the  Allies  to  postpone 
almost  indefinitely  the  realisation  of  their  ambitions  in  the 
Near  East.  Moreover  the  Balkan  policy  of  the  two 
Powers  was  profoundly  affected  by  two  new  factors.  On 
the  one  hand  Napoleon,  by  his  creation  of  an  Illyrian 
state,  did  much  to  revive  national  feeling  among  the 
Southern  Slavs,  not  only  in  Turkey  but  also  in  the  Habs- 
burg  dominions.  In  his  eyes  Dalmatia,  Albania  and 
the  Ionian  Islands,  as  French  dependencies,  were  but  so 
many  stepping-stones  on  his  path  towards  the  dominion 


AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  RIVALRY  IN  THE  BALKANS    89 

of  the  East.  On  the  other  hand,  the  rapid  growth  of  the 
commercial  interests  of  the  Western  Powers  in  various 
parts  of  Turkey  introduced  new  heirs  to  the  sordid  com- 
petition around  the  deathbed  of  the  Sick  Man. 

During  the  Napoleonic  period  French  ideas  were  as 
noticeable  in  the  Balkans  as  farther  west — acting  upon 
Turkish  conditions  as  a  corrosive  force,  but  also  as  a 
vivifying  and  renewing  force  among  the  subjected  Chris- 
tian races.  They  were  unquestionably  one  of  the  chief 
influences  in  that  new  development  which  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  was  to  rescue  the  Balkan  peoples  slowly 
but  surely  from  the  conflicting  designs  of  Austria  and 
Russia.  Thus  modern  Balkan  history  may  be  divided 
into  three  periods — the  first  in  which  Austria  set  herself 
the  task  of  expelling  the  Turks,  the  second  in  which 
Austria  and  Russia  combined  in  a  policy  of  partition 
and  worked  on  parallel  lines ;  the  third,  in  which  the 
jealousy  and  competition  which  replaced  their  partner- 
ship was  still  further  complicated  by  the  growing 
influence  and  interference  of  other  Powers.  It  is  interest- 
ing to  note  that  the  diplomatic  influence  of  France  in 
the  Near  East  turned  the  scale  against  the  Austrian  solu- 
tion in  1793;  while  it  is  of  course  notorious  that  the 
influence  of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  Napoleonic 
ferment  were  decisive  factors  in  the  awakening  of  Balkan 
nationality-.  In  1807  Napoleon  signed  a  secret  agree- 
ment with  Alexander  I.  at  Tilsit  for  the  partition  of 
Turkey,  but  stipulated  for  her  retention  of  Constan- 
tinople. The  tremendous  events  of  the  following  years 
prevented  the  realisation  of  such  designs,  and  led  up  to 
that  breach  with  Russia  which  was  to  prove  fatal  to  the 
career  of  Napoleon.  But  in  the  meantime  Alexander 
was  at  open  war  with  the  Turks,  and  it  was  only  through 
British  pressure  at  the  Porte  that  on  the  very  eve  of  the 
Moscow  campaign  the  Sultan  coilld  be  induced  to  come 
to  terms  with  Russia.     The  treaty  of  Bucarest  (May  28th, 


90     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

1812)  marks  the  last  stage  in  Russian  territorial  advance 
in  Europe.  The  greater  part  of  Bessarabia  was  aban- 
doned by  the  Turks,  and  the  river  Pruth  became  the 
boundary  between  the  two  Empires.  The  Roumanians, 
who  formed  the  great  bulk  of  the  population,  were  as 
yet  too  inarticulate  to  protest  at  their  being  thus  arbi- 
trarily severed  from  their  kinsmen  in  Moldavia ;  indeed 
the  blessings  of  Phanariot  rule  were  not  as  yet  suffi- 
ciently obvious  to  create  resentment  at  the  change. 
None  the  less  it  is  to  be  regretted,  as  having  sown  the 
seeds  of  distrust  between  Russia  and  the  most  powerful 
of  all  the  Balkan  nations. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna,  which  may  be  described  as 
one  of  the  prime  causes  of  the  subsequent  evils  which 
have  come  upon  Europe,  almost  entirely  ignored  Balkan 
matters.  To  it  legitimacy  was  the  keystone  of  the  social 
order,  and  Turkey  was  a  dynastic  state  under  a  legitimate 
ruler.  In  the  words  of  M.  Debidour,  "the  diplomats  of 
1815  took  a  year  to  provide  Europe  with  bad  laws.  It 
was  to  take  Europe  a  century  to  repair  the  evil  which 
they  wrought  upon  her."  To-day  we  may  push  this 
view  to  its  logical  conclusion  and  maintain  that  the 
present  war  is  the  direct  result  of  a  stubborn  refusal  on 
the  part  of  European  diplomacy,  even  to  try  to  repair 
that  evil;  nor  have  we  to-day  any  very  sanguine  grounds 
for  believing  that  the  diplomats  who  control  the  fate 
of  Europe  will  conduct  the  Congress  of  191 7  upon  any 
more  honest  lines  than  its  predecessors  of  Vienna,  Paris 
and  Berlin.  Only  a  healthy  and  energetic  public 
opinion  can  force  the  Greys,  the  Sazonovs,  the  Jagows, 
the  Burians,  the  Sonninos,  to  apply  true  statesmanship 
to  the  national  problems  which  await  solution,  and  to 
abandon  the  prevailing  habit  of  feeding  the  public  upon 
vague  and  fulsome  programmes,  which  only  too  often 
conceal  acts  of  a  thoroughly  reactionary  character. 

The  era  which  followed  the  Congress  of  Vienna  was 


AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  RIVALRY  IN  THE  BALKANS     91 

dominated  by  the  Holy  Alliance,  whose  only  aim,  as 
expressed  in  the  mystical  ideas  of  Alexander  I.,  was  the 
regeneration  of  Europe  into  a  true  Christian  common- 
wealth. That  Alexander  at  that  time  was  steeped  in 
constitutional  ideas  is  proved  by  his  generous  treatment 
of  Poland  and  Finland  and  his  friendy  attitude  towards 
the  Liberal  movement  in  Germany  and  Italy.  But 
events  soon  produced  a  change  in  this  unstable  if  well- 
meaning  visionary;  and  European  politics  fell  under  the 
domination  of  Metternich.  This  statesman,  with  all  the 
cynicism  of  Talleyrand  but  with  far  greater  superfi- 
ciality, passed  for  a  whole  generation  as  the  diplomat 
par  excellence.  It  was  he  who  said  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
"that  it  had  for  its  author  a  moral  significance,  and  for 
the  other  signatories  not  even  that  significance  !  H1  It 
is  true  that  Metternich  was  handicapped  by  the  throned 
bureaucrat  in  whose  service  he  worked.  But  the  secret 
of  his  political  survival  lies  in  his  practice  of  leaving 
internal  politics  in  the  hands  of  his  reactionary  and 
small-minded  sovereign,  who  was  thus  enabled  to  gratify 
his  consuming  passion  for  red  tape,  and  thus  of  securing 
for  himself  the  almost  absolute  control  of  foreign  poli- 
tics. Metternich's  system  rested  upon  the  double  basis 
of  legitimacy  and  the  status  quo,  which  in  one  sense 
may  be  regarded  as  different  expressions  of  the  same 
idea.  In  practice  Metternich's  theories  took  the  form 
of  the  repression  of  all  national  movements  in  Italy, 
whether  in  the  Austrian  provinces  or  in  the  petty  states 
of  the  peninsula,  of  strict  measures  against  liberal  tend- 
encies in  Southern  Germany,  and  of  opposition  to  the 
Greek  rising  and  to  the  Polish  movement.  He  failed  to 
prevent  the  establishment  of  Greek  independence, 
largely  owing  to  the  policy  of  Canning  and  to  the  con- 
sequent combination  between  Russia  and  the  Western 
Powers.  He  also  failed  to  prevent  Russia's  occupation 
1  Debidour,  op.   cit.,   I.,  p.   99- 


92    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

of  the  Principalities  (1829-33)  and  her  grant  of  a  con- 
stitution— the  Reglement  Organique — in  the  latter  year. 
In  this  connection  it  is  worth  noting  that  autocratic 
Russia  has  always  backed  constitutional  government  in 
Greece,  Roumania,  Serbia,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  Bul- 
garia, the  real  fact,  of  course,  being  that  she  has  always 
tried  to  secure  the  adhesion  of  the  strongest  party  in  each 
country  to  her  politics.  Above  all,  Metternich  failed  to 
prevent  the  secret  treaty  of  Unkiar-Skelessi  (1833),  which 
virtually  made  Turkey  the  vassal  of  Russia,  by  impos- 
ing upon  the  Porte  a  defensive  alliance  with  Russia  and 
pledging  the  Sultan  to  close  the  Straits  to  the  enemies 
of  the  Tsar.  This  arrangement,  which  was  mainly 
directed  against  France  and  Britain,  was  soon  followed 
by  the  conference  of  Miinchengratz,  at  which  Russia  and 
Austria  agreed  upon  joint  support  for  the  Ottoman 
dynasty,  and  by  Russia's  evacuation  of  the  Danubian 
Principalities.  Metternich  thus  succeeded  in  bolstering 
up  the  crumbling  policy  of  non-intervention;  and  the 
acute  friction  which  arose  between  the  Western  Powers 
and  the  Tsar  over  the  question  of  the  Straits  (1839-40) 
only  brought  Russia  and  Austria  closer  together. 
Throughout  this  period  the  traditional  dream  of  the 
reactionaries,  a  league  of  the  three  Conservative  Powers, 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia,  reasserts  itself  from  time 
to  time.  It  is  rare  that  all  three  are  united  except  in  the 
face  of  overwhelming  danger  from  Napoleon,  or  as  the 
result  of  the  consummate  statesmanship  of  Bismarck.  The 
rivalry  of  Austria  and  Prussia  within  the  bounds  of 
Germany,  the  complications  introduced  by  Austrian  racial 
diversity,  the  influence  of  Italian  and  Balkan  affairs,  all 
contributed  to  confuse  the  issue.  But  the  idea  of  such  a 
league,  advocated  by  Metternich  as  a  sure  bulwark  of 
authority  against  the  inroads  of  revolutionary  and  pro- 
gressive ideas,  has  grown  steadily  ever  since,  and  though 
rendered  more  and  more  difficult  of  realisation  owing  to 


/ 


AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  RIVALRY  IN  THE  BALKANS    93 

the  imperative  claims  of  nationality,  represents  to-day 
more  than  ever  the  real  inclinations  of  large  sections  of 
the  governing  class  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  It 
is  this  tendency  which  is  the  real  danger  of  the  peace 
settlement;  for  a  possible  basis  of  union  is  provided  by 
the  Polish  Question.  It  was  the  original  crime  of  the 
Polish  partition  which  created  a  bond  of  union  between 
the  three  spoilers,  and  strengthened  their  alarm  at  the 
prospect  of  any  change  which  might  affect  their  ill-gotten 
gains.  Thus  the  most  revolutionary  act  of  modern  times 
— the  wanton  suppression  of  an  ancient  state  and  its 
national  identity — was  effected  by  the  chief  exponents 
in  Europe  of  the  doctrine  of  Divine  Right,  and  of  the 
unquestionable  obedience  of  the  subject.  It  must  be  the 
task  of  all  who  have  the  cause  of  European  progress 
at  heart  to  prevent  the  perpetuation  of  the  evil  by  some 
fresh  compact  over  the  mangled  body  of  Poland  between 
the  exponents  of  reaction  in  Prussia,  Austria  and 
Russia. 

Metternich  once  boasted  in  a  phrase  which  suggests 
the  outlook  of  William  II.,  that  he  had  preserved  peace 
in  Europe  for  33  years;  and  of  course  by  sitting  on  the 
safety-valve  it  is  always  possible  to  preserve  comparative 
quiet  until  the  moment  of  the  explosion.  In  the  case  of 
Metternich  that  explosion  came  in  1848,  in  the  revolution 
of  Vienna,  Prague  and  Budapest,  in  the  fierce  racial  war 
which  overwhelmed  Hungary,  and  in  its  climax,  the 
deposition  of  the  Habsburg  dynasty  by  Louis  Kossuth. 
Order  could  only  be  restored  by  the  aid  of  180,000 
Russian  troops,  whom  Nicholas  I.  sent  across  the 
Carpathians  in  the  name  of  the  outraged  principles  of 
legitimacy  and  autocracy. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST. 

The  three  chief  characteristics  of  the  Metternich  era 
had  been  economic  exhaustion  following  the  Napoleonic 
Wars,  the  ascendancy  of  romanticism  and  the  political 
reaction  against  revolutionary  propaganda.  The  two 
bases  of  his  policy,  legitimacy  and  non-intervention, 
gradually  crumbled  away  by  reason  of  their  own  inherent 
rottenness.  The  liberal  theories  of  the  Tsar  Alexander  I. 
gave  place  to  the  black  reaction  and  brutal  autocracy  of 
his  successor,  Nicholas  I.;  and  Austrian  rule  even  at 
its  worst  in  Lombardy  and  Venetia  was  never  so  mon- 
strous as  Russian  rule  under  Nicholas.  The  theories  on 
which  they  rested  were  identical,  and  Nicholas  was 
following  a  sure  instinct  when  in  1849  he  restored  Hun- 
gary to  the  rule  of  the  Habsburgs.  But  the  doctrine  of 
non-intervention  proved  to  be  a  two-edged  weapon,  and 
led  to  results  which  were  little  short  of  comic.  Austria, 
as  the  purest  exponent  of  the  absolutist  doctrine,  in  her 
anxiety  to  preserve  the  status  quo,  found  it  necessary 
to  intervene  on  behalf  of  threatened  dynasties — notably 
Naples  and  Parma;  while  Britain,  influenced  by  sym-' 
pathy  with  liberal  and  progressive  ideas  on  the  Conti- 
nent, favoured  non-intervention  in  order  to  give  these 
ideas  a  chance  of  asserting  themselves.  Metternich 
induced  Russia  and  Prussia  to  join  Austria  in  a  declara- 
tion of  principles,  and  in  the  refusal  to  recognise  as  a 


CONCERT  OF   EUROPE   AND  THE   NEAR   EAST    95 

member  of  the  European  Alliance  any  state  which  was 
guilty  of  an  internal  revolution.1  Thus  in  his  eager- 
ness to  preserve  a  united  front  against  "the  revolution," 
he  virtually  incorporated  the  Right  of  Intervention  into 
the  Law  of  Europe.  It  was  only  a  question  of  time  for 
this  right,  which  was  intended  only  to  benefit  dynasties, 
to  be  applied  in  favour  of  nations  also.  Under  Canning 
there  was  intervention  on  behalf  of  Portugal,  and  above 
all  of  Greece;  and  the  war  of  Greek  independence,  cul- 
minating in  Navarino,  made  a  fatal  breach  in  Metter- 
nich's  political  system.  Russia  was  won  to  the  British 
side,  because  her  rulers  were  continually  harking  back  to 
the  idea  of  a  Turkish  collapse,  and  were  equally  fasci- 
nated by  the  dream  of  Santa  Sofia,  and  determined  not 
to  leave  to  Britain  or  France  a  monopoly  of  the  protection 
of  the  Greeks  or  of  an  Orthodox  Church.  Russia's  share 
in  this  campaign  involved  her,  as  we  have  seen,  in  a  long- 
land  war  with  Turkey,  terminating  in  the  treaty  of 
Adrianople  (1829),  which  secured  access  through  the 
Straits  for  foreign  vessels,  and  the  dismantling  of  all 
fortresses  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube.  Russia  re- 
mained in  the  occupation  of  the  Danubian  Principalities 
for  four  years,  and  only  withdrew  after  the  secret 
Treaty  of  Unkiar-Skelessi,  which  pledged  the  Sultan  to 
close  the  Straits  to  enemies  of  the  Tsar.  Russia  had  thus 
established  for  the  moment  her  predominance  in  the  Near 
East,  and  seemed  about  to  reduce  Turkey  to  the  position 
of  a  vassal.  From  1833  to  1854  the  central  fact  in 
European  politics  is  the  rivalry  of  Russia  and  Britain, 
or  rather  of  Nicholas  I.  and  Palmerston,  of  Absolutist 
and  Liberal  tradition.  Throughout  this  period  the  issue 
was  obscured  by  an  interplay  of  forces,  political,  racial, 
religious,  and  economic,  by  the  chemical  process  of 
Western  ideas  acting  upon  the  decaying  fabric  of  Otto- 
man rule.  Just  because  there  was  no  clear  issue,  and  so 
1  Seignobos,  Histoirc  de  I'Europe  Contemporaine,  p.  719. 


96     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

many  impondcrabilia  in  the  situation,  and  because 
every  year  and  in  every  direction  the  states  grew 
greater  than  in  any  former  epoch — for  these  very 
reasons  a  growth  of  catchwords  became  apparent, 
devised  by  essentially  bureaucratic  minds  as  the  props 
of  an  essentially  artificial  situation.  "The  Concert  of 
Europe"  and  "The  Balance  of  Power" — conceptions 
which,  in  their  true  proportion,  are  of  great  and  funda- 
mental value — became  more  and  more  the  fetish  of  the 
diplomatic  world.  The  Eastern  Question  had  become 
so  extraordinarily  complex  and  delicate,  and,  above  all, 
so  incalculable,  that  all  the  Great  Powers — Russia, 
Austria,  Prussia,  France,  and  Britain  alike — favoured 
the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

In  1839-41  a  fresh  crisis  was  provoked  by  the  revolt 
of  Egypt  under  Mehemet  Ali.  France  found  herself 
isolated,  the  other  four  Great  Powers  backing  the  Sultan 
against  his  rebellious  subject,  and  it  was  this  which  split 
the  first  Anglo-French  Entente.  In  the  winter  of  1 9 1 5 , 
certain  British  statesmen  imposed  a  dangerous  strain 
upon  the  new  and  better  Anglo-French  Entente  by  again 
opposing  French  policy  in  the  Near  East,  and  by  urging 
the  cowardly  and  perfidious  plan  of  abandoning  a 
common  ally  to  her  fate ;  but  happily  on  this  latter 
occasion  the  bonds  between  us  proved  indissoluble.  The 
Egyptian  crisis  ended  in  1841  in  the  so-called  Con- 
vention of  the  Straits  between  the  Great  Powers  and 
the  Sultan,  which  closed  the  Dardanelles  to  all  foreign 
warships.  But  just  as  Metternich's  enthusiasm  for 
the  status  quo  did  not  prevent  him  from  annexing 
the  little  independent  Polish  state  of  Cracow,  so 
Nicholas  I.,  while  the  champion  of  extreme  reaction 
at  home,  dabbled  in  revolutionary  schemes  of  foreign 
policy.  During  his  visit  to  England  in  1844  he  made 
overtures  for  regulating  the  fate  of  the  Turkish  Empire, 
but,  receiving  no  encouragement,  he  had  to  drop  the  idea. 


CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST    97 

for  the  time.  During  the  troubles  of  1848  he  devoted 
his  efforts  to  saving  the  cause  of  the  dynasties ;  but  when 
the  danger  had  passed,  his  mind  reverted  once  more 
to  his  former  ideas.  "The  Sick  Man  of  Europe"  had 
already  become  the  butt  of  international  caricature 
when,  in  1852,  Nicholas  approached  the  British  Ambas- 
sador in  Petersburg  as  to  the  need  for  "an  agreement 
about  the  funeral."  But  the  maintenance  of  Turkish 
integrity  had  become  a  fetish  of  British  statesmen;  and 
our  steady  hostility  to  Russia,  supplemented  by  Napoleon 
III.'s  desire  for  an  ambitious  foreign  policy,  led  to  the 
Crimean  War. 

It  has  become  a  commonplace  to-day  to  say  that  the 
immediate  cause  or  pretext  of  a  great  war  is  very  rarely 
the  true  underlying  cause;  and  the  Archduke's  murder 
supplies  a  classic  illustration  of  this  truth.  If  this  were 
not  so,  we  should  have  to  admit  that  the  origin  of  the 
Crimean  War  provided  greater  opportunity  for  the 
scoffer  and  the  cynic  than  any  other.  For  the  trouble 
began  with  a  dispute  regarding  the  possession  of  the  Holy 
Places  at  Jerusalem,  based  upon  the  rivalry  of  the  Latin 
Catholics  under  French  protection,  and  of  the  Greek 
Orthodox  under  Russian  protection.  It  would,  however, 
be  a  mistake  to  minimise  too  much  the  part  played  by 
what  a  witty  French  writer  described  as  "a  sacristans' 
quarrel" ;  for  the  dispute,  deplorable  as  it  was,  has  a 
profound  significance,  and  has  not  lost  it  even  to-day, 
as  the  crowds  of  Russian  pilgrims  to  Jerusalem,  and  the 
rival  German  and  Russian  settlements  outside  the  Holy 
City  amply  testify.  It  will  be  found  at  the  end  of  this 
war  that  the  fate  of  Palestine  will  not  be  a  matter  of 
indifference  to  Russia. 

There  were,  of  course,  many  other  causes,  though  at 
this  distance  of  time  it  is  difficult  to  appreciate  them,  or 
to  avoid  regarding  the  war  as  a  hideous  and  perfectly 
avoidable  mistake.    A  great  part  was  played  in  accentu- 

H 


98     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

ating  the  quarrel  by  our  Ambassador  in  Constantinople, 
Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffe,  one  of  the  greatest 
diplomatic  figures  of  the  century,  and  the  soul  of  the 
Turkophil  movement  in  England.  And  scarcely  less 
important  was  the  influence  of  the  British  peace  party  in 
convincing  Nicholas  I.  that  Britain  would  never  go  to 
war — a  miscalculation  not  altogether  dissimilar  to  that 
of  William  II.  in  1914.  It  is  typical  of  the  illogical  and 
ill-informed  nature  of  British  public  opinion  that,  while 
a  profound  insular  suspicion  of  Russia  was  excused 
and  justified  by  the  reactionary  views  of  Nicholas  and 
his  advisers,  the  hideous  corruption,  disorganisation  and 
tyranny  under  which  the  Christians  of  Turkey  groaned 
did  not  in  any  way  lessen  the  unreasoning  enthusiasm 
of  the  British  Turkophiles.  To-day  it  is  curious  to  note 
that  our  Russophiles  of  the  'fifties  were  to  be  found 
among  the  extreme  Radicals  and  Pacifists,  so  many  of 
whom  seem  to  have  forgotten  the  great  tradition  of  John 
Bright  now  that  Russia  is  our  loyal  ally,  and  moving 
steadily  towards  constitutional  reforms. 

The  course  of  the  Crimean  War  lies  quite  outside  my 
present  scope.  Politically  it  was  marked  by  two  out- 
standing events,  the  vacillation  of  Austria,  who,  in  the 
phrase  of  Schwarzenberg,  astonished  the  world  by  her 
ingratitude,  who  alienated  first  Russia,  then  Prussia, 
then  France  and  Britain,  by  her  indecision,  and  finally 
ended  by  losing  the  prize  of  the  Danubian  Principalities  : 
and  that  association  of  Piedmont  as  an  ally  of  France 
and  Britain,  which  marks  the  first  entry  of  the  future 
Italy  into  the  ranks  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  which  was 
pre-eminently  the  work  of  the  great  Cavour.  The  war 
was  followed  by  the  Congress  of  Paris  (1856)  whose 
work  may  be  very  briefly  summarised  as  follows.  The 
integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  guaranteed  by  the 
Powers.  The  Sultan  pledged  himself  to  the  introduction 
of  far-reaching  reforms,  such  as  might  be  expected  to 


CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST    99 

regenerate  the  State  and  render  tolerable  the  life  of  his 
Christian  subjects.  The  navigation  of  the  Danube  was 
made  free  and  international  under  the  control  of  a  mixed 
commission.  The  neutrality  of  the  Black  Sea  was  pro- 
claimed ;  and  as  its  waters  were  thus  closed  to  navies, 
the  maintenance  of  fortresses  on  its  shores  was  declared 
to  be  unnecessary.  The  complete  autonomy  of  Wallachia 
and  Moldavia  was  recognised  under  Turkish  suzerainty, 
and  the  southern  portion  of  Bessarabia,  which  Russia 
had  secured  in  1812,  was  reunited  to  Moldavia.  Never 
has  an  European  settlement  proved  more  futile  or  led 
so  quickly  to  a  diplomatic  fiasco.  Ere  long  every  one 
of  its  main  provisions  had  been  riddled  through.  The 
aim  of  the  Congress  had  been  to  dam  back  Russian 
advance  upon  Constantinople,  and  to  restrain  her  within 
artificial  bounds;  and  this  aim  had  been  prompted  above 
all  by  ignorance  and  fear,  and  by  a  complete  failure 
to  realise  that  the  growth  of  free  national  states  in  the 
peninsula  was  a  far  more  effective  barrier  than  treaties 
or  political  intrigues.  Lord  Salisbury  was  right  when 
he  said,  with  that  bluntness  which  threw  his  habitual 
reserve  into  greater  relief,  that  in  the  Crimean  War  we 
had  put  our  money  on  the  wrong  horse. 

In  the  years  that  followed  the  Congress  of  Paris, 
Europe  was  controlled  by  three  prominent  figures, 
Napoleon  III.,  Cavour,  and  Bismarck.  The  Crimean  War 
had  deranged  the  old  Concert  of  Europe,  and  before  it 
had  got  into  gear  again,  United  Italy  had  been  achieved. 
A  year  later,  to  the  eternal  loss  of  both  Italy  herself 
and  of  Europe,  Cavour  died ;  and  the  next  ten  years  were 
devoted  to  a  trial  of  strength  between  Napoleon  and 
Bismarck.  So  far  as  the  Balkans  were  concerned — and  it 
was,  of  course,  pre-eminently  a  Near  Eastern  settlement 
— the  Congress  of  Paris  prepared  the  way  for  the  union 
of  the  two  Principalities  under  a  single  ruler  and  the  birth 
of  modern  Roumania.  Brief  allusion  has  already  been 

H   2 


100    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

made  to  the  manner  in  which  the  Great  Powers  blocked 
the  movement  for  unity,  and  to  the  skill  with  which  their 
efforts  were  evaded  and  countered.  Their  attitude 
towards  Roumania  between  1856  and  1859  is  one  of  the 
most  striking  of  the  many  instances  of  futility  and 
wrong-headedness  of  which  the  Concert  of  Europe  has 
been  guilty. 

By  an  inevitable  process  leaf  after  leaf  was  being 
stripped  from  the  artichoke;  Roumania  was  now 
emancipated,  though  certain  restraints  of  Turkish 
suzerainty  survived ;  Serbia  was  gradually  removing  the 
last  vestiges  of  Turkish  rule;  and  Bosnia  and  Bulgaria 
were  preparing  for  trouble.  The  Great  Powers,  then,  in 
propping  up  the  Sick  Man  upon  his  pillows  and  in  block- 
ing, whenever  possible,  the  movement  for  the  liberation 
of  the  Balkan  Christians,  had  set  themselves  to  fight 
the  stars  in  their  courses;  and  it  was  an  irony  of  fate 
that  the  blackest  of  autocrats  and  reactionaries  should 
have  fought  the  battle  of  liberty  against  the  liberal 
Powers  of  the  West. 

The  Congress  of  Paris  ushered  in  the  period  of 
Turkish  reform — lucus  a  non  lucendo — one  of  the  most 
ignominious  periods  of  European  history.  As  early  as 
1839,  Sultan  Abdul  Medjid,  on  his  accession,  had  pro- 
claimed a  charter  of  reform,  but  like  all  similar  documents 
in  Turkey,  it  remained  on  paper,  and  the  only  direction  in 
which  any  serious  pretence  at  reform  was  carried  through 
was  the  administration  of  the  army,  which  was  reorganised 
in  1843.  It  is  the  unfortunate  habit  of  such  reformers — 
and  the  Young  Turks  since  1908  have  provided  a 
striking  confirmation  of  the  fact — that  they  tend  to  build 
roads  where  they  serve  strategical  purposes,  and 
schools  where  they  can  be  employed  for  military  cadets, 
and  that  building  operations  are  mainly  devoted  to  the 
erection  and  extension  of  barracks.  The  Hatti-Humayun 
of  1856  pledged  the  Porte  to  the  introduction  of  equality 


CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST      101 

before  the  law,  liberty  of  worship,  equal  taxation,  judicial 
reform  and  mixed  tribunals.  But  it  evoked  general  dis- 
content among  the  Turks ;  for  every  true  Moslem 
regarded  it  as  a  violation  of  the  principles  of  the  Koran, 
and  having  retained  the  natural  outlook  of  a  conqueror 
even  in  the  evil  days  of  Ottoman  decay,  keenly  resented 
the  bare  idea  of  the  rayah  being  treated  as  his  equal. 
Thus  reforms,  which  were  so  absolutely  irreconcilable 
with  Mohammedan  law,  simply  remained  on  paper.  One 
point  which  was  to  acquire  special  importance  in  the 
twentieth  century  was  specially  debated.  Were  Christ- 
ians to  be  admitted  into  the  army  ?  On  the  one  hand 
there  was  no  great  competition  among  the  Christians 
themselves  for  this  doubtful  honour,  while  on  the  other 
there  was  much  hostility  on  the  part  of  the  Moslems, 
who  would  on  no  account  have  obeyed  Christian  officers, 
and  who  feared  that  by  inculcating  the  Christians  with 
military  discipline  they  would  merely  be  training  soldiers 
for  the  future  armies  of  the  Tsar.  Finally,  in  1869,  a 
law  was  passed  absolutely  restricting  recruiting  to 
Moslems. 

The  whole  judicial,  and  even  administrative  problem 
was  infinitely  complicated  by  the  Capitulations,  under 
which  the  various  Great  Powers  possessed  courts,  post 
offices  and  special  privileges  of  their  own.  In  view  of 
the  anarchical  and  corrupt  condition  of  Turkish  justice, 
and  the  incompatibility  of  European  legal  ideas  with  the 
Sheriat,  it  was  obviously  impossible  to  rescind  these 
Capitulations,  even  if  all  the  Powers  could  have  been 
induced  to  agree.  In  1864,  the  Law  of  Vilayets  reorgan- 
ised the  administration  of  the  Empire.  Each  vilayet  or 
province,  under  its  Vali,  or  governor,  received  an  admin- 
istrative council  of  its  own  and  was  sub-divided  into 
Sandjaks  or  Arrondissements,  each  under  a  Mutissarif, 
Kazas,  each  under  a  Kaimakam,  and  Nahies  or  Com- 
munes, each  under  a  Mudir  or  Mayor. 


102     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  mention  the  sordid  fact  that 
commercial  and  financial  interests  and  jealousies  lay  at 
the  root  of  the  policy  pursued  by  the  various  members 
of  the  Concert  in  Constantinople,  and  it  was  financial 
reform,  the  creation  of  the  Imperial  Ottoman  Bank,  the 
consolidation  of  an  Ottoman  debt,  and  the  establishment 
of  a  Turkish  Cour  des  Comptes  which  received  the  most 
persistent  external  backing.  The  pressure  of  the  Powers 
exhausted  itself  in  a  dead  mass  of  resistance  and  was 
neutralised  by  the  peculiar  workings  of  the  Oriental 
mind  and  by  the  corrupt  accumulations  of  centuries. 

Throughout  this  period  of  reform  the  progress  of  gan- 
grene leading  to  amputation  continued.  Wallachia  and 
Moldavia  were  transformed  into  the  flourishing  state  of 
Roumania.  Montenegro's  victory  at  Grahovo  gloriously 
reaffirmed  her  defiance  of  the  Turkish  yoke.  The  ac- 
cession of  King  George  of  Greece  (1863),  followed  by  the 
cession  of  the  Ionian  Isles,  the  grant  of  a  new  constitu- 
tion and  one  of  the  more  serious  Cretan  risings,  marked 
the  opening  of  a  new  era  for  Hellenism.  In  1867  the  last 
of  the  Turkish  garrisons  was  withdrawn  from  Serbia. 

The  issue  of  the  Franco-German  War  had  a  marked 
effect  upon  the  Near  East.  France's  influence  was 
eclipsed,  Russian  prestige  revived,  while  Britain  showed 
the  same  hesitation  in  her  Balkan  policy  as  she  subse- 
quently displayed  during  the  Balkan  wars  and  during 
the  eventful  winter  of  1915.  Russia's  revival  was  marked 
by  two  very  striking  successes,  the  repudiation  of  the 
clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  guaranteeing  the  neutrality 
of  the  Black  Sea,  and  the  creation  of  the  Bulgarian  Ex- 
archate and  the  consequent  strengthening  of  Slav 
nationality  in  the  Balkans.  Meanwhile  the  attitude  of 
Austria  had  also  been  profoundly  modified  by  the  wars  of 
1866  and  1870.  In  the  former  year  she  had  been  expelled 
from  both  Italy  and  Germany,  with  the  natural  result 
that  her  eyes  turned  Eastward,  while  in  187 1  the  crown 


CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST    103 

was  set  upon  Prussian  hegemony  in  Germany  by  the 
proclamation  of  the  new  Empire  at  Versailles.  Count 
Beust,  the  Saxon  statesman  whom  Francis  Joseph  sum- 
moned to  Vienna  to  control  his  foreign  policy,  was 
dominated  by  the  idea  of  revenge  against  Prussia;  and 
that  idea  underlay  the  establishment  of  the  Dual  system 
between  Austria  and  Hungary  in  1867.  But  very  soon 
an  entirely  different  direction  was  given  to  it.  Hence- 
forth Magyar  influence  dominated  the  foreign  policy  of 
Austria-Hungary.  Count  Andrassy,  the  Magyar  aristo- 
crat, who  was  the  first  Hungarian  Premier  under  the 
Dual  system  and  succeeded  Beust  as  Joint  Foreign 
Minister,  has  even  to-day  not  been  assigned  to  his  true 
place  as  one  of  the  greatest  statesmen  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  Like  all  true  Magyars,  Andrassy  was  anti-Slav ; 
unlike  some,  he  realised  that  this  involved  being  pro- 
German.  In  short,  he  realised  what  Count  Tisza  realises 
to-day — that  the  creation  or  maintenance  of  the  Magyar 
national  state  is  only  possible  in  alliance  with  Germany. 
This  is  one  of  the  alphabetical  truths  of  Continental 
policy  which  are  still  consistently  ignored  by  British 
statesmen.  Andrassy,  then,  prevented  the  introduction 
of  federalism  in  Austria  and  vetoed  the  coronation  of 
Francis  Joseph  as  King  of  Bohemia,  while,  as  we  shall 
see,  he  laid  the  foundations  of  that  alliance  between 
Austria  and  Germany  which  dominates  the  European 
situation  to-day.  Andrassy's  attitude  was  a  natural  sup- 
plement to  that  rapprochement  between  the  three  Em- 
pires— the  three  conservative  elements  in  Europe — which 
had  always  been  the  goal  of  Bismarck's  policy,  and  which 
was  made  possible  by  the  kinship  and  personal  friend- 
ship between  William  I.  and  Alexander  II.  Alexander 
thus  based  his  policy  on  the  dynastic  and  legitimist 
motives  which  had  influenced  his  father  and  for  the  time 
being  ignored  Slavophil  ideas.  After  1870  Bismarck 
posed  as  the  bulwark  of  general  peace  in  Europe,  and  it 


104    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

would  be  unjust  to  suggest  that  except  on  one  notorious 
occasion  there  was  no  sincerity  in  the  pose.  Between 
the  years  1871  and  1876  he  arranged  a  whole  series  of 
interviews  between  the  two  sovereigns. 

As  M.  Seignobos  justly  remarked  in  1896  :  "The  whole 
political  history  of  Europe  since  1871  has  concentrated  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula."  A  new  phase  of  the  Eastern 
Question  opened  in  1875  with  the  outbreak  of  a  revolt  in 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  These  provinces  were  then, 
as  now,  inhabited  by  Serbs  and  Croats,  of  whom  rather 
more  than  one-third  was  Mohammedan  by  religion ;  and 
they  naturally  looked  for  deliverance  to  their  Serb  kins- 
men in  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  and  for  sympathy  to 
their  other  Serb  and  Croat  kinsmen  in  Croatia  and  Dal- 
matia.  From  quite  an  early  stage  in  the  crisis  Austria- 
Hungary  seriously  considered  the  occupation  of  the  two 
provinces.  Such  a  step  was  a  logical  sequel  to  her 
possession  of  Dalmatia,  for  it  is  obvious  that  if  Bosnia 
fell  into  any  other  hands,  Dalmatia  would  sooner  or  later 
be  lost.  Dalmatia  is  untenable  without  Bosnia,  except  so 
long  as  the  latter  is  held  by  an  uncivilised  and  decaying 
Power  like  the  Turks. 

A  number  of  attempts  were  made  to  force  a  scheme 
of  reform  upon  the  Porte,  but  failed  owing  to  the  un- 
compromising demands  and  resistance  of  the  insurgents. 
As  usual,  long  and  barren  diplomatic  negotiations 
between  the  Powers  kept  pace  with  growing  anarchy 
in  the  disturbed  provinces,  and  indeed  in  other  parts 
of  Turkey.  In  May,  1876,  Bulgaria  was  the  scene  of 
the  rising  and  massacre  which  roused  Gladstone  to  his 
celebrated  action ;  and  in  the  same  month  a  revolution 
broke  out  in  Constantinople  itself.  The  Sultan,  Abdul 
Aziz,  was  replaced  by  his  brother,  Murad  V.,  a  brainless 
cipher  in  the  hands  of  the  Young  Turks.  The  new 
regime  found  an  able  leader  in  Midhat  Pasha,  but  his 
followers,  though  full  of  enthusiasm  for  Western  ideas 


THE  BALKANS  BY  TREATY 
1800- 1878 


'■■■'I 1 1 1 

Boundary  of  Turkey  in  Europe  in  1800 
Boundaries  in  1856  (Treaty  of  Paris) 
■  Boundaries  in  1878  (Treaty  of  Berlin) 

Boundaries  proposed  by  the  treaty  of 

San  Stefano  (1878) 


-TBeflftrae^ 

yB  Ov  s  n  1  a  ^\tf  l8l7j, 

Saraj 


»*-  PloY^^raiu 


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^^V^Ur^^  o^  %°    U'o  *%    \    ^."^ 


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(Turkish) 


\%  \r  v%  V. 


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Emery "JTilker  Lid.  so 


CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST    105 

of  constitutional  government,  proved  quite  incapable  of 
assimilating  the  crude  doctrinaire  teachings  which  they 
had  culled  from  some  of  the  wilder  writers  of  the  French 
Revolution.  Moreover,  just  as  in  Hungary  the  leaders 
of  constitutional  reform  were  grossly  intolerant  in  their 
attitude  towards  the  other  nationalities,  so  the  Young 
Turks  were  possessed  by  the  Ottoman  idea,  which  in- 
volved the  assimilation  and  subjection  of  the  Christian 
subjects  of  the  Porte.  Their  efforts  to  gain  control  of  the 
machinery  of  state  were  naturally  encouraged  by  the  in- 
ternal anarchy  in  Turkey,  by  the  storm  of  indignation  in 
the  civilised  West  and  the  rising  tide  of  Pan-Slav  feeling 
in  Russia,  which  the  Bulgarian  atrocities  had  evoked. 

On  July  1,  1876,  the  two  Serbian  states  declared  war 
upon  Turkey,  after  issuing  proclamations  which  foretold 
the  revival  of  Stephen  Dusan's  mediaeval  Empire.  In 
this  action  Prince  Milan  of  Serbia  was  certainly  in- 
fluenced by  the  fact  that  Prince  Peter  Karagjorgjevic, 
the  head  of  the  rival  dynasty,  was  one  of  the  leaders  of 
the  Bosnian  rising  and  was  already  proving  his  qualities 
as  a  soldier.  The  Serbian  army,  though  led  by  a  Rus- 
sian General,  Cernajev,  and  augmented  by  many  Russian 
volunteers,  proved  no  match  for  the  Turks,  and  was  on 
the  point  of  being  crushed,  when  the  Tsar  imposed  an 
armistice  under  threat  of  immediate  war.  It  was  during 
this  eventful  summer,  when  the  Turkish  Empire  seemed 
once  more  threatened  to  its  very  foundations,  that  the 
phantom  Sultan  Murad  was  replaced  by  Abdul  Hamid, 
who  was  soon  to  end  the  brief  farce  of  the  Turkish  Con- 
stitution. The  peace  of  Europe  was  in  growing  danger. 
Disraeli  made  a  threatening  speech  at  the  Guildhall  Ban- 
quet in  favour  of  the  unspeakable  Turk,  and  his  words 
were  a  glaring  contrast  to  the  speech  of  Alexander  II.  to 
the  nobles  of  Moscow  on  the  following  day,  when  he 
declared  that,  "if  he  failed  to  obtain  with  the  aid  of 
Europe  the  guarantee  which  he  was  entitled  to  demand 


106     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

from  Turkey,  he  would  be  obliged  to  act  alone."  If 
Disraeli  had  had  his  way,  there  would  have  been 
another  unnecessary  war  between  Britain  and  Russia  to 
assert  the  right  of  the  Sultan  to  misgovern  and  massacre 
at  will.  Providentially  Gladstone's  agitation  on  the 
Liberal  side  and  the  influence  of  sound  commonsense 
among  the  Conservatives  led  to  the  dispatch  of  Lord 
Salisbury,  the  wisest  of  Conservative  statesmen,  to  Con- 
stantinople. The  negotiations  of  the  representatives  of 
the  Great  Powers  with  the  new  Turkish  Parliament  under 
Midhat  shattered  against  the  theories  and  racial  fana- 
ticism of  the  Turks,  who  insisted  on  "the  integrity  of 
the  Turkish  Empire."  Just  as  Kossuth,  the  Magyar 
leader,  on  the  eve  of  1848  declared  that  he  could  not 
find  Croatia  on  the  map,  so  Midhat's  followers  affected 
ignorance  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  Bulgaria.  After  the 
failure  of  these  negotiations  war  was  only  a  question  of 
time.  Early  in  1877  Pan-Slav  feeling  reached  its  height 
in  Russia,  and  the  Tsar  concluded  a  military  convention 
with  Roumania. 

The  Russo-Turkish  War,  in  which  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  soon  joined  once  more,  lies  outside  the 
scope  of  the  present  narrative,  which  seeks  to  deal  with 
causes  and  effects  rather  than  with  military  details. 
The  reverses  at  Shipka  and  Plevna,  which  followed 
the  initial  Russian  success,  were  retrieved  to  a  very  great 
extent  by  the  heroism  of  the  Roumanian  army  under 
the  able  leadership  of  Prince  Charles.  The  fall  of 
Plevna  on  December  10,  1877,  prepared  the  way  for  the 
Russian  entry  into  Adrianople  on  January  20,  1878  :  and 
Constantinople  was  soon  threatened  by  the  victorious 
Russians.  In  February,  Abdul  Hamid  took  advantage 
of  these  disasters  to  get  rid  of  his  discredited  Parlia- 
ment and  to  suspend  the  Turkish  Constitution.  The 
Hamidian  despotism  under  which  Turkey  groaned  for 
the  next  thirty  years  was  a  worthy  culmination  of  the 


CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST     107 

process  of  decay  which  the  importation  of  crude  political 
nostrums  from  the  West  had  been  unable  to  arrest. 

On  March  3,  1878,  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  was  con- 
cluded between  Russia  and  Turkey,  and  its  provisions 
revolutionised  the  whole  situation  in  the  Near  East.  The 
independence  of  Roumania  and  Serbia  was  definitely 
secured;  but  while  certain  territorial  concessions  were 
made  to  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  Bessarabia  was  to  be 
taken  from  Roumania,  who  only  received  the  Dobrudja 
as  a  sorry  exchange ;  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  instead  of 
being  united  to  their  kinsmen  on  the  East,  were  to  receive 
an  autonomy  of  their  own.  But  the  outstanding  feature 
of  the  treaty  was  the  creation  of  a  Big  Bulgaria,  under  the 
suzerainty  of  the  Sultan,  comprising  the  whole  of  Bul- 
garia proper,  Eastern  Roumelia  with  the  town  of  Philip- 
popolis  and  the  whole  of  Macedonia,  to  the  very  gates  of 
Salonica,  and  extending  westwards  as  far  as  the  Sar 
Mountains,  Dibra  and  Koritza,  and  even  eating  right 
into  the  heart  of  Albania  to  the  west  of  the  Lake  of 
Ohrida. 

The  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  was  an  absolutely  impos- 
sible arrangement  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place  it 
was  an  essentially  Slavonic  settlement,  which  neglected 
or  did  grave  injustice  to  the  non-Slav  races  of  the  Pen- 
insula, the  Greeks,  the  Albanians  and  the  Roumanians. 
In  the  second  place  it  left  Turkey  with  frontiers  such  as 
defied  every  law  of  geography,  politics  or  common  sense. 
Autonomous  Bosnia  was  to  retain  its  nominal  connection 
with  Turkey ;  but  a  narrow,  wholly  indefensible,  and 
absurdly  unnatural  corridor  through  the  Sandjak  of 
Novibazar  was  still  to  connect  Bosnia  with  the  plain  of 
Kosovo  and  to  separate  Serbia  from  Montenegro — a  cor- 
ridor infinitely  less  satisfactory  and  narrower  by  two- 
thirds  than  that  which  was  actually  created  by  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin.  Salonica  remained  Turkish,  but  was  entirely 
separated    from    its    hinterland.      Novibazar,    Kosovo, 


108     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Albania,  Epirus  and  Thessaly  were  left  in  Turkish  hands, 
as  mere  fragments,  unworkable  and  disconnected. 
Adrianople  and  the  valley  of  the  Arta  were  retained  by 
the  Turks;  but  the  whole  connection  between  Adrianople 
and  Constantinople  was  directly  threatened  by  the  as- 
signment to  Bulgaria  of  an  enclave  of  territory  includ- 
ing Kirk  Kilisse  and  extending  south  to  within  a  few 
miles  of  the  river  Ergene,  near  Liileburgas.  But  if  the 
settlement  was  unjust  and  fatal  on  general  grounds,  it 
is  just  upon  Slavonic  grounds  that  it  had  its  most  fatal 
effect.  For  it  would  have  aggrandised  Bulgaria  at  the 
expense  of  all  her  neighbours ;  and  though  it  never  be- 
came effective,  its  memory  provided  that  tenacious  race 
with  a  programme  which  struck  deep  root  in  the  minds  of 
its  leaders,  and  has  ever  since  been  regarded  by  them  as 
their  excuse  and  justification  for  aiming  at  the  hegemony 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

Meanwhile  this  settlement  displeased  and  alarmed  the 
Great  Powers  on  purely  selfish  grounds.  Britain  still 
looked  upon  Russian  control  of  Constantinople  as  a  real 
danger,  and  with  more  reason  regarded  with  disfavour 
the  clauses  which  seemed  to  secure  to  Russia  complete 
control  of  the  new  Bulgarian  administration  and  of  the 
Prince's  election.  Public  opinion  in  England  was  in- 
fluenced by  the  sentimental  appeals  of  Indian  Moslems 
in  favour  of  their  Turkish  co-religionists.  Moreover, 
Austria-Hungary  was  determined  to  have  Bosnia  for 
herself  and  was  highly  displeased  at  an  arrangement 
which  would  have  placed  Bulgaria  across  her  own  path  to 
Salonica.  The  British  Government  took  a  strong  line 
in  demanding  a  revision  of  the  Treaty,  and  was  backed 
up  by  the  mobilisation  of  Austria,  and  by  protests  from 
the  Greeks  and  other  rivals  of  Bulgaria.  Russia  was  not 
prepared  to  risk  an  extension  of  the  war  and  consented  to 
the  convocation  of  an  European  Congress,  which  in  due 
course  met  in  Berlin  under  the  presidency  of  Bismarck 


CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST  109 

as  the  "honest  broker"  (June  13 — July  13,  1878).  The 
attitude  and  outlook  of  the  Congress  were  at  once  revealed 
in  its  decision  not  to  admit  the  Greek  and  Roumanian 
delegates  to  direct  representation  or  to  the  vote,  but 
merely  to  allow  them  to  state  their  views.  Thus  the  fate 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  for  the  next  thirty  years  was 
decided  by  the  Great  Powers  over  the  heads,  and  gener- 
ally in  defiance  of  the  wishes,  of  the  states  and  races 
concerned.  If  the  settlement  of  San  Stefano  was  unjust 
to  all  but  the  Slavs  and  did  not  draw  a  just  line  even  be- 
tween those  Slavs  themselves,  the  settlement  of  Berlin 
succeeded  in  being  equally  unjust  to  all.  It  was  frankly 
based  upon  force,  upon  the  interests  of  the  Great  Powers, 
and  upon  the  negation  of  the  rights  of  small  nations. 
That  is  the  root  fact  which  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind 
throughout  the  concluding  stages  of  the  present  War — 
the  more  so  in  view  of  the  ominous  contrast  between  the 
professions  and  the  practice  of  the  statesmen  who  at 
present  control  the  fate  of  Europe,  in  all  matters  that 
concern  the  principle  of  nationality. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Article  LXIII.  of  the  new 
Treaty  declared  the  Treaty  of  Paris  to  be  still  in  opera- 
tion on  all  points  not  specifically  abrogated.  In  point 
of  fact  it  replaced  the  Treaty  of  Paris  on  virtually  every 
point  save  three,  viz.,  the  international  regulation  of  the 
Straits  (X.)  and  of  the  Danube  (XV.,  sqq.)  and  the  re- 
course to  arbitration  before  force.  Only  two  stipulations 
definitely  survived — the  principle  of  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  which  has  now- 
become  a  mere  farce,  and  the  admission  of  Turkey  to  the 
advantages  of  European  public  law,  which  was  never 
applied.1 

Under  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  the  "Big 
Bulgaria"  of  San  Stefano  vanished,  and  Bulgarian 
unity,  which  the  nation  was  to  have  won  thus  easily, 

1  Cahuet,  La  Question  d'Orient,   p.   401. 


110    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

vanished  with  it.  The  Bulgarian  race  fell  into  three 
groups — the  new  Principality,  with  a  population  of 
about  two  millions,  under  a  prince  to  be  selected  by  the 
nation,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Sublime  Porte  and 
the  Great  Powers,  from  one  of  the  petty  non-reigning 
dynasties  of  Europe;  Eastern  Roumelia  with  barely  a 
million  inhabitants,  under  a  governor  nominated  for  five 
years  by  the  Porte ;  and  the  unredeemed  Bulgarians  of 
Thrace  and  Macedonia.  Serbia  finally  acquired  her  in- 
dependence and  was  allowed  to  extend  her  frontiers  by 
the  acquisition  of  Nis,  Pirot  and  Vranja.  The  indepen- 
dence of  Montenegro,  which  had  long  been  a  solid  his- 
torical fact,  was  formally  recognised  by  the  Porte.  The 
district  of  Niksic  and  a  fragment  of  Herzegovina,  together 
with  a  few  miles  of  coast  line  beside  the  roadstead  of 
Antivari,  were  assigned  to  Montenegro;  but  the  new- 
frontier  was  so  unnatural  and  produced  such  acute  dis- 
order between  the  Montenegrins  and  the  Albanians,  that 
in  1880  the  Powers  found  it  necessary  to  consent  to  a 
revision  and  to  assign  Dulcigno  to  Montenegro.  The 
real  injustice  of  this  settlement  as  far  as  Montenegro  was 
concerned  lay  in  the  circumstance  that  Spizza,  which 
completely  dominates  Antivari,  was  left  in  Austrian 
hands,  that  Montenegro,  though  independent  and  not 
neutralised,  was  not  allowed  to  possess  ships  of  her  own, 
and  that  the  maritime  control  of  her  coasts  was  vested  in 
Austria-Hungary ;  and  that  Austria's  consent  was  neces- 
sary before  Montenegro  could  build  a  railway  through 
her  own  territory. 

The  Congress  reached  two  far  more  vital  decisions 
which  affected  the  whole  future,  political  and  economic, 
of  the  two  Serbian  states.  Bosnia-Herzegovina  was 
assigned  to  Austria-Hungary.  The  long  and  bloody 
struggle  of  the  Bosnians  for  union  with  their  Serb  kins- 
men had  thus  been  in  vain,  and  the  rights  of  nationality 
were  again  set  at  open  defiance.     The  decision  of  the 


CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  AND  THE  NEAR  EAST    111 

Powers  was  resisted  by  force  of  arms,  and  the  Austrian 
occupation  could  only  be  effected  after  a  difficult  and  ex- 
pensive campaign.  A  secret  parallel  arrangement  be- 
tween Austria-Hungary  and  the  Sultan  assured  the  latter 
that  no  steps  derogatory  to  his  rights  as  suzerain  would 
be  undertaken,  and  that  the  occupation  was  to  be  re- 
garded as  provisional.  Meanwhile  Austria-Hungary 
also  obtained  the  right  of  garrisoning  the  Sandjak  of 
Novibazar,  and  was  thus  enabled  to  drive  a  wedge  be- 
tween the  two  Serbian  states,  to  complete  the  isolation  of 
Serbia  from  the  Adriatic  and  to  keep  open  the  line  of 
advance  towards  Salonica  and  the  ^gean  which  had 
long  haunted  the  dreams  of  Austrian  Imperialists.  The 
fatal  effect  of  these  changes  upon  Serbo-Croat  national 
feeling,  and  their  share  in  producing  the  present  war  will 
form  the  subject  of  a  later  chapter. 

The  independence  of  Roumania  was  finally  recognised 
by  Europe,  though,  as  in  the  case  of  Serbia,  it  was  not 
till  1 88 1  that  Prince  Charles  assumed  the  title  of  King. 
A  disgraceful  and  shortsighted  provision  was  added  by 
which  Roumania  was  made  to  recoup  Russia  for  the 
expenses  of  the  war.  Bessarabia,  which  had  been 
acquired  by  Russia  in  1812,  but  partially  restored  to  its 
rightful  Roumanian  owners  in  1856,  was  now  reunited 
with  Russia ;  while  the  barren  and  indefensible  Dob- 
rudja,  lying  to  the  south  of  the  Danube  delta,  and 
peopled  by  a  mixed  population  of  Tartars,  Bulgarians, 
Turks,  Ruthenes,  and  Roumanians,  was  assigned  to 
Roumania  as  compensation.  It  is  difficult  to  explain 
this  arrangement  on  any  other  theory  than  that  of  a 
deliberate  desire  to  sow  discord  between  Bulgaria  and 
Roumania,  and  to  provide  the  latter  with  a  frontier  open 
to  strategical  attacks  from  the  south.  At  that  time,  it 
must  be  remembered,  Russia  expected  Bulgaria  to  be 
little  better  than  a  vassal  state,  and,  therefore,  hoped  to 
strengthen  her  hold  upon   Roumania  by  simultaneous 


112     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

strategical  control  from  north  and  south.  It  is  important 
to  remember  that  from  the  very  first  Roumania  vigor- 
ously protested  against  this  new  frontier,  and  repeatedly 
pressed  for  its  revision,  especially  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Silistria,  until  the  events  of  1913  gave  her  an 
opportunity  of  making  her  claims  effective. 

The  history  of  the  next  generation  is  the  history  of 
the  non-execution  of  these  clauses,  and  of  ponderous  and 
insincere  negotiations  between  the  Great  Powers.  At 
last,  the  period  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  ended  shame- 
fully in  the  bankruptcy  of  the  Hamidian  regime,  the 
Young  Turkish  revolt,  the  achievement  by  a  league  of 
the  small  Christian  states  of  what  Europe  had  lamentably 
failed  to  achieve,  and  the  wrecking  of  this  new-found 
unity  by  the  intrigues  and  selfish  policy  of  the  Great 
Powers. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE    BERLIN    SETTLEMENT   AND    ITS    CONSEQUENCES 
(1878-I908). 

The  Treaty  of  Berlin  was  the  supreme  effort  of  the 
European  Concert.  It  asserted  the  right  of  the  Great 
Powers  to  decide  the  destiny  of  those  fragments  which 
Turkey  had  contrived  to  rescue  from  the  wreck  of  her 
European  dominions.  Just  as  in  1815  the  allied 
Sovereigns  portioned  out  Europe  according  to  their 
dynastic  interests,  so  the  statesmen  responsible  for  the 
settlement  of  1878  followed  the  dictates  of  their  own  con- 
venience and  selfish  interest.  The  young  Christian 
states  of  the  peninsula  would  have  been  helpless,  even 
if  they  had  been  linked  together  in  close  alliance,  instead 
of  being  separated  by  the  stagnation  and  jealousy  of 
centuries.  Utterly  lacking  the  strength  to  oppose  the 
unanimous  will  of  Europe,  they  had  to  submit  perforce 
to  an  arrangement  whose  injustice  many  of  them  bitterly 
resented.  Its  effect  has  been  forcibly  summarised  in  the 
words  of  a  Roumanian  historian,  as  "the  exploitation,  in 
favour  of  the  Great  Powers,  at  one  and  the  same  time  of 
the  national  right  of  the  nations,  and  the  historical  right 
of  the  Turks."  *  The  history  of  the  thirty-four  years 
which  followed  (1878-1912)  is  the  history  of  the  gradual 
process  of  crumbling  decay  to  which  that  unnatural 
settlement  was  subjected — of  Turkey's  complete  inability 

1  Iorga,   Histoire  des  Etats   balcaniques,  p.  367. 

lis  * 


114     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

and  disinclination  to  introduce  the  promised  reforms,  and 
of  an  increasing  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  Balkan  states 
to  correct  the  status  quo  whenever  possible  by  presenting 
the  sluggish  Concert  of  Europe  with  a  fait  accoinpli. 

The  settlement  had  one  most  unpleasant  sequel,  upon 
which  the  full  light  of  history  has  still  to  be  shed ;  this 
was  the  highly  questionable  attitude  of  Disraeli.  On 
May  30  he  reached  a  secret  understanding  with  Russia  as 
to  the  conditions  upon  which  Britain  would  consent  to 
the  Congress  of  Berlin.  On  June  7,  he  promised 
Austria-Hungary  Britain's  support  for  the  occupation  of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Meanwhile  on  June  4  he  concluded 
a  secret  compact  with  Turkey,  promising  in  the  event  of 
need  the  armed  defence  of  Turkey's  Asiatic  possessions 
against  Russia,  and  exacting  as  the  price  for  this  the 
occupation  of  Cyprus,  which  was  only  to  be  restored  in 
the  event  of  Russia's  withdrawal  from  Armenian  terri- 
tory. This  scandalous  arrangement,  which  came  to  light 
prematurely,  seemed  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  to  justify  the 
title  of  "  Perfidious  Albion."  It  makes  it  impossible  for 
us  to  evade  a  heavy  moral  responsibility  for  subsequent 
developments — for  the  hideous  sufferings  of  Armenia,  for 
the  incomplete  solution  of  the  Balkan  problem,  for  the 
non-execution  of  reforms  in  Turkey,  and  for  the  con- 
sequent growth  of  anarchy  and  disorder  and  all  the 
European  complications  which  they  inevitably  involved. 
The  sins  of  the  European  Concert  have  come  back  to 
roost,  and  this  country  is  paying  for  its  mismanagement 
of  the  Balkan  problem  a  generation  ago,  by  a  situation 
in  which  French  and  British  blood  is  being  shed,  and 
shed  inevitably,  upon  the  soil  of  Macedonia. 

The  Congress  of  Berlin  ushered  in  a  new  epoch  in  the 
relations  of  the  European  Powrers,  an  epoch  of  "armed 
peace"  and  ever  growing  armaments.  It  marked  the 
height  of  the  influence  of  Bismarck,  whose  permanent 
ideal    was    friendship    between    the    three    conservative 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  115 

empires — between  the  three  spoilers  of  Poland,  whose 
initial  crime  is  so  largely  responsible  for  Europe's  sub- 
sequent misfortunes.  The  true  significance  of  1878  lies 
in  the  fact  that  Bismarck  made  Andrassy  his  colleague 
and  Disraeli  his  tool,  and  that  he  finally  won  and 
dominated  Austria-Hungary  without  at  the  same  time 
offending  Russia. 

The  year  1879,  then,  saw  the  foundation  of  the  alliance 
round  which  European  diplomacy  was  to  revolve  for  the 
next  generation,  the  Dual  Alliance  of  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary.  The  death  of  Alexander  II.  in  1881 
ended  the  entente  of  the  three  Emperors;  for  Alexander 
III.  did  not  share  his  father's  warm  personal  feelings  for 
William  I.,  and  though  essentially  pacific,  was  scarcely 
less  Germanophobe  than  his  wife  the  Empress  Marie. 
Thus  the  'eighties  were  a  period  in  which  autocratic 
Russia  and  Republican  France,  by  a  natural  political 
process,  slowly  gravitated  towards  each  other,  but  in 
which  the  process  was  delayed  by  Bismarck's  ingenious 
"reinsurance"  arrangement  between  Germany  and 
Russia.  France's  isolation  led  her  to  console  herself  for 
failure  in  Europe  by  the  foundation  of  a  new  colonial 
empire;  and  French  and  Italian  rivalry  in  Tunis  gave 
rise  to  a  conflict  which  was  promptly  exploited  by  Bis- 
marck. In  1883,  the  adhesion  of  Italy  transformed  the 
Dual  into  the  Triple  Alliance. 

Meanwhile,  with  every  year  the  rivalry  of  Austria  and 
Russia  fills  a  more  noticeable  place  in  European  politics, 
though  its  significance  is  sometimes  obscured  by  an 
artificially  fostered  jealousy  between  Russia  and  Britain. 
Cross  currents  and  conflicting  influences  become  so 
numerous  that  it  is  increasingly  difficult  for  the  onlooker 
to  detect  the  plot  of  the  play  as  a  w^hole.  But  Austro- 
Russian  rivalry  remains  as  one  of  the  dominant  factors, 
and  if  after  this  war  it  is  ever  possible  to  acquire  sufficient 
perspective  for  a  general  survey  of  the  struggle,  it  will 

I  2 


116     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

stand  revealed  as  scarcely  less  responsible  than  the 
Anglo-German  feud  for  the  outbreak  of  the  world  war. 

Quite  a  number  of  articles  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
proved  to  be  impossible  of  execution,  and  had  to  be 
imposed  by  force.  As  we  have  seen,  the  Montenegrin 
frontier  had  to  be  revised  in  favour  of  the  Albanians  in 
the  south,  and  in  favour  of  Montenegro  herself  along 
the  coasts.  Greece  succeeded  in  obtaining  Thessaly 
after  prolonged  disturbance.  Bosnia  refused  to  submit 
to  Austria-Hungary,  and  had  to  be  conquered.  A  more 
peaceful  dispute  arose  in  connection  with  the  new  frontier 
between  Roumania  and  Bulgaria,  and  was  not  finally 
settled  till  1880.  Silistria,  the  key  to  the  Dobrudja,  was 
left  in  Bulgarian  hands.  Russia's  persistent  neglect  of 
Roumanian  national  sentiment  and  the  lack  of  adequate 
support  from  France  and  Britain  inevitably  drove 
Roumania  into  the  orbit  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Ger- 
many. Thus  the  two  Latin  sisters,  Italy  and  Roumania, 
in  return  for  the  security  and  financial  advantage  offered 
by  the  Central  Powers,  renounced,  at  least  officially,  all 
irredentist  plans  for  the  emancipation  of  their  kinsmen 
in  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Even  Serbia,  under  King  Milan, 
despite  her  keen  resentment  at  the  fate  of  Bosnia,  found 
it  impossible  to  escape  from  the  Austrian  sphere  of 
influence;  and  for  many  years  the  Russophil  party  at 
Belgrade  suffered  a  complete  eclipse. 

In  the  years  that  followed  the  Congress  the  chief  centre 
of  interest  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  was  the  new  princi- 
pality of  Bulgaria.  The  Russian  occupation,  under 
Dondukov-Korsakov,  was  responsible  for  the  beginnings 
of  an  educational  and  financial  system,  for  the  formation 
of  a  national  bank  and  library  and  a  State  Press,  and  for 
the  first  draft  of  a  new  Constitution,  which  though  ultra- 
democratic  in  form,  left  the  chief  power  in  the  hands  of 
the  Prince.  In  April,  1879,  the  new  throne  was  filled 
by  the  election  of    Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg,  the 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  117 

son  by  a  morganatic  marriage  of  a  Hessian  prince.  As 
the  nephew  of  Tsar  Alexander  II.  he  was  regarded  by 
Russia  as  acceptable,  and  his  youth  and  inexperience — 
he  was  only  twenty-two — encouraged  the  belief  that  he 
might  be  a  mere  tool  in  the  hands  of  his  uncle.  The 
establishment  of  manhood  suffrage,  single  chamber 
government  and  virtually  unrestricted  freedom  of  the 
Press  in  a  country  which  had  for  centuries  groaned  under 
Turkish  rule,  was  a  distinctly  audacious  experiment; 
and  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  powers 
of  Prince  and  people  under  such  a  Constitution  were 
deliberately  framed  to  counter-balance  each  other  in  order 
that  the  true  power  might  rest  with  the  Russian  Tsar. 
Alexander  found  himself  in  a  position  of  extraordinary 
difficulty.  Bulgaria  was  entirely  lacking  in  political 
traditions.  Her  people  was  a  nation  of  peasants,  endowed 
with  more  than  the  usual  dose  of  suspicion  which  is 
inherent  in  most  peasantries,  and  with  a  natural  dis- 
position to  dislike  all  foreigners.  Her  politicians  were 
untried  men,  trained  in  half  a  dozen  different  schools, 
and  each  desperately  jealous  alike  of  the  person  and  the 
theories  of  his  neighbour.  Alexander  himself  was  as 
inexperienced  as  the  people  whom  he  was  called  upon  to 
govern,  and  soon  tired  of  the  Constitution,  which  he 
probably  quite  honestly  believed  to  be  unworkable.  This 
•change  of  attitude  did  not  meet  with  the  approval  of  the 
Tsar,  but  the  assassination  of  the  latter  in  1881  provided 
the  Prince  with  an  opportunity  of  effecting  a  coup  d'etat 
— the  assembly  being  induced  by  the  threats  of  Alex- 
ander's resignation  to  vote  the  suspension  of  the  Con- 
stitution for  seven  years.  In  effect,  this  step  placed 
Alexander  still  further  in  the  power  of  Russia.  Russian 
generals  assumed  the  offices  of  Premier  and  Minister  of 
War,  controlled  the  whole  machinery  of  state  and  showed 
themselves  anything  but  tactful  or  conciliatory.  It  is 
true  that  they  organised  the  Bulgarian  army,  but  other- 


118     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

wise  they  rapidly  alienated  public  opinion,  so  far  as  it 
can  be  said  to  have  existed  in  such  a  period  of  transition. 
In  1883  it  was  already  found  necessary  to  convoke  Parlia- 
ment once  more,  with  a  view  to  working  out  a  new 
Constitution.  Parliamentary  life  is  a  plant  of  slow 
growth,  and  it  has  never  flourished  on  Bulgarian  soil. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  system  of  party  groups  and 
fractions  has  been  steadily  fostered  by  the  attitude  of 
Prince  Alxander  and  still  more  of  his  unscrupulous 
successor  Ferdinand,  and  in  a  more  natural  manner  by 
the  rise  of  several  very  remarkable  men,  Cankov, 
Karavelov,  and,  above  all,  Stambulov,  whom  his  admirers 
were  fond  of  describing  as  the  Bismarck  of  the  Balkans. 
Meanwhile  Eastern  Roumelia,  with  Philippopolis  as 
its  capital,  had  been  organised  as  an  autonomous  Turkish 
province,  with  a  Government  appointed  for  five  years, 
and  with  an  assembly  of  thirty-six  members,  of  whom 
thirty-one  were  from  the  first  Bulgarians.1  The  pro- 
vince became  the  centre  of  a  secret  revolutionary  move- 
ment which  gained  ground  steadily  until  on  Sep- 
tember 18, 1885,  a  successful  and  almost  entirely  bloodless 
coup  d'etat  was  carried  out.  The  Governor  was  sent 
back  to  Turkey.  The  union  of  "the  Two  Bulgarias" 
was  publicly  proclaimed,  and  Alexander  was  invited  to 
accept  the  new  situation.  This  sudden  display  of  energy 
and  independent  feeling  gave  great  offence  to  so  conser- 
vative a  ruler  as  Tsar  Alexander  III.;  and  Russian 
apologists  alleged  that  Prince  Alexander,  as  recently  as 
September  1,  had  given  his  word  to  the  Russian  Foreign 
Minister,  de  Giers,  at  Franzensbad  to  do  all  he  could 
against    the     revolutionary     movement     in     Roumelia.5 

'  It  is  worth  noting  that  Mr.  Gesov,  afterwards  Bulgarian 
Prime  Minister  and  one  of  the  makers  of  the  Balkan  League, 
drew  up  the  first  Budget  of  Eastern  Roumelia  with  the  aid  of 
French  financial   advisers. 

3  Drandar.  Cinq  Ans  de  Regne  en  Bulgarie,  p.  72. 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  119 

Prince  Alexander  certainly  hesitated  to  take  such  action 
as  might  alienate  Turkey  and  Russia  simultaneously. 
But  he  found  himself  between  two  fires ;  for  Stambulov 
unquestionably  voiced  the  feeling  of  the  Bulgarian  people 
when  he  bluntly  told  the  Prince  that  if  he  did  not 
advance  to  Philippopolis  he  had  better  retire  to  Darm- 
stadt. Alexander  accepted  the  union  and  ordered  a 
general  mobilisation,  thus  drawing  down  upon  himself  a 
furious  telegram  from  the  Tsar  enjoining  the  resignation 
of  all  Russian  officers  in  the  Bulgarian  army.  But  as 
usual  the  situation  developed  in  an  unexpected  manner. 
The  Turks  refrained  from  any  attack  upon  Bulgaria. 
Count  Andrassy  publicly  declared  in  the  Hungarian 
Parliament  that  the  Berlin  settlement  of  the  Bulgarian 
problem  had  merely  been  provisional.  Lord  Salisbury, 
realising  that  the  Bulgarians  were  developing  a  will  of 
their  own  and  were  not  disposed  to  remain  mere  instru- 
ments of  Russia,  gave  Britain's  support  to  the  idea  of 
union  and  thus  tacitly  reversed  the  policy  of  Disraeli. 

The  danger  to  peace  came  from  quite  another  quarter. 
King  Milan  of  Serbia  constituted  himself  the  champion 
of  that  Treaty  of  Berlin  from  which  his  own  race  had 
suffered  most  against  the  movement  for  national  unity 
amongst  his  nearest  neighbours  and  kinsmen.  Even 
to-day  it  is  difficult  to  apportion  the  blame  for  this  fatal 
step.  Milan  Obrenovic  was  corrupt  in  private  life  and 
addicted  to  gross  favouritism.  The  corruption,  alike 
administrative,  elective  and  financial,  and  the  repeated 
violations  of  the  Constitution  which  characterised  his 
rule,  rendered  him  detested  by  all  save  the  Court  clique. 
Thus  Milan  tended  to  favour  a  policy  of  foreign 
aggrandisement  and  prestige  for  reasons  not  dissimilar 
to  those  which  had  inspired  Napoleon  III.  in  the  closing 
years  of  the  Third  Empire.  Milan  was  also  alarmed  by 
the  growing  popularity  of  the  rival  Karagjorgjevi£ 
family,  whose  bead,  Prince  Peter,  had  married  a  daughter 


120    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

of  Prince  Nicholas  of  Montenegro.  But  unquestionably 
the  main  underlying  cause  of  the  catastrophe  of  1885  was 
the  fatal  rivalry  of  Austria  and  Russia  for  influence  in 
Belgrade.  This  rivalry,  which  took  the  form  of  endless 
political  intrigue,  has  been  the  curse  of  the  two  Slav 
states  of  the  peninsula.  It  has  converted  the  splendid 
ideal  of  Jugo-slav  unity,  as  conceived  by  Bishop  Stross- 
mayer  and  Prince  Michael,  into  a  feud  of  two  natural 
allies,  as  deadly  as  the  long  feud  which  the  ambition  and 
brutality  of  Edward  I.,  the  first  of  England's  lawyer 
statesmen,  so  needlessly  created  between  England  and 
Scotland. 

On  November  13,  1885,  Milan  declared  war  upon 
Bulgaria,  trading  upon  the  confusion  which  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Russian  officers  might  be  expected  to  pro- 
duce in  a  young  and  untried  army,  and  expecting  to  enter 
Sofia  almost  unopposed.  But  overhaste,  bad  generalship, 
the  lack  of  equipment  and  cannon,  and  indeed  the  absence 
of  any  serious  strategical  plan,  proved  fatal  to  the  Serbian 
arms.  At  the  battle  of  Slivnica  the  Bulgarians  were 
completely  victorious,  and  their  advance  into  Serbia  was 
only  arrested  by  the  arrival  of  an  Austrian  emissary, 
Count  Khevenhiiller,  in  the  camp  of  Prince  Alexander, 
to  impose  an  armistice  and  to  announce  that  any  further 
advance  would  be  opposed  by  Austrian  troops.  Alex- 
ander, opposed  by  Austria-Hungary  and  frowned  upon 
by  Russia,  fell  back  upon  Turkish  aid ;  a  Convention 
was  rapidly  concluded  with  the  Porte  by  which  the  union 
of  the  "Two  Bulgarias  "  was  recognised  in  return  for  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  between  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria.  Upon  this  basis  peace  was  restored,  and 
Milan  returned  discredited  to  Belgrade  with  no  alterna- 
tive save  to  become  the  political  agent  and  vassal  of 
Austria-Hungary.  The  scandals  of  his  private  life  grew 
steadily  more  violent,  and  culminated  in  his  divorce 
from  Queen  Nathalie.     In  1889  he  saved  himself  from 


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BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  121 

an  impossible  position  by  pushing  through  a  new  and 
much  more  liberal  Constitution  and  then  immediately 
abdicating  in  favour  of  his  only  son  Alexander.  But 
though  the  regency  was  left  mainly  in  the  hands  of  Jovan 
Ristic,  the  ablest  of  Serbian  modern  statesmen,  the  old 
atmosphere  of  oriental  intrigue  and  calumny  remained. 
Milan  and  Nathalie  flitted  behind  the  scenes  and  kept 
Serbia  in  a  state  of  intermittent  political  fever,  until 
Alexander  was  ready  to  supplement  the  scandals  of  his 
parents  by  his  own,  and  until  the  unhappy  country  could 
only  escape  from  imminent  disaster  by  a  hideous  crime. 
Meanwhile  the  Bulgarian  union  had  a  dramatic  sequel. 
On  August  21,  1886,  a  coup  d'etat  was  organised  by  the 
friends  of  Russia.  Alexander  of  Battenberg  was  kid- 
napped in  his  palace  during  the  dead  of  night,  hurried 
on  to  a  Danubian  steamer,  landed  on  Russian  territory, 
and  then  allowed  to  withdraw  to  Austria.  But  Stambulov 
put  his  shoulder  to  the  wheel,  and  declined  to  allow  the 
situation  to  be  rushed  by  those  who  wished  to  be  the 
slaves  of  Russian  policy  and  who  were  not  even  ashamed 
to  kneel  in  the  mud  outside  the  Russian  Agency  in  Sofia 
in  supplication  to  the  Tsar.  Alexander  was  invited  to 
return  to  Bulgaria,  and  was  received  with  the  utmost 
enthusiasm.  Then  when  the  battle  seemed  already  won, 
he  wrecked  everything  by  sending  to  the  Tsar  a  telegram 
which  culminated  in  the  phrase,  "Russia  having  given 
me  my  crown,  I  am  ready  to  return  it  into  the  hands  of 
her  sovereign."  Alexander  III.,  who  had  never  liked  his 
cousin,  made  the  most  of  such  an  opportunity  and  sent 
the  following  characteristic  reply  :  "I  shall  abstain  from 
all  interference  with  the  sad  state  of  affairs  to  which 
Bulgaria  is  reduced  so  long  as  you  remain  there.  Your 
Highness  will  understand  what  to  do."  On  September  7, 
1886,  Alexander  abdicated  and  withdrew  to  Austria, 
ending,  as  his  successor  began,  as  an  officer  in  the 
Austrian  army. 


122     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

The  course  of  events  had  thoroughly  roused  national 
feeling  in  Bulgaria.  Stambulov,  blunt  and  masterful  by 
nature,  had  the  nation  behind  him  ;  and  the  extraordinary 
tactlessness  of  General  Kaulbars,  whom  the  Tsar  sent  to 
Bulgaria  to  lay  the  foundations  of  the  new  regime,  only 
accentuated  the  growing  desire  of  the  Bulgarian  leaders 
to  manage  their  own  affairs  and  widened  the  breach  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  Russia.  For  many  months  the 
throne  of  Bulgaria  went  begging.  At  first  an  unsuccess- 
ful attempt  was  made  to  secure  Prince  Waldemar  of 
Denmark,  the  brother  of  King  George  of  Greece,  and 
the  brother-in-law  of  the  Tsar.  A  little  later  King 
Charles  of  Roumania  declined  the  suggestion  of  a 
personal  union  between  the  two  countries.  In  view  of 
the  utter  incompatibility  of  temperament  between  the 
two  races,  he  may  have  acted  wisely ;  and  yet  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  resist  the  conclusion  that  such  a  development 
might  have  saved  the  peninsula  from  many  of  its  sub- 
sequent misfortunes.  Finally,  on  April  14,  1887,  Prince 
Ferdinand  of  Saxe-Coburg  accepted  the  vacant  throne, 
and  on  July  7  was  formally  elected  by  the  Bulgarian 
Chamber.  Prince  Ferdinand  was  a  member  of  the 
Catholic  and  Austrian  branch  of  the  house  of  which 
King  George  V.  is  the  head;  while  his  mother  was  a 
daughter  of  Louis  Philippe,  and  his  paternal  grand- 
mother, Princess  Kohary,  an  heiress  from  whom  he  in- 
herited rich  estates  in  Hungary.  No  greater  contrast 
could  be  imagined  than  that  between  the  gallant  and 
impulsive  Alexander  of  Battenberg,  and  the  subtle  and 
calculating  Ferdinand  of  Coburg,  who  has  much  in 
common  with  such  Renaissance  tyrants  as  Lorenzo  de 
Medici  or  Pandolfo  Malatesta. 

For  no  fewer  than  nine  years  Russia  remained  irre- 
concilable and  withheld  official  recognition  from  Prince 
Ferdinand,  with  the  result  that  he  could  not  be  received 
at  the  various  Courts  of  Europe.     This  was  extremely 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  123 

galling  to  Ferdinand,  but  a  matter  of  complete  indiffer- 
ence to  Stambulov,  who  as  Bulgarian  Premier  acquired 
the  position  of  virtual  dictator,  and  governed  with  a 
strong  hand  in  open  defiance  of  Russia.  In  the  words 
of  Professor  Iorga,  "Stambulov  was  a  man  of  Asiatic 
energy,  passionate  and  cruel,  a  worthy  pupil  of  his 
Russian  masters,  to  whom  he  proved  day  by  day  that 
their  weapons  can  also  be  employed  by  far  feebler 
adversaries.  He  concentrated  all  his  extraordinary 
energy  upon  delivering  Bulgaria  from  the  Russian 
tutelage  in  which  he  found  her  and  from  the  Russian 
annexation  which  seemed  to  be  in  the  future.  To  espion- 
age he  replied  by  counter  espionage,  to  conspiracies  by 
summary  executions,  to  corruption  by  another  variety 
of  corruption,  to  cynicism  by  an  equal  cynicism.  The 
Russian  system  in  the  East  was  destroyed  in  Bulgaria 
by  its  own  tricks  and  its  own  violence."  It  would,  of 
course,  be  unjust  to  quote  so  severe  a  verdict  without  at 
the  same  time  pointing  out  that  there  have  always  been 
two  currents  in  Russian  diplomacy,  reflecting  more  or 
fess  faithfully  the  dual  nature  of  Russian  political  life 
at  home — on  the  one  hand  the  corrupt  and  brutal  bureau- 
cracy which  is  in  its  death  throes  to-day,  on  the  other 
the  ideal  movement  of  Russian  and  Slavonic  thought. 
These  two  tendencies  sometimes  mingle  and  interact 
upon  each  other ;  but  it  is  easy  to  distinguish  the  con- 
servative type  of  Russian  diplomacy,  imbued  by  Pan- 
Slavist  feeling  in  its  earlier  form,  from  the  more  aggres- 
sive if  abler  tendency  represented  by  Ignatiev,  Carikov 
and  Hartwig. 

Ferdinand,  after  submitting  with  growing  impatience 
to  the  dictatorship  of  the  great  Minister,  at  last  felt  him- 
self in  May,  1894,  strong  enough  to  dispense  with  his 
services,  and  drove  him  from  office  by  a  rude  telegram 
dispatched  from  an  Austrian  watering-place.  Stambulov 
proved  to  be  even  less  capable  of  supporting  such  treat- 


124     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

ment  than  Bismarck  himself  four  years  before,  and 
carried  on  a  Press  campaign  against  the  Prince  which 
involved  him  in  a  serious  libel  action.  Finally,  on  July 
15,  1895,  Stambulov  was  assassinated  in  the  streets  of 
Sofia  by  hired  bravos,  who  added  mutilation  to  their 
crime,  and  were  allowed  to  escape  in  a  manner  which 
threw  grave  suspicion  upon  the  authorities  and  led  to 
open  accusations  of  complicity  against  the  Prince  him- 
self. The  disgraceful  scenes  at  the  funeral  of  the 
murdered  statesman,  the  manner  in  which  the  trial 
against  the  murderers  was  delayed,  and,  finally,  the 
methods  employed  at  their  trial,  only  served  to  increase 
the  suspicion  and  recriminations  of  the  rival  parties. 
But  since  1895  Ferdinand  himself  has  been  the  real 
force  in  Bulgarian  politics,  and  has  used  Ministers  and 
Cabinets  as  mere  tools  in  his  game. 

In  1896  Ferdinand  was  reconciled  to  Russia,  and 
baptized  his  son,  Boris,  into  the  Orthodox  Church,  in 
defiance  of  a  solemn  undertaking  to  his  wife,  a  princess 
of  Parma,  and  of  the  Pope's  anathema.  Meanwhile  life 
in  Bulgaria  assumed  a  normal  course,  and  material  pro- 
gress, especially  in  the  matter  of  railways  and  schools, 
has  been  rapid  and  remarkable.  Unhappily,  Ferdinand 
imported  with  him  from  Hungary  the  specific  Magyar 
quality  of  self-advertisement  in  the  foreign  Press,  and 
a  talent  for  throwing  dust  in  the  eyes  of  superficial 
strangers.  Under  the  fair  exterior  of  new  public  build- 
ings and  well-planned  streets,  attempts  have  been  made 
to  conceal  the  dearth  of  moral  achievements  and  intel- 
lectual culture.  In  the  West  it  became  the  fashion 
among  writers  on  Balkan  sujects  to  judge  everything  by 
a  standard  of  mere  material  progress,  and  to  assume  that 
Bulgaria  alone  was  worthy  of  serious  consideration.  If 
we  were  to  accept  this  basis,  it  would  be  easy  to  show  by 
a  comparison  of  trade  statistics  and  similar  evidence 
that   Roumania   had    made   even    greater    strides    than 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  125 

Bulgaria  during  the  past  twenty-five  years  in  every 
department  of  public  life.  But  in  reality  the  present  war 
has  demonstrated  that  material  prosperity  is  not  the 
main  factor  in  the  life  of  a  nation,  and  that  Serbia,  how- 
ever backward  in  hygiene  and  in  modern  scientific  re- 
search, possesses  those  qualities  of  heroism  and  imagin- 
ation upon  which  true  progress  depends. 

In  Greece  there  was  more  excuse  till  the  advent  of 
M.  Venizelos  for  regarding  the  situation  as  desperate, 
and  it  is  well  to  draw  a  veil  over  the  financial  exhaustion, 
the  party  wrangling  and  the  administrative  corruption 
which  fill  up  the  sordid  annals  of  the  'eighties  and 
'nineties.  Nemesis  came  in  1897  with  the  revolt  of  Crete, 
its  occupation  by  the  fleets  of  the  European  Concert, 
and  the  short  but  ignominious  Greco-Turkish  War,  at 
the  close  of  which  the  Powers  had  to  rescue  Greece  from 
the  consequences  of  her  own  rashness.  Crete  was 
placed  under  a  special  regime  which  satisfied  nobody 
and  continued  to  provide  permanent  material  for 
friction. 

Meanwhile  Turkey  lay  for  thirty  years  at  the  mercy  of 
Abdul  Hamid,  a  true  Eastern  despot,  who  governed  by 
all  the  rules  of  murder,  massacre,  intrigue  and  espionage, 
but  also  a  born  diplomat  and  a  man  of  profound  know- 
ledge and  skill  in  handling  the  international  situation. 
Profound  horror  for  the  crimes  for  which  he  is  respon- 
sible need  not  blind  us  to  his  remarkable  ability.  But 
the  fatal  criticism  to  which  his  regime  is  exposed  lies 
in  the  purely  negative  character  of  his  policy.  It  is  true 
that  by  an  irony  of  fate  he  succeeded  in  reviving  the 
spiritual  side  of  his  office  and  accentuating  his  position 
as  the  Caliph  of  Islam.  But  he  never  showed  any  signs 
of  constructive  genius,  and  was  content  to  play  for  a 
whole  generation  the  game  of  a  consummate  fencer  who 
invariably  contrives  to  take  his  opponents  singly  or  even 
to   play   them   off  against   each   other.      Under   Abdul 


126     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Hamid  all  threads  concentrated  in  the  Palace  of  Yildiz 
Kiosk.  Political  espionage  and  delation  were  organised 
as  a  positive  cult.  Every  man  was  set  to  watch  his 
neighbour ;  prison,  exile  or  death  awaited  the  slightest 
false  step.  Life  abroad  offered  the  sole  escape  and  it 
has  been  calculated  that  no  fewer  than  80,000  exiles 
returned  to  Constantinople  after  the  restoration  of  the 
Constitution  in  1908.  The  immediate  result  of  such  a 
system  was  administrative  paralysis,  degenerating  into 
chaos  and  anarchy,  of  which  the  crowning  example  was 
the  Armenian  massacre  of  1896.  As  we  shall  see,  not  the 
least  odious  feature  of  the  Hamidian  regime  was  the 
practice  of  playing  off  the  various  Christian  races  against 
each  other  and  embroiling  the  various  foreign  states 
which  were  interested  in  their  fate. 

In  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  question 
asked  upon  all  sides  by  historical  students  was  :  Will 
Turkey  be  partitioned,  and  how  ?  Since  the  Congress  of 
Berlin  a  new  idea  has  slowly  ripened,  an  idea  which  no 
one  did  more  to  encourage  than  Gladstone,  and  which 
may  be  summed  up  in  the  phrase,  "The  Balkans  for  the 
Balkan  peoples."  Under  Abdul  Hamid,  then,  the  real 
problem  which  lay  behind  the  complicated  intrigue  and 
manoeuvres  of  thirty  years  may  be  stated  as  follows  :  — 
How  will  the  Balkan  States  succeed  in  dividing  up  the 
Turkish  legacy?  Will  they  do  so  with,  or  without,  the 
participation  of  the  Great  Powers? 

Abdul  Hamid  continued  to  play  off  the  various  Powers 
against  each  other;  and  as  no  British  Government,  either 
Conservative  or  Liberal,  was  willing  to  shut  its  eyes  to 
the  infamies  of  his  rule,  our  influence  in  Constantinople 
naturally  declined.  The  one  great  diplomatic  figure  of 
the  period,  Sir  William  White,  a  worthy  successor  to 
Stratford  de  Redcliffe,  was  unhappily  infected  by  Russo- 
phobe tendencies.  There  was,  however,  one  Power 
which  did  not  scruple  to  associate  on  friendly  terms  with 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  127 

the  assassin  of  the  Armenians.  The  German  Emperor 
was  an  honoured  guest  at  Yildiz  Kiosk  within  two  years 
of  the  massacre,  and  followed  up  his  visit  by  a  theatrical 
entry  into  Jerusalem  and  by  doing  homage  at  the  tomb 
of  Saladin,  a  chivalrous  but  implacable  enemy  of  his 
own  crusading  ancestors.  German  influence  at  Con- 
stantinople made  itself  felt  in  two  main  directions — in  the 
reorganisation  of  the  Turkish  army  by  German  officers 
and  in  the  commercial  penetration  of  Asia  Minor,  but 
reached  its  height  in  the  secret  Bagdad  Agreement  which 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  concluded  with  Germany  in  1913- 
1914,  and  which  was  awaiting  final  signature  when  the 
Great  War  broke  out.  Germany  was  fortunate  in  her 
two  foremost  representatives  in  the  Near  East,  Marshal 
von  der  Goltz  Pasha  as  Turkish  military  adviser  and 
Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein,  who  for  twenty  years 
presided  over  the  German  Embassy  at  the  Golden 
Horn.  Under  their  guidance  German  policy  followed  a 
conservative  course  and  while  favouring  the  status  quo 
and  blocking,  as  far  as  possible,  every  movement  for 
reform,  sought  to  build  up  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  a 
commercial  hegemony  in  which  such  great  political 
institutions  as  the  Deutsche  Bank  played  a  notable  part. 
The  inner  meaning  of  this  policy  cannot  be  better  sum- 
marised than  in  the  words  of  M.  Rene  Pinon  :  "For 
Russia  and  even  Austria-Hungary  the  Ottoman  Empire 
was  an  obstacle  to  a  march  towards  the  ^igean  or  the 
Persian  Gulf;  in  the  hands  of  England  it  was  a  barrier 
erected  between  the  route  to  India  and  the  Muscovite 
pressure.  For  Germany,  it  is  the  necessary  ally,  the 
collaborator  without  whom  she  could  neither  acquire 
nor  hold  the  common  outlets  of  the  East  and  the  routes  of 
Asia.  For  England  and  Russia  it  was  a  -means,  for  Ger- 
many it  is  an  end ;  it  is  in  itself  the  expanson  hitherto 
lacking  to  German  activity."  l  Germany's  aim  then  was 
1  L'Europe  et  1'Empire  Ottoman,  p.  57. 


128     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

to  galvanise  Turkey  into  fresh  life,  or  if  that  should 
prove  impossible,  to  secure  for  herself  a  special  position 
in  the  patient's  household  at  the  moment  of  his  demise. 
To-day  we  are  witnessing  the  final  stage  of  this 
process,  but  it  is  still  too  soon  to  prophesy  as  to  the 
result. 

Apart  from  the  political  atrophy  produced  by  the  all- 
pervading  tyranny  of  the  Sultan's  police  and  the  cease- 
less diplomatic  game  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Great 
Powers,  the  main  feature  of  the  Hamidian  regime  was 
the  non-execution  of  the  reforms  which  the  Powers  had 
extracted  at  Berlin  in  1878.  The  two  points  at  which 
the  failure  to  enforce  reforms  led  to  specially  acute 
trouble  were  of  course  Armenia  and  Macedonia.  In 
Armenia  distance  and  isolation  made  a  policy  of 
massacre  the  most  practical  form  of  solving  the  problem, 
and  it  was  actually  employed  from  time  to  time  with 
complete  impunity.  It  was  Macedonia  which  eventually 
proved  fatal  alike  to  the  Hamidian  regime,  to  the  Turkish 
reformers  and  to  the  Concert  of  Europe  itself.  The 
problem  of  Macedonia  is  the  most  complex  of  all  the 
many  Balkan  problems  which  have  come  up  for  solution 
during  the  last  century.  With  the  single  exception  of 
Hungary,  there  is  no  part  of  Europe  where  the  medley 
of  race  is  so  great ;  and  it  is  not  without  justification 
that  the  word  "macedoine"  has  passed  into  the  French 
language.  Among  a  whole  series  of  causes  which 
contributed  to  leave  Macedonia  longer  than  the  neigh- 
bouring provinces  in  the  hands  of  the  Turks,  was  the 
absolute  impossibility  of  providing  it  with  genuine  racial 
frontiers.  If,  however,  the  long  record  of  Turkish  mis- 
rule in  Europe  reached  its  height  in  Macedonia,  it  is 
also  necessary  to  remember  that  the  inhabitants  of  that 
province  have  since  the  dawn  of  history  shown  an  un- 
ruly and  restless  disposition.  Perhaps  it  is  the  influence 
of  so  corrupt  and  oppressive  a  regime  that  has  made 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  129 

the  Macedonian  so  unattractive ;  but  no  one  can  deny 
his  virility,  nor  the  fierce  tenacity  and  enterprise  which 
has  made  him  the  source  of  perpetual  discord  to  all  the 
neighbouring  States.  Peopled  by  a  fluid  population  of 
Turks,  Albanians,  Jews,  Greeks,  Bulgars,  Serbs  and 
Vlachs,  Macedonia  has  been  the  home  of  ceaseless  and 
varying  racial  animosities,  of  rival  racial  and  ecclesi- 
astical propagandas,  each  backed,  as  the  Christian  states 
of  the  peninsula  grew  stronger,  by  its  particular  racial 
affinity  beyond  the  Turkish  frontiers.  Till  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century  the  Greeks  easily  held  the  field 
against  their  rivals.  The  religious  traditions  of 
centuries  and  the  fact  that  the  whole  Church  organisation 
was  in  their  hands,  gave  them  a  very  obvious  advantage. 
In  1870,  however,  the  Sultan,  partly  yielding  to  Russian 
pressure,  but  also  in  the  hope  of  playing  off  his  Christian 
subjects  against  each  other,  created  the  Bulgarian 
Exarchate,  by  which  any  district  could  be  transferred 
from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Patriarchate  to  that  of  the 
Exarchate  as  the  result  of  a  petition  by  two-thirds  of  the 
inhabitants.  This  provided  the  Bulgarians  with  a 
powerful  political  weapon  which  they  were  not  slow  to 
use.  At  this  period  their  success  was  almost  automatic, 
for  every  Slav  in  Turkish  territory  who  resented  the 
pressure  of  the  Greeks  and  was  anxious  to  remain  Slav, 
saw  his  salvation,  and  his  only  salvation,  in  the 
Bulgarian  Exarchate.  Serbia  and  Roumania  agitated 
for  the  revival  of  the  Serbian  Patriarchate  and  for  the 
creation  of  an  independent  Roumanian  Church  in 
Macedonia ;  but  the  Porte  was  by  no  means  displeased 
at  their  alarm  and  made  no  effort  to  satisfy  them,  while 
Russia  seemed  for  the  time  indifferent  to  any  distinction 
between  Serb  and  Bulgar.  The  schools  and  churches, 
then,  became  the  main  weapons  of  political  propaganda, 
and  outbid  each  other  for  popularity  among  the  inhabit- 
ants.   Children  became  a  valuable  commodity  for  which 


130    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

the  rival  agitators  paid  in  hard  cash,  and  enterprising 
fathers  have  been  known  to  distribute  their  favours  equally 
among  the  rival  propagandas,  with  the  result  that  it  is 
by  no  means  uncommon  to  find  three  brothers  in  a  single 
family  professing  three  different  nationalities.  Numer- 
ous instances  could  be  given  of  men  who  have  changed 
their  names  from  Vlach  to  Greek,  from  Greek  to 
Bulgar  and  from  Bulgar  to  Serb ;  and  many  of  these 
turncoats  have  doubtless  during  the  past  winter  again 
replaced  the  Serbian  terminal  "itch"  by  the  Bul- 
garian "ov." 

This  discord  was  steadily  favoured  by  the  Porte, 
which  transferred  its  favours  at  irregular  intervals  from 
one  race  to  the  other,  but  continued  to  act  upon  the 
principle  of  "Divide  et  Impera."  In  1890  Bulgarian 
bishoprics  were  created  at  Ohrida  and  Skoplje,  and  four 
years  later  at  Dibra  and  Veles.  In  1902  the  first  Serbian 
bishopric  was  created  at  Skoplje,  to  the  great  disgust  of 
the  Bulgarians;  and  in  1905  special  concessions  in  church 
and  school  were  made  to  the  Vlach  propaganda.  But 
the  Bulgarian  school  propaganda  continued  to  flourish 
more  than  any  of  its  rivals.  The  Greeks  were  at  a  dis- 
advantage when  nationality  was  once  aroused,  because 
for  a  Slav  there  could  be  no  real  choice  between  Greek 
and  Bulgar,  but  only  between  Bulgar  and  Serb,  and  the 
Bulgar  was  almost  invariably  first  in  the  field.  The 
Serbians  in  their  turn  were  handicapped  by  the  inaction 
and  incapacity  of  the  Obrenovic  regime,  now  tottering 
to  its  fall;  while  no  activity  on  the  part  of  the 
Roumanians  could  overcome  the  obvious  disadvantages 
imposed  upon  them  by  geography.  The  intensity  of 
the  Bulgarian  movement  rapidly  created  an  educational 
proletariat,  which,  finding  conditions  intolerable  under 
the  Turks,  transferred  itself  to  free  Bulgaria  and 
acquired  an  ever-increasing  influence  in  the  internal 
politics  of  the  Principality,  and  above  all  in  the  army. 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  131 

In  1899  these  emigrants  were  strong  enough  to  form  a 
Macedonian  Committee  at  Sofia,  which  put  forward  the 
claim  "Macedonia  for  the  Macedonians,"  but  which, 
while  demanding  autonomy  under  a  Bulgarian 
Governor-General,  aimed  frankly  at  repeating  the  pro- 
cess which  had  led  to  the  union  of  Eastern  Roumelia 
with  Bulgaria.  Ere  long  they  advanced  from  mere 
proclamations  to  the  employment  of  force.  Organised 
bands  of  Komitadjis  made  frequent  raids  across  the 
Turkish  frontier,  and  indulged  in  political  brigandage, 
murder  and  forcible  conversion.  The  kidnapping  of  the 
American  missionary,  Miss  Stone,  was  deliberately 
planned  by  these  bands,  with  the  object  of  creating 
European  complications.  In  the  opening  years  of  the 
new  century  it  became  more  and  more  obvious  that 
serious  trouble  was  brewing,  and  that  the  European 
Concert  was  far  too  sluggish  to  enforce  any  remedy  for 
the  growing  anarchy.  At  this  stage  Austria-Hungary 
and  Russia,  regarding  themselves  not  unjustly  as  the 
two  "most  interested"  Powers,  took  up  the  question  with- 
out consulting  their  neighbours,  and  presented  the  Porte 
with  a  scheme  of  reforms  known  as  the  February  Pro- 
gramme (1903).  Hilmi  Pasha  was  appointed  Inspector- 
General  of  Macedonia,  and  reorganisation  by  independent 
foreign  officers  was  promised.  But  this  change,  so  far  from 
producing  calm,  was  a  signal  for  a  fierce  insurrection 
during  the  sumer  of  1903.  The  rising,  which  was  mainly 
the  work  of  Bulgarian  Komitadjis,  soon  degenerated 
into  a  struggle  of  all  against  all.  Unspeakable  horrors 
were  committed,  thousands  of  peasants  were  rendered 
homeless,  and  finally  the  Turkish  troops  were 
encouraged  to  apply  the  most  cruel  methods  of  repres- 
sion to  the  innocent  and  the  guilty  alike.  British  public 
opinion,  wisely  voiced  by  Lord  Lansdowne  as  Foreign 
Secretary,  clamoured  for  the  prompt  enforcement  of 
reforms  on  a  wider  and  more  effective  basis.    Austria- 

k  2 


132     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Hungary  and  Russia,  still  acting  in  harmony,  forestalled1 
him  in  September,  1903,  by  the  famous  Murzsteg  Pro- 
gramme, which  takes  its  name  from  the  Styrian  hunting- 
lodge  at  which  Nicholas  II.  and  Lamsdorff  were  the 
guests  of  Francis  Joseph  and  Goluchowski.  The  main 
feature  of  the  new  scheme  was  the  creation  of  an  inter- 
national gendarmerie  for  Macedonia,  a  special  district 
being  assigned  to  each  of  the  Great  Powers.  Thus  the 
Russians  took  over  Salonica,  the  Austrians  Skoplje,  the 
French  Seres,  the  British  Drama  and  the  Italians 
Monastir;  the  Germans  alone  held  aloof.  The  chief 
command  of  the  new  force  was  assigned  to  the  Italian 
General  de  Giorgis.  The  Macedonian  gendarmerie 
proved  quite  inadequate  to  the  task  before  it.  It  was 
very  slow  to  move,  and  it  failed  to  prevent  the  occasional 
recrudescence  of  guerilla  warfare.  This  time  it  was  the 
Greeks  who  organised  bands  of  Komitadjis  on  a  larger 
scale  than  ever  before,  and  who,  while  challenging 
Bulgarian  ascendancy,  also  turned  with  considerable 
violence  against  the  Vlachs.  Here  and  there  this 
gendarmerie  did  admirable  work,  but  it  was  none  the  less 
a  striking  proof  of  the  bankruptcy  of  the  European 
Concert  in  matters  of  Balkan  policy. 

The  question  of  Balkan  reforms  was  still  further  com- 
plicated by  the  Moroccan  crisis,  which  was,  of  course, 
due  on  the  one  hand  to  Germany  taking  advantage  of 
the  paralysis  of  Russia — produced  by  the  war  with  Japan 
and  internal  revolution — and  on  the  other  to  her  deter- 
mination to  prevent  at  all  costs  that  reconciliation  between 
Britain  and  France  which  was  the  great  achievement  of 
King  Edward.  During  the  eleven  years  which  Count 
Goluchowski  spent  at  the  Ballplatz  (1 895-1906)  Austria- 

1  Lord  Lansdowne's  proposals  are  believed  to  have  reached 
Vienna  only  a  few  hours  before  the  departure  of  Count  Golu- 
chowski for  Murzsteg,  and  to  have  been  deliberately  shelved 
until   the   Austro-Ru9sian   Agreement   was   concluded 


BERLIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  133 

Hungary  and  Russia  worked  cordially  together  in 
matters  of  Balkan  policy.  Under  his  successor  Baron 
Aehrenthal,  who  as  Ambassador  in  Petrograd  had 
acquired  the  reputation  of  a  Russophil,  but  who  in  reality 
had  merely  supplemented  his  innate  sympathy  for  the 
traditions  of  Metternichian  diplomacy  by  a  study  of  the 
worst  methods  of  the  Russian  Police-state,  the  breach 
between  the  two  countries  rapidly  widened.  Russia's 
defeat  in  the  Far  East  had  encouraged  Austrian 
Imperialist  tendencies,  whose  natural  and  inevitable  field 
was  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  YOUNG  TURKISH  REVOLUTION 

Few  events  have  been  more  misunderstood  than  the 
Young  Turkish  Revolution  of  1908.  It  was  a  coup  d'etat 
carried  through  by  a  small  group  of  men  of  remarkable 
energy  and  lack  of  scruple.  Some,  like  Niazi  Bey,  who 
took  the  first  open  step  of  rebellion,  perished  by  assassina- 
tion, that  two-edged  weapon  which  he  himself  had  so 
readily  employed.  Others,  like  Enver  Bey,  still  hold  the 
field  in  Turkey,  having  extended  the  principles  of  scien- 
tific assassination  from  the  provinces  to  the  capital  and 
applied  them  with  equal  success  to  a  Commander-in- 
Chief,  a  Grand  Vizier,  and  an  Heir-Apparent,  to  say 
nothing  of  many  minor  personages.  The  Young  Turks 
with  whom  Western  Europe  was  in  contact  were  men 
who  had  fived  long  in  exile,  divorced  from  Turkish  life 
and  thought,  infected  not  so  much  by  the  true  culture  of 
the  West  as  by  the  unbalanced  theories  of  the  wilder 
spirits  of  the  French  Revolution.  Many  of  them  enjoyed 
a  doubtful  reputation,  and  almost  all  were  conspirators 
rather  than  politicians,  inspired  as  much  by  motives  of 
personal  revenge  and  hatred  as  by  patriotic  considera- 
tions. The  revolution  which  they  promoted  was  above 
all  the  work  of  a  single  town.  It  was  in  Salonica,  under 
the  shelter  of  its  masonic  lodges,  that  the  Committee  of 
Union  and  Progress,  the  secret  organism  which  over- 
threw the  Hamidian  regime,  grew  up  and  flourished. 
The  real  brains  of  the  movement  were  Jewish  or  Judaeo- 


THE  YOUNG  TURKISH  REVOLUTION  135 

Moslem.  Their  financial  aid  came  from  the  wealthy 
Dunmehs  and  Jews  of  Salonica,  and  from  the  capitalists 
— international  or  semi-international — of  Vienna,  Buda- 
pest, Berlin,  and  perhaps  also  of  Paris  and  London. 
Gradually  the  movement  was  joined  by  officers  in  the 
army,  upon  whom  its  organisation  naturally  relied  for 
the  necessary  backing  to  their  designs ;  and  after  the  plot 
had  succeeded  these  men  found  it  more  necessary  than 
ever  to  dabble  in  politics,  in  order  to  counteract  the 
perpetual  palace  intrigues  in  favour  of  a  restoration  of 
the  old  regime.  The  first  shock  of  surprise  was  followed 
by  an  ill-considered  enthusiasm  in  Western  Europe. 
Skilled  observers  on  the  spot  detected  from  the  very  first 
the  natural  affinity  which  existed  between  the  Young 
Turkish  leaders  and  the  Prussian  system,  and  predicted 
that  German  ascendancy  would  in  turn  become  even 
more  pronounced  under  the  new  than  under  the  old 
regime.  What  so  utterly  misled  the  West  was  the  re- 
vival of  the  Turkish  Constitution  of  1876  and  the  fresh 
emphasis  laid  upon  its  main  provisions — crude,  ill- 
digested,  doctrinaire  pronouncements,  transplanted,  to 
use  a  geographical  expression,  from  the  temperate  to 
the  torrid  zone.  In  this  mock  charter  of  Turkish  liberties 
two  clauses  stand  out  pre-eminent.  Paragraph  8  declares 
that  "all  subjects  of  the  Empire  are  called  Ottomans, 
whatever  religion  (Millet)  they  may  profess."  Para- 
graph 17  runs  as  follows: —  "All  Ottomans  are  equal 
before  the  law.  They  have  the  same  rights  and  the  same 
duties  towards  the  country,  without  prejudice  in  religious 
matters."  It  is  characteristic  that  in  neither  clause  is  any 
reference  made  to  nationality.  Such  doctrines  overthrew 
by  a  stroke  of  the  pen  the  fundamental  principles  of 
Ottoman  government;  indeed  they  represent  a  negation 
of  the  whole  past  history  of  Turkey  and  are  incompatible 
with  Islam  itself.  It  ought  to  have  been  obvious  from 
the  first  that  such  theories  either  could   not  be   made 


136     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

effective  in  Turkey  or  would  involve  the  destruction  of 
the  religious  and  social  foundations  of  Islam  and  the 
Mohammedan  world.  The  natural  outlook  of  the  true 
Turk  towards  reform  is  summed  up  in  a  phrase  with 
which  one  of  the  deputies  from  Constantinople  itself 
interrupted  a  speech  of  the  Grand  Vizier  in  the  Parlia- 
ment of  1909.  "Shame,"  he  cried,  "we  have  the  Koran  : 
that  ought  to  suffice.  What  need  have  we  of  European 
laws?"  Fire  and  water  cannot  mingle.  The  Ottoman 
Constitution  was  from  the  very  first  a  barren  farce. 

The  main  fact  about  the  Committee  of  Union  and 
Progress  is  its  essentially  un-Turkish  and  un-Moslem 
character.  From  the  very  first  hardly  one  among  its  true 
leaders  has  been  a  pure-blooded  Turk.  Enver  is  the  son 
of  a  renegade  Pole.  Djavid  belongs  to  the  strange  Jewish 
sect  of  the  Dunmehs.  Carasso  is  a  Sephardim  Jew  from 
Salonica.  Talaat  is  an  Islamised  Bulgarian  gypsy. 
Achmet  Riza,  one  of  the  group's  temporary  figureheads, 
is  half  Circassian  and  half  Magyar,  and  a  Positivist  of 
the  school  of  Comte.  Energy  and  ferocity  they  have 
certainly  displayed,  but  never  any  sign  of  capacity  as 
statesmen  or  diplomats;  indeed  their  chauvinism  has 
only  been  surpassed  by  their  tactlessness.  After  the  first 
raptures  of  enthusiasm  had  passed,  it  soon  became 
apparent  that  new  presbyter  was  but  old  priest  writ 
large.  The  old  officials  were  replaced  by  the  Com- 
mittee's nominees.  Baksheesh  did  not  cease,  and  was 
merely  diverted  into  other  channels.  In  effect  the 
Hamidian  system  was  decentralised  into  a  network  of 
local  organisations,  which  were  for  the  time  virtually 
sub-Governments.  The  revived  electoral  system  became 
the  channel  of  unexampled  corruption  and  violence,  all 
the  most  approved  electoral  methods  of  Hungary  being 
supplemented  by  open  murder  and  bloodshed.  The 
crude  mania  for  change  at  any  price  expressed  itself  in 
such  extraordinary  proposals  as  the  abolition  of  the  veil 


THE  YOUNG   TURKISH  REVOLUTION         137 

for  Turkish  women.  The  whole  of  Turkish  life  was  in 
a  ferment :  uncertainty  was  the  order  of  the  day,  and 
economic  stagnation  was  the  natural  result. 

The  revolution  of  July,  1908,  was  followed  nine  months 
later  by  the  counter-revolution  of  April,  1909.  The  army 
of  Macedonia  marched  upon  the  capital.  Abdul  Hamid 
was  deposed  in  favour  of  that  amiable  nonentity 
Mohammed  V.,  and  deported  to  a  villa  on  the  outskirts 
of  Salonica.  The  Young  Turks  assumed  complete  con- 
trol of  affairs,  and  their  nominee,  Hilmi  Pasha,  became 
Grand  Vizier.  The  reign  of  liberty  and  fraternisation 
had  soon  ended.  It  was  followed  by  a  real  orgy  of 
jingoism.  Turkification  was  proclaimed  as  a  definite 
policy.  The  abstract  principle  of  equality  before  the  law 
and  the  refusal  to  recognise  any  distinctions  of  race  or 
religion  were  soon  interpreted  in  a  reactionary  sense. 
Henceforth  no  race  save  the  Ottoman  was  to  be  recog- 
nised, and,  of  course,  it  was  unpatriotic  to  distinguish 
between  Ottoman  and  Turk,  or  to  claim  official  recogni- 
tion for  any  language  save  Turkish.  Clause  68  of  the 
Constitution  makes  ineligible  for  Parliament  "those  who 
claim  to  belong  to  a  foreign  nation."  Applied  as  the 
Young  Turks  began  to  apply  it,  this  clause  would  soon 
have  enabled  the  authorities  to  prevent  any  Macedonian 
who  dared  to  call  himself  a  Bulgarian  or  a  Greek  from 
standing  for  Parliament.  The  same  spirit  was  abroad  in 
Turkey  which  has  inspired  the  Magyars  in  Hungary 
for  the  last  three  generations,  which  made  the  great 
Magyar  patriot,  Kossuth,  himself  a  Slovak  by  origin, 
erect  gallows  for  Slav  patriots  in  1848,  profess  himself 
as  unable  to  find  Croatia  on  the  map  and  refer  a  Serbian 
deputation  to  the  decision  of  the  sword ;  which  made 
Coloman  Tisza,  as  Hungarian  Premier,  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  a  Slovak  nation,  and  which  prompted  another 
Hungarian  Premier,  Baron  Banffy,  when  he  declared 
that  it  was  impossible  to  consider  the  consolidation  of 


138     TIIE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

the  legal  state  until  the  existence  of  the  national  state 
had  been  secured  on  extreme  chauvinist  lines.  In  Turkey 
the  elections  were  marked  by  exceptional  brutality  and 
corruption,  and  the  opposition  was  often  not  merely  kept 
away  from  the  polls  by  military  force,  but  also  shot 
down  in  cold  blood.  Two  measures  which  created  wide- 
spread discontent  were  the  extension  of  military  service 
to  Christians  and  Jews,  and  the  attempt  to  impose  taxa- 
tion upon  the  whole  Empire,  and  to  ignore  the  immunity 
which  large  sections  of  the  Arab,  Druse,  and  Albanian 
population  had  hitherto  enjoyed. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  first,  most  serious  and 
most  persistent  movement  against  the  new  regime  came 
from  the  most  backward  of  all  the  European  races  of  the 
peninsula,  and  from  that  one  which  has  most  widely 
accepted  Islam.  The  Albanians  are  indeed  the  living 
disproof  of  that  superficial  proverb  which  describes  as 
happy  the  nation  without  a  history.  Their  hostility  to 
the  Turks  was  due  to  two  main  reasons.  On  the  one 
hand  their  traditional  attachment  to  the  Sultan  and  the 
old  regime  was  at  once  the  cause  and  the  effect  of  their 
exemption  from  taxation,  and  their  enjoyment  for 
centuries  past  of  a  peculiar  system  of  voluntary  enlist- 
ment, which  has  given  to  the  Turkish  Army  many  of  its 
best  officers.  The  Young  Turks  in  their  officious  zeal 
insisted  upon  both  taxation  and  recruiting  being  made 
uniform  throughout  the  Empire,  and  no  longer  adapted 
to  local  conditions.  On  the  other  hand  the  Constitution 
— a  word  which  was,  of  course,  entirely  meaningless  to 
the  mountaineers  of  Albania — aroused  deep-seated 
suspicion,  which  was  only  temporarily  overcome  by  pro- 
fuse assurances  that  Albanian  local  customs  would  be 
respected,  and  schools  and  other  national  institutions 
erected  and  encouraged.  With  their  keen  practical  sense, 
the  Albanians  were  the  first  to  realise,  though  few  of 
them  perhaps  could  have  expressed  the  idea  in  words, 


THE  YOUNG  TURKISH  REVOLUTION         139 

that  the  Young  Turkish  revolution  was  essentially 
Turkish,  nationalist  and  centralist  in  character.  In  July, 
1908 — within  a  fortnight  of  Niazi  Bey's  proclamation  at 
Resna — ten  thousand  Albanian  tribesmen  assembled  at 
Ferizovic  to  swear  the  "Bessa,"  and  to  protest  against 
the  Hamidian  regime,  while  disclaiming  all  hostility  to 
the  person  of  the  Sultan.  A  month  later  the  Albanians 
of  Tirana  and  Elbassan  were  already  framing  their 
demands;  and  in  November  of  the  same  year  an 
Albanian  congress  met  at  Monastir  and  adopted  the 
Latin  alphabet  for  Albanian  books,  instead  of  Turkish 
characters.  The  Albanian  propaganda  spread  very 
rapidly,  and  by  1910  they  had  reached  the  stage  of  claim- 
ing the  unification  of  the  four  vilayets  inhabited  by 
Albanians,  as  a  kind  of  autonomous  "Great  Albania." 
The  wildest  rumours  were  current  in  the  mountains,  and 
as  an  example  of  the  tribesmen's  frame  of  mind  may  be 
instanced  the  persistent  rumour  that  taxes  were  about 
to  be  imposed  upon  eggs  and  upon  beards.1  The  folly 
of  the  revenue  officials  and  of  the  military,  combined 
with  indignation  at  the  deposition  of  the  Sultan,  goaded 
the  Albanians  into  a  revolt,  which  was  suppressed  with 
extreme  brutality  by  Shevket  Torgut  Pasha.  Discontent 
became  chronic,  and  in  the  summers  of  1910,  191 1  and 
1912  regular  military  campaigns  had  to  be  undertaken 
against  the  rebellious  Albanians.  There  were  serious 
revolts  in  the  Yemen  and  in  Syria ;  but  the  Albanian 
trouble  unquestionably  did  more  than  anything  else 
towards  undermining  the  Young  Turkish  regime. 

The  internal  policy  of  the  Young  Turks,  then,  was 
based  upon  Turkification  and  terrorism ;  and  one  of  its 
many  pillars  was  the  "removal"  of  political  opponents. 
The  art  of  assassination  was  first  practised  upon  Shemshi 
Bey,  then  upon  various  "Liberal"  journalists  and  minor 

1  Die  Tiirkei  vor  den  beiden  letzten  Kriegen,  by  an  anonymous 
diplomatist,  in  the  Deutsche  Revue  of  June,  1913. 


140     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

politicians  in  Constantinople,  and  finally  upon  such  pro- 
minent personages  as  Nazim  Pasha  and  Mahmud 
Shevket  Pasha.  The  machinery  of  state  was  clogged 
more  and  more  by  personal  jealousies  and  hates  and  by 
the  old  corrupt  and  incompetent  regime,  revived  in  a 
different  and  often  cruder  form.  As  time  passed,  it  be- 
came more  and  more  obvious  that  the  sole  hope  of  salva- 
tion lay  in  the  army.  Hence  it  was  absolutely  inevitable 
that  the  Young  Turks  should  fall  under  German  in- 
fluence since  the  Germans  alone  could  be  relied  upon  to 
reorganise  the  army,  without  at  the  same  time  interfering 
with  the  autocratic  designs  of  the  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress.  The  lack  of  leaders  with  political  experi- 
ence and  prestige  compelled  the  Committee  to  recall  to 
power  some  of  the  Old  Turkish  leaders ;  and  thus  in 
January,  1912,  Said  Pasha  became  Grand  Vizier,  and  in 
July  of  the  same  year  was  followed  by  Ghazi  Mukhtar 
Pasha.  But  this  only  served  to  accentuate  the  dissen- 
sions at  headquarters.  Never  in  all  its  long  history  had 
Constantinople  been  the  scene  of  more  persistent  intrigue 
and  counter  intrigue. 

The  Albanian  movement  was  steadily  encouraged  by 
Austria-Hungary  for  her  own  ends.  It  is  scarely  neces- 
sary to  point  out  that  the  road  from  Durazzo  to  Monastir 
has  throughout  history  been  an  alternative  route  to  that 
which  follows  the  Morava  valley.  Austria's  encourage- 
ment seriously  alarmed  Italy,  and  played  its  part  in 
deciding  the  Roman  Cabinet  to  embark  upon  the  Tri- 
politan  expedition.  It  is  still  too  soon  to  affirm  posi- 
tively whether  Austria-Hungary  encouraged  Italy  into 
the  African  adventure  in  order  to  divert  her  attention 
from  the  Adriatic  and  thus  leave  to  herself  a  freer  hand 
in  Northern  Albania.  We  know,  however,  from  the 
Italian  Green  Book  that  Austria-Hungary  vetoed  Italy's 
naval  action  against  Turkey  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
be  a  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 


THE  YOUNG  TURKISH  REVOLUTION  141 

«-  Special  stress  has  been  laid  upon  the  policy  of  Turkifi- 
cation,1  not  only  because  it  provides  the  key  to  the 
internal  policy  of  the  Young  Turkish  regime,  but  also 
because  from  the  moment  it  crystallised  a  combination  of 
the  Christian  races  in  Macedonia  and  of  all  the  kindred 
Balkan  nations  against  the  common  danger  became  in- 
evitable. The  Young  Turks  in  their  arrogance  and 
chauvinism  pinned  entire  faith  upon  the  army;  and 
friendly  observers  outside  accepted  their  estimate  of  its 
sound  condition.  The  Balkan  League  did  not  share  this 
opinion;  it  staked  everything  upon  its  more  intimate 
information ;  and  it  won.  During  the  first  years  of  the 
new  regime  many  foreign  optimists  fondly  imagined 
that  the  reforms  promised  under  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  but 
never  executed,  would  now  at  last  be  enforced  under  the 
menace  of  Balkan  co-operation.  But  the  Concert  of 
Europe,  always  feeble,  was  paralysed  by  Italy's  separate 
action  and  seemed  afraid  to  push  too  hard.  Britain  had 
been  without  a  policy  since  the  death  of  King  Edward, 
while  Russia  was  working  for  her  own  hand,  and  France 
was  absorbed  by  the  internal  problem  of  the  Three 
Years'  Service  Bill.  Meanwhile  the  Central  Powers  were 
too  confident  of  Turkey's  ability  to  deal  with  her  upstart 
neighbours  to  make  any  serious  effort  to  avert  war.  In 
August,  19 1 2,  a  feeble  proposal  of  reform  was  put 
forward  by  Count  Berchtold  on  behalf  of  Austria- 
Hungary;  but  though  it  may  be  regarded  as  proving 
that  nerveless  statesman's  personal  leanings  towards 
peace,  it  was  at  once  obvious  to  everyone  that  the  twelfth 
hour  had  already  struck.  The  Balkan  League,  which  in 
191 2  took  the  field  against  Turkey,  was  the  outward  and 
visible  sign  of  the  bankruptcy  of  European  statesman- 
ship in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

1  Ottomanisation  is  a  slightly  less  hideous  but  also  less  accurate 
word. 


PART   II 
CHAPTER   XII 

THE  BALKAN   LEAGUE 

The  thirty-four  years  which  followed  upon  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin  were,  so  far  as  the  Balkans  were  concerned,  a 
period  of  arrested  development,  during  which  the  Great 
Powers,  under  pretext  of  enforcing  the  will  of  Europe, 
really  secured  a  free  hand  for  the  Turks.  The  settle- 
ment actually  imposed  in  Berlin  was  no  less  arbitrary 
and  artificial  than  that  which  Russia  had  sought  to 
enforce  at  San  Stefano  a  few  months  before.  Its 
crowning  error  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  subjected  once  more 
to  the  Ottoman  yoke  large  tracts  of  territory  which  the 
war  had  liberated,  and  yet  entirely  neglected  to  enforce 
the  guarantees  for  which  it  had  stipulated.  Despite  this 
injustice  and  the  great  misery  which  it  involved,  it  is 
possible  to  regard  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  as  the  instru- 
ment which  eventually  rendered  possible  the  liberation 
of  the  Balkan  peoples  by  their  own  unaided  efforts, 
instead  of  by  the  aid  of  a  foreign  Power.  The  enforce- 
ment of  the  San  Stefano  programme  really  would  have 
left  Russia  supreme  in  the  Near  East.  The  disappoint- 
ment and  resentment  aroused  by  the  reversal  of  this 
programme  created  a  very  different  atmosphere  through- 
out the  Balkans — a  feeling  compounded  of  the  recog- 

148 


144     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

nition  of  their  own  inability  to  resist  the  rulings  of  the 
Concert  and  the  cynical  but  natural  determination  to 
exploit  for  their  own  ends  the  jealousies  of  the  rival 
Powers.  Such  an  attitude  was  fully  justified  by  the 
cavalier  manner  in  which  the  Roumanian,  Serbian  and 
Greek  delegates  were  treated  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin, 
when  the  diplomatic  world,  repeating  the  errors  of  the 
earlier  Congress  of  Vienna,  displayed  a  superb  indiffer- 
ence to  the  wishes  of  the  population  whose  fate  it  was 
deciding. 

The  indignation  with  which  the  Balkan  Christians 
greeted  this  betrayal  of  their  interests  not  unnaturally 
revived  the  idea  of  a  Balkan  League.  To  theorists  such 
a  League  was  by  no  means  new.  Mazzini,  Michelet, 
Lamartine,  Edgar  Quinet,  Louis  Blanc,  and  many  other 
political  thinkers  of  their  time  had  advocated  in  one 
form  or  another  that  combination  of  forces  which  the 
pioneers  of  Balkan  freedom — Karageorge,  Milos, 
Ypsilanti — had  vaguely  set  up  as  their  ideal,  but  had 
lacked  the  force  to  put  into  practice.  As  early  as  1844 
the  idea  of  a  League  found  its  exponent  in  the  Serbian 
statesman  Ilija  Garasanin;  but  his  plans  did  not  begin 
to  assume  a  concrete  form  till  the  accession  of  Prince 
Michael  Obrenovic.  In  1859  Michael  had  conferred 
with  the  exiled  Kossuth  in  London:  "Fear  of  Russia 
and  hatred  of  Austria  had  brought  together  the  Serb 
prince  and  the  Magyar  patriot."  !  Kossuth,  taking  up 
an  early  proposal  of  Mazzini,2  advocated  a  Confedera- 
tion of  the  Danubian  states;  and  in  his  name  General 
Klapka  carried  on  parallel  negotiations  with  the  new 
Prince  of  Roumania,  Alexander  Couza.3  The  adher- 
ence of  Serb,  Croat  and  Roumanian  was  to  be  paid  for 
by  an  abandonment  of  the  Magyar  racial  policy  of  1848 

1  Pinon,  L'Europe  et  La  Jeune  Turquie,  p.  448. 

2  Scritti  (ed.   1847,  Vol.   III.,  p.   178). 

3  Cf.  Kossuth,  Schriften  aus  der  Emigration. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  145 

and  by  the  grant  of  linguistic  concessions  to  all  the 
nationalities  of  the  future  independent  Hungary.  Kos- 
suth's day-dreams  were  rudely  dispelled  by  the  Peace 
of  Villafranca  and  the  disfavour  of  the  Third  Napoleon, 
which  involved,  among  other  things,  the  defection  of 
Couza.  But  Michael  and  Garasanin  quietly  continued 
their  propaganda,  and  early  in  the  year  1868  concluded 
an  agreement  for  joint  action  with  the  Bulgarian 
National  Committee  in  Bucarest.  To-day  it  is  difficult 
to  read  their  programme  without  a  sigh  of  regret ;  for 
it  proclaims  the  necessity  of  "a  common  existence" 
between  "the  two  sister-nations,"  whose  country  shall 
in  future  be  called  "Serbo-Bulgaria"  or  "Bulgaro- 
Serbia,"  and  whose  national  flag  shall  be  formed  of  the 
combined  colours  of  the  two  races.  The  same  year 
witnessed  the  conclusion  of  a  close  treaty  between  Serbia 
and  Montenegro,  engaging  the  two  peoples  to  work  for 
the  emancipation  of  their  kinsmen,  and  the  formation 
of  an  unitary  Southern  Slav  state.  If  the  struggle  should 
be  brought  to  a  successful  issue,  Prince  Nicholas  under- 
took to  abdicate  in  favour  of  Prince  Michael,  but  in  the 
event  of  the  latter's  death  without  issue,  Nicholas  was 
to  be  proclaimed  King  of  Serbia.  Meanwhile  a  Serbo- 
Greek  alliance  was  already  on  the  point  of  conclusion, 
and  Michael,  in  the  course  of  a  visit  to  Bucarest,  had 
won  over  to  his  projects  Couza's  successor,  Prince 
Charles  of  Hohenzollern. 

The  assassination  of  Prince  Michael  in  June,  1868, 
dashed  the  whole  of  this  airy  fabric  to  the  ground  at 
the  very  moment  when  it  seemed  about  to  assume 
definite  form.  The  tragedy  of  Topcider  is  one  of  the 
decisive  events  of  Balkan  history  during  the  past  cen- 
tury; and  without  indulging  in  useless  speculations,  we 
may  safely  affirm  that  if  Michael  had  been  alive  in  1876-7 
the  Russo-Turkish  war  and  the  great  international  crisis 
which  it  evoked  would  have  taken  an  utterly  different 

L 


146    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

turn.  Whether  centripetal  forces  would  have  triumphed 
over  the  intrigues  and  interferences  of  the  Great  Powers 
and  led  to  the  formation  of  a  single  South  Slavonic 
state,  it  is,  of  course,  quite  impossible  to  determine. 

Michael's  successor  Milan,  though  by  no  means  devoid 
of  talents,  lacked  the  mental  and  moral  qualities  of  his 
cousin,  and  was  too  unstable  and  selfish  to  focus  around 
him  the  aspirations  of  Balkan  patriots.  Close  co-opera- 
tion between  Serbia  and  Montenegro  was  achieved 
during  the  war  of  1876;  but  Milan  was  only  saved  from 
disaster  by  foreign  intervention,  and  the  prize  for  which 
the  Serbs  had  fought  fell  to  the  share  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy.  During  the  war  the  Bulgarians  gave  no 
sign  of  their  future  military  prowess,  while  the  Rou- 
manians, whose  gallantry  retrieved  the  situation  of  the 
Russian  army  before  Plevna,  were  too  fully  occupied 
to  assist  their  Western  neighbours.  The  time  was  not 
yet  ripe  for  a  general  combination  against  the  Turks; 
all  else  was  overshadowed  by  the  Panslavonic  ambitions 
of  Russia. 

After  the  settlement  of  Berlin  the  ex-Regent  of  Serbia, 
Jovan  Ristic,  attempted  to  revive  the  projects  of 
Garasanin,  and  dreamt  of  a  League  which  should  in- 
clude the  constitutional  Turkey  of  Midhat  and  his 
followers.  But  such  an  idea  was  still  wholly  premature. 
The  vision  of  Balkan  unity  might  haunt  the  dreams  of 
a  few  far-sighted  individuals,  but  public  opinion,  such 
as  it  then  was,  was  too  entirely  dominated  by  the  religious 
and  racial  feuds  of  centuries  to  permit  of  any  real  co- 
operation. As  for  Turkey,  the  brief  era  of  Midhat  gave 
place  to  the  thirty  years'  terror  of  Abdul  Hamid,  who 
sought  in  Panislamic  designs  a  counterpoise  to  the  in- 
curable disloyalty  which  his  infamous  regime  had 
fostered  among  the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Porte. 

The  next  move  towards  Unity  came  from  Bulgaria, 
which  in  1884  tried  to  win  Serbia  for  a  customs  union. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  147 

But  these  advances  met  with  no  response  from  the 
Government  of  King  Milan,  whose  reckless  and  un- 
generous policy  of  war  fixed  in  the  following  year  a  gulf 
of  blood  between  the  two  Slavonic  neighbours.  While 
the  endeavour  to  check  Bulgaria's  legitimate  expansion 
ended  in  hideous  failure,  the  Bulgarian  coup  d'etat  of 
1886  produced  a  radical  change  in  the  Balkan  policy 
of  the  Great  Powers,  Austria  and  Russia  virtually 
changing  swords  in  their  perennial  contest;  and  the 
uncertainty  of  the  new  situation  was  highly  unfavourable 
to  all  plans  of  combination.  In  1887  Alexander  of 
Battenberg's  vacant  throne  was  offered  by  a  group  of 
Bulgarian  statesmen  to  King  Charles  of  Roumania,  and 
his  refusal  seemed  to  many  observers  a  fresh  victory 
for  centrifugal  tendencies.  But  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  a  union  of  the  Crowns  could  ever  have  been 
permanent,  so  radically  different  are  the  political  and 
social  conditions  of  Roumania  and  Bulgaria,  and  indeed 
the  whole  character  and  outlook  of  the  two  peoples. 

In  1891  the  idea  of  a  Balkan  League  was  revived  in 
another  quarter.  The  foremost  statesman  of  Greece, 
M.  Tricoupis,  visited  Belgrade  and  Sofia  and  boldly 
advocated  a  joint  campaign  against  the  Turks  and  the 
partition  of  Macedonia  among  the  allies  in  the  event 
of  success.1  The  existence  of  such  a  scheme  had  already 
become  known  to  the  Turkish  Minister  at  Belgrade,  when 
the  masterful  Stambulov  betrayed  the  details  to  the 
Porte  and  thus  effectually  destroyed  all  hope  of  its 
realisation  in  the  immediate  future.  His  treachery  was 
resented  all  the  more  because  it  earned  for  Bulgaria  a 
number  of  special  concessions  to  her  kinsmen  in  Mace- 
donia ;  and  the  collapse  of  the  idea  of  co-operation  was 

1  As  early  as  1867  the  Roumanian  envoy  at  Athens  had  laid 
before  M.  Tricoupis  a  proposal  of  Prince  Charles  for  joint  action 
by  the  Balkan  States.  See  Aus  dem  Leben  des  Kovig  Karls, 
vol.  I.,  p.  478. 

L   2 


148     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

followed  by  a  period  of  furious  racial  rivalry.  When 
in  1897  Greece  plunged  into  her  ill-considered  and  ill- 
conducted  war  with  Turkey,  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  were 
successfully  held  back  by  the  Great  Powers,  and  the 
despairing  effort  of  the  Greeks  to  stave  off  disaster  by 
offering  Bulgaria  the  partition  of  Macedonia  and  a  port 
on  the  JEgean  was  promptly  declined  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Sofia.  The  divergence  between  Hellenic  and 
Slavonic  aspirations  seemed  insuperable,  and  in  1901 
Greece  tried  to  escape  from  her  isolation  by  a  short- 
lived entente  with  Roumania,  who  throughout  this  period 
had  surrendered  herself  blindly  to  the  guidance  of 
Austria-Hungary. 

The  Macedonian  insurrection  of  1903  and  the  reprisals 
with  which  the  Turks  underlined  its  failure  resulted, 
not  in  the  expected  torpor  of  exhaustion,  but  in  an 
accentuation  of  racial  strife,  in  which  the  hand  of  every 
race  was  against  its  neighbour.  The  excesses  of  Bul- 
garian komitadjis  and  above  all  the  terrorism  exercised 
by  the  desperadoes  of  the  "External  Organisation," 
roused  the  Greeks  and  Serbians  to  similar  efforts.  Greek 
illtreatment  of  the  Vlachs  provoked  an  open  diplomatic 
rupture  between  Bucarest  and  Athens.  Greek  and  Bul- 
gar  massacred  each  other,  while  the  Turks  favoured  tne 
weaker  Serbs  against  the  Bulgarians  and  simultaneously 
incited  the  Albanians  in  their  onslaughts  upon  the  Serbs. 
The  one  serious  attempt  at  co-operation  during  this 
period,  the  projected  Serbo-Bulgarian  customs  entente 
(1907),  was  foiled  by  the  diplomatic  pressure  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  then  engaged  in  the  attempt  to  reduce  Serbia 
to  a  state  of  economic  vassalage. 

The  Young  Turkish  Revolution  of  1908  rapidly  trans- 
formed the  Balkan  situation.  The  sudden  orgy  of  racial 
reconciliation  which  followed  the  revival  of  the  Ottoman 
Constitution  subsided  as  quickly  as  it  had  broken  out. 
The    Young   Turks   soon    betrayed    Chauvinistic  senti- 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  149 

ments  such  as  the  Hamidian  regime  had  never  known, 
and  made  little  concealment  of  their  intention  to  summon 
to  the  new  Parliament  in  Constantinople  the  representa- 
tives of  Crete,  of  Eastern  Roumelia,  and  of  Bosnia. 
From  the  moment  that  their  ulterior  aim,  the  Turkifica- 
tion  of  Turkey,  began  to  emerge  into  prominence,  a 
combination  of  all  the  Balkan  nations  against  the 
common  danger  became  inevitable.  That  events  did  not 
immediately  take  this  course  was  due  to  the  attitude  of 
Europe  towards  the  new  regime,  and  to  the  international 
crisis  evoked  by  the  parallel  action  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  Bulgaria  in  the  winter  of  1908.  The  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  though  it  was  but  the  con- 
summation of  a  ceremony  performed  thirty  years  before, 
aroused  frantic  protests  from  the  two  independent  Serb 
states;  and  for  the  time  it  seemed  as  though  they  were 
even  prepared  to  risk  a  conflict  with  the  Dual  Monarchy. 
Popular  enthusiasm  overbore  the  personal  friction  which 
had  existed  between  the  Karagjorgjevic  and  Petrovi6 
dynasties;  and  the  military  convention  then  concluded 
for  the  contingency  of  war  with  Austria-Hungary  may 
be  regarded  as  the  first  germ  of  the  later  and  more  com- 
prehensive League.  The  next  step  seemed  to  be  a 
Slavonic  Triple  Alliance  in  the  Balkans,  which  was 
rendered  popular  by  the  widespread  belief — whether  well 
founded  or  not  can  hardly  be  determined — that  King 
Ferdinand  had  refused  overtures  from  Baron  Aehrenthal 
for  a  joint  Austro-Bulgarian  campaign  of  aggression 
against  Serbia.  While  both  in  Bulgaria  and  in  Serbia 
the  jealousy  engendered  by  rival  propaganda  was  gradu- 
ally subsiding,  Russian  initiative  gave  a  fresh  turn  to 
the  development  of  political  thought  in  the  Balkans.  At 
the  height  of  the  Bosnian  crisis  M.  Izvolsky,  in  his 
famous  Christmas  speech,  had  proclaimed  as  the  latest 
aim  of  Russian  policy  a  Balkan  League  which  should 
unite  Christian  and  Moslem  "in  defence  of  their  national 


150    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

and  economic  development."  Significantly  enough,  this 
league  was  to  be  confined  to  Turkey  and  the  three 
Slavonic  states.  No  mention  was  made  of  Roumania, 
which  was  treated  as  wholly  in  the  orbit  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  nor  of  Greece,  whose  Panhellenic  aspirations 
were  distasteful  to  the  Chauvinists  of  St.  Petersburg. 
Uninformed  public  opinion  passed  the  same  verdict  upon 
the  excessive  self-effacement  of  Roumania  and  the  in- 
ternal instability  of  Greece,  and  thus  these  two  states 
came  to  be  regarded,  save  by  a  few  far-sighted  indi- 
viduals, as  negligible  quantities  in  the  politics  of  the 
Near  East. 

The  undue  emphasis  laid  by  Russia  upon  the  Slavonic 
elements  in  the  peninsula  merely  represented  a  new  phase 
in  that  attempt  to  oust  Austrian  influence,  which  had 
achieved  a  brilliant  but  fleeting  success  by  the  liquidation 
of  Bulgaria's  debt  to  Turkey.  Two  of  the  ablest  Russian 
diplomats  were  entrusted  with  the  special  surveillance 
of  the  new  policy,  and  the  results  achieved  by  M.  Carikov 
at  Constantinople  and  M.  Hartwig  at  Belgrade,  though 
perhaps  differing  materially  from  the  original  intentions 
of  the  Government,  were  unquestionably  of  capital 
importance  in  the  history  of  the  Near  East. 

One  of  the  first-fruits  of  the  short-lived  Turco- 
Christian  rapprochement  was  the  visit  of  Bulgarian 
officers  to  Constantinople  on  the  occasion  of  the  first 
anniversary  of  the  restored  Turkish  Constitution  (July, 
1909).  The  intolerance  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and 
Progress  soon  led  to  a  renewal  of  the  old  friction ;  but 
in  the  following  January  matters  were  smoothed  over 
once  more  by  a  special  mission  of  Dr.  Danev,  and  the 
combined  efforts  of  Bulgarian  and  Russian  diplomacy 
secured  from  the  Porte  a  temporary  return  to  milder 
methods.  Dr.  Danev  visited  Constantinople  to  plead  for 
an  understanding,  and  paved  the  way  for  the  state  visits 
of    King    Ferdinand    and    King    Peter    to    the  Sultan 


THE   BALKAN  LEAGUE  151 

(March,  1910),  which  were  followed  three  months  later 
by  return  visits  of  the  Turkish  Heir-Apparent  to  Sofia 
and  Belgrade.  The  circumstance  that  the  meeting  of 
the  two  monarchs  with  the  representative  of  their  coun- 
tries' former  overlord  had  been  immediately  preceded 
by  their  reception  in  St.  Petersburg  by  the  Tsar  of  All 
the  Russias  not  unnaturally  gave  rise  to  fresh  rumours 
of  a  Turco-Slavonic  League.  But  though  such  a  com- 
bination was  undoubtedly  favoured  by  a  certain  section 
of  Turkish  statesmen,  the  more  masterful  members  of 
the  Committee  had  other  views.  They  realised  that  the 
policy  of  Turkification  on  which  they  were  firmly 
resolved  was  wholly  incompatible  with  cordial  relations 
towards  the  Christian  Balkan  states;  and  arrogantly 
regarding  a  rupture  as  not  only  inevitable  but  desirable, 
they  endeavoured  to  sow  discord  among  the  rival  races, 
and  to  play  off  one  against  the  other.  Thus  while  King 
Ferdinand  was  prevented  from  returning  home  by  Athos, 
full  permission  was  accorded  to  King  Peter  to  visit  both 
the  monasteries  of  the  Holy  Mountain  and  the  Mace- 
donian capital ;  and  the  ostentatious  demonstrations  of 
the  Greeks  of  Pera  in  favour  of  the  Serbian  King  seem 
to  have  been  rather  encouraged  than  repressed  by  the 
Turkish  authorities. 

In  the  summer  of  1910  the  old  hatred  between  Moslem 
and  Christian  flamed  up  as  fiercely  as  ever.  The  ex- 
treme brutality  of  the  methods  employed  to  disarm  the 
Macedonian  population  was  felt  by  Bulgar  and  Serb, 
by  Greek  and  Albanian  alike,  and  brought  home  to  the 
former  rivals  the  urgency  of  co-operation.  The  first 
sign  of  returning  harmony  had  been  the  compact  between 
Bulgars  and  Greeks  regarding  their  relative  representa- 
tion in  the  Ottoman  Parliament,  and  the  acts  of  official 
violence  which  disfigured  the  second  general  election 
brought  them  still  closer  together.  A  growing  number 
of  refugees  crossed  the  Bulgarian,  Greek  and  Monte- 


152     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

negrin  frontiers  and  swelled  the  clamour  of  those  who 
opposed  the  official  Turcophil  policy.  Nor  did  the 
Christians  stand  alone ;  for  nowhere  did  Young  Turkish 
tyranny  encounter  a  more  stubborn  resistance  than 
among  the  Albanians,  who  had  so  long  been  regarded 
as  the  surest  bulwark  of  the  Hamidian  regime.  It  would 
be  unfair  to  suggest  that  the  Balkan  Governments  were 
not  in  earnest  in  their  attempts  to  reach  an  understand- 
ing with  the  Turks.  Serbia  in  particular  had  the 
strongest  reasons  for  cultivating  the  friendship  of  the 
Porte.  The  tariff  war  with  Austria-Hungary,  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia,  ;the  campaign  inaugurated  by 
Aehrenthal  and  his  Magyar  allies  against  the  Serbs  of 
Croatia  and  Bosnia,  the  grave  scandals  of  the  Agram 
Treason  Trial  and  of  the  Vasie-Forgach  forgeries — all 
this  had  convinced  her  that  the  true  enemy  of  her  race 
was  not  so  much  Turkey  as  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The 
*'pig  war"  having  closed  her  northern  frontier,  Serbia 
found  her  trade  very  largely  dependent  upon  the  good- 
will of  Turkey.  Access  to  the  port  of  Salonica  was  as 
vital  to  her  export  of  five  stock  as  to  her  importation 
of  foreign  war  material.  At  the  same  time  Serbia  had 
fewer  racial  grounds  of  complaint  than  any  of  her  neigh- 
bours; for  the  Turks  were  openly  favouring  the  Serbian 
element  in  the  vilayet  of  Kosovo  at  the  expense  of  Bulgar 
and  Greek.  Dr.  Milovanovie,  then,  had  every  reason  to 
work  in  favour  of  a  Turco-Slavonic  entente,  though  even 
he  appears  to  have  felt  sceptical  as  to  the  possibility 
of  permanent  friendship  with  the  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress.  In  the  meantime  steps  were  taken  to 
promote  further  intimacy  among  the  Balkan  states  and 
their  rulers ;  and  for  this  the  Montenegrin  Jubilee  and 
the  assumption  of  the  royal  title  by  Prince  Nicholas 
afforded  a  specially  favourable  occasion  (August,  igio). 
The  presence  of  King  Ferdinand  and  Crown  Prince 
Alexander  in  Cetinje,  almost  within  sight  of  the  moun- 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  153 

tains  where  a  Turkish  army  was  ruthlessly  crushing  the 
insurgent  Albanian  tribes,  was  widely  regarded  as  the 
forerunner  of  military  action  in  favour  of  Macedonia 
and  Albania.  This  surmise,  however,  rests  upon  as 
insufficient  evidence  as  the  sensational  rumour  launched 
in  Paris  a  few  months  later,  to  the  effect  that  Roumania 
had  informed  the  Porte  of  her  intention  to  mobilise  in 
the  event  of  a  Turco-Bulgarian  war.  It  is  certain  that 
Bulgarian  aggression  would  have  revived  Roumania's 
old  claim — long  dormant,  but  never  abandoned — to  a 
revision  of  the  Dobrudja  frontier;  but  it  is  almost  equally 
certain  that  active  intervention  in  favour  of  the  Cres- 
cent against  the  Cross  was  never  seriously  contemplated 
in  Bucarest. 

The  winter  months  of  1910-11  witnessed  important 
political  changes  in  three  out  of  the  five  Balkan  capitals. 
In  October  the  Cretan  leader,  M.  Venizelos,  became 
Premier  of  Greece ;  in  January  the  Roumanian  Liberals 
under  M.  BrStianu  gave  place  to  the  Conservatives 
under  M.  Carp;  in  March  the  Russophile  party  of 
M.  Gesov  came  into  power  at  Sofia  and  acquired  that 
complete  command  of  the  electorate  which  in  Bulgaria 
always  accompanies  control  of  the  executive.  The  new 
Greek  and  Bulgarian  Premiers  both  favoured  friendly 
relations  with  Turkey,  and  thus  found  themselves  in 
full  accord  with  their  Serbian  colleague,  Dr.  Milo- 
vanovic.  But  the  march  of  events  rapidly  committed 
them  to  a  policy  of  which  it  may  safely  be  assumed 
that  none  of  them  foresaw  the  issue.  The  person  of 
M.  Venizelos,  despite  his  pacific  leanings,  was  highly 
distasteful  to  the  Chauvinists  of  the  Committee,  whose 
uncompromising  attitude  on  the  Cretan  question  coin- 
cided with  an  increasingly  vexatious  policy  towards  the 
Christians  of  Macedonia.  The  warnings  of  Count 
Aehrenthal  to  the  Grand  Vizier  were  disregarded,  and, 
quite  apart  from  the  well-nigh  inevitable  racial  troubles, 


154     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

the  Young  Turks  wantonly  alienated  Greek  and  Bul- 
garian opinion  by  refusing  to  allow  the  concessions  for 
the  projected  railway  lines  upon  which  Athens  depended 
for  her  connection  with  Europe  and  Sofia  for  her  con- 
nection with  the  JEgean.1  Thus  while  Milovanovic  and 
Hartwig  continued  with  diminishing  success  to  advocate 
a  Turco-Slavonic  league,  Venizelos  found  himself 
rapidly  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  a  Greco-Bulgarian 
entente  was  essential  to  Christian  interests  in  the  penin- 
sula. As  early  as  April,  191 1,  therefore,  cautious  over- 
tures were  made  in  Sofia  by  the  Greek  Minister,  M. 
Panas,  who  proposed  in  the  name  of  his  Government  an 
entente  for  common  action  in  defence  of  the  privileges 
of  the  Macedonian  Christians  and  a  defensive  alliance 
in  the  event  of  a  Turkish  attack  upon  either  Greece  or 
Bulgaria.2  At  the  same  time  Dr.  Milovanovic,  probably 
acting  in  accord  with  the  Russian  Minister,  M.  Hartwig, 
made  certain  advances  towards  Bulgaria,  but  without 
putting  forward  any  concrete  suggestions  or  eliciting 
any  definite  response.  For  the  moment  nothing  seemed 
to  have  been  effected,  and  the  negotiations  between  Sofia 
and  Athens  were  jealously  concealed,  not  merely  from 
Serbia  and  from  the  Great  Powers,  but  even  from  most 
members  of  the  Greek  and  Bulgarian  Cabinets.  In 
August,  191 1,  the  sessions  of  the  Grand  Sobranje  at 
Tirnovo  were  marked  by  a  highly  significant  incident. 
A  revision  of  the  Constitution  was  sanctioned,  author- 
ising the  King  to  conclude  secret  treaties  without  con- 
sulting Parliament.  From  this  moment  the  plot  began 
to  ripen.  During  the  autumn  both  Venizelos  and  Milo- 
vanovic gave  public  expression  to  their  conviction  that 
the  adhesion  of  Turkey  was  an  essential  condition  to 
the  formation  of  a  Balkan  League.     But  it  is  probable 

1  Kustendil   to   Kumanovo   and   Salonica   to   Larissa. 

2  Mr.   Bourchier,  the  Balkan  correspondent  of  the  Times,  had 
a  direct  share  in  these  negotiations. 


THE  BALKAN   LEAGUE  155 

that  by  this  time  the  orgies  of  Committee  rule  in  Turkey 
had  effectually  cured  both  statesmen  of  all  belief  in  their 
own  professions,  and  that  Russia,  renouncing  all  hope 
of  working  with  the  Turks,  was  also  beginning  to  devote 
her  influence  to  furthering  an  entente  among  the 
Christian  states  of  the  peninsula.  The  part  played  by 
the  Russian  consuls  in  Macedonia  in  promoting  har- 
mony between  Exarchists  and  Patriarchists — in  other 
words,  between  Bulgars  on  the  one  hand,  and  Greeks, 
Serbs  and  Vlachs  on  the  other — had  already  become 
very  marked.  It  is,  however,  certain  that  at  this  stage 
there  was  still  no  idea  of  active  intervention,  for  when 
on  the  outbreak  of  the  Turco-Italian  war  Montenegro 
proposed  a  general  order  of  mobilisation,  Dr.  Danev 
was  dispatched  to  Constantinople  to  give  pacific  assur- 
ances to  the  Young  Turks.  Bulgaria  realised  her 
inability  to  enter  the  field  alone,  while  both  Serbia  and 
Greece  were  still  occupied  in  pushing  forward  their 
armaments.  Indeed,  the  latter  was  engaged  upon  a 
drastic  reform  of  her  whole  army  system  after  the 
scandals  of  the  Military  League;  and  it  was  calculated 
that  three  years  must  elapse  before  her  forces  would  be 
ready  for  full  military  action.  The  collapse  of  Turkey 
was  already  regarded  as  inevitable,  but  not  even  the 
most  far-sighted  of  Balkan  or  Russian  statesmen 
imagined  it  to  be  so  near  at  hand.  The  policy  which 
underlay  all  subsequent  negotiations  was  a  resolve  to 
lay  the  basis  of  an  enduring  compromise,  such  as  would 
enable  the  rival  races  to  present  an  united  front  to  the 
Turks  when  the  final  day  of  reckoning  should  arrive. 
But  for  the  impetus  imparted  by  the  Tripolitan  war  to 
the  internal  process  of  decay  in  European  Turkey,  it 
is  by  no  means  impossible  that  this  result  would  have 
been  achieved. 

Those  who  assign  to   Russian  diplomacy  the  entire 
credit  (or  blame)  for  the  creation  of  the  Balkan  League 


156     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

fall  into  the  error  of  a  colour-blind  person  who 
can  only  see  the  dominant  colour  in  an  Eastern  carpet, 
and  overlook  the  numerous  threads  of  minor  colours 
which  give  character  to  the  whole  design.  There  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  Greece's  share  in  the 
alliance  did  not  enter  into  Russian  calculations  at  all, 
and  that  Russia's  chief  concern  was  to  bring  the  Slav 
nations  together.  The  manner  in  which  Turkey  was 
not  merely  eliminated  from  the  scope  of  the  League, 
but  converted  into  the  object  of  its  attack,  gave  rise  in 
some  quarters  to  the  belief  that  Russia  had  merely  put 
forward  proposals  for  the  inclusion  of  the  Turks  as  a 
"blind"  which  should  include  other  and  much  more 
aggressive  designs.  What  is  more  probable  is  that 
Russia's  intentions  towards  the  Turks  were  still  of  a 
mainly  negative  character,  and  that  her  statesmen  would 
have  been  satisfied  if  they  could  neutralise  German 
influence  on  the  Bosphorus.  But  as  has  so  often 
happened  in  Russian  history,  her  diplomats  were  allowed 
(or,  as  hostile  critics  would  suggest,  were  encouraged)  to 
pursue  a  forward  policy  which  far  outstripped  the  more 
sober  views  of  official  St.  Petersburg. 

While  the  Greco-Bulgarian  entente  was  in  no  sense 
the  work  of  Russia,  but  may  be  traced  to  the  initiative 
of  M.  Venizelos,  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  entente — that 
other  essential  preliminary  to  a  successful  coalition — 
owes  its  origin  very  largely  to  the  energy  and  skill  of 
M.  Hartwig.  He  it  was  who  imparted  to  the  pro- 
posed alliance  that  anti-Austrian  tinge  without  which 
the  statesmen  of  Belgrade  would  have  been  slow  to 
jeopardise  their  relatively  good  understanding  with 
Constantinople.  Acting,  then,  in  full  accord  with 
M.  Hartwig,  Dr.  Milovanovic  in  September,  191 1, 
approached  the  Bulgarian  Government  with  definite 
proposals  which  mark  the  turning-point  in  the  history 
of   the   negotiations.      A    notable    part   was    played   in 


THE   BALKAN   LEAGUE  157 

these,  as  also  in  the  preparation  of  a  Serbo-Bulgarian 
entente,  by  M.  Spalajkovi6,  then  Serbian  Minister  in 
Sofia,  and  formerly  one  of  the  decisive  witnesses  at  the 
sensational  Friedjung  Trial  in  Vienna. 

The  celebrations  which  attended  the  coming-of-age  of 
Prince  Boris  of  Bulgaria  (February,  191 2)  offered  a 
favourable  opportunity  for  friendly  demonstrations 
among  the  Balkan  peoples.  The  presence  in  Sofia  of 
the  Crown  Princes  of  Roumania,  Greece,  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  was  an  unique  incident  which  fired  the 
imagination  of  their  peoples  and  seemed  of  happy 
augury  for  the  future.  During  the  winter  the  negotia- 
tions had  proceeded  apace,  and  on  March  13,  1912, 
a  treaty  of  alliance  was  concluded  between  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia.  This  was  followed  two  months  later  (May  29) 
by  a  similar  if  less  detailed  treaty  between  Bulgaria  and 
Greece.  The  recall  of  M.  Carikov  early  in  March  may 
have  been  partially  due,  as  was  alleged  at  the  time,  to 
hostile  intrigues  in  the  Turkish  capital ;  in  reality  it 
marks  the  final  abandonment  of  the  attempt  to  place 
Turkey  at  the  head  of  a  Balkan  Confederation,  and  the 
conversion  of  the  latter,  with  Russia's  active  connivance, 
into  an  instrument  for  the  destruction  of  Ottoman  rule 
in  Europe. 

Events  in  Turkey  had  contributed  to  hasten  the  forma- 
tion of  the  League.  The  massacre  at  Istip  in  December, 
191 1,  the  system  of  assassination  adopted  by  the  Young 
Turks  against  their  opponents,  the  widespread  disorder 
throughout  Macedonia,  the  economic  stagnation  pro- 
duced by  the  Italian  war,  above  all,  the  gross  excesses 
of  the  Ottoman  "elections,"  by  which  the  Opposition 
was  reduced  to  ten  members — all  this  accentuated  the 
general  unrest  and  heralded  an  acute  international  crisis. 

Once  more  the  initiative  came  from  the  Albanians, 
who  broke  into  open  insurrection  and,  not  content  with 
putting  forward  various  national  and  linguistic  demands, 


158     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

clamoured  for  fresh  elections  and  the  impeachment  of 
the  late  Cabinet.  The  efforts  of  the  Young  Turks  to 
resist  this  movement  resulted  in  a  dangerous  mutiny 
at  their  former  stronghold  of  Monastir,  followed  by 
wholesale  desertions  and  the  formation  of  a  hostile 
League  of  "Saviours  of  the  Country."  The  gallant 
attempt  of  Mahmud  Shevket  Pasha  to  allay  the  storm 
by  his  own  withdrawal  from  office  proved  unsuccessful, 
and  on  17th  July  Said  Pasha  and  his  "Committee" 
Cabinet  followed  their  most  distinguished  colleague  into 
retirement.  But  even  the  appointment  of  Ghazi  Mukhtar 
Pasha  as  Grand  Vizier,  with  three  such  able  men  as 
Kiamil,  Hilmi  and  Nazim  as  members  of  his  Cabinet, 
failed  to  conciliate  the  Albanians;  every  fresh  con- 
cession served  only  to  embolden  them  still  further.  The 
tribesmen  of  the  northern  vilayets  gathered  in  ever- 
increasing  numbers,  and  after  murdering  several  officers 
in  Ipek  and  Mitrovica,  marched  upon  Uskiib.  By  the 
middle  of  August,  1912,  that  town  was  occupied  by  at 
least  15,000  to  20,000  Albanians;  the  arsenal  was 
plundered  and  thousands  of  rifles  distributed.  When 
at  length  the  Porte,  yielding  to  the  inevitable,  conceded 
the  great  majority  of  the  insurgents'  demands,  a  con- 
dition of  complete  anarchy  already  prevailed  throughout 
Macedonia  and  Albania. 

It  would  have  been  ridiculous  to  expect  that  Balkan 
statesmen  should  fail  to  take  advantage  of  Turkey's 
difficulties,  mainly  due  as  they  were  to  many  generations 
of  persistent  misrule  and  neglect.  Moreover,  on  1st  July 
the  untimely  death  of  Dr.  Milovanovic  removed  one  of 
the  chief  restraining  influences  upon  a  policy  of  adven- 
ture. His  successor,  M.  Pasie\  combined  with  equal 
ability  far  more  radical  tendencies  and  the  restless  tem- 
perament born  of  Balkan  unrest.  But  events  had  already 
passed  the  stage  at  which  conservatism  could  have  pro- 
vided a  solution.  A  series  of  outrages  in  different  parts 
of   Macedonia   kindled  racial  passions  to  a  white  heat 


THE   BALKAN  LEAGUE  159 

and  strengthened  the  hands  of  all  those  whose  aim  it 
was  to  force  intervention  upon  the  Balkan  Governments. 
The  gravest  incidents  took  place  at  Berana  on  the 
Montenegrin  frontier,  and  at  Kocana  (ist  August),  where 
a  bomb  explosion  in  the  bazaar  was  followed  by  the 
murder  of  ioo  Bulgarians.  The  honest  desire  to  avert 
a  conflict  no  longer  existed,  and  the  chief  anxiety  of  the 
new-fledged  allies  was  to  manoeuvre  themselves  into  a 
favourable  position  for  striking,  and  if  possible  to  com- 
plete their  preparations  before  Turkey  could  extricate 
herself  from  the  embarrassments  of  the  Italian  war. 
The  Serbo-Bulgar  treaty  had  found  its  natural  comple- 
ment in  a  military  convention  (12th  May)  and  the 
summer  months  had  been  employed  in  negotiating  a 
parallel  arrangement  between  Bulgaria  and  Greece, 
which  was  finally  signed  on  23rd  September.  The 
prospect  of  war  with  Turkey  not  later  than  the  autumn 
of  191 2  was  frankly  accepted  by  all  concerned  as  the 
basis  of  discussion ;  the  Angellic  conviction  that  war  is 
never  inevitable  had  not  penetrated  to  the  minds  of 
Balkan  politicians.  The  earlier  of  the  two  conventions, 
by  which  Bulgaria  undertook  to  place  at  least  200,000, 
Serbia  at  least  150,000,  men  in  the  field  against  Turkey, 
clearly  reflects  the  strategic  needs  of  the  moment.  Serbia 
held  the  key  to  the  situation ;  for  with  Serbia  merely 
neutral,  Bulgaria  would  be  condemned  to  inactivity, 
unless  she  was  prepared  to  cope  with  a  simultaneous 
Turkish  assault  upon  both  flanks,  from  Adrianople  and 
from  Uskiib.  Moreover,  Serbia  was  for  the  moment  on 
a  relatively  better  footing  with  the  Turks  than  were  any 
of  her  Christian  neighbours,  and  keen  as  was  her  interest 
in  the  Macedonian  problem,  it  was  wholly  eclipsed  by 
her  concern  and  resentment  at  the  course  of  events  on 
her  northern  and  western  frontiers.  The  real  motive 
of  Serbian  armaments  lay  in  what  she  regarded  as  the 
Austrian  menace,  and  she  was  not  prepared  to  risk 
bearing  the  brunt  of  a  war  in  the  south  when  her  action 


160    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

might  involve  her  in  complications  on  a  still  larger  scale 
elsewhere.  Hence  the  military  convention  contained 
the  provisions  that  Bulgaria  should  send  100,000  men 
to  the  support  of  the  Serbian  army  in  Macedonia,  and 
in  the  event  of  Austrian  intervention,  twice  that  number 
against  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  first  of  these  pro- 
visions is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  Bulgarian  and 
Serbian  General  Staffs  agreed  in  anticipating  the  main 
opposition  of  the  Turks  in  Macedonia,  the  second  by  the 
presumption  that  Austrian  intervention  would  bring 
Russia  into  the  field.  In  that  event  a  Russian  invasion 
of  Armenia  would  compel  the  Turks  to  reduce  their 
forces  in  Thrace,  thus  serving  as  a  necessary  diversion  in 
favour  of  Bulgaria,  while  her  armies  were  engaged  in 
helping  their  Serb  kinsmen  against  Austria.  It  is  highly 
significant  that  the  idea  of  Serbian  co-operation  in 
Thrace  is  not  even  mentioned  in  the  agreement — an 
eloquent  proof  of  the  importance  assigned  by  its  framers 
to  the  Vardar  valley.  According  to  the  original  plan 
of  campaign,  which  was  mainly  the  work  of  General 
Ficev,  the  Bulgarians  were  to  have  maintained  a  defen- 
sive attitude  on  the  Thracian  frontier,  while  their  main 
forces,  in  conjunction  with  their  Serb  and  Greek  allies, 
vigorously  pushed  forward  the  conquest  of  Macedonia. 
Late  in  the  summer,  however,  a  change  of  plan  was 
introduced  by  General  Savov,  and  henceforth  Thrace 
was  marked  out  as  the  scene  of  the  main  Bulgarian 
offensive.  On  5th  September  the  Serbian  General  Staff 
formally  consented  to  the  modifications  in  the  general 
plan  which  this  involved,  and  though  still  adhering  to 
its  view  as  to  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  fields 
of  operation,  consented  to  a  reduction  of  the  Bulgarian 
contingent  in  Macedonia  from  100,000  to  25,000  men.1 
But   the   agreements   which    embodied   this   and   other 

1  On  these  negotiations  it  is  well  to  consult  Serbien  und  Bul- 
garien  im  Balkankriege  (pp.  60-65),  by  "  Balcanicus,"  a  pro- 
minent member  of  the  then  Serbian  Cabinet. 


THE   BALKAN  LEAGUE  161 

less  vital  tactical  changes  differed  essentially  from  the 
original  convention ;  for  while  this  was  a  state  document 
to  which  the  two  Kings,  the  Premiers,  the  Ministers  of 
Foreign  Affairs  and  War,  and  the  Chiefs  of  the  General 
Staffs  all  appended  their  signatures,  the  later  protocols 
were  merely  friendly  arrangements  between  the  military 
chiefs.  This  circumstance,  though  quite  immaterial  at 
the  time,  acquired  no  little  importance  when  events  came 
to  centre  round  the  exact  fulfilment  and  literal  interpre- 
tation of  the  various  treaties  between  the  Allies.  The 
Bulgarians,  not  content  with  the  revised  agreement, 
endeavoured  to  reverse  the  whole  position  by  securing 
Serbian  reinforcements  for  Thrace ;  but  here  they  were 
met  by  a  friendly  but  firm  refusal.  It  should  be  added 
that  this  sudden  change  in  the  Bulgarian  attitude  was  at 
least  partially  due  to  persistent  rumours  of  an  impending 
Turkish  concentration  round  Adrianople. 

Towards  the  end  of  September  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment did  actually  announce  its  intention  of  holding 
grand  manoeuvres  in  Northern  Thrace,  in  which  300,000 
troops  were  to  take  part.  But  this  decision  was  almost 
immediately  revoked  at  the  instance  of  Great  Britain 
and  Russia,  who  pointed  out  to  the  Porte  the  provo- 
catory  effect  of  such  a  step.  At  the  outbreak  of  war, 
as  we  shall  see,  the  Turkish  army  in  Thrace  amounted 
to  less  than  half  the  contemplated  number ;  but  the 
Bulgarian  General  Staff,  despite  the  excellence  of  its 
intelligence  department,  appears  to  have  genuinely  over- 
estimated the  enemy. 

The  Greco-Bulgarian  convention  of  23rd  September 
reveals  the  progress  of  opinion  during  the  summer. 
Bulgaria  now  pledges  herself  to  place  not  less  than 
300,000  men  in  the  field  (an  increase  of  one-third  since 
the  convention  with  Serbia),  while  the  Greek  forces  are 
placed  at  a  minimum  of  120,000.  The  strength  of  the 
Bulgarian  contingent  in  Macedonia  was  to  depend  upon 

M 


1C2     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

that  of  the  Serbian  army  ! — a  somewhat  singular 
arrangement  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Serbia  was  not  a 
party  to  this  agreement.  By  a  strange  irony  of  fate 
Sofia  formed  the  connecting  link  between  Serbia  and 
Greece;  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  no  formal 
treaty  bound  the  future  allies  of  the  second  Balkan 
war.  I 

The  attitude  of  the  Great  Powers  towards  the  growing 
crisis  in  the  Near  East  had  for  some  time  past  been 
compounded  of  despairing  laisser  faire  and  ill-concealed 
cynicism.  The  success  of  the  Albanian  movement,  the 
growing  anarchy  throughout  Macedonia,  the  frequent 
incidents  on  the  Montenegrin  and  Bulgarian  frontiers, 
and  the  weak  attitude  adopted  by  the  new  Turkish 
Cabinet  under  Ghazi  Mukhtar  Pasha,  were  steadily 
creating  one  of  those  political  situations  in  which  a 
snowball  soon  becomes  an  avalanche.  On  20th  August 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Minister,  Count  Berch- 
told,  made  a  belated  attempt  to  restore  confidence,  and 
his  proposals  for  decentralisation  and  administrative 
reforms,  adapted  to  local  conditions,  were  sympathetic- 
ally received  by  the  other  Great  Powers,  but  never 
passed  beyond  the  purely  platonic  stage. 

Two  days  earlier  a  number  of  Turkish  officers  were 
murdered  at  Ipek  and  Mitrovica,  and  the  Albanians 
assembled  in  thousands  all  over  the  vilayet  of  Kosovo, 
fraternised  with  the  troops,  and,  marching  upon  Uskub, 
broke  into  the  military  depots  and  distributed  rifles  and 
ammunition  broadcast.  The  Central  Government,  find- 
ing itself  powerless  to  cope  with  the  movement,  conceded 
the  majority  of  the  insurgents'  claims — the  opening  of 
Albanian  schools,  the  recognition  of  the  Albanian  lan- 
guage, the  building  of  roads,  fresh  elections,  and  (in 
ambiguous  terms)  the  impeachment  of  the  Hakki  Cabinet. 
But  on  two  points — the  localisation  of  military  service 

1  See  Mr.  Bourchier,  Article  4,  in  the  Times,  nth  June,  1913. 


THE   BALKAN   LEAGUE  163 

and  the  arming  of  all  and  sundry  in  Albania — the  Porte 
remained  obdurate ;  and  it  was  just  on  these  two  points 
that  the  insurgents  set  especial  value.  A  deadlock 
ensued,  and  the  authority  of  Stambul  sank  to  zero 
throughout  the  greater  part  of  Macedonia. 

Though  at  first  unwilling  to  listen  to  Count  Berch- 
told's  advice,  the  Turkish  statesmen  afterwards  modified 
their  views  sufficiently  to  extend  to  the  whole  Empire 
the  inadequate  privileges  conceded  to  Albania  (22nd  Sep- 
tember).    But   by   this   time  the   situation   was   rapidly 
getting  out  of  hand.    The  Balkan  states  were  secretly 
completing  their  preparations   for  war,  and  the   Porte 
stopped  the  passage  of  Serbian   war  material  through 
Salonica  and  decided,   under  pretext  of  holding  grand 
manoeuvres,  to  mass  300,000  troops  around  Adrianople. 
On  the  very  day  upon  which  the  new  Turkish  reforms 
were  announced,  the  French  Premier,  M.  Poincare,1  sug- 
gested to  the  British  Government  that  the  Powers  should 
urge  a  pacific  attitude  upon  the  Balkan  states,  pointing  out 
that  in  the  event  of  war  they  need  not  hope  for  territorial 
gains  and  that  at  the  same  time  they  should  exercise  further 
pressure  upon  the  Porte,  in  order  to  secure  the  neces- 
sary  concessions   in    Macedonia.     Before,  however,   the 
views  of  all  the  Powers  could  be  collated,  the  situation 
had  been   gravely   compromised  by   the   almost  simul- 
taneous orders   for  the   mobilisation  of   the   Bulgarian, 
Serbian,  Greek  and  Turkish  armies  (1st  October).    The 
ponderous  machinery  of  the  Concert  rendered  further 
delays   inevitable,   and   before   any   decisive   step  could 
be  taken  in  Constantinople,  the  Porte,  hesitating  to  the 
last  between  the  two  extremes  of  concession  and  sword- 
rattling,  had  announced  its  resolve  to  put  in  force  the 
Vilayet  Law  of   1880,  and  thus,  after  an   interval  of  a 
generation,  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin  (6th  October).     It  thus  forestalled  by  a  few  days 

1  To-day   President  of  the  Republic. 

M    2 


164     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

the  Collective  Note  of  the  five  Great  Powers,1  which, 
in  its  endeavour  to  soothe  Turkish  susceptibilities, 
deprived  its  advocacy  of  reform  of  any  such  value  as 
it  might  otherwise  have  possessed  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Balkan  Allies.  Indeed,  the  chief  concern  of  the  Note 
seemed  to  be  to  safeguard  the  territorial  integrity  of 
Turkey  and  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Sultan,  and  only 
then  to  further  the  cause  of  reform.  Meanwhile  another 
Note  was  addressed  by  the  Powers  to  the  four  Balkan 
states,  strongly  deprecating  any  hostile  action,  pledging 
themselves  to  enforce  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (after  a  lapse 
of  thirty-four  years),  and  adding  the  warning  that  no 
change  in  the  territorial  status  quo  would  be  tolerated, 
even  in  the  event  of  war.  When,  however,  the  Russian 
and  Austro-Hungarian  Ministers  at  Cetinje,  acting  for 
themselves  and  their  colleagues,  presented  the  Note  to 
King  Nicholas,  they  were  informed  that  he  had  only 
a  few  hours  before  declared  war  upon  Turkey  (8th 
October).  This  step,  which  was  undoubtedly  the  result 
of  collusion,  greatly  diminished  the  chances  of  a  peaceful 
settlement,  and  at  the  same  time  gave  the  other  three 
states  an  excuse  for  raising  their  demands.  On  13th 
October  Bulgaria,  Serbia  and  Greece  replied  to  the 
Powers  that  in  such  a  situation  far  more  drastic  reforms 
were  required  than  those  included  in  the  stillborn  Law 
of  Vilayets,  and  at  the  same  time  presented  the  Porte 
with  a  formidable  list  of  demands,  adding  a  request  for 
their  acceptance  within  a  period  of  six  weeks  and  for 
the  demobilisation  of  the  Turkish  army  in  the  mean- 
time. The  main  points  in  this  new  programme  were  : 
racial  autonomy  for  all  the  nationalities  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  and  their  proportional  representation  in  Parlia- 
ment;  equality  of  Christian  and  Moslem  schools;  a 
pledge  that  the  Christians  would  not  be  liable  to  mili- 
tary  service  outside   their  own   province,   and  that   no 

1   Italy,  being  still  at  war,  naturally  could  not  participate. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  165 

attempt  would  be  made  to  alter  the  racial  character  of 
any  district;  the  reorganisation  of  the  gendarmerie  under 
Swiss  or  Belgian  chiefs ;  the  appointment  of  Swiss  or 
Belgian  Valis,  with  elected  councils  to  advise  them ; 
and  the  creation  of  a  Supreme  Council  at  Constanti- 
nople, composed  equally  of  Christians  and  Moslems, 
whose  duty  it  would  be  to  watch  over  the  execution  of 
reforms  and  whose  functions  would  be  subject  to  the 
control  of  the  Ambassadors  of  the  Great  Powers.  Such 
demands  far  exceeded  what  any  sovereign  state  could 
be  expected  to  accept  under  the  pressure  of  foreign 
dictation,  and  were  probably  not  intended  to  be  accepted. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Porte  decided  to  ignore  the 
Note  altogether,  and  on  15th  October  requested  the 
Ministers  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia  and  Greece  to  apply  for 
their  passports.  The  diplomatic  breach  with  Greece 
had  already  been  rendered  inevitable  by  the  final 
admission  of  the  Cretan  deputies  into  the  Greek  Parlia- 
ment;  and  Turkey  found  herself  plunged  into  war  with 
four  new  adversaries  on  the  very  day  following  the 
conclusion  of  peace  with  Italy. 


CHAPTER    XIII 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN    WAR 


No  war  of  modern  times  has  been  conducted  under 
conditions  of  such  absolute  secrecy  as  the  two  Balkan 
wars  of  1912-13,  and  many  incidents  of  both  campaigns, 
especially  of  the  second,  are  still  shrouded  in  mystery. 
The  railway,  the  telegraph  and  the  telephone  have  trans- 
formed modern  warfare,  but  instead  of  contributing  to 
the  elucidation  of  the  real  facts,  they  have  actually  ren- 
dered it  more  difficult.  In  time  of  war  all  channels  of 
information  are  controlled  by  the  military  authorities 
to  a  degree  even  to-day  not  generally  recognised,  and 
nowhere  was  this  more  true  than  in  the  Balkans,  where 
the  interception  of  news  was  favoured  by  the  backward 
state  of  the  country  and  the  lack  of  means  of  communi- 
cation. The  drastic  measures  adopted  by  the  General 
Staffs  of  all  the  countries  engaged  ought  not  to  have 
surprised  anyone.  During  the  Russo-Japanese  War  it 
had  become  apparent  that  the  days  of  the  war  cor- 
respondent were  numbered,  and  at  the  time  of  the 
Bosnian  crisis  no  secret  was  made  of  the  fact  that  in 
the  event  of  war  no  journalist,  of  whatever  nationality, 
would  be  allowed  anywhere  near  the  front.  The  hordes 
of  journalists  who,  on  the  outbreak  of  war  in  October, 
1912,  flocked  from  all  parts  of  Europe  to  the  Balkans, 
reduced  their  profession  ad  absurdum,  not  merely  by 
their  often  ludicrous  lack  of  qualifications,  but  by  the 

166 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  167 

arrogance  of  their  claims  for  assistance.1  No  army  in 
the  world  would  have  tolerated  their  presence  in  such 
numbers,  and  it  is  only  to  be  regretted  that  this  was 
not  made  clear  from  the  very  first.2 

At  the  outset,  the  complete  absence  of  outside  control 
of  news  enabled  the  rival  General  Staffs  to  supply 
Europe  with  false  or  misleading  information  regarding 
the  progress  of  the  campaign,  and  thus  to  impress  or 
influence  public  opinion  in  the  various  capitals  during  a 
critical  period  when  there  was  still  danger  of  interven- 
tion. This  was  especially  marked  in  the  case  of  the 
Bulgarian  Staff,  which,  in  its  extremely  able  reports  for 
foreign  consumption,  appears  to  have  invented  or  sup- 
pressed whole  battles,  according  as  the  strategy  of  the 
moment  seemed  to  recommend.  For  the  time  being  this 
method  was,  of  course,  eminently  successful,  the  more 
so  as  it  coincided  with  the  interests  of  the  sensational 
Yellow  Press;  but  it  carried  with  it  its  own  revenge. 
At  first  Europe  imagined  that  Liile  Burgas  was  only  the 
last  of  a  series  of  mighty  battles,  that  the  Bulgars  were 
close  on  the  heels  of  the  retreating  Turks,  and  that 
Tchataldja  might  fall  at  any  moment.  When  at  last 
the  truth  began  to  trickle  through,  enthusiasm  was 
succeeded  by  scepticism ;  and  after  the  resumption  of 
war  in  February,  1913,  and  still  more  during  the  Serbo- 
Bulgar  campaign,  sane  foreign  opinion  was  openly 
disinclined  to  credit  any  official  information  supplied 
from  Sofia. 

After  what  has  been  said,  it  would  be  extremely  rash 

1  To  this  general  rule  there  were,  of  course,  certain  brilliant 
exceptions,  whose  names  will  at  once  occur  to  many  readers. 

2  I  leave  the  above  paragraph  unaltered,  as  I  wrote  it  in 
February,  1914.  To-day  it  may  seem  obvious  and  even  banal,  but 
I  do  not  feel  ashamed  of  having  written  it  six  months  before 
the  bursting  of  the  storm  which  has  revolutionised  all  our  mili- 
tary and  civil  standards.  I  may  add  that  the  whole  of  Chapters 
XIII.  and  XIV.  were  written  during  the  winter  of  1913-14. 


168     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

for  a  mere  civilian  to  attempt  any  detailed  narrative  of 
the  Balkan  campaigns;  and,  indeed,  any  adequate 
treatment  would  far  exceed  the  limits  of  the  present 
volume.1  My  aim  is  rather  to  supply  the  reader  with 
a  brief  summary  of  the  war  as  a  connected  whole,  to 
show  its  component  parts  in  their  true  perspective,  and 
to  indicate  some  at  least  of  the  underlying  causes  which 
decided  the  issue. 

In  meeting  the  onslaught  of  the  four  allies,  the  Turks 
were  faced  with  the  problem  of  defending  simultaneously 
four  widely  separated  theatres  of  war.  Of  these,  the 
Montenegrin  and  Greek  could  for  the  moment  be  left 
out  of  account.  The  relatively  small  numbers  of  the 
Montenegrin  and  Greek  armies,  the  acute  crisis  which 
the  latter  had  so  recently  passed  through,  and  above  all 
the  strength  of  the  fortresses  of  Skutari  and  Janina, 
would,  it  was  argued,  neutralise  all  serious  danger  from 
these  two  sides.  Even  at  the  worst,  a  defensive  attitude 
in  Epirus  and  in  the  difficult  passes  behind  Olympus 
ought  to  prevent  the  Greeks  from  threatening  Salonica, 

1  Little  wonder  that  there  are  so  few  books  of  any  real  value 
dealing  with  either  war.  The  only  general  surveys  that  need  be 
seriously  considered  are  in  German- — Colonel  Immanuel,  Der 
Balkankrieg,  1912/ 13,  in  5  parts,  and  Major  Alfred  Meyer, 
Der  Balkankrieg,  in  4  parts.  For  the  Thracian  campaign  the 
most  authoritative  sources  are  the  publication  of  the  German 
General  Staff,  Der  Balkankrieg,  1912/13  (No.  50  in  the  series, 
Kriegsgeschichtliche  Einzelschriften),  and  the  admirable  treatise 
of  Major  P.  Howell,  The  Campaign  in  Thrace.  Lord 
Percy's  article  in  the  National  Review  for  February,  1914,  also 
deserves  mention.  On  the  Turkish  side  we  have  the  books  of 
Mr.  Ashmead-Bartlett,  Major  James  (slight),  and  especially 
Mahmud  Mukhtar  Pasha  and  Major  von  Hochwaechter  (both  in 
German).  Colonel  de  Monddsir's  monograph  on  the  Siege  of 
Adrianople  (in  French)  is  also  valuable.  On  the  Serbian  cam- 
paign consult  Taburno  and  Barby ;  on  the  Greek,  Cassavetti  and 
Nikolaides  (all  four  eulogistic).  For  further  details,  see  biblio- 
graphy. 


THE   BALKAN   CAMPAIGNS 
1912-13 


Serbo  -  Croat    Orthography 

s  =  sh  in  "ship." 
c  ■=   ch  in  "church." 
c  =  do.  (softer). 

I  -  J    in   French   "jour." 
j    =  y    in   "you." 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  169 

until  a  decisive  action  had  been  fought  out  elsewhere. 
In  this  calculation  the  Turks,  like  the  rest  of  Europe, 
placed  far  too  low  a  value  upon  the  Greek  army. 

In  theory,  then,  the  Turks  might  be  expected  to  assume 
the  immediate  offensive  and  to  endeavour  to  force  Bul- 
garia and  Serbia  to  their  knees  before  the  two  smaller 
states  could  join  hands  with  them.  In  practice,  how- 
ever, the  outbreak  of  war  found  the  Turks  extremely 
ill-prepared.  Their  contemptuous  attitude  towards  the 
Balkan  states  had  betrayed  them  into  the  fatal  error  of 
disbanding,  as  recently  as  August,  1912,  the  large  army 
of  120,000  men  which  Mahmud  Shevket  Pasha  had 
assembled  at  Smyrna  to  prevent  an  Italian  landing  in 
Asia  Minor.  Incidentally  this  action  may  be  regarded 
as  a  conclusive  proof  that  the  Porte  as  yet  knew  nothing 
of  the  military  conventions  which  already  existed 
between  the  Balkan  states. 

The  Turks  rashly  neglected  the  axiom  that  in  time 
of  war,  and  above  all  in  the  selection  of  the  right 
moment,  diplomacy  and  strategy  must  act  in  unison. 
Political  motives — compounded  of  Chauvinism,  false 
pride,  over-confidence,  and  a  desire  to  impress  home  and 
foreign  opinion — led  them  to  declare  war  on  Bulgaria 
and  Serbia  (17th  October).  Such  a  step  had  absolutely 
no  meaning  unless  it  was  to  be  followed  by  prompt 
aggression,  and  this  was  quite  beyond  the  power  of  the 
Turks.  Thus  the  fact  that  four  days  were  allowed  to 
elapse  without  any  move  on  their  part  is  in  itself  a  proof 
that  the  necessary  harmony  and  co-operation  between 
the  Ministries  of  War  and  Foreign  Affairs  were  lacking 
from  the  very  first.  There  were  plenty  of  paper  theories 
in  Constantinople,  but  no  serious  attempt  to  carry  them 
into  practice,  and  this  neglect  of  practical  details  was 
immensely  aggravated  by  a  radical  divergence  of  opinion 
between  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  his  higher  officers 
in  the  field.    To  those  acquainted  with  the  true  facts 


170     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

of  the  case  it  seemed  that  the  Turks  had  everything  to 
gain  by  delay.     Their  natural  tactics  would  have  been 
to  remain  on  the  defensive,  "using  the  pivots  Adrianople 
and    Kirk    Kilisse   as    breakwaters    against  the  tide  of 
Bulgarian  invasion,"  1  until  mobilisation  was  completed, 
and  the  raw  Redifs  at  the  front  could  be  replaced  by 
the   seasoned   troops   of  Asia   Minor.2     An    even    more 
effectual  plan,  according  to  some  strategists,  would  have 
been  to  leave  an  adequate  garrison  in  Adrianople  and 
then    withdraw  to   a   strong    position    behind   the   river 
Ergene,  until  the  army  was  ready  for  a  vigorous  offen- 
sive   movement.     That    this    second    plan    was    never 
seriously   considered  was  due  partly   to    the    over-con- 
fidence of  the  Turkish  commanders,  but  above  all  to  a 
much  more  cogent  reason,  namely,  the  effect  which  a 
withdrawal   might    have    had    upon    the  moral  of    the 
troops.     But  prestige  and  moral,  always  matters  of  the 
first     importance     in     war,     were    in     this    case    over- 
emphasised, the  warnings  of  von  der  Goltz  Pasha  were 
ignored,  and  a  plan  was  put  into  operation,  the  success 
of  which  was  from  the  outset  rendered  more  than  doubt- 
ful  by   the    inadequate   numbers,    inferior  material   and 
utterly    faulty    equipment   of   the   Turkish   army.     The 
design  of  Nazim  Pasha— imposed  upon  Abdullah  Pasha 
against    the    latter's    better    judgment3 — was    to    press 
home  from   Kirk  Kilisse  in  a  south-westerly  direction, 
to  drive  the  Bulgars  back  upon   Adrianople,  and  thus 
hem  them  in  between  the  main  Turkish  army  and  the 
garrison  of  the  city.     The  Turks  were  well  informed  as 
to  the  movements  of  two  of  the  three  invading  armies, 
but  either  failed  to  reckon  with,  or  else  under-estimated 
the  strength  of,  the  Bulgarian  movement  from  the  north 

1  Cit.  Howell,  p.  4  :  cj.  Immanuel,  Heft  II.,  p.  io. 

2  Cj.  Hochwachter,   p.    12. 

3  Immanuel,  Heft  II.,  p.  26. 


THE  TURCO  BALKAN  WAR  171 

against  the  Turkish  right.1  It  has  since  transpired  that 
the  Bulgarian  Third  Army  (General  Dimitriev)  was 
still  more  in  the  dark  as  to  the  movements  and  numbers 
of  the  Turks  opposed  to  it,  and  we  may  therefore  con- 
clude that  in  theory  Nazim  Pasha's  scheme  had  a  real 
prospect  of  success  and  only  broke  down  owing  to  the 
complete  lack  of  organisation. 

While  internal  circumstances,  then  still  unknown  to 
the  outer  world,2  rendered  a  Turkish  victory  in  Thrace 
well-nigh  impossible,  the  situation  of  the  Turks  in  Mace- 
donia, though  by  no  means  free  from  difficulty,  was  still 
distinctly  more  favourable  than  farther  east.  In  the 
first  place,  their  Serb  and  Greek  opponents  seemed  far 
less  redoubtable  than  the  Bulgarians,  who  had,  it  was 
notorious,  been  preparing  for  the  struggle  for  a  whole 
generation  past ;  the  Turkish  army  started  upon  its  task 
full  of  confidence  and  with  a  record  of  former  victories. 
Secondly,  Zekki  Pasha  had  succeeded  in  concentrating 
the  main  body  of  the  Macedonian  army  in  the  district 
between  Uskiib  (Skoplje)  and  Ishtib  (Stip)  and  thus 
possessed  an  admirable  base  of  operations  against  the 
invaders.  Finally,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  Macedonia 
was,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  relatively  better 
prepared  for  war  than  Thrace.  It  must  be  remembered 
than  Salonica  and  Monastir  were  the  real  strongholds 

1  Cf.  the  Times  of  13th  February,  1913,  in  which  its  corre- 
spondent in  Thrace  challenges  the  statement  of  Major  Howell 
that  the  Bulgarian  screening  operations  were  successful.  He 
was  in  a  position  to  assert  that  the  Turkish  General  Staff  were 
aware,  "before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,"  "of  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  two  Bulgarian  armies  at  Jamboli."  During"  a  con- 
versation with  Nazim  Pasha  at  the  time,  he  was  informed  that 
the  main  Bulgarian  army  of  invasion  was  coming  from  the  north. 

3  How  far  this  applies  to  the  allies,  is  a  question  which  has 
not  as  yet  received  any  adequate  answer,  though  both  the  Bul- 
garian and  Serbian  Intelligence  Departments  are  known  to  have 
been  very  well  served. 


172     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

of  the  Young  Turkish  movement  and  had  received  the 
special  attention  of  its  leaders,  both  civil  and  military. 
Even  the  casual  traveller  could  not  fail  to  notice  the 
evident  stress  laid  by  the  new  regime  upon  the  military 
defence  of  Old  Serbia1  and  Macedonia.  At  every  place 
of  importance  the  chief  features  in  the  landscape  were 
huge  new  or  enlarged  and  reconstructed  barracks,  mili- 
tary schools  and  hospitals.  The  only  roads  which  were 
built  were  those  which  served  a  strategic  purpose — 
notably  those  which  ran  from  Monastir  through  Prilep 
to  Veles,  and  from  Veles  across  the  Ovcepolje  (the 
Sheepdowns)  to  Ishtib ;  and  it  is  significant  that  the 
latter  was  in  course  of  extension  towards  the  Bulgarian 
frontier,  thus  linking  both  Monastir  and  Salonica  with 
the  shortest  route  of  access  to  Sofia.  It  was  to  the 
prompt  action  of  the  troops  stationed  in  Macedonia  that 
the  Committee  owed  its  final  triumph  over  Abdul  Hamid 
in  April,  1909,  and  in  the  following  three  years  the  re- 
peated risings  in  Albania  had  led  to  large  concentrations 
of  troops  in  Monastir  and  Uskiib.  That  in  the  summer 
of  1912  the  Turks  still  had  very  considerable  military 
forces  in  Macedonia  was  due  to  two  circumstances.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  war  with  Italy  had  deprived  them  of 
the  command  of  the  ^gean  and  so  had  rendered  the 
transference  of  troops  from  Macedonia  impossible,  save 
by  the  tortuous  land  route  Salonica — Dedeagac — Con- 
stantinople— Anatolia.  But  quite  apart  from  this  tech- 
nical difficulty,  the  Porte  had  the  strongest  reasons  for 
leaving  them  where  they  were.  Albania  was  still  full  of 
unrest,  and  it  was  feared  that  Italy  might  attempt  to 
bring  matters  to  a  climax  by  landing  troops  between 

1  It  is  necessary  to  point  out  that  till  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks 
from  Macedonia  "  Old  Serbia "  meant  the  territory  inhabited  by 
Serbs,  lying  south  of  the  Serbo-Turkish  frontier.  Since  iqi2, 
however,  it  has  been  applied  to  the  original  Kingdom  of  Serbia, 
the  newly  acquired  territory  being  described  as  "New  Serbia." 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  173 

Valona  and  Corfu.  The  design,  if  it  had  ever  been 
seriously  entertained  in  Rome,  was  abandoned  from  fear 
of  international  complications;  but  it  found  full  credence 
in  Constantinople,  and  amply  justified  the  retention  of 
strong  forces  in  Macedonia.  The  growing  rivalry  of 
Committee  and  anti-Committee  officers,  nowhere  so 
marked  as  in  Monastir,  supplied  the  Government  with 
an  additional  motive  for  not  moving  these  forces  to  the 
capital. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  Zekki  Pasha  was  in  command 
of  the  Vardar  Army,  consisting  of  not  less  than  85,000 
troops  and  20,000  to  25,000  Albanian  irregulars — in  other 
words,  of  a  force  larger  than  that  which  Abdullah  Pasha 
had  at  his  disposal  for  aggression  in  Thrace,  since  the 
garrison  of  Adrianople,  being  bound  to  the  defensive,  has 
to  be  deducted  from  the  Turkish  total.  Zekki's  plan  of 
campaign  wTas  obvious.  He  had  to  assume  the  aggres- 
sive against  the  First  Serbian  Army  (Crown  Prince 
Alexander),  to  defeat  it  before  it  could  unite  with  the 
Third  and  Second  Armies,  advancing  by  Pristina  and 
Egri  Palanka,  and  then  to  crush  these  two  weaker  units 
in  detail.  If  this  could  be  achieved  (and  it  is  clear  that 
a  decisive  defeat  of  the  Crown  Prince  would  almost  cer- 
tainly have  involved  the  other  armies  in  ruin),  the  Serbs 
would  be  forced  back  upon  Nis,  the  road  to  Sofia  would 
be  open,  the  Bulgarians  would  have  to  recall  one  of  their 
Thracian  armies  to  defend  the  capital,  and  the  whole  plan 
of  campaign  of  the  allies  would  fall  to  the  ground.  The 
potential  value  of  the  Vardar  army  as  the  means  of 
creating  a  diversion  in  favour  of  the  ill-prepared  Thra- 
cian army  can  hardly  be  exaggerated ;  and  it  is  remark- 
able that  this  point  has  been  so  little  insisted  upon.  The 
very  rapidity  and  completeness  of  the  Serb  suc- 
cess, in  removing  all  fear  of  such  a  contin- 
gency, actually  contributed  to  obscure  the  gravity 
of    the     issues     involved,     and     at     the     same     time 


174     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

removed    the    necessity    of    adjusting     the     focus    for 
a    general   survey   of    the    campaign. 

Meanwhile,  the  task  before  the  Allies  was  equally 
clear.  Their  ulterior  aim,  though  at  first  concealed  by 
vague  diplomatic  assurances,  was  unquestionably  the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  Turks  from  Europe.  This  could  only  be 
effected  as  the  result  of  a  decisive  and  crushing  defeat, 
and  for  various  reasons  this  demanded  great  rapidity  of 
action.  Every  day  gained  increased  the  chances  of  the 
Allies,  since  it  lessened  the  danger  of  European  inter- 
vention and  reduced  the  time  available  to  the  Turks  for 
bringing  up  reinforcements  from  Asia  Minor.  While, 
then,  Montenegro  endeavoured  to  "rush"  Skutari,  the 
main  Serbian  and  Greek  armies  and  a  lesser  Bulgarian 
force  advanced  simultaneously  from  the  north,  south  and 
north-east,  with  Salonica  as  their  objective.  Meanwhile, 
the  three  principal  Bulgarian  armies  concentrated  their 
efforts  upon  Thrace,  their  plan  of  campaign  being  to 
mask  Adrianople  as  rapidly  as  possible,  to  attack,  and 
if  necessary  storm,  Kirk  Kilisse,  and,  this  once  accom- 
plished, to  mass  against  the  main  Turkish  army,  and 
force  on  a  decisive  combat  before  the  raw  levies  at 
the  front  could  be  augmented  by  seasoned  Anatolian 
troops. 

The  campaign  was  opened  by  Montenegro,  who  de- 
clared war  as  early  as  8th  October.  Its  action  was  deter- 
mined alike  by  military  and  political  reasons.  The 
allies,  having  once  embarked  upon  mobilisation,  wished 
at  all  costs  to  frustrate  the  efforts  of  the  Great  Powers 
to  preserve  peace.  That  the  challenge  should  come  from 
the  most  insignificant  of  Turkey's  opponents  was  a 
calculated  insult  which  could  not  fail  to  infuriate  the 
Porte,  already  irritable  and  excited  after  the  events  of  the 
preceding  summer.  Montenegro,  owing  to  its  small  area 
and  the  primitive  basis  of  its  military  system,  could 
collect   its  forces  more   rapidly   than   the  other   Balkan 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  175 

states,  and  at  the  same  time  it  ran  less  grave  risks,  both 
in  view  of  its  remote  geographical  situation  and  of  the 
fact  that  the  Turkish  forces  round  Skutari,  though  ade- 
quate for  the  defence  of  that  city,  were  far  too  weak  to 
assume  the  offensive  against  the  almost  impregnable 
mountain  fastnesses  of  King  Nicholas.  Moreover,  the 
best  hope  of  the  Montenegrins  lay  in  surprising  Skutari 
by  a  rapid  coup  de  main,  their  army  being,  despite  its 
heroic  gallantry,  lacking  in  the  discipline  and  equipment 
necessary  for  modern  siege  operations. 

In  the  initial  stages  the  Montenegrins  had  the  assis- 
tance of  the  Mirdite  and  Malissori  tribes  of  North  Alba- 
nia, and  this  proved  invaluable  during  the  advance  along 
the  difficult  country  to  the  east  of  the  Lake  of  Skutari. 
On  October  10  Decic,  and  four  days  later  Sipcanik,  the 
key  to  the  Turkish  frontier  positions,  were  captured  after 
a  stubborn  resistance  and  heavy  losses  on  both  sides. 
The  issue  was  decided  by  the  superior  artillery  fire  of  the 
invaders;  3,500  men  and  24  guns  fell  into  their  hands. 
But  though  this  victory  brought  the  Montenegrins  within 
6,000  yards  of  Skutari  (October  25),  they  were  not 
strong  enough  to  reduce  it  to  submission.  The  army  of 
Crown  Prince  Danilo,  advancing  from  Antivari,  suc- 
ceeded in  storming  one  of  the  western  forts;  but  the 
formidable  hill  of  Tarabos  prevented  further  progress  on 
that  side.  On  29th  October  a  storming  party,  after 
heroic  efforts,  ejected  the  Turks  from  the  important  posi- 
tion of  Bardanjolt,  but  next  day  it  was  retaken,  and  the 
exhausted  Montenegrins  were  no  further  than  before. 
The  Turks,  under  the  able  leadership  of  Hassan  Riza 
Pasha,  made  repeated  sorties  from  the  town  and  it  was 
not  until  the  Serbs  occupied  Alessio  (19th  November) 
and  Medua  (21st)  that  the  investment  of  Skutari  became 
effective.  The  siege  operations  were  still  dragging  on 
indefinitely  when  the  armistice  was  proclaimed ;  but 
Hassan  Riza,  being  cut  off  from  all  connection  with  Con- 


176     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

stantinople,  refused  to  recognise  it,  and  a  state  of  unoffi- 
cial war  ensued. 


Thrace 

For  a  whole  generation  past  Bulgaria  had  regarded  a 
war  with  Turkey  as  sooner  or  later  inevitable,  and  had 
made  her  military  preparations  accordingly.  While 
doubtless  giving  careful  consideration  to  a  number  of 
alternative  plans  of  campaign,  whose  adoption  would 
depend  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  moment,  the 
General  Staff  seems  to  have  always  realised  that  its  chief 
aim  must  be  to  seek  out  and  crush  the  main  Turkish 
army,  and  that  all  else  must  be  regarded  as  subordinate. 
That  the  reduction  of  Ardianople  by  siege  had  never 
seriously  entered  into  the  calculations  of  Bulgaria,  is  best 
shown  by  the  fact  that  during  her  long  and  careful  pre- 
paration for  war  she  omitted  to  provide  herself  with  the 
heavy  siege  guns  necessary  to  reduce  a  strong  modern 
fortress.1 

It  is  an  open  secret  that  this  omission  was  in  deference 
to  Russia,  who  had  no  desire  that  Adrianople,  if  it  ceased 
to  be  Turkish,  should  pass  into  any  hands  but  her  own, 
and  who  only  withdrew  her  veto  as  a  result  of  the 
League's  rapid  triumph  and  of  Austrian  competition  for 
Bulgarian  favour.  But  Adrianople,  if  not  captured,  or 
stormed,  must,  owing  to  its  geographical  position,  be 
isolated  before  any  further  advance  into  Thrace  was 
possible.  To  the  Second  Army,  therefore  (about  90,000 
men  under  General  Ivanov),  was  assigned  the  task  of 
"sealing  up  "  Adrianople  and  digging  itself  into  posi- 
tions of  sufficient  strength  to  repel  any  serious  sortie  of 
the  garrison. 

The  mountainous  country  lying  to  the  west  of  Adria- 
nople not  permitting  of  any  advance  on  a  large  scale, 

1  See  infra. 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  177 

the  next  problem  before  the  Bulgarians  was  that  of  Kirk 
Kilisse,  separated  from  Adrianople  by  30  miles  of  open 
downland.  Had  the  Turks  carried  cut  the  projects  of 
their  German  advisers,  Kirk  Kilisse  would  have  been  a 
modern  fortress  "capable  of  holding  the  Prussian  army 
at  bay  for  three  months  "  ;  in  reality,  its  fortifications  had 
remained  almost  entirely  on  paper,  and  only  fools  can 
regard  its  unopposed  capture  as  a  rebuff  to  German 
strategy.  It  has  not  yet  transpired  to  what  extent  the 
Bulgarian  plan  of  campaign  was  based  upon  a  knowledge 
of  Turkish  unpreparedness ;  but  it  may  be  assumed  that 
their  information  was  detailed  and  accurate,  for  the  ad- 
vance from  Jamboli  would  have  been  an  extremely  risky 
undertaking  if  Kirk  Kilisse  had  deserved  its  paper  repu- 
tation.1 It  seems  certain  that  General  Savov  hoped  to 
take  the  Turks  unawares,  and  therefore  made  every  effort 
by  a  strict  censorship  of  news  and  by  elaborate  screening 
movements  of  his  cavalry,  to  conceal  from  the  enemy  till 
the  last  moment  the  direction  from  which  his  main  at- 
tack was  to  come.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Turks  were 
better  informed  than  Savov  had  imagined,  and  their  com- 
plete failure  to  check  the  Bulgarian  Third  Army  was  due, 
not  to  surprise  or  ignorance,  but  to  other  causes  to  which 
we  shall  refer  later. 

The  Second  Army  crossed  the  frontier  on  18th  October, 
occupied  Mustafa  Pasha  and  its  bridge,  and  advanced  on 
Adrianople  virtually  unopposed.  It  at  once  proceeded 
to  invest  the  city,  first  blocking  the  western  access  in  the 
Marica  Valley,  and  then  gradually  extending  its  opera- 
tions to  the  northern,  eastern  and  southern  sectors. 
Meanwhile,  the  Third  Army,  numbering  70,000  to  80,000 
men  under  General  Dimitriev,  advanced  southwards 
from  Jamboli  in  Eastern  Bulgaria,  with  definite  instruc- 
tions to  take  Kirk  Kilisse,  while  the  gap  between  Ivanov 

1  On  the  other  hand,  Savov 's  caution  after  the  fall  of  Kirk 
Kilisse  suggests  the  contrary. 

N 


178     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

and  Dimitriev  was  filled  by  the  First  Army  under 
General  Kutincev  ready  to  reinforce  one  or  other  accord- 
ing to  necessity.  Savov's  plan  was  to  take  no  undue 
risks  and  to  refrain  from  any  direct  aggression  until  the 
besiegers  of  Adrianople  had  time  to  "dig  themselves 
in  "x  ;  but  in  any  case  the  First  and  Third  Armies  were 
delayed  by  difficulties  of  transport,  due  to  the  absence  of 
real  roads  and  the  continuous  heavy  rain.  The  dissen- 
sions among  the  Turkish  commanders  paralysed  the 
execution  of  Nazim  Pasha's  plan2  and  it  was  not  until 
22nd  October  that  the  first  contact  was  established.  On 
that  day  there  was  more  or  less  serious  fighting 
along  the  entire  front.  The  Adrianople  garrison  was 
repulsed  by  the  First  Army  at  Kaipa,  to  the  north-east 
of  the  city,  while  further  east,  at  Seliolu,  the  Turks  were 
routed  after  a  fierce  encounter  and  pursued  by  the  Bul- 
garian cavalry  as  far  as  Kavakli,  on  the  new  railway 
linking  Kirk  Kilisse  with  the  Orient  route.  This  pur- 
suit, in  the  course  of  which  the  baggage  of  the  first 
Turkish  Army  Corps  was  captured,  appears  to  have  had 
a  demoralising  effect  on  the  Turkish  forces  round  Kirk 
Kilisse,  which  consisted  to  a  large  extent  of  undisci- 
plined and  ill-equipped  Redifs,  still  further  weakened  by 
an  admixture  of  unwilling  Christians  in  the  ranks.  On 
the  following  day  (23rd  October)  the  Bulgarians  re- 
sumed the  attack  between  Petra  and  Erekler,  where  the 
Turkish  resistance,  never  very  formidable,  soon  ended 
in  a  panic,  which,  despite  all  the  efforts  of  the  able 
Turkish  General,  Mahmud  Mukhtar  Pasha,  degenerated 
into  a  disorderly  retreat  southwards.  This  continued 
throughout  the  night,  and  on  24th  October  the  Bulgars 
occupied  Kirk  Kilisse  unopposed.  Unfortunately,  they 
were  exhausted  by  the  fighting  following  on  many  days 
of  strenuous  marching,  and  were,  moreover,  unaware  of 

1  Howell,  op.  cit.,  p.  54. 

2  See  supra,  p.   170. 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  179 

the  completeness  of  their  success.  Dimitriev  was  anxious 
to  push  on  without  delay ;  but  Savov  was  still  deter- 
mined to  take  no  risks,  "to  locate  the  Turkish  mass" 
before  striking,  and  then  "to  strike  with  his  full  force, 
suitably  disposed,  reorganised,  well-supplied  and 
rested."1  He  therefore  ordered  a  halt,  and  a  pause  of 
four  days  ensued. 

Needless  to  say,  this  momentous  decision  affected  the 
whole  issue  of  the  war.  If  Dimitriev  had  had  his  way, 
the  remnants  of  the  Turkish  army  might  have  been  anni- 
hilated or  cut  off,  and  the  lines  of  Tchataldja  and  with 
them  Constantinople  itself  might  have  lain  at  the  mercy 
of  the  invaders.  It  is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event, 
and  we  now  know  that  there  would  have  been  no  risk 
involved  in  an  immediate  advance,  the  more  so  as  the 
captured  stores  of  Kirk  Kilisse  had  solved  the  problem 
of  supplies.  But  if  we  limit  ourselves  to  the  facts  then 
at  Savov's  disposal,  we  must  in  all  fairness  admit  that 
though  he  guessed  wrong,  all  the  probabilities  were  in 
favour  of  his  guess.  While,  however,  the  military  stu- 
dent will  absolve  him,  the  historian  must  regard  his 
decision  as  mainly  responsible  for  Bulgaria's  subse- 
quent failure  to  break  down  the  last  defences  of  the 
Turks. 

Four  days  elapsed  before  hostilities  were  resumed, 
and  this  respite  enabled  the  Turks  to  rally  their  broken 
columns  and  to  concentrate  their  main  forces  along  the 
Karagatch-dere  river.  But  the  dissensions  among  the 
Turkish  Commanders  continued,  and  prevented  full  ad- 
vantage being  taken  of  the  natural  strength  of  their  new 
position.2  On  28th  October  the  Bulgarians  resumed  the 
offensive,  and  for  five  days  a  fierce  battle  raged  along  a 
front  of  almost  25  miles,  from  Lule  Burgas  on  the  south 
as  far  as  Bunar  Hissar  and  Sirmos  on  the  north.      The 

1  cit.,  Howell,  op.  cit.,  p.  76. 

2  Immanuel,  op.  cit.,  p.  95. 

N    2 


180     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Bulgarian  plan  consisted  in  a  determined  frontal  attack, 
followed  by  an  enveloping  movement  on  the  Turkish  left, 
designed  to  drive  the  enemy  off  the  railway  and  their 
lines  of  communication,  and  to  direct  their  retreat  towards 
the  Istranja  Balkan  mountains — a  geographical  cul  de 
sac.  The  most  noteworthy  feature  of  the  battle  is  the 
poor  leadership  on  both  sides.  In  the  case  of  the  Turks, 
Abdullah  Pasha  was  at  variance  both  with  headquarters 
at  Constantinople  and  with  his  own  chief  officers  in  the 
field,  and  the  Turkish  machine  broke  down  so  utterly  that 
each  separate  command  virtually  acted  on  its  own 
responsibility.  At  one  time  the  General  Staff  actually 
appears  to  have  been  without  telephonic  or  even  tele- 
graphic connection  with  the  various  units;  in  such  cir- 
cumstances there  could  be  nothing  in  the  nature  of  a 
general  plan.  The  Bulgarians,  in  their  turn,  were 
seriously  handicapped  by  the  remote  position  of  the 
General  Staff.  For  reasons  of  geography  and  weather, 
Savov  had  been  forced  either  to  remain  at  Kizilagatch 
or  to  lose  touch  with  the  front  for  two  days,  which  would 
have  involved  too  great  a  risk ;  he  thus  had  to  surrender 
tactical  control  to  his  second  in  command,  Dimitriev, 
and  thereby  sacrificed  unity  of  design.  While  the 
Bulgarian  left,  thanks  mainly  to  "record"  marching, 
came  into  action  sooner  than  had  been  anticipated,  the 
heavy  rains  had  delayed  the  advance  of  the  First  Army 
on  the  right.  Gaps  arose  in  the  Bulgarian  line,  for  a 
time  intercommunication  practically  ceased,1  and  on  the 
evening  of  the  second  day  of  the  battle  (29th  October) 
the  situation  of  the  Third  Army  would  have  been  highly 
precarious,  if  it  had  been  faced  by  troops  still  capable 
of  taking  the  offensive.  Meanwhile  Shiikri  Pasha 
ordered  a  sortie  from  Adrianople,  but  made  the  fatal 
error  of  striking  westwards  along  the  Maritza  valley. 
If  instead  of  this  he  had  moved  upon  Liile  Burgas — a 

1  Howell,  op.  cit.,  p.  116. 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  181 

distance  of  barely  forty  miles — his  arrival  might  have 
decided  the  battle  in  favour  of  the  Turks.1  While,  then, 
29th  October  was  a  critical  day  for  the  Bulgarian  centre, 
the  left  wing  was  held  at  bay  by  the  spirited  defence  of 
Mahmud  Mukhtar;  desperate  fighting  took  place,  and 
Poryali  changed  hands  at  least  four  times.  It  was  not 
till  daylight  on  the  fourth  day  (31st  October)  that  the 
centre  succeeded  in  storming  the  heights  at  Karagatch ; 
but  even  then  one  division  failed  to  cross  the  river. 
Towards  afternoon  the  superior  fire  of  the  Bulgarian 
artillery  finally  crushed  the  resistance  of  the  Turkish 
left,  but  no  pursuit  was  attempted.  Mahmud  Mukhtar, 
now  isolated  on  the  Turkish  right,  still  offered  a  gallant 
resistance  on  the  fifth  day  (1st  November),  but  the 
Bulgarian  artillery  fire  directed  against  both  flanks  at 
last  forced  his  troops  into  flight,  and  the  Turkish  retreat 
became  general. 

As  at  Kirk  Kilisse,  there  was  no  pursuit.  The  Bul- 
garian army,  though  victorious,  was  at  the  last  stage  of 
exhaustion ;  there  were  no  fresh  troops  available  to  take 
their  place,  and  the  cavalry  division,  instead  of  being 
held  in  reserve,  had  been  worn  out  by  constant  recon- 
noitring, and  at  the  critical  moment  when  Dimitriev 
gave  the  order  for  pursuit  was  physically  incapable  of 
obeying.  The  torrents  of  rain  which  again  set  in  on 
the  night  of  1st  November  finally  settled  the  question. 
The  Bulgarian  general  plan  had  failed,  and  the  battle 
of  Liile  Burgas  cannot  be  described  as  truly  decisive. 
The  Turkish  retreat  became  a  panic,  such  as  had  no 
European  parallel  since  the  Borodino,2  and  a  pitiless 
pursuit  would  have  led  to  the  annihilation  of  the  beaten 
army  and    the  occupation  of    the  lines  of    Tchataldja. 

1  Ibid.,  p.   119. 

2  On  November  2,  the  artillery  of  the  Third  Army  Corps 
actually  fired  on  its  own  troops,  mistaking  them  for  the  enemy. 
See  Hochwaechter's  Diary. 


182     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

This  would  have  been  the  turning-point  of  the  war  and 
might  even  have  involved  the  final  expulsion  of  the 
Turks  from  Europe.  But  this  effort  was  beyond  the 
power  of  the  Bulgarians.  Their  victory  was  due,  not  to 
the  superior  strategy  of  the  commanders,  but  to  the 
heroism  and  enthusiasm  of  the  rank  and  file  and  to  the 
complete  breakdown  of  the  Turkish  military  system. 
A  combination  of  high  patriotic  ideals  with  practical 
training  gave  to  the  Bulgarian  peasant  an  irresistible 
elan  such  as  was  wholly  lacking  to  the  ill-led  and  half- 
starved  Turkish  army.  The  spade  and  the  bayonet  were 
used  with  equal  effect,  and  their  w7ork  was  completed  by 
superior  artillery  practice.  But  victory  was  paid  for  by 
enormous  losses,  and  there  can  be  no  question  that  many 
lives  were  recklessly  wasted  in  frontal  attacks,  and  that 
the  almost  entire  neglect  of  sanitary  precautions1  in- 
creased the  mortality  and  added  to  the  exhaustion  which 
followed  battle.  The  callousness  to  human  life  displayed 
by  the  Bulgarians  in  both  these  directions  brought  its 
own  revenge  at  a  later  period. 

On  ist  November  the  Bulgarians  were  left  in  posses- 
sion of  the  field;  but  five  days  of  absolute  rest  elapsed 
before  the  advance  was  resumed,  and  even  then  the  pace 
was  far  from  rapid.  Though  the  distance  from  Liile 
Burgas  to  the  lines  of  Tchataldja  is  only  seventy  miles, 
it  was  not  till  the  16th  that  the  Bulgarians  arrived  within 
reach  of  the  Turkish  guns.2  This  interval  of  a  fortnight 
had  been  employed  to  strengthen  the  defences  of  the 
capital,  and  to  remove  some  at  least  of  the  worst  defici- 
encies of  the  lines.  Their  desperate  condition  at  the 
time  of  the  retreat  may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that  on 

1  Cf.  Pennenrun,  La  Guerre  dcs  Balkans.  Openly  admitted 
by  the  Foreign  Minister,  Genadiev,  in  his  speech  in  Sofia 
on  16th  November,  1913.  ("Sanitary  material  was  virtually  non- 
existent.") 

2  Immanuel,  II.,  p.  53. 


THE   TURCO-BALKAN   WAR  183 

4th  November  Major  von  Hochwaechter,  as  an  active 
member  of  Mahmud  Mukhtar's  staff,  recorded  in  his 
diary:  "Indeed,  on  the  whole,  the  Tchataldja  line  has 
been  given  up."  This  verdict  was,  of  course,  based 
upon  purely  military  considerations;  but  it  has  since 
transpired  that  on  the  following  day  (5th  November)  the 
Turkish  Government,  through  its  diplomatic  represen- 
tatives, was  assuring  the  Great  Powers  of  its  inability 
to  defend  the  lines  and  was  already  relying  upon  external 
political  pressure  to  prevent  a  Bulgarian  occupation  of 
Constantinople.1  Full  advantage,  however,  was  taken 
of  the  respite  offered  by  the  invader ;  siege  guns  were 
hurriedly  moved  up  to  the  lines,  proper  stores  and 
ammunition  were  accumulated,  drastic  measures  were 
adopted  to  stamp  out  the  epidemic  of  cholera  which  had 
followed  the  retreat,  and,  above  all,  great  efforts  were 
expended  on  entrenchments  and  wire  entanglements. 

During  this  fortnight  of  preparation,  Europe  rang  with 
the  fictitious  accounts  of  a  great  battle  waged  for  three 
days  (3rd,  4th,  5th  November)  at  Tcherkeskoj,  followed 
by  a  general  assault  on  Tchataldja,  also  lasting  three 
days  (7th-9th  November).2  These  stories,  garnished  with 
minute  geographical  and  strategic  details,  were  supplied 
by  the  Bulgarian  General  Staff  to  the  correspondent  of 
a  prominent  Viennese  newspaper,  whose  knowledge  of 
Balkan  languages  had  already  enabled  him  to  out- 
distance his  numerous  journalistic  rivals. 

The  real  battle  of  Tchataldja  commenced  on  17th 
November  with  a  heavy  cannonade  against  the  Turkish 
positions.     This  was  followed  up  by  a  determined  assault 

1  Cf.  Roumanian  Green  Book. 

'  Cf.  Reichspost,  Nos.  512  (4th  November),  575,  577  (7th 
November),  519-531  (8th-i5th  November).  In  a  telegram  dated 
from  the  Bulgarian  Headquarters  at  10  a.m.  on  7th  November, 
minute  details  (covering  a  column  and  a  half)  are  given  of  these 
imaginary  events. 


184    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

upon  the  weakest  spot  of  the  defence,  beside  the  Lake 
of  Derkos,  and  during  the  night  the  Bulgarians  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  within  600  to  800  yards  and  digging 
themselves  in.  On  the  18th,  however,  no  further  pro- 
gress could  be  made,  for  the  Turkish  artillery  fire 
gradually  asserted  its  superiority.  On  the  third  day 
the  battle  was  confined  to  an  artillery  duel,  in  which  the 
Black  Sea  fleet  took  some  part;  and  at  nightfall  the 
Bulgarians  retired,  after  losses  which  have  been 
estimated  at  10,000  killed  and  wounded.1  Their  original 
elan  had  forsaken  them ; 2  their  exhaustion  had  been 
completed  by  a  temporary  dislocation  of  the  commis- 
sariat,3 by  shocking  sanitary  conditions,  and  the  conse- 
quent outbreak  of  dysentery  and  cholera.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  desperate  efforts  of  the  Turkish  commanders 
had  infused  a  new  spirit  into  their  troops ;  and  the  battle 
afforded  a  new  proof  that  the  Ottoman  soldier  is  at  his 
best  in  a  defensive  position.  But  the  determining  factor 
in  the  battle  was  the  Turkish  artillery,  which  disproved 
the  alleged  inferiority  of  German  armaments.4  The 
lines  had  proved  too  tough  a  nut  for  the  Bulgars  to 
crack,  and  they  now  withdrew  to  a  defensive  position 
some  miles  to  the  north  of  the  lines,  and  definitely 
abandoned  the  idea  of  a  triumphal  entry  into  Con- 
stantinople. Thus  both  in  a  strategical  and  in  a  political 
sense   the  battle  of   Tchataldja  was  the  decisive  event 

1  Immanuel,   II.,  p.  58.     Pennenrun,  p.    135. 

3  "  II  a  manque"  aux  Bulgares  ce  souffle,  ce  coeur  qui  les  avait 
fait  vainqueurs  jusqu'ici." — Pennenrun,  p.  114.  "Ces  gens-la 
n'ont  pas  I'air  de  vainqueurs,"  said  someone  to  Pennenrun  on 
17th  November,  as  they  watched  the  Bulgarian  columns  moving 
to  the  front. 

3  The  Third  Army  ran  short  of  provisions  for  two  days  on  the 
eve  of  Tchataldja  (15th— 16th  November).  See  Pennenrun,  pp.  19, 
91. 

1  See  Hochwaechter,  p.  121,  who  described  it  as  "ein  glanzender 
Erfolg  der  Tiirken." 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN   WAR  185 

which  preserved  to  the  Turks  the  last  and  most  vital 
fragment  of  their  European  empire,  and  at  the  same  time 
denied  to  Bulgaria  the  coveted  role  of  the  Prussia  of 
the  Balkans. 

While  their  main  armies  had  been  concentrated  in 
Thrace,  the  Bulgarians  had  not  been  idle  further  west. 
One  division  had  been  posted  at  Kiistendil,  to  co-operate 
with  the  Serbs  and  if  necessary  screen  Sofia  from  attack. 
The  decisive  battle  of  Kumanovo  removed  all  danger 
from  this  quarter;  and  not  merely  this  division,  but 
also  the  greater  part  of  the  Second  Serbian  Army  under 
General  Stepanovic  were  promptly  transferred  to 
Adrianople  to  reinforce  the  besieging  army.  To  another 
Bulgarian  group  had  been  assigned  the  task  of  occupy- 
ing the  country  south  of  the  Rhodope  range  and  of 
"cutting"  the  railway  between  Constantinople  and 
Salonica.  The  advance  took  place  in  two  parallel 
columns  down  the  valleys  of  the  Mestra  and  Struma, 
Kavala  and  Seres  being  occupied  without  serious  resist- 
ance within  a  couple  of  days  of  each  other;  but  it  was 
not  till  gth  November  that  the  main  force  succeeded 
in  reaching  Salonica,  which  had  already  capitulated  on 
the  previous  day  to  the  Greek  Crown  Prince. 

Meanwhile,  the  investment  of  Adrianople  was  steadily 
pushed  forward.  Shiikri  Pasha  had  40,000  to  50,000 
men  under  his  command,  while  General  Ivanov's  forces 
considerably  exceeded  100,000.  On  7th  November  the 
Bulgarians  stormed  two  positions  on  the  south-west  of 
the  city,  which  secured  to  them  the  command  of  the 
railway  along  the  Marica.  But  this  progress  was  handi- 
capped by  lack  of  heavy  siege-guns  and  by  the  outbreak 
of  disease  and  epidemics;  while  the  Turkish  garrison, 
well  supplied  with  stores  and  courageously  led,  showed 
a  fighting  spirit,  and  made  at  least  four  determined 
sorties  during  November.  The  Turkish  headquarters, 
encouraged  by   their  success  at   Tchataldja,   began   to 


186     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

concert  measures  for  the  relief  of  Adrianople,  and  with 
this  end  in  view  sent  considerable  reinforcements  to 
Gallipoli  and  Bulair,  on  the  isthmus  behind  the  Dar- 
danelles. If  at  this  stage  the  Turks  had  been  really 
capable  of  an  offensive  stroke,  they  might  by  an  advance 
upon  Dimotika  have  cut  the  communications  of  the 
Bulgarian  army  before  Tchataldja.  The  Bulgarian 
General  Staff  took  steps  to  avert  this  danger.  The  2nd 
Division  was  moved  against  Dimotika,  and  on  28th 
November,  at  Merhumli,  surrounded  and  took  prisoners 
the  last  remnants  of  the  Turkish  forces  in  the  Marica 
valley.1  At  the  same  time  most  of  the  7th  Division  had 
been  transferred  on  Greek  transports  from  Salonica  to 
Dedeagac,  and  by  1st  December  a  compact  Bulgarian 
force  was  advancing  towards  Bulair  to  forestall  any 
Turkish  attempt  to  assume  the  offensive.  Towards  the 
close  of  November  the  operations  before  Adrianople 
were  resumed  with  fresh  vigour,  and  after  a  continuous 
bombardment  of  three  days  an  attempt  was  made  on 
the  night  of  3rd  December  to  storm  the  eastern  sectors. 
Its  failure  was  the  last  incident  in  this  stage  of  the 
Balkan  war,  for  on  the  following  day  the  pourparlers 
which  had  been  conducted  between  the  Allies  and  the 
Turks  for  nearly  a  fortnight  past  reached  a  successful 
issue,  and  on  4th  December  an  armistice  was  concluded. 


Macedonia. 

The  Porte  had  declared  war  upon  Bulgaria  and  Serbia 
simultaneously,  and  the  armies  of  the  two  Slav  allies 
crossed  the  frontier  on  the  same  day  (18th  October).  In 
Serbia  mobilisation  was  carried  out  with  the  same  speed 
and  smoothness  as  in  Bulgaria.     Within  three  days  95 

1  According  to  Immanuel  (II.,  p.  70),  9,000  men  with  10  guns. 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN   WAR  187 

per  cent,  of  the  reservists  had  presented  themselves,1 
and  before  the  opening  of  hostilities  the  number  of  men 
available  is  said  to  have  exceeded  by  no  fewer  than 
90,000  the  estimate  of  the  authorities. 

The  Turkish  plan  of  campaign,  as  has  already  been 
pointed  out,  was  to  assume  the  aggressive  against  the 
main  Serbian  army,  to  crush  it  before  it  could  unite  with 
the  auxiliary  Serb  and  Bulgar  columns  to  the  north  and 
east,  and  having  thus  driven  it  back  to  Serbian  territory, 
to  march  upon  Sofia.  The  main  Bulgarian  forces  in 
Thrace  would  thus  have  been  taken  in  the  rear  and 
probably  forced  to  abandon  the  offensive. 

The  Serbian  plan  of  campaign  was  directed  in  the 
first  instance  upon  Uskiib  (Skoplje),  with  the  double 
object  of  recovering  the  ancient  Serb  capital  and  of 
acquiring  a  strategic  centre  whose  capture  would  render 
Turkish  aggression  against  Serbia  or  Bulgaria  impos- 
sible. The  Serbian  forces  advanced  in  four  sections, 
disposed  in  echelon  formation.  The  First  Army,  over 
90,000  strong,  under  the  Crown  Prince  and  General 
Bojevic,  followed  the  valley  of  the  Morava  and  the  main 
railway  line  to  Salonica.  The  Third  Army,  34,000,  under 
General  Jankovic,  crossed  the  Prepolac  Pass  to  Pristina, 
with  the  object  of  occupying  the  plain  of  Kosovo,  and 
threatening  Uskiib  from  the  north.     To  a  smaller  group 

of  16,000  men  under  General  Zivkovic,  starting  from 
western  Serbia,  was  assigned  the  task  of  occupying  the 
Sandjak  of  Novibazar  and  joining  hands  with  the  eastern 
Montenegrin  army;  while  the  Second  Army,  consisting 
of  25,000  men  under  General  Stepanovic,  advanced  from 
Bulgarian  territory  by  Egri  Palanka,  in  co-operation 
with  a  similar  Bulgarian  force. 

1  It  is  worth  noting  that  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  had  relatively 
but  few  emigrants.  In  the  case  of  Montenegro  and  Greece,  on 
the  contrary,  many  thousands  returned  from  x^merica  to  fulfil 
their  military  obligations. 


188     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

The  Serbian  operations  were  seriously  delayed  by 
heavy  rains,  which  turned  such  roads  as  there  were  into 
mere  quagmires,  and  by  the  activity  of  the  Turkish 
advance  posts  and  swarms  of  Albanian  irregulars.  Thus 
the  First  Army  took  four  days  to  advance  36  kilometres,1 
and  on  22nd  October  the  General  Staff,  over-estimating 
the  opposing  forces,  was  virtually  acting  on  the  defen- 
sive. At  the  battle  of  Kumanovo  (23rd-24th  October) 
it  was  the  Turks  who  first  assumed  the  offensive.  During 
the  first  day  the  Serbs  were  much  inferior  in  numbers 
and  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  holding  their  ground. 
Indeed,  but  for  the  possession  of  three  curious  rock- 
crowned  hillocks  some  miles  to  the  east  of  the  town 
of  Kumanovo,  the  Serb  resistance  would  inevitably 
have  been  overpowered ;  the  village  of  Nagoricano,  the 
weak  spot  in  the  Serb  defences,  was  the  scene  of 
desperate  fighting  all  day  and  till  far  into  the  night,  and 
changed  hands  at  least  four  times.  Djavid  Pasha,  the 
commander  of  the  Turkish  right,  aimed  at  turning  the 
left  flank  of  the  Serbs  and  thus  threatening  their  line 
of  advance  upon  Kumanovo.  Reinforcements  came  up 
slowly  on  both  sides  during  the  night,  and  early  next 
morning  the  two  armies  took  the  offensive  almost  simul- 
taneously. The  issue  was  finally  decided  towards  after- 
noon on  24th  October,  by  the  accurate  and  deadly  fire 
of  the  Serbian  artillery,  which  only  came  into  action 
on  the  second  day.  The  Albanian  irregulars  on  the 
Turkish  left  were  stricken  with  panic  and  fled  in  wild 
disorder  westwards,  thus  exposing  the  centre  to  the 
attack  of  fresh  Serb  columns  advancing  from  the  north. 
Thus  the  panic  spread  and  soon  became  general;  only 
the  right  under  Djavid  Pasha  held  its  ground  till  4  p.m. 
and  then  withdrew  in  fair  order  towards  Ishtib.  While 
the  losses  of  the  victors  amounted  to  1,000  killed  and 
3,200  wounded,  those  of  the  Turks  have  been  estimated 
1  Immanuel,  p.  74. 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN   WAR  189 

at  12,000  men,  including  2,000  prisoners.  Sixty-five 
guns  and  large  military  stores  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Serbs ;  indeed,  by  25th  November  the  number  of  cap- 
tured cannon  had  risen  to  150.1  But  even  these  figures 
do  not  reveal  the  full  extent  of  the  Turkish  collapse. 
So  dire  a  disaster,  following  close  upon  overweening 
self-confidence,  completely  demoralised  the  remains  of 
Zekki  Pasha's  army;  thousands  melted  away  during  the 
retreat  and  stormed  the  trains  for  Salonica.  Privates 
and  even  officers  threw  off  their  uniforms,  and  when  the 
Serbs  entered  Uskub,  were  found  in  disguises  of  a 
strange  and  sometimes  ludicrous  nature. 

Kumanovo,  like  Liile  Burgas,  was  pre-eminently  a 
soldier's  battle.  On  neither  side  was  any  brilliant 
generalship  shown,  and  both  armies  seem  to  have  been 
surprised  at  finding  the  enemy  where  they  did.  The 
dashing  qualities  of  the  Serbian  infantry  and  the  excel- 
lence of  their  artillery  gave  a  brilliant  foretaste  of  sub- 
sequent achievements. 

The  Serbian  General  Staff,  misled  by  a  false  report 
that  the  Sixth  Turkish  Army  Corps  was  advancing  from 
Veles,  refrained  from  any  active  pursuit  and  did  not 
enter  the  town  of  Kumanovo  until  the  following  day. 
Their  excessive  caution,  which  offers  an  exact  parallel 
to  Savov's  attitude  at  Kirk  Kilisse,  was  based  upon  a 
general  over-estimate  of  the  Turks,  but  suggests  the 
possibility  that  the  allies  were  still  reckoning  with  inter- 
national complications. 

In  Uskiib  chaos  reigned  for  forty-eight  hours,  and  the 
foreign  consuls  found  it  necessary  to  assume  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs  until  the  Serbs  arrived.  Some  idea  of 
the  prevailing  panic  may  be  obtained  from  a  single 
incident.     The   Vali,  while  crossing  the  old  bridge  on 

1  This  number  is  given  by  Zekki  Pasha  in  his  telegram  an- 
nouncing the  defeat  to  Ali  Riza  Pasha  in  Salonica  (reproduced 
in  Barby,  Les  Victoires  Serbes,  p    82). 


190    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

his  way  to  the  station  and  to  safety,  was  fired  upon  by 
an  Albanian  volunteer.  No  one  was  hit,  but  the  cry  of 
"The  Serbs!  "  was  raised,  and  a  wild  sauve  qui  petit 
followed.  Four  batteries  were  abandoned  in  the  main 
street,  their  gunners  cutting  the  traces  and  riding  off; 
and  thirty  hours  later,  when  the  Serbian  army  entered 
Uskiib,  the  guns  were  still  there  !  Under  such  dramatic 
circumstances  did  the  Serbs  resume  possession  of  the 
capital  of  their  long-vanished  Empire.  The  dreams  of 
five  hundred  years  of  poetic  lamentation  were  at  length 
fulfilled,  and  the  armies  of  King  Peter  had  avenged 
the  fatal  defeat  of  Kosovo.  Uskiib  had  become  Skoplje 
once  more. 

At  this  point  it  is  interesting  to  compare  the  psy- 
chology of  the  allied  forces.  Bulgars  and  Serbs,  fired  by 
equal  enthusiasm,  were  at  first  held  back  by  the  over- 
anxiety  of  their  leaders;  then,  as  victory  crowned  their 
arms,  the  elan  of  the  former  slowly  decreased,  while 
that  of  the  latter  became  more  and  more  marked — a 
contrast  which  is  largely  accounted  for  by  their  respec- 
tive attitude  to  problems  of  commissariat  and  sanitation. 
It  was  the  Greeks  who  from  the  very  first  day  displayed 
the  most  dashing  qualities;  and  even  though  this  may 
be  partly  due  to  the  relative  ease  of  their  task  and  to 
the  fact  that  they  are  "good  winners,"  we  must  not 
withhold  our  recognition  of  the  admirable  spirit  dis- 
played by  the  Greek  army. 

The  elation  which  this  event  aroused  throughout  the 
entire  Serbo-Croat  race  did  not  betray  the  Serbian 
General  Staff  into  undue  haste;  as  at  Kirk  Kilisse, 
reasons  of  geography  and  strategy  combined  to  enforce 
a  slight  pause  in  the  operations.  Four  days  were  spent 
in  a  redistribution  of  the  Serbian  forces.  The  Third 
Army,  which  had  occupied  Pristina  on  22nd  October 
and  reached  Skoplje  from  the  north  only  two  days  later 
than  the  main  army,  was  now  considerably  reduced  in 


THE   TURCO  BALKAN  WAR  191 

numbers  and  left  to  cope  with  the  Albanian  irregulars. 
The  Second  Army,  which  could  now  be  safely  spared, 
was  promptly  dispatched  to  the  aid  of  the  Bulgarians 
before  Adrianople,  where  it  arrived  on  5th  November. 
The  Crown  Prince  and  his  Generals  were  thus  left  with 
85,000  men  to  cope  with  the  remainder  of  the  Turkish 
forces,  which  had  abandoned  the  Vardar  Valley  and 
fallen  back  upon  Monastir  as  their  base.  On  1st 
November  the  Serbs  advanced  in  three  columns,  the 
weakest  of  which,  passing  through  Ishtib  and  Kavadar, 
met  with  no  serious  opposition  whatever.  The  right 
occupied  Tetovo  (Kalkandelen)  on  1st  November  and 
marched  upon  Krcevo,  where  the  pass  was  defended  by 
Fethi  Pasha ;  on  6th  November  the  Serbs  succeeded  in 
dislodging  the  enemy  and  driving  them  back  towards 
Monastir,  but  a  further  advance  had  to  be  postponed, 
owing  to  the  need  of  co-operation  with  the  main  army. 
More  serious  resistance  was  encountered  by  the  central 
column  in  its  advance  from  Veles.  On  5th  November 
the  Serbs  attacked  the  Turks  in  a  strong  mountainous 
position  at  the  pass  of  Prisat;  owing  to  the  lie  of  the 
ground  it  was  found  impossible  to  bring  the  Serbian 
artillery  into  action,  and  the  battle  was  decided  by  a 
resolute  flanking  movement  of  the  1st  Drina  division, 
pushed  home  with  the  bayonet.  That  evening  the  town 
of  Prilep  was  occupied  without  further  opposition;  but 
the  Turks  had  merely  withdrawn  to  a  strong  position 
on  the  low  hills  of  Bakurna  Gumna  to  the  south  of  the 
town,  and  on  the  following  morning  they  opened  fire 
from  their  entrenchments.  The  Serbian  commander, 
while  directing  a  flanking  movement  against  the  Turkish 
left,  supported  it  by  an  audacious  frontal  attack  across 
five  miles  of  open  plain  on  which  there  was  literallv 
not  cover  enough  for  a  dog.  Simultaneously  the  Serb 
artillery,  also  without  cover,  poured  a  deadly  fire  upon 
the  Turks,  whose  gunnery  practice  proved  itself  alto- 


192    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

gether  inferior.  The  invincible  spirit  which  animated 
the  Serb  army  throughout  the  war  is  best  illustrated 
by  a  single  anecdote.  Overlooking  the  plain  of  Prilep 
stands  the  ruined  fortress  of  Marko  Kraljevic,  the 
redoubtable  hero  round  whose  name  many  generations 
of  Southern  Slavs  have  woven  a  splendid  garland  of 
ballad  poetry ;  and  now,  as  the  Serbs  advanced  to  redeem 
the  region  which  their  ancestors  had  lost,  more  than 
one  soldier  in  the  ranks  fancied  that  he  saw  King  Marko 
on  his  piebald  steed  splashing  through  the  mud  and 
waving  them  on  to  victory.  Such  exaltation  produced 
a  corresponding  depression  among  the  Turks.  Captured 
Ottoman  officers  confessed  some  months  later  in  Bel- 
grade that  their  men  were  infected  by  the  doubt  whether 
ordinary  bullets  could  harm  a  Serbian  soldier  !  Thus 
in  Europe  of  the  twentieth  century  do  we  recapture  the 
atmosphere  of  Lake  Regillus. 

These  two  minor  battles  near  Prilep  had  cost  the  Serbs 
over  3,000  killed  and  wounded.  The  Turkish  losses 
may  have  been  less  heavy ;  they  withdrew  towards 
Monastir,  leaving  no  prisoners,  but  over  forty  cannon. 
On  the  evening  of  the  second  fight  heavy  snow  fell, 
and  the  floods  which  followed,  coupled  with  scarcity  of 
supplies  and  transport  difficulties,  rendered  a  fresh  pause 
in  the  Serbian  operations  inevitable  and  gave  the  Turks 
time  to  place  themselves  on  the  defensive  outside 
Monastir.  It  was  not  till  13th  November  that  the 
advance  was  resumed  and  two  more  days  passed  before 
contact  was  restored. 

In  the  interval  Djavid  Pasha  had  hurried  southwards 
from  Monastir  and  defeated  the  Greek  army  at  Banica 
with  a  loss  of  twelve  guns.  Djavid,  who  alone  of  the 
Turkish  generals  in  Macedonia  showed  high  military 
capacity,  now  urged  upon  headquarters  a  plan  for  con- 
centrating the  entire  Turkish  forces  against  the  Greeks, 
crushing  their  armies  piecemeal,  and  only  turning  back 


THE  TURCO  BALKAN  WAR        193 

against  the  Serbs  after  Greece  had  been  brought  to  her 
knees.  Such  a  result,  if  it  could  be  attained,  would,  he 
argued,  force  Greece  to  withdraw  from  the  League,  thus 
restoring  Turkey's  control  of  the  JEgean  and  enabling 
her  to  dispatch  reinforcements  to  Salonica.  We  need 
not  stop  to  consider  what  prospect  of  success  such  a 
plan  may  have  had ;  for  his  arguments,  though  rendered 
highly  plausible  by  the  fact  that  for  political  reasons 
(see  page  198)  the  Greek  forces  were  at  this  very  juncture 
scattered  over  a  wide  area,  were  never  seriously  enter- 
tained at  Constantinople.  For  sentimental,  if  for  no 
other  reasons,  Monastir  must  be  defended  at  all  costs. 
Hence  the  small  Greek  army  was  left  to  recover  from 
its  reverse  at  Banica  and  await  the  approach  of  the 
Crown  Prince's  army;  while  Djavid  Pasha  rejoined  the 
main  Turkish  army  outside  Monastir. 

The  defensive  position  taken  up  by  the  Turks  was 
one  of  great  natural  strength,  resting  against  the  range 
of  hills  which  sheltered  the  city  from  the  north,  and 
extending  over  a  front  of  about  sixteen  miles.  The  wide 
Pelagonian  plain,  upon  the  Turkish  right  wing,  would 
in  summer  have  favoured  a  flanking  movement  in  that 
direction ;  but  the  heavy  rains  and  consequent  floods 
seriously  hampered  the  invaders.  Thus  the  Serbs,  while 
endeavouring  to  envelop  the  enemy  and  intercept  his 
main  lines  of  retreat  to  Fiorina  and  to  Resna,  found  it 
necessary  to  concentrate  their  efforts  on  the  Turkish 
left.  While  the  attack  of  the  Serbian  right  was  develop- 
ing in  the  difficult  country  west  of  Monastir,  the  heavy 
artillery  took  up  its  position  behind  the  ridge  facing  the 
Turkish  centre,  and  later  on  other  guns  were  posted  in  a 
deliberately  exposed  position  on  the  flat  ground  further 
east,  in  order  to  keep  the  Turkish  right  fully  occupied. 
The  turning  movement  met  with  desperate  resistance 
from  Djavid  Pasha  and  his  troops;  Oblakovo  (1450  m.), 
the  key  to  the  Turkish  position,  was  taken  and  retaken, 

o 


194     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

and  on  the  second  day  of  the  battle  (16th  November)  the 
issue  was  still  undecided.  Next  day,  in  order  to  prevent 
the  Turks  from  concentrating  still  further  on  their  left 
flank,  the  Serbs  undertook  a  frontal  attack  upon  the 
Turkish  centre.  Supported  by  heavy  artillery  fire  and 
taking  advantage  of  the  misty  weather,  portions  of  the 
ist  Morava  and  Drina  Divisions  advanced  across  the 
flooded  valley  of  the  Sevnica  and  towards  night  managed 
to  ensconce  themselves  along  the  raised  causeway  of  the 
public  road.  Many  of  the  troops  were  several  hours  in 
the  water,  sometimes  up  to  their  shoulders,  and  within 
full  range  of  the  Turkish  rifle  fire.  After  spending  the 
night  in  this  precarious  position  they  were  able  early  next 
morning  (18th  November)  to  force  their  way  right  up  to 
the  Turkish  trenches,  the  Serbian  artillery,  by  its  supe- 
rior fire  and  remarkable  precision,  having  utterly  crushed 
the  resistance  of  the  Turkish  batteries.  Meanwhile 
pontoons  had  been  erected  on  the  Serbian  left,  and  the 
right  had  at  length  stormed  Oblakovo  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet.  On  the  afternoon  of  18th  November  the  victo- 
rious army  occupied  Monastir,  capturing  8000  prisoners, 
95  guns  (including  the  12  pieces  taken  from  the  Greeks), 
and  enormous  military  stores.  The  Turkish  losses  were 
estimated  at  7000  killed  and  wounded,  those  of  the  Serbs 
at  4000  to  5000. l  Both  from  a  strategic  point  of  view 
and  as  an  example  of  prowess,  endurance  and  efficiency, 
the  German  critic,  Colonel  Immanuel,  is  probably  justi- 
fied in  describing  the  battle  of  Monastir  as  "the  best 
performance  of  the  entire  Balkan  War."2  The  Turks 
were  beaten  not  only  by  superior  numbers,3  but  by  better 
leadership  and  tactical  skill ;  the  Serbian  plan  was  care- 
fully thought  out  and  succeeded  in  every  particular. 

1  Barby,  p.  124.  2  Op  cit.,  II.,  p.  88. 

s  The    Turks    had    65,000  troops    and    a    good    many    thousand 

irregulars,  whose  numbers  cannot  be  determined ;  the  Serbs, 
80,000. 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  195 

The  battle  of  Monastir  finally  decided  the  Macedonian 
campaign  in  favour  of  the  allies.  Henceforward  the  best 
which  the  Turks  could  hope  for  was  to  prolong  opera- 
tions by  guerilla  warfare  and  if  possible  to  retain  their 
hold  upon  the  fortresses  of  Skutari  and  Janina,  as  sub- 
jects of  bargaining  at  the  peace  negotiations.  Some 
broken  fragments  of  the  Turkish  army  survived  the 
battle.  Zekki  Pasha,  with  at  least  15,000  men,  effected  his 
retreat  to  Janina,  though  pursued  by  both  Serbs  and 
Greeks,  and  brought  a  most  welcome  addition  to  the 
forces  of  the  garrison.  Fethi  Pasha,  with  barely  4000 
men,  retreated  westwards  upon  Resna,  but  was  over- 
taken by  the  Serbs  and  routed  outside  the  town ;  the 
unfortunate  general  was  killed,  and  his  troops  scattered 
in  all  directions.  Meanwhile  Djavid  Pasha,  finding  his 
retreat  by  Resna  cut  off,  made  his  way  along  the  western 
slopes  of  Mt.  Perister,  and  withdrew  into  central  Albania 
with  about  16,000  men.  Here  the  allies  wisely  refrained 
from  following  him ;  and  the  presence  of  a  Turkish 
general  in  the  district  of  Berat,  acting  in  nominal  agree- 
ment with  the  new  "government"  at  Valona,  deprived 
the  Great  Powers  of  any  excuse  for  military  intervention 
in  favour  of  Albania. 

It  remains  for  us  to  consider  the  minor  operations  of 
the  Serbs  in  the  northern  theatre  of  war.  The  Third 
Army,  under  General  Jankovic,  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
occupied  without  much  difficulty  Pristina  and  the 
historic  plain  of  Kosovo.  Meanwhile  General  Zivkovic 
invaded  the  Sandjak  from  western  Serbia  (22nd  October), 
occupied  Sjenica  and  Novibazar  after  a  brief  but  sharp 
resistance  (24th  October),  and  joined  hands  with  a  Mon- 
tenegrin detachment  at  Plevlje,  whose  garrison  withdrew 
into  Bosnian  territory  and  was  disarmed  by  the  Aus- 
trians.  The  Sandjak  being  thus  cleared  of  Turkish 
troops,  and  the  two  independent  Serb  States  being  united 
for  the  first  time  in  history,  a  simultaneous  advance  was 

o  2 


196    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

made  against  the  Albanian  irregulars,  and  before  the 
close  of  the  month  Zivkovic  had  occupied  Djakovo,  the 
Montenegrins,  Ipek,  and  Jankovic,  Prizren  (30th-3ist 
October).  But  a  further  task  awaited  the  Serbs — that  of 
securing  that  outlet  to  the  sea  to  which  they  had  so  long- 
aspired  and  which  to  them  was  the  most  valuable  prize 
of  war.  Their  natural  access  through  Bosnia  and  Dal- 
matia,  provinces  inhabited  by  their  own  race,  is  in  the 
hands  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  thus  they  were  of 
necessity  led  to  seek  it  at  the  expense  of  a  neighbouring 
race's  independence. 

After   the  fall   of    Prizren   ten   days    were    spent    in 
measures  of  precaution  and  transport  arrangements.    To 
the  troops  of  General   Zivkovic  was  assigned  the  task 
of  policing  the  thinly-peopled  and  mountainous  Sandjak, 
disarming  the  native  Albanians  and  raising  new  regi- 
ments from  the  Serb  population ;  while  General  Jankovic 
was  left  to  supervise  the    advance  to  the  coast.      Two 
entirely  separate  expeditions  were  sent.     The  first,  con- 
sisting  of   8,700   men   of   the    2nd    Drina   Division,    10 
mountain  guns,  and   jo  machine-guns,  left  Djakovo  on 
10th   November,  and  crossing  the  river   Drin  at  Spas, 
made  its  way  through  the  wild  Mirdite  country  to  Puka 
and  Alessio,  whose  garrison,  astounded  at  the  appear- 
ance of  a  Serb  army,  surrendered  after  a  short  passage 
of  arms  (19th   November).     The  second,  composed  of 
7,000  men  of  the  1st  Sumadia  Division,  with  4  guns  and 
10   machine-guns,   left    Prizren    one    day    earlier    and 
followed  an  even   more  difficult  course    to    Kroja  and 
Tirana,   only  reaching   their  goal    at    Durazzo  after  a 
fortnight  of  continual  danger  and  privation.     In  both 
cases  the  march  lay  for  many  days  through  wild  and 
trackless  mountains;  deep  snow  and  swollen  rivers  were 
among  the  obstacles  encountered.    Provisions  were  often 
not  obtainable  on  the  way,  and  it  was  difficult  to  carry 
much  with  them.    Sometimes  their  rations  were  reduced 


THE  TURCO  BALKAN  WAR  197 

to  uncooked  maize,  grass,  and  roots.  Weakened  by 
hunger  and  cold,  they  had  to  find  a  passage  for  their 
guns  and  ammunition.  With  very  imperfect  maps,  and 
permanently  exposed  to  the  attack  of  guerilla  bands,  they 
dared  not  leave  their  wounded  or  sick  comrades  behind 
them.  An  English  military  critic  has  compared  their 
achievement  to  Pizarro's  passage  of  the  Andes,  and  it 
certainly  has  no  parallel  in  Europe  since  Napoleon 
crossed  into  Italy.1  It  deserves  special  prominence,  not 
only  as  the  most  adventurous  incident  of  the  whole  war, 
but  as  one  to  which  full  justice  has  not  hitherto  been 
done.2 

Finally,  after  the  battle  of  Monastir,  columns  were 
pushed  forward  from  Ochrida  down  the  valley  of  the 
White  Drin  to  Dibra  and  westwards  to  Elbasan.  Before 
the  conclusion  of  the  armistice  the  whole  of  northern 
Albania  was  in  effective  possession  of  the  Serbian  army. 
Their  arms  had  been  crowned  with  unbroken  success. 
Unaided  they  had  crushed  the  western  Turkish  army, 
and  now,  after  occupying  more  territory  than  their 
wildest  dreams  had  bade  them  hope  for,  they  were  free 
to  send  large  contingents  to  the  aid  of  their  allies  before 
Adrianople  and  Skutari.  The  position  envisaged  by  the 
treaty  of  alliance  had  been  strikingly  reversed ;  instead 
of  Bulgaria  aiding  Serbia  with  100,000  men,  she  was 
herself  accepting  the  assistance  of  50,000  Serbian  troops. 

Thessaly  and  Epirus. 

The  Turkish  declaration  of  war  against  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia  had  been  immediately  followed  by  the  Greek 
declaration  of  war  against  Turkey;  and  on  18th  October 

1  Granville  Baker,  Passing  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  p.  290. 

'  Even  the  well-informed  and  accurate  Colonel  Immanuel  has 
failed  to  realise  that  there  were  two  distinct  expeditions.  Cf. 
op.  cit.,  pp.  100-102.  The  numbers  and  route  are  based  on  in- 
formation supplied  me  at  headquarters  in  Skoplje  in  May,  1913. 


198     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Crown  Prince  Constantine  crossed  the  frontier  at  the 
head  of  60,000  men.  His  opponent,  Hassan  Tahsim 
Pasha,  has  been  credited  with  the  design  of  marching 
upon  Larissa  by  the  coast  route  and  thus  cutting  off  the 
Greek  army  from  its  base;  but  not  the  slightest  attempt 
was  made  to  execute  such  a  move.  The  Turkish  forces 
at  this  point  cannot  have  exceeded  40,000  men,  but  their 
inferiority  in  numbers  was  compensated  by  the  great 
strength  of  the  mountain  passes  through  which  the  Greeks 
were  obliged  to  advance.  Yet  Elassona  was  occupied  on 
the  very  first  day,  and  every  skirmish  resulted  in  a  fresh 
Turkish  withdrawal.  On  22nd  October  a  battle  took 
place  at  Serfidje,  which  ended  in  the  rout  of  the  Turks 
and  the  capture  of  22  guns;  the  losses  on  both  sides 
amounted  to  about  3,000  killed  and  wounded.  The  whole 
northern  slopes  of  Olympos  thus  fell  into  Greek  hands; 
Veria  and  Vodena  were  occupied  unopposed  and  the 
railway  between  Monastir  and  Salonica  was  cut.  The 
Turks  fell  back  in  two  main  bodies,  the  one  towards 
Monastir,  the  other  towards  Salonica,  and  therefore  the 
pursuing  Greeks  also  divided  their  forces.  On  1st 
November  a  second  battle  opened  at  Jenidje-Vardar, 
Tahsim  Pasha  holding  an  entrenched  position  between 
the  mountains  and  the  marshes.  The  Greeks  were  again 
completely  successful,  and,  without  sustaining  any  very 
serious  losses,  drove  the  Turks  back  upon  Salonica  in 
disorderly  flight.  In  the  city  itself  all  discipline  was  at 
an  end,  its  fortifications  were  old  and  worthless,  and  the 
problem  of  defence  was  complicated  by  the  presence  of 
50,000  Moslem  refugees.  For  a  few  days  the  Greek 
advance  was  checked  by  the  Vardar  river,  but  on  7th 
November,  through  the  mediation  of  the  foreign  consuls, 
negotiations  were  opened  between  the  Crown  Prince  and 
the  Turkish  commander.  Two  days  later  the  victorious 
Greek  army  occupied  Salonica.  The  bloodless  surrender 
of  Tahsim  Pasha,  with  26,000  men  and  100  guns,  gave 


THE    TURCO-BALKAN    WAR  199 

rise  to  unproved  rumours  that  money  had  completed 
what  force  of  arms  began.  The  truth  is  that  fortune 
greatly  favoured  the  Greek  arms,  but  this  does  not 
detract  from  the  fine  leadership  of  the  Crown  Prince  or 
from  the  bravery  of  his  troops. 

On  the  very  evening  after  the  surrender  the  7th  Bulga- 
rian Division,  under  General  Todorov,  entered  from  the 
north,  and  was  assigned  the  church  of  St.  George  and 
the  eastern  section  of  the  city.  Next  day  there  also 
arrived  a  Serb  cavalry  regiment,  which  had  pushed  down 
the  valley  of  the  Vardar  after  Kumanovo ;  but  finding  its 
presence  unnecessary,  it  retraced  its  steps  a  few  days 
later  to  Veles,  and  after  rapid  marching  arrived  before 
Monastir  in  time  for  the  battle. 

From  the  very  first  there  was  serious  friction  between 
the  Greeks  and  Bulgars  at  Salonica,  the  latter  even  pro- 
claiming themselves  as  the  first-comers  until  the  full  facts 
became  known,  and  reproaching  the  Turks  for  not  sur- 
rendering to  them  as  the  strongest  of  the  allies.  Regard- 
ing themselves  as  the  natural  reversionaries  of  Mace- 
donia, they  claimed  Salonica  as  a  necessary  appendage 
to  its  hinterland.  But  the  fortune  of  war  had  given 
priority  to  a  nation  whose  acquisitiveness  throws  even 
that  of  the  Bulgars  into  the  shade,  and  as  the  two  momen- 
tary allies  had  embarked  upon  the  war  without  any 
agreement  with  regard  to  sharing  the  spoils,  the  Greeks 
were  fully  within  their  rights  in  acting  upon  the  motto 
"  ]'y  suis,  j'y  reste." 

The  Greeks,  having  thus  accomplished  their  main 
object,  at  once  offered  to  send  four  divisions  to  the  aid 
of  the  Bulgarians  in  Thrace  :  but  the  offer  was  not 
unnaturally  declined,  from  the  fear  lest  it  might  provide 
Greece  with  an  opportunity  of  pegging  out  a  further 
claim  in  what  Bulgaria  regarded  as  her  exclusive  sphere 
of  influence.  Greek  transports  were  supplied  for  the 
conveyance  of  13,000  Bulgarian  troops  from  Salonica  to 


200    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Dedeagac ;  but  under  the  circumstances  no  credit  accrues 
to  the  Greeks  for  this  service,  since  they  were  thereby 
ridding  themselves  of  a  dangerous  rival. 

After  the  battle  of  Serfidje  one  section  of  the  beaten 
Turkish  army  had  retreated  in  the  direction  of  Fiorina 
and  Monastir.  Tahsim  Pasha's  troops  being  utterly 
demoralised  and  no  longer  capable  of  taking  the  offen- 
sive, the  Greeks  ought,  from  a  purely  strategic  point  of 
view,  to  have  concentrated  against  the  western  Turkish 
column  and  driven  it  back  upon  Monastir,  thus  opening 
the  way  for  active  co-operation  with  the  Serbs  and  placing 
Zekki  Pasha  and  the  main  Turkish  army  between 
two  fires.  The  final  defeat  of  Zekki  would  at  once  render 
hopeless  all  further  resistance  on  the  part  of  Tahsim. 
But  political  considerations  were  for  the  moment  more 
urgent  than  reasons  of  strategy,  and  the  Crown  Prince 
decided  to  make  sure  of  Salonica  before  all  else.  Hence 
the  column  dispatched  northwards  from  Serfidje  towards 
the  Lake  of  Ostrovo  only  consisted  of  11,000  men,  under 
Colonel  Matthiopoulos.  On  29th  October  this  little 
army  met  with  unexpected  resistance  at  the  village  of 
Nalbandkoj,  but  drove  back  the  Turks,  who  were  still 
inferior  in  numbers,  with  a  loss  of  over  1,000  men  and 
4  guns.  On  1st  November  the  Greeks  occupied  the 
passes  and  village  of  Banica  almost  unopposed,  and  the 
road  to  Monastir  already  seemed  open,  when  the  tables 
were  turned  with  dramatic  suddenness.  Djavid  Pasha, 
though  not  allowed  to  carry  out  his  plan  of  campaign  in 
its  entirety,  hastened  southwards  with  greatly  superior 
forces,  and,  fiercely  attacking  the  Greeks  at  Banica,  drove 
them  back  upon  Sorovic  with  the  loss  of  500  men  and 
12  guns  (2nd  November).  Here  fighting  was  resumed 
on  the  two  following  days,  but  the  Greeks,  though  hard 
pressed  by  a  flanking  movement  of  the  Young  Turk 
leader  Niazi  Bey,  were  able  to  hold  their  own  in 
entrenched    positions.      Djavid    Pasha's    initiative   was 


THE  TURCO-BALKAN  WAR  201 

thus  brought  to  a  standstill,  and  the  threatened  Serb 
advance  from  the  north  forced  him  to  return,  with  most 
of  his  troops,  to  Monastir.  But  the  Greek  advance  had 
been  effectually  checked,  and  Turkish  and  Albanian 
bands  wreaked  their  vengeance  upon  the  Greek  and 
Vlach  peasantry  in  the  mountainous  district  lying  to 
the  west  of  the  Greek  occupation.1  It  is  only  fair  to  add 
that  the  behaviour  of  the  Turkish  troops,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  irregular  forces  employed,  appears  to 
have  been  exemplary  throughout  the  war. 

On  14th  November  Crown  Prince  Constantine  left 
Salonica  at  the  head  of  four  divisions,  and  advanced  by 
forced  marches.  After  several  sharp  skirmishes  with 
the  Turks  near  the  Lake  of  Ostrovo  (i7th-i8th  Novem- 
ber), Banica  was  reoccupied  by  the  Greeks,  and  on  20th 
November  the  allied  Greek  and  Serb  forces  met  at 
Fiorina.  But  despite  every  effort  the  Greeks  arrived  two 
days  too  late ;  for  after  his  defeat  at  Monastir  Zekki 
Pasha,  with  15,000  men,  had  effected  his  escape  through 
Fiorina  in  a  south-westerly  direction.  On  21st  Novem- 
ber the  pursuing  Greeks  fought  a  rearguard  action  with 
him  at  Pissoderi,  but  failed  to  bring  him  to  a  halt ;  and 
he  eventually  made  his  way  to  Janina,  thus  greatly 
strengthening  the  garrison's  powers  of  resistance. 
Zekki's  escape  reflects  no  discredit  upon  the  Greeks,  for 
the  consequences  fell  not  upon  their  allies,  but  upon 
themselves  alone,  and  subsequent  events  have  proved 
that  they  would  have  paid  for  a  too  rapid  concentration 
against  Monastir  by  the  loss  of  Salonica  to  the  Bulga- 
rians. 

Parallel  with  the  main  advance  from  the  Thessalian 
frontier,  General  Sapundzakis  had  invaded  Epirus  with 
10,000  regular  troops  and  numerous  bands.  Advancing 
slowly  from  the  south,  he  had  a  violent  encounter  with 
the  Turks  under  Essad  Pasha  at  Gribovo  (24th  October) 

1  Especially  below  Kastoria  and  Grevena. 


202    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

and  drove  them  back  upon  Janina.  Prevesa  fell  on  ist 
November,  but  the  Greeks  were  not  strong  enough  for 
further  offensive  action  until  a  fresh  detachment  of  4,000 
men,  crossing  the  passes  of  the  Pindus,  occupied 
Metsovon  (14th  November)  and  thus  began  to  turn  the 
Turkish  flank.  By  25th  November  Janina  was  invested 
from  three  sides,  but  the  great  natural  strength  of  its 
position  and  the  inferior  forces  at  the  command  of  the 
Greeks  made  it  impossible  for  them  to  complete  the  circle 
on  the  northern  side.  Thus  the  way  was  open  to  Zekki 
Pasha,  whose  arrival  with  15,000  fresh  troops  placed  the 
Turks  in  a  position  of  marked  superiority,1  and  destroyed 
all  hope  of  capturing  the  town  until  the  arrival  of  con- 
siderable reinforcements.  It  was  above  all  this  consider- 
ation which  led  Greece  to  decline  the  armistice  now  about 
to  be  concluded  by  her  three  allies,  and  to  continue  with 
renewed  vigour  the  campaign  in  Epirus. 

Though  the  land  forces  of  Greece  did  not,  as  we  have 
seen,  exercise  any  decisive  influence  upon  the  early 
course  of  the  war,  the  strategic  importance  of  the  Greek 
navy  cannot  easily  be  exaggerated.  Such  naval  engage- 
ments as  took  place2  were  not  of  a  very  serious  character, 
though  the  Greek  sailors  showed  great  gallantry.  But 
the  essential  fact  remains  that  the  Greeks  were  able  to 
retain  the  mastery  of  the  ^Egean  and  thus  to  prevent  the 
possibility  of  Turkish  reinforcements  being  sent  by  sea 
to  the  western  area.  The  tortuous  Dedeagac-Salonica 
railway  was  thus  the  only  available  connection  with 
Macedonia,  and  as  this  not  merely  proved  to  be  quite 
unequal  to  the  severe  strain  put  upon  it,  but  was  much 

1  Probably  not  fewer  than  36,000,  including  7,000  to  8,000 
Albanians.  The  Greeks  only  had  24,000  men,  exclusive  of  bands. 
Cf.  Immanuel,   II.,  p.   100-2. 

3  A  useful  account  will  be  found  in  Cassavetti,  Hellas  and  the 
Balkan  Wars ;  those  who  wish  to  study  the  naval  operations  in 
detail,  may  be  referred  to  Hans  Rohde,  Die  Ereignisse  zur  See 
und  das  Ziisammenwirken  von  Heer  und  Flotte  im  Balkankrieg." 


THE  TURCO  BALKAN  WAR  203 

exposed  to  raids  from  the  north,  Macedonia  was  almost 
from  the  first  isolated  and  left  to  its  own  resources.  It 
must,  however,  be  remembered  that  the  Greek  command 
of  the  sea  was  hardly  less  serviceable  to  Bulgaria  than 
to  Greece  and  Serbia;  for  it  prevented  the  Turks  from 
shipping  their  troops  from  Smyrna  to  Dedeagac  and 
Gallipoli  as  well  as  to  Salonika,  and  thus  limited  them 
to  the  devious  course  of  the  Anatolian  railway.  A  refer- 
ence to  the  map  of  Asia  Minor  will  render  superfluous 
any  commentary  upon  this  fact.  During  the  decisive 
weeks  of  the  war  all  reinforcements  for  Thrace  had  to 
pass  through  the  capital,  and  the  flagrant  disorganisa- 
tion of  the  Turkish  railway  system  effectually  prevented 
the  transport  of  large  masses  of  troops  to  the  front. 
Command  of  the  sea  would  have  solved  the  whole 
problem  of  transport.  To  take  only  two  instances,  the 
Bulgarian  right  wing,  which  decided  the  issue  of  the 
battle  of  Liile  Burgas,  could  not  have  acted  as  it  did 
if  Dedeagac  and  Enos  had  been  available  for  the  land- 
ing of  Turkish  reinforcements,  while  in  the  second  stage 
of  the  war  the  Bulgarian  operations  against  Bulair  could 
never  even  have  been  attempted,  if  the  Gulf  of  Xeres  had 
been  accessible  to  the  Turkish  fleet.  Seldom  in  history 
has  there  been  so  striking  an  object-lesson  of  the  value  of 
sea-power,  and  when  we  consider  the  very  inadequate 
equipment  of  the  Greek  fleet,  the  far-reaching  conse- 
quences of  its  superiority  seem  all  the  more  remarkable. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  SECOND  PHASE  OF  THE  WAR 

On  4th  December,  191 2,  the  armistice  came  into  force 
between  Turkey  on  the  one  hand  and  Bulgaria,  Serbia, 
and  Montenegro  on  the  other.  Outside  Skutari,  however, 
hostilities  did  not  cease,  since  the  Turkish  commander 
refused  to  be  bound  by  an  arrangement  of  which  he  had 
no  official  intimation  from  headquarters.  Meanwhile 
Greece  declined  to  accept  the  armistice  and  continued 
the  war.  This  decision  was  prompted  by  her  obvious 
desire  to  reduce  Janina  and  to  complete  her  occupation 
of  the  JEgean  islands.  But  it  is  possible  that  there  were 
other  contributory  motives,  and  that  Greece  was  secretly 
encouraged  by  her  allies  in  a  step  which  would  effectu- 
ally prevent  the  Turks  from  moving  up  fresh  troops  by 
sea. 

On  the  Turkish  side,  the  armistice  gave  the  authori- 
ties a  welcome  opportunity  of  strengthening  still  further 
the  lines  of  Tchataldja,  stamping  out  the  cholera,  restor- 
ing discipline  to  the  army,  and  augmenting  it  by 
Asiatic  levies.  The  Fabian  tactics  so  dear  to  Turkish 
diplomacy  might  be  employed  with  the  reasonable  hope 
that  international  complications  would  enable  the  Porte 
to  extricate  itself  from  an  otherwise  hopeless  situation. 
Meanwhile  the  Bulgarians  were  far  nearer  the  end  of 
their  resources  than  they  cared  to  admit ;  the  exhaustion 
following  upon  heavy  losses  had  been  increased  by  a 
serious  outbreak   of   cholera.      They   had   reached   the 


THE   SECOND  PHASE   OF  THE  WAR         205 

utmost  limit  of  territorial  expansion  and  might  reason- 
ably hope  to  reduce  Adrianople  without  a  costly  assault. 
The  Serbs,  for  their  part,  had  achieved  complete  success 
and  had  nothing  further  left  to  fight  for;  while  the 
Montenegrins  looked  to  the  Great  Powers  to  secure  for 
them  what  they  had  failed  to  win  by  force  of  arms. 

The  conditions  of  the  truce  fall  under  three  main  heads. 
The  armies  were  to  remain  in  their  positions;  the 
besieged  towns  were  not  to  be  revictualled;  and  the  terms 
of  peace  were  referred  to  a  Conference  in  London.  On 
1 6th  December  the  delegates  of  the  five  States  met  at 
St.  James's  Palace,  Turkey  being  represented  by  Mustafa 
Reshid  Pasha,  a  former  Ambassador  in  Rome  and 
Vienna,  and  Osman  Nizami  Pasha,  the  acting  Ambassa- 
dor in  Berlin ;  Bulgaria  by  the  President  of  the  Sobranje 
Dr.  Danev,  General  Paprikov,  and  the  Minister  in 
London,  M.  Madjarov ;  Serbia  by  the  historian  and 
former  Premier  Dr.  Novakovic,  the  President  of  the 
Skupstina  M.  Nikolic,  and  the  Minister  in  Paris,  M. 
Vesnic;  Greece  by  her  distinguished  Premier  Mr. 
Venizelos,  and  the  Greek  Ministers  in  London  and 
Vienna,  MM.  Gennadius  and  Streit;  Montenegro  by  the 
ex-Premier  Mr.  Miuskovic  and  the  Croat  historian  Count 
Lujo  Vojnovic.  No  such  representative  meeting  of 
Balkan  statesmen  had  taken  place  since  the  Christian 
states  of  the  peninsula  first  came  into  being. 

The  allies  at  once  laid  claim  to  the  whole  of  European 
Turkey,  except  the  Dardanelles  and  the  immediate 
neighbourhood  of  Constantinople,  Bulgaria  in  particular 
insisting  upon  access  to  the  Sea  of  Marmora  at  Rodosto. 
The  Turks  met  these  uncompromising  demands  with 
delay  and  prevarication  and  relied  upon  the  support  of 
the  Great  Powers  in  a  matter  which  affected  the  delicate 
question  of  the  Straits.  The  persistence  with  which 
the  Roumanian  Government  urged  upon  Bulgaria  its 
claim      for      territorial      compensation      still       further 


206     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

strengthened  the  Turks  in  their  non  possumus 
attitude.  The  meetings  of  the  conference  soon 
became  a  mere  formality,  while  the  real  negotiations 
took  the  shape  of  elaborate  intrigues  behind  the  scenes. 
At  length,  when  a  month  had  been  wasted  in 
truly  Byzantine  methods  of  diplomacy,  the  Great 
Powers,  showing  quite  unexpected  unanimity,  pre- 
sented a  Joint  Note  to  the  Porte  (18th  January,  1913) 
advising  the  cession  of  Adrianople  to  Bulgaria,  and 
adding  the  outspoken  warning  that  a  resumption  of  the 
war  might  involve  the  loss  of  Constantinople  itself.  The 
bitter  pill  thus  offered  to  the  Turks  was  gilded  by  the 
somewhat  equivocal  promise  to  reserve  the  questions  of 
the  JEgean  islands  and  of  a  war  indemnity  for  the  deci- 
sion of  the  European  Concert,  and  considerable  loans 
were  held  in  prospect,  should  Turkey  show  herself  amen- 
able to  reason.  The  veteran  Grand  Vizier,  Kiamil 
Pasha,  unable  of  himself  to  assume  so  grave  a  responsi- 
bility, laid  the  proposals  of  the  Powers  before  a  specially 
convoked  Council  of  Notables,  which,  in  sanctioning 
compliance,  implicitly  recognised  Europe's  right  of 
mediation  between  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  League  (22nd 
January).  But  this  complete  surrender  roused  the  Chau- 
vinist forces  of  the  Turkish  capital  to  a  final  effort,  and 
on  the  following  day  the  Young  Turk  leader,  Enver  Bey, 
and  his  adherents  forced  their  way  into  the  presence  of 
the  Cabinet,  dictated  to  Kiamil  his  resignation,  and  shot 
down  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Nazim  Pasha,  in  the 
ante-room.  This  murder,  like  that  of  the  Mexican 
President,  Madero,  a  few  months  later,  was  lightly 
passed  off  as  a  regrettable  misunderstanding,  and  the 
spoils  of  power  were  once  more  in  the  hands  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Union  and  Progress.  But  though  the  new 
Cabinet  raised  the  cry  that  the  national  honour  was  in 
danger  and  that  Adrianople  must  be  held  to  the  bitter 
end,  there  is  good   reason  to  suspect  that    motives    of 


THE    SECOND   PHASE   OF  THE   WAR         207 

personal  ambition  were  the  dominant  factor  in  the  revo- 
lution. No  one  was  better  aware  than  Mahmud  Shevket 
Pasha,  the  new  Vizier,  of  the  hopelessness  of  further 
aggressive  action ;  and  though  repudiating  his  prede- 
cessor's answer  to  the  Powers,  his  Government  only  five 
days  later  put  forward  the  relatively  moderate  proposal 
that  the  river  Marica  should  form  the  new  frontier.  In 
view  of  the  united  front  presented  by  the  Great  Powers, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Turks  would  soon  have 
made  further  concessions  and  that  a  renewal  of  the  war 
might  have  been  avoided.  Unfortunately,  the  Balkan 
delegates  in  London  took  the  protestations  of  the  Young 
Turks  at  their  face  value,  and  immediately  broke  off  the 
negotiations  (28th  January).  This  result  was  due,  above 
all,  to  the  arrogance  of  the  Bulgarian  delegates,  who,  not 
content  with  displaying  an  absolute  rigidity  in  their 
dealings  with  the  Turks,  intrigued  with  Austria-Hun- 
gary behind  the  backs  of  their  Serbian  colleagues  and 
steadily  repelled  all  the  overtures  of  the  Greek  Premier 
in  favour  of  the  amicable  discussion  of  disputed  points 
between  Greece  and  Bulgaria. 

On  3rd  February  hostilities  were  resumed,  but  their 
character  was  widely  different  from  that  of  the  war  in 
its  earlier  stages.  Rapid  advance  and  fiery  onslaught 
were,  except  on  rare  occasions,  replaced  by  slow  and 
deliberate  move  and  counter-move.  The  only  hope  of 
the  Turks  lay  in  assuming  the  offensive,  but  such  a  task 
was  altogether  beyond  their  powers,  despite  all  the 
improvements  which  had  been  effected  during  the  seven 
weeks'  truce.  The  cholera  had  been  stamped  out,  the  com- 
missariat reorganised,  discipline  restored,  and  new  troops 
assembled ;  but  the  spirit  of  initiative,  the  soul  of  the 
army,  was  lacking.  On  the  Bulgarian  side  all  idea  of 
occupying  Constantinople  had  been  finally  abandoned, 
and  every  effort  was  concentrated  upon  the  reduction  of 
Adrianople.     The  First  and  Third  Armies,  amounting 


208     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

to  132,000  men,  were  still  left  outside  Tchataldja,  but  in 
order  to  avoid  needless  skirmishes  and  bloodshed,  were 
withdrawn  before  the  middle  of  February  to  a  strong 
position  on  the  Ergene,  from  whence  any  fresh  move- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  Turks  could  be  at  once  observed 
and  checked. 

The  Turks,  recognising  that  an  advance  from  Tcha- 
taldja could  only  end  in  failure,  conceived  the  idea  of 
moving  upon  Adrianople  from  the  Dardanelles,  and  for 
this  purpose  began  to  strengthen  their  forces  on  the 
isthmus  of  Gallipoli.  Shortly  before  the  conclusion  of 
the  armistice  the  Bulgarians,  foreseeing  the  possibility 
of  such  a  move,  had  pushed  the  Fourth  Army,  under 
General  Kovacev,  southwards  from  Dimotika  towards 
Bulair.  On  the  resumption  of  hostilities  Bulair  at  once 
became  the  centre  of  sharp  fighting  (4th-7th  February). 
The  Turks,  under  the  command  of  Hurshid  Pasha  and 
his  chief  of  staff,  Enver  Bey,  laid  their  plans  for  a  general 
attack  from  the  isthmus,  to  be  supported  by  a  landing  of 
the  Tenth  Army  Corps  in  the  rear  of  the  Bulgarian  posi- 
tion, under  cover  of  the  fleet.  The  battle  began  in 
earnest  on  8th  February,  but  as  both  the  Turkish  wings, 
advancing  from  Gallipoli,  received  a  very  decided  check, 
their  co-operation  with  Hurshid  Pasha  completely  broke 
down,  and  those  troops  which  had  already  landed  had  to 
be  hastily  re-embarked  and  withdrawn  to  Gallipoli. 
Severe  weather  put  an  end  to  further  action,  and  the  last 
danger  of  a  serious  Turkish  initiative  vanished.  Coast 
batteries  were  erected  by  the  Bulgarians  to  prevent  any 
further  landing.  The  battle  of  Bulair  proved  that  the 
Bulgarians  had  lost  none  of  their  original  valour  and 
endurance,  and  definitely  sealed  the  fate  of  Adrianople. 
As  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war,  false  reports  were 
spread  abroad  regarding  the  aims  and  intentions  of  the 
Bulgarians,  and  Western  public  opinion  seriously 
credited  them  with  the  design  of  seizing  the  Dardanelles 


THE   SECOND   PHASE  OF   THE  WAR  209 

for  themselves  and  admitting  the  Greek  fleet  into  the 
Sea  of  Marmora.  In  reality  their  sole  aim  was  to  hold 
back  the  Turks  from  the  beleaguered  city,  and  when  this 
object  had  once  been  attained,  fighting  virtually  ceased 
outside  Bulair,  as  outside  Tchataldja. 

Meanwhile  the  siege  of  Adrianople  was  resumed  with 
fresh  vigour,  but  Shukri  Pasha  had  employed  the  period 
of  the  armistice  in  strengthening  his  defences  and  in 
erecting  an  elaborate  system  of  wire  entanglements.  The 
city's  food  supply  was  quite  adequate.  The  besieging 
army,  under  General  Ivanov,  consisted  of  60,000  Bulga- 
rians and  47,000  Serbs,  while  the  garrison  did  not  greatly 
exceed  40,000  men.  The  Bulgarians,  however,  were 
handicapped  by  the  lack  of  heavy  siege  guns,  and  it  was 
not  until  the  arrival  of  the  Serb  siege  train,  consisting 
of  38  guns  (12  and  15  centimetre)  on  14th  February  that 
the  bombardment  could  be  entirely  effective.  Moreover, 
operations  were  hampered  by  terrible  snowstorms  during 
the  second  half  of  February ;  and  the  troops  suffered 
severely  from  lack  of  shelter,  from  bad  water,  and  even 
from  a  partial  breakdown  of  the  commissariat.  On  nth 
February  the  rations  of  the  Bulgarian  troops  were  re- 
duced from  300  to  150  grammes;1  and  this  doubtless 
accounts  both  for  General  Ivanov's  refusal  to  admit  cor- 
respondents to  the  lines  and  also  for  the  circumstance  that 
his  Serb  allies  were  left  to  provide  their  own  supplies  from 
distant  Serbia.  Privation  bred  disease,  and  the  Bulgarians 
lost  heavily  from  dysentery,  typhus,  and  even  cholera. 

From  the  end  of  February  the  exposed  sectors  of  the 
fortress,  especially  those  on  the  north-east  and  east,  were 
repeatedly  bombarded,  and  the  besiegers  crept  steadily 
nearer.  At  length,  on  24th  March,  the  order  was  given 
for  a  general  assault,  and  after  an  artillery  duel  lasting 
eight  hours  several  of  the  advanced  positions  were 
stormed  at  dead  of  night  by  the  Bulgarians,  who  in  some 

1  Cf.   Barby,  p.   224. 

P 


210     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

cases  got  within  100  yards  unchallenged.  Once  more 
they  displayed  their  prowess  with  the  bayonet,  and  under 
cover  of  a  thick  fog  were  able  to  move  their  artillery 
into  the  captured  positions.  Meanwhile  the  garrison 
held  its  own  against  the  Serbs  and  Bulgars  in  the  west 
and  south ;  but  on  the  north-west  the  First  Timok  Divi- 
sion of  the  Serbs  stormed  the  forts  and  repelled  a  strong 
counter-attack,  though  supported  by  nothing  more  than 
field  artillery.  On  the  following  night  (25th-26th 
March)  the  assault  was  resumed  with  even  greater  suc- 
cess; the  Turkish  resistance  was  broken,  and  an  entrance 
was  effected  almost  simultaneously  by  the  Bulgarians  on 
the  east  and  south  and  by  the  Serbs  on  the  west.  Shiikri 
Pasha,  with  12  Pashas,  1000  officers,  38,500  men,  and 
600  guns,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  allies.  On  examina- 
tion it  transpired  that  the  much-vaunted  fortifications  of 
Adrianople  fell  far  short  of  modern  scientific  require- 
ments, and  that  an  assault  might  have  been  hazarded 
three  months  earlier  with  reasonable  prospects  of  suc- 
cess. While  the  Turkish  resistance  cannot  be  compared 
to  that  offered  by  Osman  Pasha  at  Plevna,  it  worthily 
vindicated  the  honour  of  the  Turkish  army  and  earned 
for  Shiikri  the  coveted  epithet  of  "  Ghazi." 

Unhappily,  this  splendid  victory  was  marred  by  an 
undignified  dispute  between  the  allies,  each  claiming  the 
distinction  of  having  captured  the  Turkish  Commander- 
in-Chief.  It  is  not  easy  to  reconcile  the  rival  versions  of 
this  affair,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  good  faith 
of  all  parties  concerned.  In  the  absence  of  detailed  infor- 
mation, we  are  limited  to  the  following  facts: — that  the 
Bulgarian  Colonel  Markolev  accepted  Shiikri  Pasha's 
Parole  about  10  a.m.  on  26th  March,  but  subsequently 
withdrew  and  left  him  unguarded ;  that  at  1  p.m.  the  20th 
Serb  Regiment,  on  entering  Fort  Haderluk,  found 
Shiikri  Pasha,  attended  by  2  generals  and  216  officers, 
but  not  a  single  Bulgarian  soldier;  that  its  commander, 


THE   SECOND   PHASE   OF   THE   WAR  211 

Colonel  Gavrilovic,  in  his  turn,  accepted  Shukri's  sur- 
render; and  that  an  official  written  receipt  was  given  by 
General  Ivanov  to  his  Serb  colleague,  General  Stepano- 
vic,  when  Shukri  Pasha  was  handed  over  to  the 
Bulgarians  next  day.1 

It  would  have  been  well  to  draw  a  veil  over  this 
quarrel  but  for  the  light  which  it  throws  upon  the  psy- 
chology of  the  two  allied  peoples  during  the  second  war. 
The  cordial  telegram  of  Ivanov  : — "  This  work  will  show 
the  enemies  of  the  Slavs  what  a  sincere  alliance  and 
union  among  them  can  accomplish" — was  soon  to  re- 
ceive a  melancholy  commentary ;  for  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  five  months  of  co-operation  outside 
Adrianople,  instead  of  cementing  the  alliance,  actually 
increased  the  estrangement  which  political  differences 
were  evoking.  The  Bulgar  combines  with  many  admir- 
able qualities  an  extreme  frugality  which  his  neighbours 
regard  as  niggardly  and  mean ;  his  immobile  and 
unadaptable  nature  betrays  him  into  an  arrogant 
self-confidence  which  distrusts  the  warnings  of  his 
friends  and  minimises  the  strength  of  his  opponents. 
The  faults  of  the  Serb  are  far  more  suggestive  of  the 
Celtic  temperament.  A  certain  lack  of  balance  leads 
him  into  alternate  extremes  of  self-depreciation  and 
megalomania.  Ever  the  plaything  of  sentiment,  he  is 
easily  roused  to  anger  and  as  easily  reconciled.  The 
Serb,  when  a  favour  is  asked  of  him,  is  too  proud  to 
exact  his  price;  the  Bulgar,  to  whom  an  offer  is  made, 
is  too  canny  to  refuse  it,  and  assuming  from  his  own 
experience  that  nothing  is  given  for  nothing,  is  only  too 
ready  to  exact  his  pound  of  flesh  and  haggle  with  his 
dearest  friend.  The  risk  of  a  misunderstanding  between 
two  such  different  natures  increased  in  proportion  to  the 
length    of    the    war.     The    Bulgarians,   belittling    the 

1  Cf.  Barby,  p.  249;  Balcanicus,  Serben  und  Bidgaren.  and 
General  Ivanov's   published  statement. 

P  2 


212     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

achievements  of  the  Serbs  in  Macedonia,  treated  their 
ready  assistance  before  Adrianople  as  a  matter  of  course 
and  nursed  a  grievance  against  the  Voivode  Putnik  for 
only  sending  two  instead  of  three  divisions.  This  army, 
which  Serbia  was  under  no  treaty  obligation  to  provide, 
was  not  merely  expected  to  supply  all  its  wants  from 
home,  but  was  charged  freight  for  all  that  it  transported 
on  the  Bulgarian  railways,  and  on  its  return  to  Serbia 
in  April,  1913,  a  bill  was  presented  by  Sofia  for  trans- 
port expenses.  Though  the  coinage  of  both  countries 
belongs  to  the  Latin  Union  and  the  credit  of  Belgrade 
was  no  worse  at  the  outbreak  of  war  than  that 
of  Sofia,  yet  the  Government  of  the  latter  im- 
posed an  agio  of  10  per  cent,  on  all  Serbian  money 
circulating  in  Bulgaria,  and  this  was  rigorously 
exacted  even  from  the  Serb  soldiers  outside  the 
besieged  city.  Not  content  with  charging  customs 
dues  on  the  Red  Cross  material  so  freely  supplied  by 
Russia  for  the  benefit  of  their  own  troops,  the  Bulgarians 
actually  refused  to  allow  the  remains  of  fallen  Serb  sol- 
diers to  be  sent  home  to  Serbia  until  the  representative 
of  the  dead  man  had  deposited  a  sum  of  200  francs  to 
defray  expenses.  The  indignant  resentment  on  the  part 
of  poor  Serbian  peasants  at  such  meanness  on  the  part 
of  their  "brothers"  can  easily  be  imagined.  After  the 
fall  of  Adrianople  the  Serbs  were  not  invited  to  share  in 
the  triumphal  entry,  and  on  their  homeward  passage 
through  Bulgaria  they  were  not  the  objects  of  a  single 
demonstration  of  friendship  or  gratitude.  When 
General  Stepanovic — himself  a  pronounced  Bulgaro- 
phile — passed  through  Sofia,  the  Bulgarian  authorities 
did  not  even  send  an  official  representative  to  greet  him 
at  the  station  !  The  effect  of  such  incidents  upon  the 
temper  of  the  Serbian  private  soldier  was  only  too 
apparent  when,  in  May,  1913,  I  visited  near  Kumanovo 
the  camps  of  some  regiments  which  had  then  recently 
returned  from  Adrianople. 


THE   SECOND   PHASE  OF  THE   WAR         213 

Epirus. 

For  very  obvious  reasons  Greece  had  declined  to  enter 
upon  the  armistice  with  her  three  allies,  and  during 
'December  and  January  proceeded  steadily  with  the  occu- 
pation of  the  ^gean  Islands.  On  2nd  January  the 
Turkish  garrison  of  Chios  surrendered,  and  soon  after- 
wards Lesbos  and  the  autonomous  island  of  Samos  fol- 
lowed their  example. 

In  Epirus  operations  moved  much  more  slowly.  The 
garrison  of  Janina,  as  reinforced  by  the  fragments  of 
the  Vardar  army,  was  numerically  much  superior  to  the 
Greek  forces,  and  held  one  of  the  strongest  natural  posi- 
tions in  the  peninsula.  Thus  no  real  aggression  was  pos- 
sible until  four  fresh  Greek  divisions  could  be  trans- 
ferred by  sea  to  Prevesa  and  Santi  Quaranta ;  and  it  was 
not  till  23rd  January  that  the  Crown  Prince  assumed 
command  before  Janina  and  organised  the  attack  with 
great  vigour.  The  bad  weather  which  prevailed  through- 
out February  gave  rise  to  further  delays ;  but  in  the  first 
week  of  March  a  heavy  bombardment  was  opened  on 
the  south  and  east,  while  the  Greek  left  stormed  several 
of  the  heights  commanding  the  western  portion  of  the 
town  (ist-5th  March).  A  fresh  assault  had  already  been 
ordered,  when  negotiations  were  opened  by  Essad  Pasha, 
and  on  6th  March  Janina  surrendered  unconditionally 
to  Crown  Prince  Constantine.  Hunger  and  lack  of 
ammunition  rendered  further  resistance  useless,  and  the 
Greek  losses  were  relatively  immaterial.  Nearly  23,000 
Turks  became  prisoners  of  war,  but  Essad  Pasha,  with 
at  least  7000  men,  took  advantage  of  the  interval  between 
the  opening  of  pourparlers  and  the  actual  surrender  to 
escape  northwards  into  Albania.1    The  capture  of  Janina 

1  He  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  well-known  Albanian  leader 
of  the  same  name,  who  succeeded  Hassan  Riza  in  the  command 
of  Skutari. 


2U     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

was  due  in  great  part  to  previous  neglect  of  its  fortifica- 
tions, the  indifferent  quality  of  its  garrison,  and  the  short- 
age of  supplies ;  but  this  in  no  way  detracts  from  the 
achievement  of  the  Greek  Crown  Prince,  who  finally  and 
completely  revindicated  his  military  reputation. 

Skutari. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  Turkish  commandant, 
Hassan  Riza,  declined  to  recognise  the  existence  of  the 
armistice,  under  the  pretext  of  having  received  no 
instructions  from  his  Government.  In  reality  his  object 
was  to  maintain  the  irregular  connection  with  the  north- 
ern Albanian  tribes,  to  which  he  owed  the  replenishing 
of  his  stores  and  ammunition ;  and  he  cleverly  reckoned 
that  the  continuance  of  hostilities  with  Montenegro 
would  increase  the  chances  of  European  intervention  in 
favour  of  Albania,  without  adding  materially  to  the  risk 
of  capture.  Thus  throughout  December  and  January 
there  were  repeated  encounters,  but  no  operations  on  a 
large  scale.  After  the  official  resumption  of  the  war  in 
February,  the  Montenegrins  strained  every  nerve  to  re- 
duce Skutari  to  submission,  and  King  Nicholas  appealed 
to  Serbia  for  help.  The.  Voivode  Putnik  placed  three 
divisions  and  some  heavy  guns  at  his  disposal,  and  on 
7th  February  a  general  assault  was  directed  by  the  two 
allies  against  the  main  positions  of  Tarabos  and  Brdica. 
But  once  more  the  garrison  held  its  own,  and  the  attack 
was  beaten  off  with  terribly  heavy  losses.  A  fresh  pause 
was  ordered,  while  further  Serbian  reinforcements  and 
siege  guns  were  shipped  from  Salonica  to  Medua  on 
Greek  transports;  but  early  in  March  the  Montenegrins 
resumed  the  bombardment.  With  every  fresh  delay  the 
political  difficulties  increased;  for  the  Great  Powers, 
yielding  to  the  importunity  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
Italy,  had  definitely  decided  upon  the  inclusion  of  Skutari 


THE   SECOND   PHASE   OF  THE   WAR         215 

in  the  new  Albanian  state,  and  Austrian  troops  were 
being  steadily  massed  along  the  Dalmatian  and  Bosnian 
frontiers,  with  a  view  to  enforcing  the  nominal  wishes 
of  Europe  upon  recalcitrant  Montenegro.  On  31st  March 
the  general  assault  was  resumed,  this  time  under  the 
supervision  of  the  Serbian  general  Bojevic,  but  again 
without  success.  At  this  stage  Hassan  Riza,  who  steadily 
declined  to  sanction  the  departure  of  the  civil  population, 
was  treacherously  murdered  by  an  Albanian ;  but  his 
successor,  Essad  Pasha,  in  answer  to  a  summons  of  the 
besiegers,  proclaimed  his  resolve  to  defend  the  town  till 
the  last  man  had  fallen.  Meanwhile  the  pressure  of  the 
Powers  assumed  a  new  form,  and  it  was  only  the 
unwearying  mediation  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  pre- 
vented the  keen  divergence  of  opinion  between  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburg  from  leading  to  an  open  rupture. 
Isolated  Austrian  intervention  could  only  be  averted  by 
the  clumsy  expedient  of  a  combined  naval  demonstra- 
tion. On  10th  April  there  opened  the  farcical  spectacle 
of  the  fleets  of  the  five  Great  Powers  (Russia  held  aloof) 
defying  a  persistent  scirocco  along  the  unfriendly  Monte- 
negrin coast,  in  order,  forsooth,  to  blockade  Antivari 
and  Dulcigno,  two  ports  whose  commercial  importance 
may  be  compared  to  that  of  Mallaig  or  Tobermory  ! 
From  his  mountain  eyrie  King  Nicholas  scoffed  at  the 
distant  fleet  and  declined  to  suspend  operations  against 
Skutari.  A  thick  veil  of  mystery  still  shrouds  the  sub- 
sequent proceedings ;  but  enough  has  transpired  to  show 
that  the  actual  combatants  were  mere  pawns  in  an  elabo- 
rate game  of  intrigue  between  Skutari,  Cetinje,  Belgrade, 
Constantinople,  Vienna,  and  Rome.  Vienna  had  been 
prepared  to  acquiesce  in  the  cession  of  Skutari  to  Mon- 
tenegro ;  but  the  price  demanded  was  nothing  less  than 
the  mountain  peak  of  Lovcen,  which  dominates  the  Aus- 
trian naval  base  in  the  Bocche  di  Cattaro.  It  is  just  pos- 
sible   that    King   Nicholas    might    have    thrown    poetic 


216     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

tradition  to  the  winds  and  ceded  a  position  upon  which 
the  defensibility  of  Cetinje  depends,  in  return  for  a  new 
and  far  better  situated  capital  at  Skutari.  The  hostility 
of  Italy  had  hitherto  been  regarded  as  the  chief  obstacle 
to  an  arrangement  which  would  have  rendered  Austria 
supreme  on  the  eastern  Adriatic;  but  this,  though  seri- 
ous, could  probably  have  been  overcome  by  concessions 
farther  down  the  coast.  The  decisive  factor  in  the  situa- 
tion was  the  attitude  of  Russia,  who  left  the  Ballplatz  in 
no  doubt  that  the  acquisition  of  Lovcen  by  Austria  would 
be  regarded  as  a  hostile  act.  Russian  public  opinion 
approved  of  this  attitude  as  the  defence  of  a  small  kins- 
man against  a  powerful  bully;  but  Austrian  statesmen, 
of  course,  treated  it  as  a  further  proof  that  the  Panslav 
designs  of  Russia  reach  far  beyond  the  Dardanelles  and 
include  even  the  Adriatic  within  their  aggressive  sphere. 
The  exact  date  of  this  veto  is  not  easily  determined;  but 
from  a  fact  within  the  knowledge  of  the  present  writer 
it  would  be  possible  to  infer  that  up  to  the  very  last 
moment  Austria  was  prepared  for  a  bargain.  Within 
a  week  of  the  actual  fall  of  Skutari  military  supplies, 
unshipped  from  Austrian  or  Hungarian  vessels,  were 
finding  their  way  from  southern  Dalmatia  to  Cetinje  ! 
This  involves  either  direct  connivance  on  the  part  of  the 
authorities  or  a  combination  of  treachery  and  corruption 
which  there  are  no  adequate  grounds  for  assuming. 

Meanwhile  the  Cabinet  of  Belgrade,  afraid  of 
jeopardising  the  result  of  previous  victories,  saw  itself 
obliged  to  yield  to  the  urgent  representations  of  Vienna 
and  to  order  the  withdrawal  of  the  Serbian  army  from 
before  Skutari.  But  here  again  the  facts  belied  appear- 
ances, and  though  General  Bojevic  countermanded  an 
assault  which  was  to  have  taken  place  within  three  hours 
of  the  actual  receipt  of  his  new  orders,  the  Serbian  artil- 
lery was  left  in  position  and  the  Serbian  troops  which 
now  began  to  re-embark  under  the  eyes  of  the  interna- 


THE   SECOND   PHASE   OF  THE  WAR         217 

tional  fleet  were  those  which  could  best  be  spared  from 
the  siege.     With  the  utmost  secrecy  negotiations  were 
opened  between  King  Nicholas  and  Essad  Pasha,  who 
conferred  with  some  high  Montenegrin  officers  regard- 
ing possible  terms  of  surrender.     Both   Belgrade  and 
Constantinople   had  a   hand   in   the  game,  and  a   plot 
of  truly   Oriental   ingenuity  was   concocted.     When  at 
the  critical  moment  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation  at 
Cetinje  got  wind  of  the  affair  and  dispatched  its  military 
attache    to    Cattaro    with    the    news,    the    Montenegrin 
Government  did  not  scruple  to  declare  the  frontier  closed 
and  to  delay  his  exit  by  rendering  the  only  road  impass- 
able for  motor  traffic.    On  23rd  April  Essad  Pasha  for- 
mally surrendered  Skutari  to  the  Montenegrins ;  the  gar- 
rison marched  out  with  the  honours  of  war,  carrying  with 
them  the  greater  part  of  their  military  stores.     As  in 
the  case  of  Djavid  Pasha  at  Berat  in  the  previous  Decem- 
ber,  the   presence  of  a   Turkish   general   and  army   in 
northern  Albania  deprived  the  interested  Powers  of  all 
excuse  for  armed   intervention.     Neither   Austria-Hun- 
gary nor  Italy  was  entitled  to  be  more  Turcophil  than 
the  Turks.     Essad  Pasha,  himself  a  powerful  Albanian 
feudal  chief,  returned  to  his  estates  at  Tirana,  a  pros- 
perous little  town  lying  to  the  east  of  Durazzo,  and  de- 
voted his    time  to  consolidating    his  influence    in    the 
northern  and  central  districts  and  intriguing  against  the 
phantom  Government  of  Valona.    There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  his  proclamation  as  King  of  Albania  was  seriously 
contemplated,  that  the  Governments  of  Cetinje  and  Bel- 
grade, realising  that  the  veto  of  the  Powers  upon  their 
own    territorial    designs   must    be    obeyed,   would    have 
welcomed  the  candidature  of  a  native  Moslem  chief  for 
the  new  throne,  and  that  the  scheme  was  secretly  aided 
and  abetted  from  Constantinople.     The  various  foreign 
candidates  would  thus  be  forestalled  and  Essad  Pasha 
would  obviously,  from  the  necessities  of  the  case,  be  a 


218     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

more  complaisant  neighbour  in  questions  of  frontier 
regulation.  The  numerous  cross-currents  which  contri- 
buted to  the  conception  and  failure  of  this  design  will 
perhaps  never  be  known,  but  it  may  confidently  be 
described  as  one  of  the  prettiest  intrigues  in  recent 
European  history. 

The  triumph  of  the  Montenegrins  was  short-lived.  In 
view  of  the  continued  insistence  of  the  Great  Powers, 
their  troops  were  withdrawn  from  Skutari  early  in  May, 
and  the  maintenance  of  order  was  assigned  to  detach- 
ments of  bluejackets  from  the  international  fleet,  under 
the  command  of  Admiral  Burney.  Meanwhile  the  Serbs 
had  evacuated  Durazzo  and  withdrawn  their  troops 
behind  the  artificial  frontier  laid  down  by  the  Ambas- 
sadors' Conference  in  London.  Only  in  the  wild  Ljuma 
district  between  Dibra  and  Prizren  did  they  still  main- 
tain advance  posts,  in  the  vain  hope  that  a  revision  of 
frontier  might  be  secured  in  accordance  with  the  natural 
geographical  boundaries.  The  final  withdrawal  of  the 
Serbs  in  the  autumn  of  1913,  at  the  peremptory  summons 
of  Austria-Hungary,  was  the  signal  for  a  formidable 
Albanian  raid  against  Dibra  and  Tetovo,  which  of 
course  in  its  turn  led  to  severe  reprisals  by  the  Serbs. 


The  fall  of  Skutari  was  the  last  incident  of  the  war. 
On  16th  April  the  armistice  had  been  renewed  between 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  and  it  was  soon  afterwards 
extended  to  the  three  other  combatants.  Peace  negotia- 
tions were  then  resumed  in  London,  but  progress  was 
as  slow  as  ever.  The  allies,  after  the  additional  sacri- 
fices of  the  past  three  months,  were  naturally  disinclined 
to  abate  any  of  their  original  demands,  while  the  suc- 
cessors of  Kiamil  Pasha  could  not  decently  sanction 
terms  which  a  short  time  before  had  formed  their  excuse 
for  a  revolution.  Moreover,  the  growing  dissensions 
among  the  allies  regarding   the  division   of  the  spoils 


THE   SECOND   PHASE   OF   THE   WAR  219 

encouraged  the  Turks  to  hope  for  complications  such 
as  might  assign  to  them  the  role  of  tertius  gaudens. 
Before  the  delegates  could  be  brought  to  business,  it  was 
necessary  for  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  abandon  for  once  his 
suave  reserve  and  bluntly  to  inform  them  that  unless 
they  were  prepared  to  conclude  peace  without  further 
delay,  they  had  better  leave  London  altogether.  This 
intimation,  combined  with  diplomatic  pressure  behind 
the  scenes,  at  last  produced  the  desired  effect,  and  on 
30th  May,  1 913,  the  Treaty  of  London  was  concluded 
between  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  League,  still  regarded 
as  a  unit.  Only  in  one  particular  did  its  terms  differ 
very  materially  from  those  accepted  by  Kiamil  Pasha. 
Bulgaria  renounced  her  claim  to  a  port  upon  the  Sea 
of  Marmora  and  contented  herself  with  a  frontier  run- 
ning from  Enos,  near  the  outlet  of  the  Marica  into  the 
yEgean,  to  Midia,  on  the  Black  Sea.  The  details  were 
to  be  settled  later  by  a  special  commission.  Crete  was 
definitely  ceded  to  the  allies,  but  the  future  status  of  the 
other  Turkish  islands  in  the  yEgean  and  of  the  penin- 
sula of  Mt.  Athos  was  left  to  the  decision  of  the  Powers, 
to  whom  also  was  assigned  the  task  of  prescribing  the 
frontiers  and  constitutional  position  of  the  new-born 
Albanian  state.  The  financial  questions  arising  from 
the  war,  notably  the  apportionment  of  liability  for  the 
Ottoman  Debt,  were  referred  to  a  special  conference  in 
Paris,  at  which  the  belligerent  states  and  the  Great 
Powers  were  all  to  be  represented.  Special  conventions 
were  to  regulate  the  exchange  of  prisoners  and  both  com- 
mercial and  religious  disputes  arising  out  of  the  war. 

From  the  very  first  the  Treaty  of  London  was  regarded 
as  a  mere  provisorium.  The  allies  had  shown  remark- 
able restraint  and  unity  of  purpose  during  the  long- 
campaign,  and  had  resolutely  postponed  their  internal 
jealousies  until  the  enemy  could  be  completely  crushed. 
But  this  very  postponement,   following  upon  the  terri- 


220     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

torial  surprises  of  November  and  December  and  the  long 
strain  of  the  spring,  had  crystallised  the  rival  claims, 
whetted  the  appetites  of  the  claimants  and  rendered 
mutual  concession  infinitely  more  difficult.  The  unex- 
pected creation  of  Albania  had  fatally  disturbed  the 
balance  upon  which  the  intended  partition  rested,  and 
vital  economic  interests  combined  with  reasons  of  race 
and  sentiment  to  stiffen  the  unyielding  attitude  of  the 
rivals  and  to  accentuate  the  mutual  charges  of  treachery 
and  intolerance.  This  must  form  the  subject  of  a  sub- 
sequent chapter ;  for  the  moment  it  only  remains  for  us 
to  direct  attention  to  some  of  the  underlying  factors 
of  a  war  which  revolutionised  South-Eastern  Europe 
and  directly  paved  the  way  to  the  far  greater  conflict 
of  1914. 

Many  causes  contributed  to  the  defeat  of  the  Turkish 
arms.  It  has  become  the  fashion  to  throw  all  the  blame 
upon  the  recklessness  and  Chauvinism  of  the  Young 
Turk  regime,  and  it  is  certainly  true  that  their  internal 
policy,  combined  with  weak  diplomacy,  brought  about  a 
political  conjuncture  more  unfavourable  to  the  Ottoman 
state  than  any  which  it  had  faced  for  generations.  Both 
good  and  bad  elements  in  the  new  regime  had  their 
share  in  this  result.  The  promises  of  universal  brother- 
hood which  were  so  liberally  made  after  the  Revolution 
of  1908  caused  serious  alarm  among  the  Christian  states 
of  the  peninsula,  and  for  a  time  seemed  seriously  to 
threaten  their  position  as  reversionary  legatees  to  the 
Sick  Man's  inheritance.  Their  selfish  political  interests 
ran  directly  counter  to  any  genuine  Turkish  revival, 
and  the  exiles  with  whom  thirty  years  of  Hamidian  mis- 
rule had  crowded  everv  Balkan  capital  set  their  whole 
propaganda  in  action  to  complicate  the  issue.  When 
all  too  soon  the  Committee's  liberal  promises  were 
superseded  by  a  policy  of  violent  Turkiflcation,  racial 
passions  were  revived  with  greater  intensity  than  ever, 


THE   SECOND   PHASE  OF   THE  WAR         221 

Balkan  public  opinion  clamoured  for  action  in  favour 
of  the  victims,  and  acute  friction  between  the  Christian 
states  and  Turkey  became  inevitable.  The  evil  influ- 
ences which  emanated  from  the  Salonican  lodges  and 
the  secret  international  forces  which  lurked  in  the  back- 
ground rapidly  overpowered  whatever  idealism  had  pos- 
sessed the  Turkish  reformers. 

If  from  the  political  side  the  Young  Turks  are 
unquestionably  responsible  for  the  debacle  of  1912,  the 
blame  from  a  military  point  of  view  must  rest  above  all 
with  the  Hamidian  regime.  The  late  Sultan  relied  less 
upon  the  force  of  arms  than  upon  his  own  mastery  of 
the  art  of  diplomacy  and  upon  the  prestige  of  the 
Khalifate ;  and  the  splendid  army  which  he  had  received 
from  his  brother,  defeated  but  crowned  with  the  laurels 
of  Plevna,  was  ruined  by  thirty  years  of  inaction  and 
inquisition.  The  system  of  espionage  which  Abdul 
Hamid  introduced  into  all  branches  of  the  public  service 
exercised  its  corroding  influence  upon  both  officers  and 
men.  To  such  lengths  was  it  carried  that  officers  dared 
not  meet  together,  whether  for  study  or  pleasure;  that 
army  manoeuvres  were  abandoned  for  a  whole  genera- 
tion ;  that  military  science  and  rifle  practice  alike  were 
neglected;  that  the  men's  training  was  confined  to  the 
barrack  square  and  all  intercourse  between  officers  and 
men  virtually  ceased.1  When  the  Revolution  came,  the 
Turkish  army  had  to  be  recreated  from  the  very  founda- 
tions— a  labour  of  Hercules  which  required  ten  years  of 
peace.2  The  fatal  weakening  of  authority  which  resulted 
from  the  upheaval  of  1908  became  even  more  marked 
after  the  military  revolt  of  the  following  year.  A  whole 
generation  of  incompetent  officers  had  been  passed  over 
to  make  way  for  the  young  Committee  plotters,  and  the 

1  Von  der  Goltz,  Der  jungen  Ttirkei  Niederlage,  p.  9.  It 
was  exceptional  for  the  men  to  know  even  the  names  of  the  higher 
officers,  often  even  of  the  battalion  commanders. 

3  Ibid.,  p.   10. 


222     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

countless  feuds  and  intrigues  to  which  this  gave  rise 
were  multiplied  tenfold  by  the  arrogance  of  the  new- 
comers and  by  the  Court  favouritism  which  too  often 
determined  appointments  and  promotions.1  This,  in 
its  turn,  engendered  a  factious  spirit  within  the  ranks 
of  the  Committee,  and  neutralised  every  effort  of 
JMahmud  Shevket  Pasha  and  a  few  genuine  army  re- 
formers to  divert  all  energies  into  purely  military  chan- 
nels. Politics  and  doctrinaire  theories  played  havoc  in 
ground  already  poisoned  by  a  repudiation  of  the  tradi- 
tions and  tenets  of  Islam.  While  Mahmud  Shevket 
remained  at  the  War  Office,  much  was  done  to  repair 
the  errors  and  omissions  of  the  past.  New  instructors 
were  summoned  from  abroad,  large  sums  were  spent  on 
ammunition  and  equipments,  the  military  schools  were 
extended,  new  courses  of  training  were  opened  and 
manoeuvres  were  held  near  Adrianople  and  on  a  smaller 
scale  in  Macedonia.  But  the  need  for  repressing  the 
continual  revolts  which  broke  out  in  various  parts  of 
the  Empire — in  Arabia,  Syria,  Albania — and  the  further 
complications  caused  by  the  Tripolitan  War,  proved 
fatal  to  the  maintenance  of  a  steadfast  policy  at  the 
War  Office.  Continual  changes  were  made  to  meet  the 
demands  of  the  moment  and  reviving  efficiency  was 
undermined  once  more. 

The  famous  German  instructor,  Baron  von  der  Goltz 
Pasha,  sums  up  in  two  brief  sentences  the  prime  secret 
of  the  Turkish  defeat.  "  A  modern  army  of  a  million 
men  cannot  be  created  out  of  nothing  in  three  years." 
"Europe,  in  passing  sentence,  completely  overlooked 
the  fact  that  the  beaten  army  was  only  three  years  old."  2 

1  This  is  emphasised  by  von  der  Goltz,  ibid.,  p.   33. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  18  and  20.  I  leave  these  quotations  exactly  as  I 
wrote  them  down  in  April,  1914.  Every  reader  is  to-day  in  a 
position  to  judge  how  far  the  military  upheaval  of  the  last  two 
years  in  our  own  country  justifies  the  views  of  the  great  German 
strategist. 


THE    SECOND   PHASE   OF  THE   WAR         223 

The  administrative  chaos,  the  deterioration  of  the  offi- 
cers' corps,  the  loss  of  all  zeal  for  efficiency  as  an  end  in 
itself — all  this  could  not  fail  to  exercise  a  fatal  influence 
upon  the  Turkish  soldier,  whose  peculiar  psychology 
has  always  lain  at  the  root  of  Turkish  military  triumphs. 
The  new  catchword  of  a  constitution,  utterly  meaning- 
less to  the  Anatolian  or  Thracian  peasant,  effaced  the 
old  ideals — blind  faith  in  the  Padishah's  commands  and 
the  zest  of  fighting  against  the  unbeliever.  The  decay 
of  religious  sentiment,1  already  promoted  by  the  unortho- 
doxy  of  the  Young  Turk  officers,  was  still  further 
affected  by  the  admission  of  Christians  to  the  ranks. 
These  were,  of  course,  quite  unreliable  against  their 
Christian  kinsmen  and  generally  took  the  first  oppor- 
tunity to  desert.2 

Such,  briefly,  were  the  antecedents  of  the  beaten  army. 
The  more  immediate  causes  were  faulty  strategy  and 
overhaste,  a  tendency  to  undervalue  the  enemy,  the  lack 
of  good  officers,  and  a  complete  breakdown  of  the 
administration  and  the  commissariat.  Both  at  Kirk 
Kilisse  and  at  Liile  Burgas  many  of  the  troops  were 
without  food  for  forty-eight  hours,  or  even  longer ;  the 
stubbornness  of  their  resistance  under  such  conditions 
can  only  be  described  as  heroic.  There  were  no  field 
kitchens  or  bakeries,  a  hopeless  shortage  of  cloaks  and 
mantles,  no  proper  protection  against  cold  and  rain, 
hardly  any  doctors,  no  first-aid  appliances,  no  attempt 
at  sanitary  precautions,  no  water  fit  either  for  drinking 
or  for  washing  wounds,  very  often  even  a  lack  of  cart- 
ridges. The  railway  system  broke  down  under  the  strain, 
and  frequent  collisions  added  to  the  confusion  and  panic. 

1  Cf.  Sir  Edwin  Pears,  "'Turkey,  Present  and  Future"  (Con. 
temporary   Review,    June,    1913). 

1  Cf.  Noel  Buxton,  With  the  Bulgarian  Staff.  At  Liile  Bur- 
gas, however,  not  a  single  Christian  soldier  remained  on  the 
Turkish  side.     See  Mahmud  Mukhtar  Pasha,  op.  cit.,  p.   164. 


224     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

The    roads    were    appalling,    the    bridges    were    often 
impassable  or   non-existent.     The  field  telegraphs  and 
telephones  did   not  break  down,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  they  were  never  in  working  order.     The  telegraph 
clerks  could  not  always  be  relied  upon,  and  messages 
were  sometimes  transmitted   in   German,   because  spies 
were   suspected    among    them.       At    Kirk    Kilisse — in 
other  words  at  a  critical  point  in  the  scheme  of  defence 
adopted — the  earthworks  and  fortifications  designed  by 
the  German  advisers  of  the  Porte  seem  to  have  remained 
almost  entirely  on  paper,  and  the  defences  of  Salonica, 
Janina,   even   Adrianople,   had  suffered   from  a  similar 
neglect.     The  majority  of  the  Turkish  troops  who  first 
met  the   Bulgar  attack  were  not  regulars,  but    Redifs, 
wretchedly  equipped  and   undisciplined,   without  spirit 
or  initiative,  and  with  incompetent  officers  to  lead  them. 
Indeed,  many  of  the  men  did  not  even  know  how  to  load 
a  rifle  !     In  addition  to  all  these  fatal  errors  and  omis- 
sions, the  Turks,  in  defiance  of  the  good  advice  offered 
by   German    strategists,  adopted  a  plan    of    campaign 
which  was  neither  truly  aggressive  nor  truly  defensive, 
but  combined  the  defects  of  either  method.     In  short, 
the  leaders  were  at  variance  among  themselves,  and  the 
men  were  altogether  unequal  to  the  task  imposed  upon 
them.     In  the  words  of  one  of  their  ablest  generals,  the 
Turks    were,    above    all,    "the    victims    of    their    own 
mistakes."1 

All  this  may  seem  at  first  sight  to  belittle  the  achieve- 
ment of  Bulgaria,  and,  indeed,  it  does  detract  from  the 
absurdly  exaggerated  accounts  which  filled  the  Euro- 
pean Press.  Public  opinion,  which  before  the  war 
had  formed  far  too  high  an  estimate  of  the  Turkish 
army,  soon  atoned  for  this  error  by  a  corresponding 
overestimate  of  the  victorious  Bulgarians.  But  in  em- 
phasising the  absurdity  of  loose  talk  about  "the  new 

1  Mahmud  Mukhtar  Pasha,  op.  cit.,  p.   180. 


THE   SECOND   PHASE   OF   THE   WAR         225 

Napoleon"  and  the  "Japanese  of  the  West"  we  must 
not  be  accused  of  depreciating  the  splendid  qualities 
of  the  Bulgarian  army.  War  in  the  twentieth  century, 
as  in  all  past  history,  is  decided  by  two  main  factors — 
leadership  and  moral.  In  the  former  the  Bulgarians, 
without  displaying  any  real  military  genius,  showed 
themselves  markedly  superior  to  the  Turks.  But  it  is  in 
the  latter  respect  that  they  deserve  the  most  unstinted 
praise.  The  patriotic  fervour  which  inspired  the  whole 
nation  found  expression  in  countless  acts  of  self-sacrifice 
and  heroism,  and  imparted  to  the  somewhat  unemotional 
and  phlegmatic  Bulgarian  peasant  an  elan  which  in  the 
earlier  stages  of  the  war  was  almost  irresistible.  In 
feats  of  marching,  in  simple  and  uncomplaining  endur- 
ance of  fatigue,  exposure,  and  pain,  in  their  equally 
effective  use  of  the  bayonet  and  of  the  spade,  the  Bul- 
garians established  a  record  of  which  any  nation  might 
be  proud. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  course  of  the  war  revealed 
certain  grave  defects  on  the  part  of  the  Bulgarian  autho- 
rities. Their  sheer  disregard  for  human  life,  which 
explains  many  a  frontal  attack  that  could  easily  have 
been  avoided,  finds  its  most  striking  illustration  in  the 
almost  total  neglect  of  sanitary  arrangements.  While 
every  Serbian  soldier  carried  two  packets  of  first-aid 
appliances  and  knew  how  to  use  them  in  case  of  need, 
this  simple  measure  had  been  neglected  by  the  Bulga- 
rians, with  the  result  that  cases  of  mortification  and 
gangrene  were  about  four  times  as  numerous  among 
the  latter  as  among  their  allies.  The  strict  rules  of 
cleanliness  and  disinfecting  precautions  enforced  in  the 
Serbian  camps  before  Adrianople  account  for  the  fact 
that  their  casualties  were  not  merely  absolutely  but  also 
relatively  far  lower  than  those  of  the  Bulgarians. 
Neglect  soon  brought  its  own  punishment,  and  the 
disease  which  sapped  the  vigour  of  the  advancing  army 

Q 


226     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

may  be  regarded  as  the  main  reason  why  their  attack 
was  not  overwhelming. 

A  further  grave  error,  from  a  national  point  of  view, 
lay  in  their  absolute  refusal  to  differentiate.  In  a  citizen 
army  there  can  be  no  exemptions,  but  the  Bulgarian 
system  represents  democracy  run  wild.  Instead  of  em- 
ploying the  members  of  their  all  too  scanty  educated 
and  professional  class  upon  tasks  of  administration 
and  organisation  at  the  rear  of  the  army,  the  authorities 
allowed  them  to  follow  their  own  natural  inclination  and 
take  their  chance  at  the  front.  The  result  has  been  the 
decimation  of  the  elite  of  Bulgaria.  At  the  very  moment 
when  schoolmasters  and  trained  officials  are  needed  in 
greater  numbers  than  ever,  their  ranks  have  been  terribly 
thinned  by  war.  I  was  informed  from  a  reliable  source 
in  Sofia  that  the  first  war  cost  Bulgaria  no  fewer  than 
300  officials  in  the  judicial  branch  alone.  The  National 
Theatre  lost  its  two  leading  actors — a  terrible  blow  to  a 
country  whose  drama  is  still  in  its  infancy.  The  Serbs 
showed  greater  wisdom  in  this  respect,  and  I 
shall  long  remember  the  disgust  of  a  Serbian  poet, 
who,  instead  of  serving  in  the  fighting  line,  had  been 
entrusted  for  many  months  with  the  task  of  organising 
the  supplies  of  fodder  for  the  bullocks  on  which  the 
whole  transport  system  of  the  army  depended.  It  had 
not  occurred  to  him  to  write  an  ode  to  the  Balkan  ox, 
in  some  respects  the  true  hero  of  the  war  I1 

When  we  turn  from  a  comparison  of  Turk  and  Bulgar 
to  consider  the  relative  value  of  the  allies  themselves,  we 
at  once  find  ourselves  on  extremely  delicate  ground.  In 
the  foregoing  narrative  we  have  attempted  to  place  the 
various  incidents  of  the  war  in  their  true  perspective  and 
to   make   it  clear   that   public  opinion   in  the  West,   in 

1  If  these  remarks  were  true  when  written  in  the  spring  of 
1 014,  they  have  been  accentuated  tenfold  by  the  events  of  1914- 
1916. 


THE   SECOND   PHASE  OF  THE   WAR         227 

concentrating  its  attention  upon  Bulgaria  and  ignoring  or 
slurring  over  the  achievement  of  her  allies,  was  not  only 
guilty  of  an  injustice,  but  was  replacing  one  false  esti- 
mate by  another  and  rendering  itself  incapable  of  fore- 
casting the  outcome  of  the  second  war.  Several  causes 
contributed  to  this  mistake.  The  proximity  of  the 
Turkish  capital  invested  the  battlefields  of  Thrace  with 
a  special  interest  and  glamour  of  their  own.  The  ster- 
ling merits  of  Bulgaria  and  her  army  had  been  con- 
sistently advertised  for  many  years,  and  their  sudden 
victory  seemed  to  prove  all  that  had  been  asserted  in  their 
favour.  But,  above  all,  the  ill-repute  of  a  distant  past 
hung  over  the  Serbian  and  Greek  armies,  and  it  was 
rashly  assumed  that  nothing  had  changed  since  the 
defeat  of  Slivnica  in  1885  or  the  Thessalian  rout  of  1897. 
For  at  least  a  generation  past  it  has  been  the  custom  of 
the  Western  Press  to  report  nothing  from  Belgrade 
save  some  tit-bit  of  sensational  scandal,  nothing  from 
Athens  save  the  harmless  chronicle  of  the  Royal  family. 
The  revival  of  Serbia  had  remained  unnoticed,  and  the 
dark  shadow  of  the  regicide  obscured  the  country's  repu- 
tation abroad.  In  reality  great  changes  had  taken  place 
in  the  Serbian  army  in  the  years  preceding  the  war. 
Perhaps  in  no  other  country  are  the  relations  between 
officers  and  men  characterised  by  such  a  delightful 
blend  of  bonhomie  and  discipline;  and  competent  mili- 
tary critics  are  of  opinion  that  the  fighting  qualities  of 
the  Serb  soldier,  combining  alertness  and  intelligence 
with  fire  and  endurance,  make  him  the  equal  of  any 
soldier  in  Europe.1 

The  Greeks  had  a  much  easier  task  than  any  of  their 
allies,  but  this  fact  does  not  detract  from  what  was  in 
every  way  a  very  fine  performance  for  an  army  still  in 
the  course    of    radical    reorganisation.     Their   peculiar 

1  Here  again  the  Great  War  has  amply  vindicated  what  was 
written   before   its   outbreak. 

Q  2 


228     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

temperament  was  specially  favoured  by  the  initial  suc- 
cesses, and  in  dash  and  enterprise  they  were  unsurpassed 
throughout  the  war.  The  best  proof  of  the  extraordinary 
enthusiasm  which  prevailed  throughout  the  Greek  race 
is  the  fact  that  over  40,000  emigrants  returned  from 
America  and  other  parts  of  the  world  to  serve  against 
the  hereditary  enemy. 


A  few  words  must  be  devoted  to  the  vexed  question 
of  armaments.  In  certain  quarters  the  Turkish  debacle 
was  acclaimed  as  a  victory  of  Creusot  over  Krupp  and 
as  a  condemnation  of  the  German  instructors  of  the 
Turkish  army.  This  parrot  cry,  repeated  by  so  many 
superficial  journalists,  has  not  the  slightest  foundation 
in  real  fact.  The  fault  lay,  not  with  German  methods, 
but  with  those  who  neglected  to  translate  them  from 
theory  into  practice,1  not  with  German  guns,  but  with 
those  who  were  incapable  of  working  them.  A  saying 
ascribed  to  Marshal  von  der  Goltz  Pasha — that  Kirk 
Kilisse  could  hold  the  Prussian  army  at  bay  for  three 
months — was  skilfully  exploited  as  a  means  of  extolling 
the  Bulgarians,  who  occupied  it  on  the  sixth  day  of  the 
war;  but  nothing  was  said  of  those  premises  on  which 
his  remark  was  based,  and  in  the  absence  of  which  it 
simply  becomes  meaningless.  As  for  the  Krupp  guns, 
their  excellence  was  amply  demonstrated  at  Tchataldja, 
when  at  last  they  had  competent  gunners  behind  them  ; 
the  repulse  of  the  Bulgarians  was  due  above  all  to  the 
superiority  of  the  Turkish  artillery.2 

1  Cf.   Hochwaechter,   op.   cit.,  p.    121. 

-  Even  so  well-informed  a  correspondent  as  M.  Barby,  of  Le 
Journal,  who  remained  concealed  for  some  weeks  at  the  siege 
of  Adrianople  as  a  Serb  volunteer,  seems  to  be  firmly  persuaded  of 
the  myth  of  Krupp's  inferiority  and  to  have  been  encouraged  in 
this  by  Serbian  officers.  Personally,  I  had  opportunities  during 
May   and    June,    1913,   of   questioning  a   number  of   Serbian    line 


THE   SECOND    PHASE   OF   THE  WAR         229 

It  would  be  mere  audacity  on  my  part  to  draw  mili- 
tary lessons  from  the  Balkan  war.  But  one  fact  has 
emerged  with  absolute  certainty  and  cannot  be  empha- 
sised too  strongly — the  supreme  importance  of  psy- 
chology in  war.  Just  as  bravery  is  of  little  avail  without 
discipline  and  training,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  even  the 
highest  efficiency  depends  for  its  effect  upon  the  spirit 
of  the  troops.  It  was  their  superior  moral  and  national 
enthusiasm  that  carried  the  forces  of  the  allies  to 
victory.    The  Balkan  war  was  essentially  a  soldiers'  war. 

and  artillery  officers  (including  members  of  the  General  Staff)  on 
this  very  point ;  but  I  never  found  a  single  one  who  would  admit 
any  inferiority  on  the  part  of  Krupp.  My  own  opinion,  as  that 
of  a  civilian,  is,  of  course,  worthless  on  this  point.  But  the  reader 
may  be  referred  to  Major  Howell  (op.  cit.,  p.  162),  who  found 
among  the  Bulgarian  General  Staff  the  same  opinion  as  I  elicited 
from  their  Serbian  colleagues.  The  truth  is  that  the  products  of 
Creusot-Schneider  and  of  Krupp  both  belong  to  the  very  first 
class,  and  that  each  has  its  own  special  points  of  excellence. 


CHAPTER     XV 

THE     DISPUTE    AMONG     THE     ALLIES 

The  Treaty  of  London  was  from  the  very  first  re- 
garded as  a  temporary  makeshift.  For  the  moment 
Turkey  could  withdraw  into  the  background,  but  with 
the  scarcely  concealed  intention  of  assuming  the  role  of 
tertius  gaudens  in  the  approaching  conflict  between  the 
allies.  The  origin  of  this  conflict,  and  the  various  causes 
which  actuated  it,  must  form  the  subject  of  the  present 
chapter. 

History  offers  few  examples  of  a  military  campaign 
conducted  by  four  allies  in  a  spirit  of  such  loyal  and 
harmonious  co-operation  as  the  first  Balkan  war.  In 
the  period  preceding  the  first  armistice  the  only  apparent 
friction  was  that  which  characterised  the  race  for 
Salonica  and  the  partially  successful  effort  of  General 
Hasapcev  to  peg  out  a  Bulgarian  claim  in  the 
Macedonian  capital.  But  though  the  occupation  of  the 
city  was  marked  by  several  ominous  incidents,  an  open 
breach  was  averted  by  the  personal  influence  of  King 
George  and  King  Ferdinand;  and  European  public 
opinion,  which  still  nursed  the  happy  illusion  that 
Salonica  was  to  become  an  international  free  port,  over- 
looked for  a  time  amid  the  excitements  of  the  Prochaska 
affair,  the  dangers  involved  in  a  division  of  the  spoils. 

The  dispute  assumed  a  two-fold  form  :  on  the  one  hand 
Bulgaria's  claims  against  Serbia,  and  on  the  other  her 

230 


THE   DISPUTE  AMONG   THE   ALLIES         281 

claims  against  Greece.  From  a  legal  point  of  view  the 
former  were  infinitely  stronger  than  the  latter,  for  they 
were  based  upon  a  definite  treaty  of  partition.  By  it  all 
territories  occupied  by  the  allies  were  to  be  regarded 
as  a  condominium,  but  a  division  of  the  spoils  was  to 
take  place  within  three  months  of  the  final  conclusion 
of  peace,  in  accordance  with  a  very  clearly  defined  plan. 
The  two  contracting  states  recognised  all  the  territory 
east  of  the  river  Struma  as  within  the  Bulgarian,  all 
territory  north  and  west  of  the  Sar  Mountains  as  within 
the  Serbian,  sphere  of  interest.  The  remainder,  as  the 
wording  of  the  Agreement  clearly  implied,  was  expected 
to  form  an  autonomous  Macedonia ;  but  it  is  expressly 
laid  down  that  in  event  of  this  solution  proving  impos- 
sible, Serbia  shall  not  lay  claim  to  anything  situated 
beyond  a  line  drawn  from  a  point  on  the  Old  Turco- 
Bulgarian  frontier  near  Egri  Palanka  as  far  as  the  lake 
of  Ochrida.  The  adoption  of  this  line  as  the  new  frontier 
between  the  allies  would  have  involved  Serbia's  evacua- 
tion of  Ochrida,  Monastir,  Prilep,  Veles,  and  Stip,  but 
would  have  left  her  in  possession  of  Struga,  Tetovo, 
Skoplje  (Uskiib),  and  Kumanovo.  In  case  of  disagree- 
ment both  Governments  pledged  themselves  to  accept 
the  arbitration  of  the  Tsar.  By  the  secret  military  con- 
vention which  formed  a  natural  corollary  to  this  treaty 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia  undertook  to  place  in  the  field  a 
force  of  not  fewer  than  200,000  and  150,000  regular 
troops  respectively. 

A  whole  series  of  clauses  was  included  to  guard 
against  various  eventualities.  If  either  Roumania  or 
Turkey  should  attack  Bulgaria,  Serbia  was  bound  to 
send  100,000  men  to  the  latter's  assistance,  while  Bul- 
garia in  her  turn  was  to  render  similar  aid  in  the  event 
of  an  attack  upon  Serbia.  Above  all,  if  Austria-Hun- 
gary should  attack  Serbia,  Bulgaria  pledged  herself  to 
supply  as  many  as  200,000  troops  in  aid  of  the  Serbs, 


232     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

and  this  was  also  to  apply  in  the  event  of  an  Austrian 
invasion  of  the  Sandjak,  whether  with  or  without 
Turkish  consent.  Finally,  in  the  event  of  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia  simultaneously  declaring  war  upon  Turkey  (as 
actually  occurred),  each  of  the  two  states  was  bound  to 
dispatch  an  army  of  at  least  100,000  men  to  the  Vardar 
valley. 

It  is  thus  clear  that  a  literal  interpretation  of  the  treatv 
must  inevitably  result  in  Bulgaria's  favour.  And  if  the 
first  conference  in  London  had  been  successful  the  Ser- 
bian Government  would  probably  have  had  no  alterna- 
tive but  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  Monastir  and 
Prilep.  But  the  negotiations  were  broken  off,  and  during 
the  four  weary  months  of  hostilities  which  followed  an 
entirely  new  situation  arose.  On  the  one  hand  the 
paeans  of  praise  with  which  Europe  greeted  the  Thracian 
victories  completely  turned  the  heads  of  the  Bulgarians 
and  betrayed  them  into  an  exaggerated  estimate  of  their 
own  powers  and  a  corresponding  contempt  for  their 
allies.  On  the  other,  the  Serbians,  having  found  it  neces- 
sary to  establish  some  kind  of  administration  in  the 
territory  which  they  had  occupied,  soon  began  to  develop 
that  appetite  which  comes  with  eating  and  to  show  a 
growing  reluctance  to  disgorge  any  of  the  spoils  of  war. 
The  old  controversies  with  regard  to  the  racial  compo- 
sition of  the  Macedonian  population  were  revived  by 
the  rival  Chauvinists  and  professional  statisticians  of 
Sofia,  Belgrade,  and  Athens,  and  ill-feeling  was  aggra- 
vated by  a  series  of  incidents  in  which  neither  the  Ser- 
bian authorities  nor  the  Bulgarian  propagandists 
showed  to  advantage.  The  strength  of  the  military 
party  in  Serbia,  which  strenuously  opposed  all  serious 
concessions,  found  its  counterpart  in  the  influence  of  the 
Macedonian  emigres  in  Sofia,  which  stiffened  the  back 
of  the  Government  and  acted  as  an  irritant  upon  public 
opinion. 


THE  DISPUTE   AMONG   THE   ALLIES  233 

The  longer  the  war  lasted,  the  more  steadily  dwindled 
all  inclinations  towards  concession  on  either  side,  and 
by  the  month  of  June  it  had  become  clear  that  the  only 
hope  of  averting  a  conflict  lay  in  the  imposition  of  a 
settlement  from  without.  Unhappily,  what  little  energy 
the  Concert  of  Europe  still  possessed  had  been  expended 
upon  the  creation  of  Albania  and  the  concession  of 
Silistria  to  Roumania.  A  really  effective  demonstration 
on  the  part  of  all  the  Great  Powers  was  not  to  be 
expected,  for  of  the  two  whose  interests  seemed  most 
vitally  affected,  Austria-Hungary  was  openly  relieved 
at  the  prospect  of  a  dissolution  of  the  Balkan  League, 
while  Russia,  though  genuinely  alarmed  and  distressed 
by  the  dissensions  of  her  proteges,  was  also  highly 
reluctant  to  exercise  the  privilege  of  arbiter,  which 
seemed  to  forecast  the  certain  resentment  of  one  or 
other  of  the  claimants. 

The  difficulties  of  a  peaceful  solution  may  best  be 
realised  if  we  consider  the  dominant  motives  of  the  com- 
batants in  entering  upon  the  war  against  the  Turks. 
While  dynastic  ambition,  the  greed  of  territory,  and 
many  other  reasons  undoubtedly  played  their  part,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Bulgarian  nation  as  a  whole 
believed  itself  to  have  embarked  upon  a  war  of  liberation 
on  behalf  of  their  oppressed  kinsmen  under  the  Turkish 
yoke.  To  every  subject  of  King  Ferdinand  Macedonia 
was  a  Bulgarian  province,  whose  historic  associations, 
civil  and  religious  alike,  were  intimately  bound  up  with 
the  ancient  Tsardom  of  Boris  and  Samuel.  Towards 
Macedonia  had  been  directed  forty  years  of  sacrifice 
and  propaganda.  The  boundaries  which  the  Tsar 
Liberator  had  proclaimed  at  San  Stefano,  but  which 
Europe  had  unjustly  annulled,  were  the  watchword  of  a 
Big  Bulgaria  :  and  after  a  war  of  unexampled  success 
nothing  less  could  satisfy  the  nation. 

The  motives  which  underlav  Serbia's  initiative  were 


284     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

somewhat  different.  There  was,  of  course,  the  same 
popular  enthusiasm  for  the  liberation  of  the  Balkan 
Christians  and  for  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks  from 
Europe.  But  beside  and  beyond  this  was  the  intolerable 
geographical  situation  of  the  little  kingdom,  her  impera- 
tive need  for  a  direct  connection  with  Montenegro,  and, 
above  all,  for  free  access  to  the  sea.  The  events  of  the 
previous  eight  years — the  tariff  war  with  Austria-Hun- 
gary, the  Bosnian  crisis,  Turkey's  absolute  control  of 
the  introduction  of  war  material,  and  a  hundred  minor 
incidents — rendered  this  a  question  of  life  and  death  for 
Serbia;  and  in  concluding  the  Balkan  alliance  the  calcu- 
lations of  her  statesmen  centred  upon  the  acquisition, 
first,  of  the  Sandjak  and  Kosovo  as  the  means  to  an 
end,  and,  secondly,  of  a  port  in  northern  Albania  as  a 
final  objective.  Even  before  the  first  conference  met  in 
London,  the  intervention  of  Austria-Hungary  in  favour 
of  an  independent  Albania  had  rendered  the  realisation 
of  Serbia's  dream  in  the  highest  degree  precarious. 
Yielding  to  earnest  representations  from  more  than  one 
quarter,  her  statesmen  consented  in  principle  to  the 
evacuation  of  Durazzo  and  Medua,  and  refrained  from 
exacting  from  Bulgaria  the  fulfilment  of  her  pledge  of 
assistance  against  Austrian  interference.  But,  once  shut 
out  from  the  Adriatic,  they  were  forced  to  look  elsewhere 
for  an  outlet ;  and  a  glance  at  the  map  shows  that  the 
sole  possible  alternative  to  an  outlet  in  northern  Albania 
is  an  outlet  along  the  valley  of  the  Vardar.  Thus 
southern  Macedonia  assumed  at  once  an  importance 
which  it  had  not  hitherto  possessed.  When  once  the 
creation  of  Albania  had  been  ordained,  Bulgaria's  pos- 
session of  Monastir  and  Ochrida  would  have  destroyed 
the  possibility  of  a  joint  Serbo-Greek  frontier,  such  as 
had  been  contemplated  by  the  allied  Cabinets. 

If,   then,  Salonica  should   remain    in    Greek    hands, 
Serbia's  position  would  be  worse  than  before  the  war, 


THE   DISPUTE    AMONG  THE   ALLIES  «235 

for  she  would  no  longer  have  one,  but  two,  customs 
frontiers  between  her  and  her  main  access  to  the  sea,  and 
the  two  countries  which  would  block  her  way  would  no 
longer  be  moribund  Turkey,  with  its  lack  of  commercial 
enterprise  and  its  free  trade  principles,  but  two  virile 
and  expanding  national  states,  each  with  an  aggressive 
commercial  policy  and  a  protective  tariff  of  its  own. 

The  conditions  under  which  the  original  treaty  had 
been  concluded  having  thus  been  radically  altered  by 
the  course  of  events,  Serbia  decided  to  put  forward  the 
plea  rebus  sic  stantibus  and  to  claim  a  revision  of  the 
territorial  settlement.  As,  however,  it  was  not  to  be 
expected  that  Bulgaria  would  give  her  consent  without 
very  material  compensation,  Serbia  endeavoured  to  find 
this  in  the  Eastern  theatre  of  war. 

It  is  an  open  secret  that  Bulgaria,  when  entering  upon 
the  war,  never  contemplated  the  retention  of  any  por- 
tions of  the  vilayet  of  Adrianople,  Russia  having,  ever 
since  San  Stefano,  inculcated  in  Sofia  the  doctrine  that 
Adrianople,  as  a  strategic  key  to  Constantinople,  lay 
within  her  sphere  of  influence,  just  as  the  Sandjak  lay 
within  that  of  Austria-Hungary  till  the  winter  of  1908. 
Here,  too,  the  Turkish  debacle  created  a  new  situation. 
The  Bulgarians  openly  claimed  the  Midia-Enos  line  as 
a  minimum,  and  began  to  regard  even  Rodosto  as  a  per- 
manent conquest;  while  King  Ferdinand,  for  once 
losing  his  grip  of  realities,  was  occupied  with  plans  for 
his  state  entry  into  Constantinople,  and  even  his  procla- 
mation as  Emperor  of  the  East.  When,  then,  under 
stress  of  Austrian  diplomatic  competition  in  Sofia, 
Russia  withdrew  her  veto  upon  the  cession  of  Adrianople 
to  Bulgaria,  her  action  only  served  to  increase  the  arro- 
gance and  inelasticity  of  the  Bulgarian  claims.  The 
statesmen  of  Sofia  were  unable  or  unwilling  to  realise 
that  Petrograd  regarded  this  as  a  more  than  generous 
compensation  for  concessions  to  Serbia  in  Macedonia. 


236     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

They  stubbornly  insisted  upon  a  literal  fulfilment  of  the 
treaty  of  alliance,  and  declined  to  admit  the  argument 
that  circumstances  alter  cases. 

During  the  negotiations  relative  to  Albania,  Serbia 
was  offered  from  Vienna  the  whole  valley  of  the  Vardar, 
with  Salonica  itself,  if  only  she  would  abandon  her  pre- 
tensions on  the  Adriatic.1  But  so  far  from  being  im- 
pressed by  her  loyal  rejection  of  this  offer,  the  Bulgarian 
delegates  in  London  bluntly  warned  their  Serbian  col- 
leagues that  they  must  not  expect  Bulgaria's  support  of 
their  Adriatic  claims,  and,  indeed,  made  it  clear  that 
Bulgaria  was  not  prepared  to  fulfil  her  treaty  obligations 
in  the  event  of  Austrian  intervention.  Much  may  be  said 
in  favour  of  such  an  attitude,  for  at  that  moment 
Tchataldja  and  Adrianople  were  straining  Bulgaria's 
entire  resources,  and  it  would  not  have  been  easy  to 
withdraw  so  large  a  body  of  troops  from  Thrace.  But 
this  circumstance,  while  absolving  Bulgaria  from  the 
charge  of  bad  faith,  immensely  weakens  her  position  as 
the  vindicator  of  a  literal  interpretation  of  the  treaty. 

Not  content,  however,  with  withholding  their  diplo- 
matic support,  the  Bulgarian  delegates  intrigued  actively 
behind  the  backs  of  their  colleagues  at  the  conference. 
They  endeavoured  to  induce  the  Ambassadors  of  the 
Great  Powers  to  exclude  the  town  of  Dibra  from  the 
new  Albania,  whose  frontiers  were  then  under  considera- 
tion— not  that  it  might  be  incorporated  with  Serbia,  but 
that  it  might  form  an  outpost  of  Greater  Bulgaria,  and 
perhaps  even  supply  a  point  of  contact  between  Bul- 
garia  and   Montenegro.2     The   unscrupulous   nature  of 

1  Cf.  the  speech  of  Mr.  Pa§ic"  in  the  SkupStina,  28th  May,  1914. 

2  This  incident,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  by  no  means  confined 
to  Serbian  diplomatic  circles,  received  an  interesting  confirmation 
in  the  indiscreet  interview  published  by  Slovenec  (organ  of  the 
Slovene  Clericals  in  Laibach)  in  the  last  week  of  May,  1913,  with 
a  secretary  of  the  Bulgarian  Legation  in  London.  This  young 
diplomat,  speaking  in  the  name  of  his  chief,  expressly  declared 


THE   DISPUTE    AMONG   THE    ALLIES        237 

this  intrigue  is  best  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  accord- 
ing to  the  treaty  which  Bulgaria  proclaimed  as  so 
inviolable,  Dibra  lies  within  the  territory  which  is  recog- 
nised as  indisputably  Serbian  !  As  a  well-known  Bul- 
garian diplomat,  M.  Rizov,  has  since  publicly  admitted, 
the  statesmen  of  Sofia  knew  from  the  first  that  they 
could  not  hope  to  attain  their  end  alone,  and  conse- 
quently Serbian  aid  was  essential  to  success.  They  were 
also  very  well  aware  that  their  objective,  the  erection 
of  a  Big  Bulgaria  in  the  widest  sense  of  that  term,  would 
be  fatal  to  Serbia's  continued  existence  as  an  indepen- 
dent state,  and  despite  that  knowledge  they  deliberately 
attempted  to  commit  Serbia  to  acquiescence  in  a  Bulga- 
rian hegemony  in  the  peninsula.  There  is  no  longer 
any  room  for  doubt  that  in  this  policy  they  were  secretly 
encouraged  by  Austria-Hungary,  who,  perhaps  not 
unnaturally,  in  view  of  the  anti-Austrian  clauses  of  the 
alliance,  held  herself  to  be  justified  in  playing  the  part 
of  Mephistopheles  in  the  duel  of  the  allies. 

Meanwhile,  despite  growing  friction,  the  allies  were 
unanimous  in  postponing  any  settlement  of  their  dis- 
putes until  the  close  of  hostilities  against  the  common 
enemy.  The  demands  of  Bulgaria  proved  inacceptable 
to  the  Turks,  and  the  London  conference  came  to  an 
abrupt  close.  The  Serbian  Government  lent  its  unquali- 
fied support  to  these  demands,  partly  from  a  desire  to 
convince  its  ally  of  its  loyal  intentions,  partly  in  the 
belief  that  the  larger  the  spoils  of  war  might  be,  the 
greater  was  the  prospect  of  an  amicable  agreement  for 
their  division  As  a  pledge  of  goodwill  it  had  already  sent 
a  contingent  of  50,000  troops  to  Adrianople,  though  no 
such  assistance  had  been  contemplated  by  the  treaty  ; 

that  one  of  Bulgaria's  special  ambitions  was  to  acquire  a  joint 
frontier  with  Montenegro  across  the  Sar  Mts.  Incidentally,  he 
expounded  the  view  that  the  Greek  Navy  had  injured  rather  than 
assisted  Bulgaria ! 


238     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

and  this  freewill  offering,  in  return  for  which  the  Pasic 
Cabinet,  in  opposition  to  the  urgent  advice  of  Marshal 
Putnik,  refused  to  exact  any  equivalent,  was  now  con- 
tinued till  the  fall  of  the  besieged  city.  Of  equal  value 
was  the  loan  of  Serbia's  heavy  siege  guns,  which  sup- 
plied a  very  serious  want  on  the  part  of  the  Bulgarians. 
Incidentally,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  the  fact  that  a 
country  which  had  been  preparing  for  war  against  the 
Turks  for  a  whole  generation  past  possessed  no  adequate 
siege  guns  for  the  reduction  of  the  chief  fortress  which 
blocked  their  advance,  goes  far  towards  proving  the  con- 
tention that  Bulgaria,  even  in  her  wildest  dreams,  never 
expected  to  retain  Adrianople.  Unhappily,  this  assist- 
ance, as  we  have  already  seen,  actually  increased  instead 
of  diminished  the  friction.1  The  Bulgarian  censor 
rigorously  "cut"  any  references  to  the  two  Serbian 
divisions  in  the  telegrams  of  foreign  correspondents,2 
and  public  opinion  in  Sofia  either  failed  to  realise,  or 
declined  to  admit,  the  sterling  services  which  Serbia  had 
so  freely  rendered  to  the  common  cause.  In  short,  Bul- 
garia held  out  stubbornly  for  the  treaty,  the  whole  treaty, 
and  nothing  but  the  treaty. 

Many  further  arguments  have  been  adduced  on  both 
sides.  The  Serbians,  for  instance,  point  out  that  Bul- 
garia never  fulfilled  that  clause  of  the  treaty  which 
pledged  her  to  send  100,000  men  to  the  Vardar  valley; 
while  the  Bulgars  reply  that  this  provision  was  modified 
by  a  subsequent  agreement  between  the  Bulgarian  and 
Serbian  General  Staffs  on  23rd  August,  1912,  on  the 
ground  that  further  reinforcements  were  required  for 
the  Thracian  campaign.  The  Serbs  point  out  that  they 
sent  two  divisions  to  Adrianople,  and  this  in  order  to 
win  for  Bulgaria  territory  the  acquisition  of  which  had 
never  been  foreseen  by  the  treaty ;  the  Bulgarians  reply 

1  See  page   212. 

*  See  Barby,   Bregalnitza,  p.  2. 


THE    DISPUTE   AMONG   THE   ALLIES  239 

that  such  works  of  supererogation  on  the  part  of  an  ally 
do  not  in  any  way  affect  the  question,  and  that  a  bargain 
is  a  bargain.  Such  pleas,  however,  are  of  purely  con- 
troversial value.  The  really  decisive  arguments  lie  far 
deeper.  On  the  one  side  the  possession  of  the  Vardar 
valley  was  to  Serbia  a  vital  economic  necessity  :  its  loss 
would  have  endangered  her  whole  future  prospects  of 
economic  independence  and  undone  all  the  advantages 
which  accrued  to  her  from  victory.  Bulgaria,  on  the 
other  side,  wras  intoxicated  by  the  dream  of  national 
unity,  but  in  her  zeal  allowed  herself  to  interpret  it  as 
a  right  to  unrestrained  hegemony  over  the  whole 
peninsula. 


CHAPTER     XVI 

THE     BREAK-UP     OF     THE     BALKAN     LEAGUE 

The  sudden  victories  of  the  Balkan  League  had  taken 
Europe  completely  by  surprise;  and  the  effect  on  public 
opinion  in  the  West  was  heightened  still  further  by  the 
cordial  co-operation  of  the  four  allies.  By  the  beginning 
of  December  Europe,  as  voiced  by  her  responsible  states- 
men, had  abandoned  the  long-cherished  principle  of  the 
status  quo,  and  established  in  its  place  the  more  con- 
venient formula  that  the  allies  must  not  be  robbed  of  the 
fruits  of  their  victories.  Yet  among  the  Great  Powers 
there  was  one  to  whom  Turkey's  defeat  seemed  equiva- 
lent to  her  own.  Austria-Hungary,  still  under  the  evil 
influence  of  the  Aehrenthal  tradition,  hampered  at  every 
turn  by  Magyar  racial  policy,  both  in  Hungary  proper 
and,  above  all,  in  Croatia  and  the  Southern  Slav  pro- 
vinces of  the  Monarchy,  proved  herself  incapable  of 
modifying  her  Slavophobe  attitude,  and  thus,  renounc- 
ing the  confidence  and  approval  of  the  Slav  majority 
among  her  population,  gravitated  slowly  but  surely 
towards  a  position  of  vassalage  to  Berlin.  After  an 
initial  period  of  irresolution,  following  on  the  unexpected 
collapse  of  Turkey,  Count  Berchtold  quite  definitely 
rejected  the  overtures  of  the  Pasic  Cabinet  for  a  com- 
mercial understanding  and  ordered  an  extensive  mobili- 
sation on  the  southern  frontier.   The  notorious  Prochaska 

240 


THE  BREAK-UP  OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  241 

Affair  and  the  sudden  prohibition  of  all  demonstrations 
in  favour  of  the  Balkan  allies  were  outward  signs  of  the 
growth  of  acute  friction  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Serbia,  whose  increased  prestige  with  her  Serbo-Croat 
and  Slovene  kinsmen  was  intensely  distasteful  to  Vienna 
and  Budapest.  Having  based  her  calculations  upon  a 
Turkish  victory,  Austria-Hungary  had  to  choose 
between  one  of  two  alternatives — either  a  complete  and 
prompt  reversal  of  her  whole  anti-Slav  policy  or  the 
encouragement  at  all  costs  of  discord  between  the  Balkan 
allies.  With  this  latter  end  in  view — for  the  rival  policy 
was  never  seriously  considered — Austria-Hungary  im- 
posed an  emphatic  veto  upon  Serbia's  access  to  the 
Adriatic.  Baulked  in  her  efforts  to  escape  from  the 
economic  orbit  of  the  Monarchy,  the  little  landlocked 
kingdom  would,  it  was  rightly  argued,  look  eastwards 
for  her  outlet,  and  thus  speedily  embroil  herself  with 
Bulgaria.  The  plot  succeeded  only  too  well.  The  Serbs, 
whose  motives  in  going  to  war  were  almost  equally 
national  and  economic,  were  absolutely  bent  upon  secur- 
ing an  access  to  the  sea,  and  Austria-Hungary's  very 
insistence  served  to  reveal  to  them  the  gravity  of  their 
danger.  It  soon  became  obvious  that,  in  view  of  the 
attitude  of  the  Great  Powers,  their  hopes  of  an  Adriatic 
port  were  illusory.  Even  Russia  did  not  back  Serbia, 
and  on  9th  November  Mr.  Sazonov  invited  the  Bulgarian 
Government  to  restrain  Serbia  from  her  Adriatic 
designs.1  As  early  as  16th  December  Mr.  Novakovic\  the 
chief  Serbian  delegate  to  the  London  Peace  Conference, 
informed  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Paris,  Mr.  Izvol- 
sky,  that  if  the  Serbian  claim  to  a  port  were  disallowed 
Serbia  would  be  forced  to  look  for  compensation  beyond 
the  frontiers  fixed  by  the  Serbo-Bulgar  treaty.  At  an 
early  stage  in  the  conference  the  Serbian  delegates  were 
seriously  perturbed  by  the  unfriendly  attitude  of  Mr. 

1  GeSov,   Balkan  League,  p.  63. 

R 


242     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Danev,  who  behind  their  backs  attempted  to  win  the 
Great  Powers  to  a  settlement  by  which  Bulgaria  and 
Montenegro  would  secure  a  common  frontier,  at  Serbia's 
expense,  and  in  defiance  of  that  treaty  which  he  was  so 
ready  to  treat  as  sacrosanct  when  it  suited  his  purpose. 
His  action  in  stopping  at  Budapest  to  confer  with  lead- 
ing Austrian  and  Hungarian  statesmen,  but  passing 
through  Belgrade  without  even  exchanging  greetings 
with  his  allies,  was  something  more  than  mere  tactless- 
ness; indeed,  there  are  some  grounds  for  believing  that 
the  visit  marked  a  fresh  stage  in  the  Austro-Bulgarian 
understanding  which  began  in  1908  and  reached  comple- 
tion in  1915. 

The  Bulgarians  did  nothing  whatever  to  back  the 
Serbian  claim  to  a  port,1  and  at  the  same  time  preserved 
an  evasive  silence  when  Mr.  Venizelos  pressed  for  an 
amicable  discussion  of  the  respective  claims  of  Greece 
and  Bulgaria,  with  the  view  of  avoiding  the  growth  of 
doubt  and  misunderstanding.  The  arrogance  and  angu- 
larity of  the  chief  Bulgarian  delegate,  Mr.  Danev,  did 
much  to  widen  the  growing  breach  at  a  time  when  every 
week's  delay  increased  the  dangers  to  the  alliance.  But 
for  Bulgaria  peace  might  have  been  attained  early  in 
January;  yet  Serbia,  whose  military  task  was  over, 
loyally  continued  the  war  and  contributed  very  materially 
to  winding  up  the  Thracian  campaign.  But  as  the  year 
advanced,  it  became  obvious  that  the  decisions  of  the 
Conference  of  Ambassadors  had  radically  transformed 
the  situation  and  that  the  treaty  could  not  fail  to  be 
affected  by  the  change.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  not  till 
1st  March  that  Mr.  PaSic  officially  raised  the  question 
of  revision  by  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Bulgarian  Govern- 
ment. This  step  led  to  lengthy  discussions  between  the 
latter  and  Mr.  Spalajkovi'd,  the  Serbian  Minister  in  Sofia, 

1  Mr.  Gelov  denies  this,  but  produces  no  evidence  to  support 
his  denial  (op.  cit.,  p.  64). 


THE  BREAK-UP  OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  243 

who  eventually  suggested  that  the  whole  matter  should 
be  referred  to  arbitration.1 

From  the  first  the  statesmen  of  Bulgaria  displayed  the 
same  intransigeant  spirit  which  had  already  earned  Dr. 
Danev  so  unenviable  a  reputation  in  London ;  and  the 
best  indication  of  their  outlook  lies  in  the  fact  that  as 
early  as  5th  April,  1913,  a  Cabinet  Council  held  at 
Adrianople  under  the  presidency  of  King  Ferdinand 
resolved  to  negotiate  secretly  with  the  Turks  for  an 
armistice  and  to  transfer  the  army  as  soon  as  possible 
against  the  Serbs  and  Greeks.2 

It  is  not  clear  whether  this  was  known  at  the  time  to 
Belgrade  and  Athens,  but  the  uncompromising  attitude 
of  the  Bulgars  was  patent  even  to  the  most  superficial 
observer;  and  it  is  difficult  to  blame  the  Serbian  and 
Greek  Governments  for  discussing  precautionary  mea- 
sures. The  first  germ  of  an  arrangement  may  be  traced 
to  informal  conversations  in  London,  when  Mr.  Veni- 
zelos,  alarmed  at  Dr.  Danev's  abrupt  rejection  of  his 
overtures,  discussed  the  future  with  the  Serbian  dele- 
gates. A  further  stage  was  reached  on  23rd  January, 
when  Prince  Alexander  paid  a  visit  to  Prince  Nicholas 
of  Greece  at  Salonica.  The  visit  had  been  prompted 
by  a  disquieting  rumour  that  Greece  had  made  a  secret 
bargain  with  Bulgaria,  by  which  she  was  to  retain 
Salonica  in  return  for  ejecting  the  Serbs  from  Monastir. 
The  two  princes  having  traced  the  origin  of  the  story 
in  a  flimsy  intrigue  to  set  Greece  and  Serbia  at  logger- 
heads, passed  on  to  a  general  discussion  of  the  situation 
and  were  soon  able  to  convince  each  other  of  their 
common  interests.3    On   10th  March  a  second  meeting 

1  Gesov,  op.  cit.,  p.  74. 

2  General  Savov  in  Dnevnik  of  29th  May,  1914,  cit.  Balcanicus, 
op.  cit.,  p.  3. 

3  Crawfurd  Price,  The  Balkan  Cockpit,  p.  237.  Mr.  Price 
played   a  part  in   these  negotiations  not   altogether  dissimilar  to 

R   2 


244     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

took  place  between  the  two  princes,  and  this  time  serious 
negotiations  were  entered  upon,  which  ended  in  an  agree- 
ment with  regard  to  the  future  Serbo-Greek  frontier  and 
foreshadowed  joint  action  in  the  event  of  a  Bulgarian 
attack  upon  either  of  her  neighbours.1  The  assassina- 
tion of  King  George  on  18th  March  undoubtedly  re- 
moved a  real  bulwark  of  peace  and  strengthened  the 
hands  of  the  Greek  military  party.  George  I.,  a  monarch 
of  experience  and  moderation,  was  succeeded  by  his  son, 
Constantine,  a  man  of  obstinate  temper  and  limited 
political  intelligence,  unreasonably  jealous  of  the  great 
statesman  whom  he  found  at  the  head  of  affairs,  and, 
above  all,  eager  to  increase  his  own  military  prestige. 

The  growing  tension  between  the  allies  and  the  clan- 
destine efforts  of  Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy  to 
accentuate  it  still  further,  were  viewed  with  growing 
alarm  by  Mr.  Sazonov,  who  at  first  made  no  secret  of 
his  regret  that  the  Serbian  Government  should  have 
raised  the  question  of  revision,  and  on  17th  April  defi- 
nitely expressed  disapproval  of  the  Serbo-Greek  negotia- 
tions, as  bound  to  lead  to  a  disruption  of  the  Balkan 
alliance.  That  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  was  fully 
alive  to  both  sides  of  the  question  was  shown  by  the 
warning  which  his  representative  conveyed  to  the 
Government  of  Sofia  on  28th  April,  to  the  effect  that 
an  armed  conflict  would  not  merely  expose  Bulgaria  to 
real  danger  from  Roumania,  but  would  tend  to  alienate 
public  opinion  in  Russia  itself,  and  would  render  the 
Treaty  of  1912  null  and  void.2  It  was  further  suggested 
that  the  Balkan  Premiers  would  do  well  to  meet  for  an 
amicable  discussion  of  the  whole  question.  On  30th 
April   Mr.   Nekljudov  and   Mr.   Hartwig,3  acting  upon 

that  played  by  Mr.   Bourchier  at  an  earlier  stage  between   Sofia 
and  Athens.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  240-1. 

2  Balcanicus,  The  Aspirations  of  Bulgaria,  p.  2. 

3  The  Russian  Ministers  at  Sofia  and  Belgrade. 


THE  BREAK-UP  OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  245 

identical  instructions,  intimated  the  regret  of  Russia  at 
the  budding  quarrel,  and  pointedly  reminded  the  allies 
of  the  stipulation  by  which  "every  dispute  concerning 
the  interpretation  and  application  of  the  treaty  and  the 
military  convention  must  be  submitted  to  the  arbitration 
of  Russia." x  A  week  earlier  Russia  had  proposed 
simultaneous  demobilisation  by  the  rival  claimants,  and 
on  the  29th  both  General  Savov  and  his  Chief  of  Staff, 
General  Ficev,  appear  to  have  advised  the  Cabinet  to 
comply,  though  in  point  of  fact  with  the  object  of  post- 
poning the  attack  upon  their  allies  until  the  autumn. 

As  at  this  moment  the  Skutari  crisis  was  at  its  height 
and  Austria-Hungary  seemed  likely  to  proceed  to 
extreme  measures  against  the  two  Serbian  kingdoms, 
it  is  by  no  means  impossible  that  Sofia  reckoned  upon 
securing  Macedonia  peacefully,  after  they  had  been 
reduced  to  impotence  by  an  attack  from  the  north. 
On  2nd  May  that  able  exponent  of  the  extreme 
Bulgarian  view,  Mr.  Bourchier,  telegraphed  the  inspired 
warning  that  a  Serbo-Bulgarian  collision  could  only 
redound  to  the  advantage  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
"might  bring  about  the  final  liquidation  of  Serbia,  who 
would  find  herself  encompassed  by  enemies  on  both 
sides."  He  even  hinted  that  "circumstances  might 
bring  into  existence  "  a  compact  between  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Bulgaria.2 

During  the  first  half  of  May  the  attitude  of  Bulgaria 
appears  to  have  stiffened  still  further.  General  Savov, 
who  had  hitherto  opposed  war  both  on  strategic  grounds 
and  owing   to  the   increasing   discontent   in   the  army, 

1  Russian  Orange  Book,  No.  141,  cit.,  Gesov,  op.  cit.,  p.  77. 

2  Times,  3rd  May.  His  telegrams  contain  much  the  best  pre- 
sentment of  the  Bulgarian  point  of  view  throughout  the  critical 
period  of  May-August,  19 13.  Their  animus  against  Serbia  and 
Roumania  is  too  patent  to  require  any  comment.  (See  especially 
Times  of  14th,   17th,   18th,  and  21st  July,   1913.) 


246     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

abandoned  his  opposition  as  a  result  of  the  intrigues 
which  were  undermining  his  position  at  Court.  The 
settlement  of  the  Bulgaro-Roumanian  frontier  dispute 
at  Petrograd  on  terms  highly  favourable  to  Sofia,  so 
far  from  rendering  the  Bulgarians  more  amenable,  was 
treated  by  them  as  removing  all  danger  of  interference 
from  the  north  of  the  Danube ;  and  the  extreme  dissatis- 
faction of  Roumania  at  these  terms  was  wholly  disre- 
garded. General  Savov,  with  all  the  zeal  of  a  convert, 
urged  upon  Gesov  that,  as  war  was  now  inevitable, 
peace  must  be  concluded  with  the  Turks  without  delay. 
The  true  issue,  he  argued,  was  the  hegemony  of  the 
peninsula,  and  a  bold  onslaught  would  swiftly  settle  this 
in  favour  of  Bulgaria;  four  days  of  hostilities  ought  to 
suffice  to  separate  the  Greeks  from  the  Serbs  and  force 
them  to  sue  for  peace.1  Obviously  it  was  essential  to 
force  a  decision  before  the  harvest,2  and  as  the  bulk  of 
the  Bulgarian  army  had  to  be  transported  from  Thrace 
to  the  new  western  front,  not  a  moment  was  to  be  lost 
in  reaching  such  an  agreement  with  Turkey  as  would 
permit  of  their  transference.  It  was  this  underlying 
strategic  factor,  in  this  case  compounded  of  geography 
and  economics,  which  accounts  for  the  eager  impatience 
displayed  by  the  Bulgarian  peace  delegates  in  London 
and  the  corresponding  reluctance  and  dilatoriness  of  the 
Serbs  and  Greeks.  From  a  theoretical  standpoint  Sir 
Edward  Grey  was  unquestionably  right  in  issuing  his 
abrupt  advice  to  sign  or  leave  London  ;  but  in  practice 
it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  effect  was  to  encourage 
Bulgaria  in  her  warlike  designs  and  in  the  fatal  illusion 
that  the  Powers,  in  guaranteeing  the  Treaty  of  London, 
were  really  freeing  Bulgaria  from  the  necessity  of  guard- 
ing her  eastern  frontier  against  the  Turks.3 

1  Balcanicus,  op.  cit.,  p.  19.  2  Times,  16th  May. 

'  This  view  is  shared  by  the  anonymous  author  of  Nationalism 
and   War  in  the  Near  East,  who  writes  (p.  250):  "It  is  a  melan- 


THE  BREAK-UP  OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  247 

Henceforth  the  breach  between  Bulgaria  and  Russia 
widens  perceptibly.  In  Petrograd  and  Moscow  the 
recalcitrant  attitude  of  Sofia  began  to  be  regarded  as  a 
betrayal  of  the  cause  of  Slav  solidarity;  while  the 
inspired  Press  of  Vienna  and  Budapest  steadily  fanned 
the  quarrel  of  the  two  Slav  peoples  and  magnified  local 
frontier  incidents  into  the  opening  stages  of  a  new  war.1 
The  encouragement  of  Chauvinist  feeling  in  any  Balkan 
state  is  always  an  easy  task,  and  the  hotheads  of  Bel- 
grade vied  with  the  Macedonian  agitators  of  Sofia  in 
inflaming  public  opinion.  In  spite  of  Russian  efforts  to 
secure  general  demobilisation,  even  so  wise  a  statesman 
as  Mr.  Pacu,  the  Serbian  Minister  of  Finance,  publicly 
declared  that  Serbia  could  not  think  of  such  a  step  until 
the  frontier  question  had  been  settled ;  and  a  few  days 
later  his  colleague,  the  Minister  of  War,  gave  great 
offence  in  Sofia  by  repeating  the  same  statement  in  a 
much  more  aggressive  form. 

But  far  more  important  than  either  utterance  was  the 
speech  of  the  Serbian  Premier  Mr.  PaSic,  on  27th  May, 
which  certainly  had  the  effect  of  posing  the  question  for 
the  first  time  publicly  before  Europe.  It  was  unques- 
tionably due  to  internal  difficulties  and  to  the  persistent 
demand  of  the  Opposition  leaders  for  information,  but 
is  also  to  be  explained  partly  by  the  fact  that  a  defensive 

choly  probability  that  but  for  the  success  of  the  Powers  in  making 
a  partial  peace  for  Bulgaria  with  Turkey  and  Roumania,  there 
would  have  been  no  war  made  by  Bulgaria  against  Greece  and 
Serbia.  For  even  Bulgars  swollen  with  success  would  not  have 
attacked  Greece  and  Serbia,  unless  they  had  supposed  they  were 
safe  from  Turkey  and   Roumania." 

1  See  leader  in  Pester  Lloyd  of  25th  May,  which  openly  espouses 
the  Bulgarian  cause  and  speaks  of  60,000  Bulgars  beating  the 
Greeks  at  Nigrita  and  marching  on  Salonica.  There  are  believed 
to  have  been  13,000  Bulgars  engaged,  which  is  bad  enough,  but 
a  very  different  matter  With  the  organ  of  the  Hungarian 
Government  the  wish  was  obviously  the  father  to  the  thought. 


248     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

military  convention  with  Greece  had  been  signed  on  14th 
May,  and  that  the  final  Serbo-Greek  Treaty  was  on  the 
very  point  of  signature.1 

Mr.  PaSic  quite  openly  insisted  upon  a  revision  of  the 
treaty,  proclaimed  it  as  the  cardinal  point  in  Serbian 
policy,  and  then  went  on  to  justify  the  demand,  not 
merely  by  a  long  array  of  historical,  political,  and  senti- 
mental arguments,  but,  above  all,  by  laying  emphasis  on 
the  altered  situation  since  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty. 
In  order  to  demonstrate  still  further  Serbia's  loyal  atti- 
tude towards  her  allies,  he  made  known  the  fact  that  in 
the  previous  winter  Austria-Hungary — whom  he  did  not, 
of  course,  mention  by  name — had  directly  encouraged 
Serbia  to  compensate  herself  for  her  impending  eviction 
from  Albania  by  retaining  the  Vardar  valley,  and  in 
that  event  had  actually  offered  her  support  to  a  Serbian 
occupation  of  Salonica. 

This  sensational  entrance  of  Mr.  Pasic  into  the  arena 
was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  causes  which  led  the  pacific 
Mr.  GeSov  to  place  his  resignation  in  the  hands  of  King 
Ferdinand  (30th  May).  But  the  main  reason  was  the 
consciousness  that  his  views  conflicted  with  those  of 
the  King,  of  the  General  Staff,  and  of  a  powerful  section 
of  public  opinion.  Within  two  days  of  Gesov's  accept- 
ance of  the  Russian  proposal  for  parallel  demobilisa- 
tion (26th  May),  King  Ferdinand  had  himself  ordered 
Savov  to  hasten  the  transport  of  the  army  westwards 
(28th) ;  and  the  army  chief  had  wired  back  next  day  that 
between  twenty-five  and  thirty-five  days  would  be 
required  to  transfer  the  troops  from  Bulair  to  Macedonia, 
and  that  if  negotiations  with  Serbia  could  only  be  pro- 
longed for  this  period,  all  military  danger  from  the  Ser- 


1  It  was  actually  signed  at  Salonica  on  1st  June  by  MM.  Alex- 
andropoulos  and  Boskovic  for  their  respective  Governments. 
Crawfurd  Price,  op.  cit.,  p.  241. 


THE  BREAK-UP  OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  249 

bian  side  would  have  disappeared.1  What  finally  de- 
cided Mr.  Gesov's  attitude  was  the  fact  that  on  the 
receipt  of  General  Savov's  wire  King-  Ferdinand  pri- 
vately called  together  a  meeting  of  all  the  Bulgarian 
party  leaders  except  the  Premier  himself,  and  that  the 
latter  first  learnt  of  this  next  day  from  the  King's  private 
secretary,  who  then  informed  him  that  all  the  others 
favoured  a  warlike  policy.2  In  his  own  laconic  phrase, 
which  reveals  for  an  instant  the  existence  of  a  whole 
array  of  sinister  secrets,  "  I  was  not  in  unity  with  the 
Crown."3  His  resignation,  which  was  timed  to  coincide 
with  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  London,  was  not 
made  public  for  the  moment,  and  in  response  to  urgent 
representations  from  Petrograd  he  met  Mr.  Pasic  at 
Tsaribrod  on  ist  June,  and  joined  the  latter  in  accepting 
the  further  Russian  proposal  that  the  Balkan  Premiers 
should  meet  and  confer  at  Petrograd.  While  remain- 
ing for  the  whole  of  the  next  week  in  statu  demissionis, 
Mr.  Gesov  appears  to  have  resigned  himself  to  swim- 
ming with  the  current.  Mr.  Sazanov's  suggestion  for  the 
reduction  of  the  allied  armies  to  one-third  of  their 
strength,  coupled  with  the  announcement  that  both 
Greece  and  Serbia  had  given  their  consent,  was  meekly 
referred  by  Gesov  to  Savov  for  his  opinion.  The 
general's  reply  was  to  impose  three  conditions — that  the 
Serbs  should  evacuate  the  disputed  territory,  or,  failing 
this,  that  the  Great  Powers  should  guarantee  Serbia's 
fulfilment  of  the  treaty,  and  that  in  that  event  Bulgaria 

1  See  Balcanicus,  op.  cit.,  pp.  30-1.  The  position  of  the  Serbs, 
knowing  that  an  attack  was  pending,  but  knowing  also  that  by 
forestalling  it  they  would  put  themselves  in  the  wrong  before 
Europe,  has  an  interesting  parallel  in  their  position  in  October, 
1915,  when  thev  knew  of  Bulgaria's  impending  attack,  but  were 
not  allowed  to  forestall  it  owing  to  the  virtual  veto  of  Entente 
diplomacy. 

2  Balcanicus,  op.  cit.,  p.  40. 

3  GeSov,  op.  cit.,  p.  91. 


250     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

should  be  allowed  to  send  as  many  troops  to  Macedonia 
as  the  combined  Serb  and  Greek  forces  already  there. 
Obviously  such  proposals  were  acceptable  neither  to 
Bulgaria's  allies  nor  to  the  Russian  arbiter,  and  were 
never  meant  to  be  accepted.  The  general  attitude  in 
Sofia  at  this  moment  is  clearly  reflected  in  the  Times 
telegrams  of  Mr.  Bourchier,  who  on  ist  June  announces 
with  evident  approval  : — "  The  Bulgarian  character  is 
singularly  undemonstrative,  but  the  national  spirit  is 
thoroughly  aroused,  and  war  with  Serbia  is  not  only 
eagerly  desired,  but  is  generally  regarded  as  inevitable." 
Nor  was  he  alone  in  pouring  fresh  oil  upon  the  flames. 
A  Bulgarian  ex-Premier,  General  Petrov,  interviewed 
by  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  on  2nd  June,  declared  that  war 
could  not  be  avoided  unless  Serbia  observed  every  detail 
of  the  treaty  and  unless  Greece  evacuated  Salonica; 
while  the  Serbian  War  Minister,  General  Bojanovic, 
spoke  of  the  possibility  of  "a  short  but  bloody  war,"  if 
Bulgaria  persisted  in  claiming  Veles  and  Monastir.  An 
interview  with  the  Serbian  Crown  Prince,  published  in 
the  Belgrade  Politika  of  7th  June,  struck  an  equally 
uncompromising  note ;  and  the  patent  truth  of  his  asser- 
tion that  Bulgaria  was  really  aiming  at  the  hegemony 
of  the  Balkans  only  served  to  make  it  more  unpalatable 
to  Sofia. 

The  Russian  Government  continued  untiringly  in  its 
efforts  to  promote  an  accord,  but  was  met  by  growing 
suspicion  and  even  hostility  on  the  part  of  the  Bulga- 
rians, who  contended  that  Russia  had  already  prejudged 
the  case  by  even  considering  the  question  of  revision. 
Thus  in  the  same  breath  they  professed  to  accept  arbi- 
tration and  insisted  upon  limiting  the  sphere  of  the  arbi- 
tration in  such  a  way  as  to  prejudge  the  case  against 
Serbia  in  her  turn.  The  bare  idea  of  compromise  was 
spurned  :  it  must  be  the  treaty,  the  whole  treaty,  and 
nothing  but  the  treaty.     On  8th  June   Mr.  Bourchier 


THE  BREAK-UP  OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  251 

announced  that  "  the  statement  that  Bulgaria  has  agreed 
to  accept  revision  of  the  treaty  with  Serbia  had  no 
foundation  whatever."1 

On  the  same  day  the  Tsar  of  Russia  took  the  momen- 
tous step  of  directing  a  personal  telegraphic  appeal  to 
the  Kings  of  Serbia  and  Bulgaria,  reminding  them  of 
their  engagement  to  refer  disputes  to  him  as  arbiter. 
"A  war  between  the  allies  would  not  leave  me  indiffer- 
ent. In  fact,  I  should  like  to  make  it  clear  that  the  state 
which  commences  war  will  be  held  responsible  before 
the  Slav  cause,  and  that  I  reserve  to  myself  full  liberty 
concerning  the  attitude  which  Russia  will  adopt  at  the 
end  of  such  a  criminal  war."  The  publication  of  such 
a  message  from  the  acknowledged  head  of  the  Slavonic 
world,  and  its  dispatch  from  the  historic  Kremlin,  served 
to  emphasise  Russia's  view  of  the  gravity  of  the  situa- 
tion. The  reply  of  King  Peter  has  never  been  published, 
but  its  general  terms  are  known.  After  expressions  of 
respect  and  gratitude  for  Russia's  untiring  interest  in 
the  Slavonic  cause,  he  emphasised  the  danger  to  which 
Serbia  would  be  exposed  by  the  realisation  of  Bulgaria's 
full  claims,  and  the  certainty  that  this  would  involve, 
not  merely  the  fall  of  the  Serbian  Government,  but 
serious  internal  convulsions  and  perhaps  even  the 
destruction  of  the  dynasty.  Meanwhile  King  Ferdinand 
did  not  show  the  same  restraint,  and  his  reply,  couched 
in  most  acrid  and  unconciliatory  terms,  was  immediately 
made  public.  After  throwing  the  entire  blame  upon 
Serbia,  and  defining  the  functions  of  the  arbiter  in  their 
narrowest  sense,  he  proceeded  to  enlarge  upon  the 
unanimity  of  the  Bulgarian  nation  and  its  duties  towards 
the  population  of  Macedonia,  and  closed  upon  a  note 
which  seemed  to  render  further  discussion  hopeless:  — 
M  And  your  Majesty  will  deign  to  remember  that  these 
duties  have  for  many  years  past  been  recognised  by 
1  Times,   ioth  June,  1913. 


252     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Russia  herself."  Such  an  answer  was  an  open  rebuff 
for  the  friends  of  peace,  and  there  was  only  one  quarter 
in  which  it  was  well  received.  The  Press  of  Vienna 
and  Budapest,  which  had  hailed  the  Tsar's  telegram 
as  "  a  reprimand  addressed  to  vassals  "  and  an  attempt 
to  establish  "a  new  Slav  apostolate,"  could  not  conceal 
its  satisfaction  at  Ferdinand's  defiant  attitude. 

On  the  very  eve  of  its  dispatch  a  new  Bulgarian 
Cabinet  was  formed  under  Dr.  Danev  as  Premier  (ioth 
June);  but  any  hopes  which  might  have  rested  upon 
his  Russophil  tendencies  had  already  been  discounted 
by  the  rigid  Jingoism  which  he  had  displayed  at  the  two 
conferences  in  London.  It  is  only  fair  to  add  that  the 
responsibility  for  King  Ferdinand's  answer  to  the  Tsar 
probably  rests  with  the  monarch  himself  and  not  with 
his  newly  appointed  Minister.  The  special  Slavonic 
appeal  of  Russia  having  failed,  the  clumsier  apparatus 
of  the  European  Concert  was  now  set  in  motion.  On 
13th  June  a  joint  demarche  of  the  Powers  at  Sofia  and 
Belgrade  urging  the  demobilisation  of  the  two  armies 
elicited  the  fact  that  Mr.  Pasic  had  already  made  a 
similar  proposal  to  Bulgaria,  but  that  it,  like  his  earlier 
notes  in  favour  of  revision  and  a  conference  of  Premiers, 
had  remained  unanswered.  When  at  last,  on  15th  June, 
the  reply  came,  it  consisted  of  a  refusal  to  discuss  revi- 
sion and  a  long  catalogue  of  the  crimes  of  Greece  and 
Serbia  as  the  justification  for  precautionary  measures 
on  the  part  of  Bulgaria.1  At  this  moment  the  internal 
difficulties  of  the  Pasic  Cabinet  reached  an  acute  stage, 
as  the  result  of  sharp  criticism  in  the  Skupstina  :  and 
though  their  resignation  was  not  accepted  by  King 
Peter,  they  found  themselves  between  a  strong  and 
restive  opposition  and  the  steady  pressure  of  six  Great 

1  See  Times,  16th  June.  Wire  of  Mr.  Bourchier,  dated  Sofia, 
15th  June,  and  summarising  the  points  of  a  document  which  it 
suited  the  Bulgarian  game  to  place  at  his  disposal. 


THE  BREAK-UP  OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  253 

Powers,  whose  predominant  feeling  was  annoyance  at 
the  persistence  of  a  quarrel  which  their  own  secular 
jealousies  had  done  so  much  to  create. 

On  17th  June  General  Savov  came  from  the  army 
headquarters  to  the  capital  and  reported  to  the  King  the 
growing  symptoms  of  unrest  among  his  troops.1  He 
warned  Dr.  Danev  that  if  they  remained  inactive  more 
than  ten  days  longer,  it  would  become  virtually  impos- 
sible to  retain  them  with  the  colours;  and  both  appear 
to  have  accepted  this  period  as  a  respite  before  the  final 
decision  need  be  made.  Next  day  a  secret  circular  was 
issued  to  the  five  army  commanders,  urging  them  to 
unity  and  warning  them  of  the  possibility  of  immediate 
operations.2  Probably  as  the  result  of  Savov's  visit, 
Bulgaria  proposed  to  Serbia,  as  a  preliminary  to  demo- 
bilisation, the  joint  occupation  of  the  disputed  area,  and 
in  a  further  Note,  handed  in  on  19th  June,  replied  at 
considerable  length  to  the  Serbian  arguments  for  revi- 
sion. This  pedantic  insistence  upon  the  letter  of  the 
law,  and  the  parallel  attempt  to  strengthen  their  case  by 
allowing  Mr.  Bourchier  to  publish  the  first  summary  of 
the  provisions  of  the  much-cited  but  mysteriously 
guarded  secret  treaty,  was  not  calculated,  and  probably 
not  intended,  to  advance  the  cause  of  peace.  On  a  literal 
interpretation  of  the  treaty  the  Bulgarian  case  was 
unanswerable;  but,  of  course,  the  whole  contention  of 
the  Serbs  was  that  equity  demanded  an  observance  of 
the  spirit  rather  than  the  letter  of  the  agreement. 

On  19th  June  an  event  occurred  which  gave  a  fatal 
turn  to  the  crisis  and  more  than  counteracted  all  the 
efforts  of  Russia.  Count  Stephen  Tisza,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded only  a  week  earlier  to  the  Hungarian  Premier- 
ship after  the  scandals  of  the  Lukacs-D^sy  trial,  made 
an    important    pronouncement    in    Parliament    on    the 

1  Times,  17th,  18th  June. 
8  Balcanicus,  op.  cit.,  p.  52. 


254     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

foreign  policy  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Opening  with 
the  unfounded  assertion  that  Austria-Hungary  had  been 
the  first  state  to  declare  that  the  Balkan  people  must  not 
be  robbed  of  the  fruits  of  victory,  he  pointed  out  that 
their  free  development  and  complete  independence  was 
her  foremost  aim.  Disinterestedness  he  defined  as  "no 
protectorate,  privileged  position,  or  plans  of  expansion," 
but  also  as  not  meaning  lack  of  interest  in  Balkan  affairs. 
Passing  finally  to  Russia's  separate  action,  he  added  : 
"Here  also  the  Balkan  states  are  independent,  and  con- 
sequently free  to  choose  their  own  method  of  settling 
their  differences.  They  may — and  we  should  deplore 
it  if  they  did  so,  but  they  are  entitled  to  do  so — choose 
the  method  of  war,  or  they  may  choose  mediation  or  a 
tribunal  of  arbitration.  But  it  is  self-evident  that  the 
latter  methods  can  only  be  applied  on  the  basis  of  the 
untrammelled  decision  of  the  independent  states  in  ques- 
tion, and  within  the  limits  they  may  establish."1  Austria- 
Hungary  could  not  allow  any  other  state  to  acquire 
special  prerogatives  in  the  Balkans. 

Short  of  open  hostility,  it  would  have  been  difficult  to 
convey  a  plainer  hint  to  Russia;  and  the  Opposition 
leader,  Count  Andrassy,  hastened  to  endorse  his  rival's 
view.  Indeed,  it  was  freely  hinted  in  Vienna  and  Buda- 
pest that  the  Monarchy  would  be  able  to  prevent  Rou- 
mania's  intervention  on  the  Serbian  side  by  promising 
her  a  portion  of  Serbian  territory  in  the  event  of 
Bulgaria's  victory;  while  if  the  improbable  should 
happen  and  Bulgaria  should  be  defeated,  Austria- 
Hungary  would  immediately  intervene  to  crush  the 
Serbs. 

The  stiffening  effect  of  the  speech  became  at    once 

apparent.    On  22nd  June  Dr.  Danev,  in  answer  to  fresh 

Russian  appeals  for  a  conference  of  the  four  Premiers 

at  Petrograd,  insisted  on  a  preliminary  guarantee  from 

1  Pester  Lloyd,  and  Times  of  20th  June. 


THE   BREAK-UP   OF  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE    255 

the  Serbs  "  that  they  will  accept  arbitration  and  the  joint 
occupation  of  Macedonia."  He  ended  his  telegram  to 
Mr.  Sazonov  with  the  truculent  phrase  :  "  Let  the  Impe- 
rial Government  entertain  no  illusions  on  that  subject."1 
A  Crown  Council,  held  the  same  day  at  King  Ferdi- 
nand's summer  palace  outside  Sofia,  was  influenced  by 
urgent  telegrams  from  General  Savov,  insisting  that 
further  delays  would  demoralise  the  army  and  make  it 
unfit  for  action ;  but  though  some  members  favoured 
immediate  war,  it  was  finally  decided  to  offer  to  Russia 
a  week's  delay,  in  which  to  pronounce  her  verdict  as 
arbiter.  If  this  offer  should  be  accepted  within  forty- 
eight  hours,  Dr.  Danev  would  be  prepared  to  come  to 
Petrograd.2  It  can  hardly  be  wondered  at  that  a  message 
of  this  kind  gave  extreme  offence  in  Russia.  Through 
the  medium  of  the  Bulgarian  Minister,  Mr.  Sazonov 
transmitted  a  stiff  message  to  Dr.  Danev,  ascribing  this 
"  ultimatum  "  to  Austrian  influence  and  telling  him  to 
expect  nothing  more  from  Russia  and  to  forget  the 
existence  of  any  engagements  undertaken  since  1902.3 
While  the  Russophil  Premier,  by  his  tactlessness,  thus 
cut  the  ground  from  under  his  feet  at  Petrograd,  the 
Austrian  Minister  in  Sofia,  Count  Tarnowski,  completed 
his  ascendency  over  the  political  counsels  of  King 
Ferdinand  and  pulled  the  secret  wires  which  were  to 
lead  to  disaster. 

Meanwhile  the  uncompromising  attitude  of  the 
Serbian  officers'  corps  and  dissensions  within  the  Cabi- 
net had  led  Mr.  Pasic  to  resign  (22nd) ;  but  although 
three  of  his  colleagues  were  believed  to  favour  immediate 

1  This  wire  was  afterwards  copied  from  the  Foreign  Office 
archives  in  Sofia  by  Mr.  Genadiev,  Foreign  Minister  in  the  Rado- 
slavov  Cabinet,  and  read  aloud  during  a  debate  in  the  Sobranje. 
See  Balcanicus,  op.  cit.,  p.  54. 

2  Mr.  Venizelos  and  Mr.  Pa§ic  had  given  their  unqualified 
consent  on   17th  June.     See  Times,   18th  June. 

3  Balcanicus,  op.  cit.,  p.  62. 


256     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

annexation  of  the  disputed  territory,  as  a  means  of 
creating  a  fait  accompli,  this  extreme  step  was  avoided, 
and  the  Serbian  Government  consented  to  place  its  case 
unreservedly  in  the  hands  of  Russia.  After  a  stormy 
secret  session  of  the  Skupstina,  the  PaSic  Cabinet 
remained  in  office  (26th).  There  followed  a  brief  calm 
before  the  storm  burst.  Serbia  had  rejected  the  Bul- 
garian proposal  for  joint  occupation  (22nd),  while 
Bulgaria  refused  the  Greek  suggestion  for  a  reduction 
of  effectives,  unless  immediate  joint  occupation  was 
agreed  upon  (20th).  The  deadlock  was  complete.  On 
28th  June  the  Roumanian  Government,  which  had  at  an 
earlier  stage  given  more  than  one  informal  indication  of 
its  attitude,  officially  informed  Bulgaria  that  it  would  not 
remain  neutral  in  the  event  of  war.1 

1  When  shortly  afterwards  Roumania  did  actually  intervene, 
certain  Bulgarophil  organs  in  London  bitterly  attacked  her  as  a 
"hyaena  Power,"  and  "an  assassin  treacherously  stabbing  in  the 
back."  Yet  such  an  attitude  on  their  part  betrayed  complete 
ignorance  of  the  true  situation,  above  all  of  the  capital  fact  that 
Roumania  had  given  Bulgaria  fair  warning,  and  that  this  warning 
was  arrogantly  disregarded.  As  I  pointed  out  in  a  letter  to  the 
Nation  (18th  July,  1913)  I  was  myself  assured  with  great  frankness 
on  20th  June — i.e.,  nine  days  before  the  night  attack — in  Bucarest 
by  two  prominent  members  of  the  Maiorescu  Cabinet  that 
Roumania  would  never  allow  Bulgaria  to  crush  the  Serbs,  and 
that  it  had  been  made  abundantly  clear  to  the  Bulgars  that  "  if 
they  move,  we  move  also." 


CHAPTER     XVII 


THE    SECOND    BALKAN     WAR 


Psychology  is  always  an  important  factor  in  war,  and 
in  the  critical  period  when  war  and  peace  hang  in  the 
balance  the  psychology  of  the  governing  class  in  each 
country  may  not  unfairly  be  regarded  as  the  decisive 
fact.  Nowhere  was  this  more  certainly  the  case  than  in 
Bulgaria  during  the  Balkan  wars.  In  Sofia  both  the 
Court  and  the  highest  political  and  military  circles  were 
dominated  by  an  arrogant  sense  of  superiority  to  their 
rivals,  which  led  them  to  despise  and  ignore  the  most 
obvious  dangers  and  obstacles.  General  Savov  is 
credibly  reported  to  have  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
Bulgarian  army  would  cut  through  the  Serbs  like  a 
knife  through  rotten  cheese,1  while  Dr.  Danev  on  ist  July 
warned  the  Roumanian  Minister  that  Serbian  resistance 
would  be  at  an  end  before  Roumania  could  possibly  hope 
to  complete  her  mobilisation.  Nothing  proves  the  over- 
weening self-confidence  of  the  Bulgarians  more  glaringly 
than  the  fact  that  they  seriously  thought  that  General 
Hasapcev's  little  garrison  of  1,500  men  could  hold  all 
the  Greeks  of  Salonica  at  bay  until  General  Ivanov's 
triumphal  entry  into  the  town  ! 

The  second  Balkan  war  was  essentially  a  political  war, 
alike  in   the  manner  of  its  outbreak  and   in  the  course 

1  A  similar  phrase  was  used  by  a  prominent  Macedo-Bulgar  on 

10th  July  to  the  Vienna  correspondent  of  the   Times  (sre  Times. 

nth   fulv,  iqn). 

257  s 


258     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

which  it  pursued.  Its  authors,  soldiers  and  statesmen 
alike,  allowed  both  strategy  and  tactics  to  be  subordinated 
to  purely  political  considerations.  Long  before  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  with  Turkey  the  Bulgarian  General 
Staff  had  begun  to  work  out  an  elaborate  plan  of  cam- 
paign.1 On  2nd  July  five  army  groups  were  to  be 
deployed  against  the  Serbs  and  Greeks  along  the  whole 
front  from  the  Danube  to  the  JEgean.  While  the  First 
Army  under  Kutincev  (45  battalions)  moved  on 
Knjazevac,  the  Third  under  Dimitriev  (36  battalions)  on 
Slivnica,  and  the  Second  under  Ivanov  (57  battalions) 
dealt  with  the  Greeks,  the  main  attack  was  to  be  directed 
by  the  Fourth  Army  under  Kovacev  against  the  Kocana- 
Stip-Strumnica  front,  and  the  Fifth  Army  (20  battalions) 
under  Tosev  was  to  be  ready  to  supplement  Kovacev's 
efforts  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Kustendil. 

Owing  to  the  mutal  recriminations  which  followed 
failure,  far  more  of  the  secrets  of  these  eventful  days  have 
transpired  than  is  usual  in  contemporary  history;  but 
it  is  not  yet  clear  what  were  the  exact  reasons  which 
led  to  the  execution  of  this  plan  in  a  premature  and 
incomplete  form.  Absurd  as  it  may  seem,  the  aim  of  the 
Bulgarian  authorities  was  to  take  forcible  possession  of 
the  coveted  territory  without  a  declaration  of  war  and 
then,  having  placed  their  quondam  allies  and  Europe 
before  a  sudden  fait  accompli,  to  present  themselves  at 
the  conference  table  in  Petrograd  in  the  guise  of  beati 
possidentes.  This  crudely  naive  method  had  already 
been  employed  on  several  occasions  with  varying  success. 
As  early  as  5th  March,  1913,  the  Bulgars  attempted  to 
eject  the  Greeks  from  their  positions  at  Nigrita,  selecting 

1  The  French  military  critic  in  the  Revue  Bleue,  whose  five 
articles  are  much  the  most  authoritative  account  of  the  second 
war,  has  had  this  plan  in  his  hands,  and  maintains  that  only 
a  military  expert  can  duly  appreciate  the  length  of  time  which 
it  must  have  taken  to  prepare. 


THE   SECOND    BALKAN    WAR  259 

the  day  un  which  the  latter  were  celebrating  the  news  of 
the  fall  of  Janina  and  the  Romanov  Tercentenary,1  and 
only  desisted  after  a  two  days'  assault.  This  incident 
gave  rise  to  an  acrimonious  correspondence  between 
Prince  Nicholas  of  Greece  and  General  Hasapcev,  and 
for  two  months  there  was  no  further  disturbance  of  the 
peace.  Early  in  May,  however,  there  were  fresh  skir- 
mishes, and  on  the  21st  a  large  Bulgarian  column2  made 
a  determined  effort  to  drive  the  Greeks  out  of  the 
Panghaion  district,  and  were  only  repulsed  after  several 
days'  fighting. 

On  17th  June  an  order  was  issued  by  General  Kovacev 
at  Radoviste  to  the  officers  of  his  command,  announcing 
that  the  concentration  of  troops  would  be  completed 
within  the  next  week,  and  that  events  would  then  be  ripe 
for  a  decision.  He  instructed  them  to  explain  to  their 
men  the  reasons  which  made  an  attack  on  their  perfidious 
allies  necessary,  to  rouse  them  by  bringing  them  into 
contact  with  the  Macedonian  refugees,  and  to  represent 
the  Serbian  and  Greek  soldiers  as  mere  cowards,  wmose 
moral  was  at  zero  and  who  were  deserting  freely.  The 
best  proof  of  their  rottenness,  he  argued,  was  their  com- 
plete passivity  in  face  of  the  Bulgarian  concentration 
along  their  whole  front.8 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Serbian  Commander-in-Chief, 
General  Putnik,  had  ever  since  the  beginning  of  June 
been  aware  that  the  Bulgarian  forces  round  Kocana  were 
being   daily    reinforced.     At   first   he  organised   strong 

1  Celebrated  throughout  Greece  in  honour  of  Queen  Olga,  a 
Russian  Princess. 

3  According  to  a  telegram  in  Pester  Lloyd  of  the  28th,  13,000 
men  with  24  cannon  were  involved.  In  a  leader  on  25th  May  in 
the  same  paper,  60,000  Bulgars  were  said  to  be  marching  on 
Salonica. 

3  Revue  Bleue,  13th  December,  1913.  For  the  present  this  may 
be  regarded  as  the  chief  authority  on  the  strategy  of  the  second 
war 

S    2 


260     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

defensive  positions  and  awaited  events,  but  on  20th  June, 
having  received  certain  proofs  that  the  enemy  was  less 
numerous  than  he  had  hitherto  supposed,  he  revised  his 
plans  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  able  to  counter  any  attack. 
Already  on  the  17th  he  had  been  warned  by  Mr.  Pasic 
to  take  all  necessary  measures  against  the  possibility  of 
a  Bulgarian  surprise  onslaught.  He,  therefore,  made 
Skoplje  his  headquarters,  and  concentrated  the  First  and 
Third  Armies  under  the  Crown  Prince  and  General 
Jankovic,  between  Egri  Palanka  on  the  old  Turko- 
Bulgarian  frontier,  and  Veles,  in  the  Vardar  valley, 
leaving  the  weaker  Second  Army  under  General 
Stepanovii  to  guard  Serbia  proper  against  invasion.  In 
due  course  Serbian  outposts  were  attacked  by  the  Bulgars 
at  Zletovo  (25th  June),  and  Putnik  promptly  gave  orders 
to  the  First  and  Third  Armies  to  concentrate  in  view  of 
a  general  attack  in  the  direction  of  Stip,  and  at  the  same 
time  requested  the  Greek  General  Staff  to  send  three 
divisions  to  Gjevgjeli  to  co-operate  with  the  Serbian 
right  wing  in  an  attack  upon  Strum nica.  The  Greeks 
were  able  to  adduce  valid  reasons  for  not  complying 
with  this  request,  and  as  the  Bulgars  had  meanwhile 
withdrawn  behind  the  Zletovska  river,  Putnik  counter- 
manded the  attack  at  the  last  moment. 

By  this  time  only  extreme  arrogance  could  have 
blinded  the  Bulgarian  commanders  to  the  fact  that  Putnik 
was  fully  alive  to  the  danger  which  threatened  him  and 
ready  to  repay  with  interest  any  blow.  How  accurately 
he  had  gauged  the  enemy's  intentions  may  be  seen  from 
the  confidential  instructions  which  he  issued  to  his  com- 
manding officers.  "The  Bulgars,"  he  said,  "will  use 
their  amicable  relations  with  us  and  will  attack  us  by 
surprise.  It  is  thus  that  they  attacked  the  Greeks,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  that  they  will  do  the  same  with  us  as 
soon  as  they  find  a  favourable  occasion.  Consequently 
you  must  always  be  on  your  guard,  above  all  at  nights, 


THE   SECOND    BALKAN   WAR  261 

and  be  ready  not  only  to  repel  the  Bulgars,  but  above  all 
to  take  the  offensive  instantly  and  punish  the  Bulgars 
by  beating  them  and  pursuing  them  mercilessly."1  In 
point  of  fact,  on  certain  sections  of  the  front  Serbian  and 
Bulgarian  officers  dined  together  on  the  evening  pre- 
ceding the  final  "stab  in  the  back,"  and  the  very  men 
who  a  few  hours  before,  with  the  fatal  orders  in  their 
pockets,  had  been  clinking  glasses  with  their  Serbian 
comrades,  crept  back  at  the  dead  of  night  in  the  hope  of 
slaughtering  them  unawares.  In  all  the  grim  story  of 
modern  Balkan  warfare  this  repulsive  incident  stands  out 
above  all  the  rest  and  remains  as  an  indelible  stain  upon 
the  Bulgarian  scutcheon. 

At  11.30  p.m.  on  26th  June  the  dispositions  of  the 
various  Bulgarian  armies  were  issued  by  General  Savov 
to  their  respective  commanders.2  Finally  at  8  p.m.  on 
28th  June  the  following  order  was  dispatched  by  Savov 
to  Kovacev,  the  commander  of  the  Fourth  Army  at 
Radoviste.  "  In  order  to  prevent  our  silence  in  presence 
of  the  Serb  attacks  reacting  unfavourably  upon  our 
soldiers,  and  in  order  that  the  enemy  should  not  be 
further  encouraged,  I  order  you  to  attack  the  enemy  as 
energetically  as  possible,  along  the  whole  line,  without 
unmasking  all  your  forces  and  without  letting  yourself  be 
drawn  into  a  long  engagement.  You  will  make  an  effort 
to  establish  yourself  securely  at  Krivolak,  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Bregalnica,  on  the  height  of  Bogoslav,  on 
the  ridge  550,  and  on  the  ridge  near  the  village  of 
Dobrovo.  It  is  preferable  for  you  to  open  hostilities  in 
the  evening,  and  during  the  night,  under  cover  of  dark- 

1  Revue  Bleuc,  ibid. 

2  This  order  (23)  is  quoted  entire  by  Balcanicus,  <-/>.  cit., 
p.  64-5  (reproduced  from  the  Sofiote  newspaper  Dnevnik,  where 
Savov  himself  published  it  on  15th  June,  IQ14,  No.  4236).  More 
detailed  instructions  (24)  were  prepared  at  the  same  time,  but  not 
actually  communicated  till  30th  June,  the  day  following  the  night 
attack.     No.  24  has  not  as  yet  been  published. 


262     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

ness,  to  deliver  an  impetuous  attack  along  the  whole  line. 
This  operation  is  to  take  place  to-morrow  evening,  29th 
June."  l  At  the  same  time  a  shorter  telegram  was  sent 
to  General  Tvanov,  in  command  of  the  Second  Army, 
informing  him  that  the  Fourth  Army  was  about  to  attack 
the  "entire  Serbian  line,"  and  ordering  him  meanwhile 
to  attack  the  Greeks  "most  energetically"  at  Leftera 
and  Tsaigesi  and  to  fortify  himself  well  in  those 
positions.2 

The  crisis  found  the  Serbian  Third  Army  ready  for 
instant  action.  Its  centre  held  the  Ovcepolje  (the  Sheep 
Plain),  wide  grassy  downs  which  form  the  strategic  key 
of  Macedonia;  while  its  two  flanks  were  protected  by 
more  mountainous  country.  The  First  Army  further 
north  was  faced  by  a  more  difficult  problem ;  for  reasons 
of  geography  exposed  it  to  attack  from  two  different 
directions — from  Kustendil  on  the  old  Serbo-Bulgar 
frontier,  and  from  the  Zletovska,  on  the  extreme  left  of 
the  sister  army.  While  the  former  suffered  from  blazing 
heat,  the  latter,  at  no  great  distance  from  it  but  on  far 
higher  ground,  was  exposed  to  extreme  cold,  for  which 
its  summer  outfit  was  ill-suited. 

The  Bulgarian  attack  opened  on  the  night  of  29th 
June,  along  a  front  of  100.  kilometres.  Between  midnight 
and  2  a.m.  the  Bulgarians  crossed  the  river  Zletovska, 
while  two  hours  later  the  strong  fort  of  Redki-Buki  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Macedo-Adrianople  division.  It 
appears  to  be  certain  that  if  after  this  initial  check  Putnik 
had  withdrawn  his  troops  to  defensive  positions  nearer 
Skoplje,  the  Bulgars  would  have  made  no  attempt  to 
follow  him,  but  would  have  contented  themselves  with 
occupying  the  disputed  territory.  In  brief,  their  aim  was 
to  overrun  Ovcepolje  by  a  rapid  surprise  movement,  to 

'  Reproduced  by  Balcanicus,  p.   66,    Revue   Bleue  (first   article), 
and  Nationalism  and   War,  p.   265. 
2  Cit.,   Balcanicus,  p.   67. 


THE    SECOND    BALKAN   WAR  263 

seize  the  bridge-head  of  Krivolak  on  the  Vardar,  and 
having  thus  cut  the  communications  between  the  Serbs 
and  Greeks,  to  move  rapidly  upon  Monastir.  The  Greeks 
were  regarded  as  almost  a  negligible  quantity,  and  it 
was  assumed  that  Salon  ica  would  fall  an  easy  prey  to 
General  Ivanov.1  But  the  whole  of  this  calculation, 
reared  upon  a  fixed  theory  of  Serbian  cowardice  and  in- 
capacity, collapsed  under  the  rude  shock  of  General 
Putnik's  counter-offensive.  Leaving  an  adequate  force 
on  the  defensive  at  Kustendil,  and  renouncing  for  the 
moment  the  idea  of  recapturing  Redki-Buki,  he  launched 
a  strong  attack  against  the  dominant  position  of  Car  Vrh 
(Sultan  Tepe).  The  rashness  of  the  Bulgarian  design  at 
once  became  apparent.  The  Fourth  Army,  104  battalions 
strong,  attacked  along  a  front  of  no  kilometres,  with 
the  result  that  its  force  was  unduly  scattered.  Qui  trop 
embrasse,  mal  etreint.  Moreover,  Bulgarian  strategy  fell 
between  two  stools.  Savov,  whose  aim  was  not  war  but 
a  sudden  forcible  seizure  of  the  spoils,  fully  realised  that 
to  employ  the  First  and  Third  Armies  against  Serbia 
proper  in  accordance  with  the  original  plan  (see  above, 
p.  258)  would  involve  a  definite  rupture  between  the  two 
countries;  and  yet  he  left  them  in  position,  instead  of 
throwing  all  but  a  containing  force  into  the  Macedonian 
scales.  Nay  more,  he  did  not  even  make  use  of  the  Fifth 
Army  at  Kustendil.  Its  commander,  General  To§ev, 
hearing  the  sound  of  the  cannon  to  the  south,  wired  to 
Sofia  for  instructions,  but  only  received  the  order  to 
attack  on  the  evening  of  30th  June,  when  the  psychological 
moment  was  already  lost.2  Worst  of  all,  Kovacev's 
army  was  allowed  to  attack  without  any  reserves  save  a 
single  brigade  at  Radoviste.  Thus  everything  depended 
upon  the  enemy  yielding  at  the  first  push  or  at  least 
remaining  upon  the  defensive,  and  it  was  precisely  this 

1  Immanuel,  Der  Balkankrieg,  Heft  V.,  p.  37. 

2  Revue  Bleite,  I. 


264    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

which  Putnik  avoided,  thus  showing  a  moral  courage 
and  soundness  of  judgment  which  deserve  the  highest 
praise.  A  further  telegram  dispatched  by  Savov  to 
Kovacev  on  the  afternoon  of  30th  June,  very  strikingly 
illustrates  the  degree  to  which  he  allowed  politics  to 
outweigh  military  considerations.  A  declaration  of  war, 
he  explains,  had  been  dispensed  with  for  four  reasons  : 
to  raise  the  moral  of  the  the  troops  and  convince  them 
that  their  former  allies  had  become  enemies;  to  force 
Russian  diplomacy,  by  the  danger  of  a  declaration  of 
war,  to  make  a  speedy  decision  ;  to  render  the  allies  more 
amenable  by  dealing  smashing  blows;  and  to  seize  and 
hold  the  disputed  territory  until  the  intervention  of  the 
Powers,  which  already  seemed  imminent.  "Swift  and 
strong  action  "  was  thus  essential,  and  the  Fourth  Army 
was,  therefore,  ordered  to  continue  the  attack  and  occupy 
Veles  at  all  costs,  while  the  Second  Army,  in  event  of 
these  operations  being  successful  and  the  Vardar  valley 
strongly  held,  was  to  attack  Salonica.1  By  the  time  this 
order  had  arrived  at  the  front  the  whole  situation  was 
already  transformed.  Bulgaria's  "stab  in  the  back" 
had  glanced  off  the  Serbian  armour,  and  the  Serbs  were 
in  their  turn  assuming  the  offensive.  Putnik's  orders  to 
the  First  Army  were  to  hold  the  left  flank  towards 
Kustendil  and  to  concentrate  all  other  available  forces 
on  the  Redki-Buki-Racani  front;  while  the  Third  Army 
was  told  to  check  at  all  costs  the  enemy's  offensive  and 
as  soon  as  possible  to  counter  with  an  offensive  movement 

1  Quoted  in  extenso  in  Revue  Bleue,  first  article,  and  in 
Nationalism  and  War,  p.  266.  The  Times  of  12th  July,  1913, 
published  a  translation  of  the  Order  sent  out  by  Colonel  Encev, 
a  brigadier  of  the  4th  Bulgarian  Division,  at  8  p.m.  on  29th  June, 
to  the  sectional  commanders  under  him,  for  the  attack  on  the 
Serbs  next  day.  This  document  was  captured  from  the  defeated 
Bulgars,  and,  reproduced  in  facsimile,  was  the  first  piece  of 
evidence  published  in  Western  Europe,  to  show  that  the  Bulgars 
were  the  aggressors. 


THE   SECOND    BALKAN   WAR  265 

against  Slip.  That  evening  General  Jankovic  announced 
that  he  was  holding  his  own,  but  asked  urgently  for 
reinforcements.  Putnik  received  his  appeal  philoso- 
phically, and  ordered  him  to  hold  his  ground  till  next 
day,  when  fresh  troops  would  be  brought  up. 

On  30th  June  the  Bulgarian  Fourth  Army  succeeded 
in  occupying  Krivolak,  while  the  Second,  under  Ivanov, 
drove  the  Greeks  out  of  Gjevgjeli.  But  though  the  two 
allies  were  thus  separated  by  a  wedge  of  Bulgarian  troops 
along  the  Vardar,  the  great  gamble  initiated  by  Savov 
and  his  master  had  already  signally  failed.  Then  came 
perhaps  the  most  incredible  incident  in  a  long  series 
of  surprises.  On  the  morning  of  1st  July,  Savov, 
realising  that  the  Serbs,  so  far  from  being  intimidated, 
were  ready  and  eager  for  the  fray,  telegraphed  the  order 
to  stop  hostilities.1  Thus  for  some  hours  there  was  a 
pause  along  the  entire  front,  and  it  is  not  altogether 
clear  at  what  point  and  on  which  side  fighting  recom- 
menced. After  the  long  strain  passions  had  reached  fever 
heat  in  both  armies  and  could  no  longer  be  restrained. 
But  the  essential  factor  in  the  situation  was  that  the  Serbs 
were  thoroughly  tired  of  Bulgarian  methods,  and  deter- 
mined to  put  the  matter  to  a  final  and  decisive  test. 

On  1  st  July  a  proclamation  of  King  Peter  was  issued 
to  the  Serbian  troops,  bidding  them  defend  their 
conquests  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  Greeks  against 
the  greed  of  Bulgaria.  There  is  no  reference  to  the  night 
attack,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  document  had  been 
prepared  some  time  previously  in  Belgrade  and  held  in 
readiness  with  a  blank  space  for  the  insertion  of  the  date.2 
That  afternoon  the  Serbian   counter-offensive  began  in 

1  The  Revue  Bleuc  critic's  terse  but  adequate  comment  upon 
this  volte-face  is:  "C'est  a  n'y  pas  croirc." 

2  Published  in  facsimile  in  Mir  (Mr.  GeSov's  organ)  on  8th  July. 
1913,  and  reproduced  in  Gesov,  Balkan  League,  p.  102.  It 
affords  an  interesting  proof  of  Serbia's  "  preparedness." 


266     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

real  earnest.  While  the  First  Army  attacked  vigorously 
from  Car  Vrh  in  the  direction  of  Kocana,  the  Third  was 
ordered  to  remain  on  the  defensive  until  the  effect  of 
the  sister  army's  operation,  and  notably  of  the  first 
Sumadia  Division,  should  make  itself  felt,  and  then  to 
assume  the  offensive  without  a  moment's  delay  along  the 
Zletovska  front.  Putnik's  plan  was  brilliantly  conceived, 
and  if  carried  out  in  every  detail  would  probably  have 
ended  in  the  complete  destruction  of  Kovacev's  army  : 
for  it  took  full  advantage  of  the  dangerous  strategical 
position  of  the  Bulgarians.  Immediately  behind  the 
latter's  front  and  at  right  angles  to  it  lay  the  Plaskovica 
Planina,  a  tract  of  lofty,  inaccessible  and  pathless 
mountains,  which,  in  the  event  of  their  complete  lack  of 
reserves  forcing  them  to  retreat,  might  become  a  solid 
wedge  cutting  their  army  into  two  halves,  preventing  all 
communication  between  the  two  and  exposing  the 
southern  section  to  a  Greek  attack.  Only  two  ex- 
planations of  Savov's  action  are  possible — complete 
military  incompetence  or  an  over-confidence  so  great  as 
to  accept  altogether  excessive  risks  :  and  it  is  to  the 
latter  explanation  that  all  the  evidence  points. 

On  2nd  July,  after  fierce  and  prolonged  fighting,  the 
Bulgarians  were  thrown  back  across  the  Zletovska  and 
ejected  from  the  strong  fortified  position  of  Redki-Buki. 
All  efforts  of  the  Bulgarians  to  recover  it  next  day  were 
unsuccessful,  and  after  nightfall  they  evacuated  the  right 
bank  of  the  Zletovska.  On  the  4th,  the  Serbs,  who  had 
been  growing  steadily  stronger,  captured  Racjanski  Rid, 
one  of  the  keys  to  the  whole  position,  and  drove  the 
Bulgarians  back  in  confusion  in  the  direction  of  Kocana. 
The  situation  of  the  Third  Army,  however,  still  remained 
critical  :  the  Bulgarians  more  than  held  their  ground  at 
Krivolak,  and  General  Jankovic  appears  to  have  wavered 
and  lost  the  power  of  initiative.1    Thus  on  the  night  of 

1   Revue  Bleue,  fifth  article. 


THE  SECOND  BALKAN  WAR       267 

the  4th,  Putnik  found  it  necessary  to  divert  to  Jankovic's 
aid  a  portion  of  the  victorious  First  Army,  with  the  result 
that  the  remainder  was  not  able  to  follow  up  the  pursuit, 
and  what  might  have  been  a  Bulgarian  rout  was  merely 
a  hurried  retreat.  Even  after  these  reinforcements  had 
reached  him,  and  in  spite  of  orders  to  attack  the  enemy 
"with  the  utmost  energy,"  Jankovic  still  delayed,  not 
realising  that  his  own  situation  at  Krivolak  was  infinitely 
less  precarious  than  that  of  Kovacev  on  the  Bregalnica. 
Between  the  4th  and  7th  the  Bulgarians  withdrew  their 
convoys  and  artillery,  clinging  the  while  desperately 
to  the  heights  east  of  Egri  Palanka  and  Car  Vrh.  Thus 
when  at  last  the  Serbs  advanced  in  earnest  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  8th,  contact  with  the  enemy  had  already  been 
lost,  and  Jankovic's  army,  in  the  words  of  a  French  critic, 
"tomba  dans  le  vide"1  On  9th  July  the  whole  Serbian 
Army  was  on  the  move,  and  occupied  both  Stip  and 
Kocana,  and  on  the  next  day  Radoviste. 

In  spite  of  the  numerous  "revelations"  which  pro- 
minent Bulgarian  statesmen  and  generals  have  bandied 
at  each  other's  heads  ever  since  the  final  disaster,  it  is 
still  too  soon  to  apportion  responsibility  for  the  events  of 
29th  June;  but  it  is  already  clear  that  the  lion's  share 
must  be  assigned  to  King  Ferdinand  himself  and  to  his 
close  connections  with  Vienna  and  Budapest.  In  de- 
fending himself  after  the  war  against  the  savage  attacks 
of  his  critics,  Mr.  Danev  declared  that  during  his  premier- 
ship there  was  another  irresponsible  Cabinet  behind  the 
scenes,  which  without  his  knowledge  reached  the  most 
momentous  decisions,  as  the  result  of  secret  conferences 
with  Count  Tarnowsky.  Two  of  Danev 's  colleagues,  Mr. 
Todorov  and  Mr.  Burov,  also  assured  the  Sobranje  that 
as  late  as  nine  o'clock  on  the  following  evening  they  were 
still  in  ignorance  of  the  attack2;  and  Mr.  Gesov,  though 

1    Revue  Bleue,  ibid. 

-  Balcanicus.  op.  cit.  p.  72. 


268     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

too  discreet  to  lift  the  veil  from  the  events  concerning 
which  he  unquestionably  knows  the  truth,  quite  definitely 
asserts  in  his  recent  book  on  the  genesis  of  the  Balkan 
League,  that  the  attack  took  place  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  Danev  Cabinet  and  contrary  to  its  unanimous 
decision.1  The  mere  fact  that  the  Cabinet  did  not  meet  at 
all  on  that  eventful  day  is  in  itself  highly  significant . 
If  Dr.  Danev  and  the  author  of  certain  sensational  articles 
in  Dnevnik,  presumably  inspired  by  him  and  never 
controverted  officially,  are  to  be  believed,  Tarnowsky  had 
already  given  verbal  assurances  to  King  Ferdinand  that 
Austro-Hungarian  troops  would  reoccupy  the  Sandjak  in 
the  event  of  a  Serbo-Bulgar  war,  and  on  26th  June  a 
treaty  was  signed  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Bul- 
garia, by  which  the  latter  bound  herself,  in  the  event  of 
an  Austro-Serbian  or  an  Austro-Russian  war,  to  mobilise 
enough  troops  to  paralyse  Serbia's  action,  while  Austria- 
Hungary  in  her  turn  undertook  to  prevent,  either  by 
diplomatic  or  militarv  action,  any  attack  of  Roumania 
upon  Bulgaria  in  the  event  of  the  latter  becoming  in- 
volved in  war  with  the  allies,  and  even  to  intervene  her- 
self, should  the  war  take  a  turn  unfavourable  to  Bulgaria. 
In  any  case,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  throughout  the 
summer  of  19 13  Austria-Hungary  was  seriously  con- 
templating an  attack  upon  Serbia.  In  May  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Minister  in  Bucarest,  Prince  Furstenberg, 
communicated  to  Mr.  Take  Ionescu,  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior  in  the  Maiorescu  Cabinet,  a  long  telegram  which 
he  had  received  from  Count  Berchtold,  and  which  in- 
structed him  to  inform  the  Roumanian  Government  that 
Austria-Hungary  was  ready  to  defend  Bulgaria  by  force 
of  arms.     Mr.   Ionescu's  attitude  was  so  discouraging 

1  GeSov,  op.  til.,  p.  92.  Evidence  pointing  in  this  direction 
was  produced  at  a  political  libel  action  in  January,  1915,  in  the 
form  of  a  certificate  from  the  secretary  of  the  Ministerial  Council, 
stating  that  the  Council's  minutes  contain  no  order  for  the  open- 
ing of  hostilities  against  Greece  and  Serbia, 


THE   SECOND   BALKAN    WAR  269 

that  the  Minister  refrained  from  approaching  Mr. 
Maiorescu,  and  warned  his  Government  not  to  proceed. 
Henceforth  Vienna  concentrated  its  attention  upon  Sofia 
rather  than  Bucarest. 

The  great  battle,  of  which  the  night  attack  was  the 
opening  incident,  and  which  may  be  said  to  have  con- 
tinued uninterruptedly  until  9th  July,  will  live  in  history 
as  the  battle  of  Bregalnica,  though  of  course  it  actually 
extended  over  a  much  wider  front.  The  best  proof  of  the 
scale  upon  which  the  attack  was  planned  and  of  the 
fierceness  with  which  it  was  conducted  is  supplied  by  the 
Serbian  losses,  which  are  officially  admitted  to  have 
amounted  to  3,500  within  the  first  twenty-four  hours.1 

Parallel  with  their  surprise  attack,  the  Bulgarians  took 
steps  to  convince  Europe  that  it  was  their  would-be  victim 
who  had  commenced.  "  C'est  le  lapin  qui  a  commence." 
On  30th  June  it  was  officially  announced  from  Sofia  that 
the  Serbian  troops  had  opened  sustained  fire  upon  the 
Bulgarian  lines  between  Zletovo  and  Stip,  and  early  in 
the  morning  of  that  day  the  Bulgarian  Minister  in  Bel- 
grade actually  went  to  the  Serbian  Foreign  Office  to 
lodge  a  protest  against  the  Serbian  attack  !  At  first  sight 
it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  Mr.  Tosev  could  have 
known  in  Belgrade  at  seven  o'clock  that  fighting  had  be- 
gun on  the  Zletovska  only  two  or  three  hours  earlier.  The 
explanation  is  that  the  attack  had  originally  been  planned 
for  the  night  of  28th  June,  and  that  its  postponement  for 
twenty-four  hours  had  been  decided  at  the  last  moment 
and  not  intimated  to  Mr.  Tosev,  who  thus  through  no 
fault  of  his  own  committed  a  fatal  indiscretion.2  Some 
days  later  the  Serbs  and  Greeks  captured  the  original 
orders  for  the  attack  issued  by  a  divisional  commander, 
and  naturally  hastened  to  supply  facsimiles  to  the 
chancelleries  and  Press  of  Europe ;   yet   the   Bulgarian 

1  Barby,    Bregalniiza,    p.    38. 

2  Revue  Bleue,  first  article. 


270     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

Government  had  the  effrontery  to  issue  a  formal  state- 
ment, describing  the  captured  document  as  a  forgery. 
It  was  not  till  after  the  war  that  the  facts  were  finally 
and  irrefutably  established  by  the  rival  Bulgarian  fac- 
tions washing  their  dirty  linen  in  the  face  of  the  whole 
world. 

The  utter  failure  of  their  original  plan  had  filled  the 
conspirators  of  Sofia  with  dismay,  and  already  on  3rd 
July  Savov  was  removed  from  his  command  and  replaced 
by  General  Radko  Dimitriev,  the  hero  of  the  Thracian 
campaign.1  Whether  Savov's  chief  crime  in  the  eyes  of 
King  Ferdinand  consisted  in  his  issuing  the  order  for 
the  attack  or  the  order  for  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  is 
still  a  matter  of  conjecture;  but  it  fs  far  more  probable 
that  he  was  thrown  to  the  wolves  of  public  opinion  the 
moment  that  his  failure  became  apparent.  The  mobilisa- 
tion of  the  Roumanian  army  on  5th  July  came  as  a 
further  shock  to  the  Bulgarian  Government  and 
paralysed  their  whole  plan  of  campaign.  Instead  of 
rapidly  strengthening  Kovacev's  hard-pressed  army 
by  the  transference  of  troops  from  the  Pirot-Vidin 
front,  they  denuded  still  further  the  army  of  Ivanov, 
which  was  already  threatened  by  the  Greek  advance 
(see  p.  276). 

Mr.  Danev,  whose  position  was  rapidly  becoming 
untenable,  more  than  once  placed  his  resignation  in  the 
King's  hands,  but  the  continuance  in  office  of  a  dis- 
credited Russophil  was  thought  for  the  moment  to  be 
convenient.  A  letter  addressed  to  the  King  by  Messrs. 
Radoslavov,  Genadiev,  and  Toncev,  urging  the  need  for 
security  against  Turkey  and  Roumania  and  advocating 
an  intimate  accord  with  Austria-Hungary  as  the  sole 
means  of  attaining  this  and  of  saving   Bulgaria   from 

1  There  is  said  to  have  been  a  violent  scene,  almost  degenerating 
into  a  scuffle,  between  Savov  and  Todorov,  the  Minister  of  Finance. 
See  Reichspost.  30th  July,  1913. 


THE    SECOND   BALKAN   WAR  271 

disaster,1  throws  light  upon  the  real  political  back- 
ground at  Sofia  and  foreshadowed  the  return  of  long- 
discredited  statesmen  to  power.  Not  all  the  efforts  of 
the  Bulgarian  press  bureau  could  avail  to  conceal  the 
gravity  of  the  situation.2  The  first  sign  of  impending- 
danger  from  the  Turkish  side  was  the  Porte's  invitation 
to  the  Government  of  Sofia  to  withdraw  its  troops  from 
Rodosto  to  within  the  new  frontier  (8th  July),  and  news 
of  the  capture  of  Koiana  by  the  Serbs  and  of  Strumnica 
by  the  Greeks  coincided  with  Roumania's  declaration 
of  war  (10th).  In  breaking  off  relations  the  Roumanian 
Government  pointedly  reminded  Dr.  Danev  that  he  had 
received  fair  warning  from  Bucarest,  but  had  never  even 
condescended  to  reply.  Bulgaria,  on  the  contrary,  had 
attacked  Serbia  "without  any  observance  of  even  the 
elementary  rules  of  preliminary  notification  which  would 
at  least  have  testified  to  a  respect  for  the  conventions  of 
international  usage."  Next  day  Roumanian  troops 
began  to  cross  the  Danube,  and  Bulgaria  announced  that 
they  would  not  be  opposed.  Realising  that  the  situation 
was  becoming  desperate,  Mr.  Danev  placed  himself  in 
the  hands  of  Russia,  and  appealed  for  mediation.  But 
naturally  enough  Mr.  Sazonov  no  longer  showed  the 
same  eagerness  to  mediate,  and  declined  to  entertain  the 
idea,  unless  all  the  Balkan  states  were  willing  to  submit 
their  claims.  He  made  no  concealment  of  his  view  that 
Bulgaria's  action  had  destroyed  the  original  treaty  of 
191 2,  and  that  Serbia  and  Greece  had  a  right  to  insist 
upon  a  common  frontier.     Sofia  was  not  yet  prepared 

1  See  full  text  in  Reichspost  of  12th  October,  1913. 

2  According  to  the  news  supplied  to  Mr.  Bourchier  on  6th  July, 
the  Serbs  were  "  now  completely  repulsed."  On  10th  July  the 
Serbs  were  announced  as  retreating  all  along  the  line,  pursued 
by  the  Bulgars;  while  on  17th  July  he  records  a  great  victory 
over  the  Greeks  at  Strumnica,  hitherto  "cancelled  for  political 
reasons  but  now  confirmed."  See  Times  of  7th,  12th,  and  10th 
July,  1913. 


272    THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

tor  such   humiliation,  and  events  were  allowed  to  take 
their  course.1 

With  the  capture  of  Egri  Palanka  on  14th  July  by 
the  Serbs  the  struggle  on  their  front  reached  its  high- 
water  mark.  Next  day  the  Bulgarian  Fourth  Army  with- 
drew to  strong  positions  round  Pehcevo,  thus  re- 
establishing its  connections  with  Ivanov's  forces;  and 
henceforth,  though  intermittent  fighting,  sometimes  of 
a  very  fierce  character,  continued  till  the  very  eve  of  the 
armistice,  something  approaching  a  stalemate  had  been 
reached.  It  had  become  a  war  of  frontal  positions,  and 
the  Serbs  could  not  hope  to  pierce  the  Bulgarian  lines 
except  at  enormous  cost.  Their  losses  had  already  been 
extremely  heavy,  and  as  the  result  of  difficulties  in  the 
supply  of  water  to  the  troops,  a  serious  epidemic  of 
cholera  had  broken  out  in  their  ranks  and  was  causing 
much  alarm  at  headquarters.  Above  all,  Serbia's  aim  had 
been  attained.  Her  armies  had  defied  all  attempts  to 
evict  them  from  their  much  coveted  Macedonian  con- 
quests ;  they  were  in  occupation  of  all  and  more  than 
they  desired  to  keep.  Any  attempt  to  make  fresh  con- 
quests would  only  have  destroyed  the  reviving  sym- 
pathies of  Europe  and  increased  still  further  the  danger 
of  an  Austrian  attack  upon  Serbia.  As  we  shall  see, 
the    spectre   of    Austro-Hungarian    intervention    lurked 

1  The  Russophobe  tendencies  which  ;it  this  moment  gained  the 
upper  hand  in  Sofia,  are  faithfully  reflected  in  Mr.  Bourchier's 
telegrams  to  the  Times.  On  16th  July  he  writes  that  "the  fatal 
mistake  of  believing  that  Russia  would  protect  this  country  against 
the  consequences  of  misadventure  is  now  manifest.  Russia  has 
played  a  double  role.  She  has  witnessed  complacently  the  denun- 
ciation of  a  treaty  concluded  under  her  auspices,  she  has  allowed 
the  Protocol  of  Petrograd,  embody in^  the  decision  of  Europe,  to  be 
set  aside,  and  she  has  encouraged  a  neighbouring  sta'te  to  invade 
the  territory  of  her  defenceless  prole'ge'.  Having  sanctioned  the 
unity  of  the  Bulgarian  race  at  San  Stefano,  she  now  proposes  its 
dismemberment.  She  is  even  suspected  of  having  instigated  the 
advance  of  the  Turkish  Army."     (See  Times  of  17th  July,  1913.) 


THE   SECOND^  BALKAN   WAR  273 

continually  in  the  background  and  was  probably  only 
averted  by  the  attitude  of  Roumania.  In  August 
Bucarest  no  longer  availed  to  hold  back  Vienna,  and 
the  combined  efforts  of  Berlin  and  Rome  were  needed 
to  prevent  the  Ballplatz  from  taking  action  which  would 
almost  certainly  have  plunged  Europe  into  war. 


Almost  simultaneously  with  the  treacherous  night 
attack  upon  the  Serbs,  and  acting  upon  parallel  orders, 
the  Bulgarian  Southern  Army  under  General  Ivanov 
assumed  the  offensive  against  the  Greeks;  and  it  was 
calculated  that  if  the  operations  on  the  Bregalnica  front 
followed  the  desired  course,  there  would  be  no  great 
difficulty  in  taking  possession  of  Salonica.  Savov, 
however,  being  obsessed  with  the  idea  of  Greek  in- 
feriority, left  Ivanov  with  quite  inadequate  forces,  on 
a  far  broader  and  more  open  front  than  that  between 
the  Bulgar  and  Serbs.  The  number  of  men  at  Ivanov's 
disposal  has  been  the  subject  of  fierce  controversy  both 
in  Sofia  and  Athens ;  and  after  the  war  the  General 
himself,  in  the  Bulgarian  Press,  accused  Savov  of 
deliberately  leaving  him  to  face  an  enemy  which  out- 
numbered him  by  three  to  one,  out  of  revenge  for  their 
difference  of  opinion  at  the  siege  of  Adrianople.  A  con- 
fidential Bulgarian  report  captured  by  the  Greeks  shows 
that  on  4th  June  the  strength  of  the  Second  Army  was 
83  infantry  battalions  and  216  cannon1;  but  this,  of 
course,  gives  no  clue  as  to  its  strength  nearly  four  weeks 
later.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  Bulgarian 
regiments  were  very  often  under  strength.  At  the 
critical  moment  estimates  vary  between  30  and  66  bat- 
talions, and  a  French  military  expert  accepts  57  as  the 
true  figure.2    But  it  is  certain  that  as  soon  as  Kovacev's 

1  Crawfurd  Price,  Balkan  Cockpit,  p.  280. 

2  See  Revue  Bleue,  op.   cit.  (first  article).     Captain  Trapmann, 
who  accompanied  the  Greek  army,  maintains  that  the  Bulgarians 

T 


274     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

coup  de  main  against  the  Serbs  had  failed,  a  consider- 
able portion  of  Ivanov's  forces  were  hurriedly  diverted 
northwards,  and  consequently  that  the  Greeks  for  the 
first  three  weeks  of  the  campaign  greatly  outnumbered 
the  Bulgars  and  were  especially  superior  in  artillery.  The 
Greek  plan  consisted  in  holding  the  Bulgarian  right 
wing  by  an  attack  upon  Kukus-Likovan,  which  if 
successfully  maintained  would  have  the  effect  of  driving 
a  wedge  between  the  Bulgarian  Fourth  and  Second 
Armies;  meanwhile  the  Greek  right  was  to  cut  the 
railway  between  Seres  and  Drama  and  thus  restrict  the 
arrival  of  Ivanov's  supplies  or  reinforcements  to  a  single 
road  across  the  Rhodope  Mountains.  Ivanov  gallantly 
tried  to  forestall  this  plan  by  prompt  offensive  opera- 
tions; and  on  30th  June  the  Bulgarian  left  drove  in 
the  Greek  advance  guards  between  Lake  Tachinos  and 
the  sea,  while  their  right  seized  Gjevgjeli.  But  already 
lack  of  men  fatally  hampered  his  movements;  and  he 
found  it  necessary  to  transfer  what  troops  he  had  at 
Seres  with  all  possible  speed  in  the  direction  of  Kukus. 
Meanwhile  an  abrupt  end  was  put  to  the  dream  of  a 

numbered  80,000  on  2nd  July,  and  115,000  on  3rd  July,  as  opposed 
to  60,000  and  80,000  respectively  on  the  Greek  side.  This  writer's 
statements,  however,  are  to  be  accepted  with  great  caution.  What 
he  says  of  the  Bulgars  is  rant  of  the  worst  kind  :  "cold-blooded, 
cruel,  ignorant,  vicious,  and  lustful  " — all  this  is  thrown  at  their 
heads  in  a  single  sentence.  "  Tippoo  Sahib,  Nero,  Robespierre, 
Catherine  of  Russia,  and  the  Borgias  were  but  mildly  oppressive 
and  unkind,  as  compared  with  the  lustful  brutes  who  wore  the 
uniform  of  King  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria."  After  this  the  reader  is 
apt  to  discount  the  absurd  assertion  that  the  Bulgars  during  the 
nine  months  preceding  the  Second  War  "have  done  to  death 
between  450,000  and  500,000  peaceable  inhabitants,  men,  women, 
and  children,  Turks  and  Greeks."  On  the  other  hand,  we  may 
acci.pt  his  account,  based  upon  his  own  investigations  on  the  spot 
within  a  few  days  of  the  events,  of  the  atrocities  committed  by  the 
Bulgarians  at  Nigrita.  (See  his  article  in  Nineteenth  Century  for 
October,  1913.) 


THE    SECOND   BALKAN    WAR  275 

Bulgarian  seizure  of  Salonica.  General  Hasapcev's 
troops,  abandoned  by  their  officers  with  orders  to  resist 
to  the  death  and  the  assurance  that  they  would  be 
relieved  within  twelve  hours,  offered  a  stout  resistance, 
but  eventually  surrenderd  when  they  realised  they 
were  caught  like  rats  in  a  trap. 

On  2nd  July  the  Greek  army,  led  by  King  Constantine 
in  person,  opened  a  vigorous  offensive  at  Kukus,  with 
the  object  of  capturing  the  Bulgarian  base  of  supplies  at 
Dojran  and  thus  threatening  Kovacev's  rear  during  his 
struggle  with  the  Serbs.  The  Greek  superiority  in 
mountain  guns1  and  the  King's  able  generalship  were 
supplemented  by  the  remarkable  elan  of  the  Greek  in- 
fantry, who  in  spite  of  blazing  heat  forced  the  Bul- 
garians to  yield  ground  and  to  evacuate  Gjevgjeli  (3rd 
July).  Next  day  the  Greek  Third  Division  took  posi- 
tions of  Lahana  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  while  the 
First  Division  forced  the  Bulgarians  northwards  to- 
wards Strumnica.  That  night  General  Ivanov,  seeing 
his  communications  threatened,  ordered  a  general 
retreat,  and  acting  on  instructions  from  Sofia,  withdrew 
into  the  Struma  valley,  the  one  column  direct  from 
Seres  and  Demirhissar  through  the  gorge  of  Rupel,  the 
other  across  the  Belasica  Planina  to  Strumnica,  a  small 
town  near  the  source  of  the  river  of  the  same  name, 
itself  a  tributary  of  the  Struma. 

These  operations  involved  very  grave  risks,  owing 
to  the  wide  front  and  very  inferior  numbers  of 
the  Bulgarians,  but  they  were  carried  out  with  sur- 
prising precision  and  success,  and  though  21  cannon 
fell  into  Greek  hands,  the  number  of  prisoners 
taken  was  insignificant.  The  fierceness  with  which 
the  battle  of  Kukus  was  contested  may  be  judged 
from  the  Greek  casualties,  which  amounted,   according 

1  According  to  Colonel  Immanuel,  60  to  12  (288  guns  in  al!  to 
140  Bulgarian),  op.  cit.,  p.  60. 

T  2 


276     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

to  official  admissions,  to  over  10,000  in  three  days,  or 
fourteen  per  cent,  of  the  forces  engaged.1 

On  the  evening  of  6th  July  the  town  of  Dojran,  a 
valuable  strategic  point,  rilled  with  huge  military  stores, 
was  occupied  by  the  Greeks  without  a  struggle ;  and 
their  advance  next  day  upon  Strumnica  at  once  began 
to  affect  the  position  of  Kovacev's  army,  which  was 
forced  to  evacuate  Stip  and  Radoviste  to  the  Serbs.  On 
9th  July  the  Greek  advance,  necessarily  slow  owing  to 
the  broken  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  lack  of  good 
roads,  placed  Strumnica  in  their  hands,  but  they  had 
found  it  impossible  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Bulgars 
down  the  valley  of  the  Strumnica.  By  1  ith  July  Ivanov's 
army  was  safely  ensconced  in  the  Kresna  Pass,  and 
engaged  in  consolidating  its  position  and  linking  up 
with  the  Fourth  Army  on  the  upper  Bregalnica. 

Meanwhile  Seres,  which  had  been  evacuated  by  the 
Bulgars  as  early  as  5th  July,  was  not  occupied  by  the 
Greeks  till  the  eleventh;  and  in  the  interval  large  bands 
of  Bulgarian  komitadjis,  armed  with  cannon  and  led  by 
regular  officers,  sacked  the  town  and  committed  hideous 
excesses  against  the  Greek  and  Turkish  population.  The 
victors  found  more  than  half  the  town,  including  many 
of  its  rich  tobacco  depots,  in  ruins;  and  King  Constan- 
tine  himself  lost  no  time  in  exploiting  these  and  other 
"Bulgarian  horrors"  by  sensational  interviews  in  th<- 
Ruropean  press.2     By  an   irony  of  fate  the  memorable 

1  Price,   op.    cit. ,   p.    299. 

2  The  whole  question  of  atrocities  is  exhaustively — and  exhaust- 
ingly — dealt  with  by  the  Report  of  the  International  Commission 
of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace  (Washington, 
1914),  and  it  could  serve  no  good  purpose  to  deal  with  the  question 
in  detail  in  such  a  volume  as  the  present.  But  it  is  essential  that 
the  reader  should  be  informed  of  certain  facts  regarding  the  com- 
position of  the  Carnegie  Commission.  If  all  its  members  had 
actually  taken  part  in  the  investigations,  as  the  reader  is  left 
to  infer  from  an  extraordinarily  misleading  preface  by  Baron 
D'Estournelles  de  Constant,    its  mission  could   hardly  have  been 


THE   SECOND   BALKAN   WAR  277 

phrase  of  Gladstone  now  became  a  reproach  to  the 
nation  in  whose  aid  it  had  mobilised  civilised  opinion 
a  generation  earlier. 

opposed  by  the  belligerent  Governments,  and  its  findings  would 
have  commanded  universal  respect.  In  point  of  fact,  Professor 
Redlich  (Vienna),  Professor  Paszkowski  (Berlin),  and  Mr.  F.  W. 
Hirst  (London),  were  from  the  very  first  prevented,  Baron 
D'Estournelles  remained  at  home,  and  Professor  Schiicking  (Mar. 
burg)  got  no  farther  than  Vienna.  Thus  the  Commission  con- 
sisted only  of  four — two  entirely  non-committal,  because  un- 
acquainted with  Balkan  problems,  M.  Godart  (the  French  deputy) 
and  Professor  Dutton  (Columbia  University),  and  two  whose 
knowledge  and  high  reputation  no  one  can  fairly  dispute,  bul 
whose  selection  was  bitterly  and  openly  resented  by  the  Serbian 
and  Greek  Governments,  and  by  public  opinion  in  Belgrade  and 
Athens,  owing  to  their  pronouncedly  Bulgarophil  record — namely, 
Professor  Paul  Miljukov  and  Mr.  H.  M.  Brailsford.  Personally 
I  have  absolute  confidence  in  their  desire  to  be  impartial,  but  none 
whatever  in  a  central  committee  which  failed  to  realise  the  fatal 
error  of  making  such  a  selection,  unless  it  were  supplemented  bv 
the  appointment  of  other  equally  well-known  friends  of  the  Hellenic 
or  Serbian  cause. 

Those  who  desire  to  investigate  the  repulsive  and  thorny  subject 
of  atrocities,  may  be  referred  to  the  following  publications  : — 

(i)  (Greek  case)  Professor  Theodore  Zaimis  :  Atrocites  bulgares 
en  Macddoine.  Expose  soumis  par  le  recteur  de  I'Universitc 
d'Athenes  aux  recteurs  des   Univcrsites  d'Europe  et  d'Amerique, 

(2)  (Bulgarian  case)  Professor  L.  Miletitch,  Atrocitis  Grecques 
en  Macidoine.  Sofia  (Imprimerie  de  l'Etat),  1913,  and  Reponse 
a  la  Brochure  des  Professeurs  d'Athenes,  bv  the  University  Pro- 
fessors of  Sofia. 

(3)  (Serbian  case).     Bulgarian  Atrocities.     Belgrade,  1913.     (Illustrated). 

(4)  (Turkish  case)  The  Balkan  Massacres:  a  Turkish  appeal, 
and,   Come  Over  to  Macedonia  and  Help    Us  (both  published   bv 

the  "  Balkan  Allies  Atrocities  Publication  Committee,"  of  Con- 
stantinople), and  Pierre  Loti's  La  Turqttie  Agonisante,  which 
reveals  its  author's  well-known  qualities  of  imagination.  For  the 
behaviour  of  the  Turks  on  their  return  to  Thrace,  see  statements 
of  an  eye-witness,  the  Augustinian  Father  Superior  Theophistus, 
in  Reichspost  of  20th  August,   1913. 

There  can  be  no  question  that  the  atrocities,  bad  as  they  were, 
were  magnified  tenfold,  and  that  this  was  due  not  merely  to  those 
habits  of  mutual  calumny  and  abuse  and  love  of  exaggeration 
which  Turkish  rule  has  ingrained  in  the  Macedonian  population, 


278     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

After  the  fall  of  Seres  and  Demirhissar  there  was  an 
unaccountable  delay  of  nearly  a  week  in  the  Greek 
advance.  King  Constantine's  aim  was  to  isolate  the 
Bulgarians  at  Nevrokop  and  Zernovo  from  the  main 
forces  further  west,  but  above  all  to  drive  a  wedge 
between  the  Second  and  Fourth  Bulgarian  Armies  and 
link  up  with  the  Serbs  on  the  Bregalnica.  But  the  un- 
quenchable Ivanov  explained  this  unexpected  respite 
from  attack  as  a  sign  of  slackening  on  the  part  of  the 
Greeks,  and  was  only  prevented  from  resuming  the 
offensive  by  the  refusal  of  headquarters  to  supply  him 
with  the  necessary  reinforcements.  Sofia  was  still  com- 
pletely paralysed  by  the  rapid  advance  of  the  Rouma- 
nians, and  while  hesitating  to  involve  itself  in  actual 
hostilities  with  the  new  invader,  neglected  to  employ 
its  surplus  troops  at  the  point  where  their  appearance 
might  possibly  have  turned  the  scale.  On  15th  July 
yet  another  stroke  of  misfortune  befell  Bulgaria.  The 
Porte  intimated  to  Sofia  that  it  regarded  the  Treaty  of 
London  as  no  longer  binding,  in  so  far  as  Adrianople 
and  the  Marica  were  concerned,  and  that  it  intended  to 
secure  a  real  strategic  frontier  instead  of  the  untenable 
Enos-Midia  line.  The  same  day  a  cavalry  division  under 
Bnver  Bey  reoccupied  Liile  Burgas  and  began  to 
march  upon  Kirk  Kilisse.  The  Bulgarian  Govern- 
ment made  a  frantic  appeal  to  Sir  Edw:ard  Grey  for 
action  such  as  might  enforce  respect  for  the  Treaty  of 
London,  "promoted  and  guaranteed  by  the  Powers." 
But  in  London,  as  in  Petrograd,  these  appeals  met  with 
scant  sympathy ;  and  whatever  may  be  said  of  the  wisdom 

and  to  a  lesser  degree  in  some  of  its  neighbours,  but,  above  all,  to 
the  deliberate  propaganda  of  occult  influences  which  sought  to 
discredit  all  the  Balkan  States  with  Western  public  opinion.  The 
worst  offenders  were  the  Young  Turks,  with  their  invisible 
backers  in  the  underworld  of  European  finance,  and  many  worthy 
p*v,-ple  became  their  unconscious  dupes. 


THE  SECOND  BALKAN  WAR       279 

of  such  an  attitude,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  tht 
Times  was  accurately  interpreting  the  average  public 
opinion,  when,  in  a  leading  article  of  17th  July,  it  ex- 
pressed doubt  whether  Bulgaria,  having  deliberately 
refused  to  listen  to  the  counsels  of  Europe,  had  any 
right  to  expect  Europe  to  save  her  from  the  consequences, 
or  "any  right,  legal  or  moral,  to  regard  the  obligations 
of  the  Powers  as  intact,  after  she  herself  has  rekindled 
the  flames  of  war."  Looking  back  upon  these  events 
in  the  light  of  what  has  happened  since,  it  is  easy  to 
see  that  our  complaisant  attitude  towards  the  Turks 
alienated  the  Bulgarians  from  the  Entente  and  left  them 
with  a  deep  sense  of  grievance  towards  those  who  had 
imposed  the  Treaty  of  London  upon  them  and  then  so 
soon  consented  to  regard  it  as  "a  scrap  of  paper,"  and 
that  while  leaving  Bulgaria  to  pay  the  penalty  for  her 
act  of  treachery  towards  Serbia  and  her  neglect  of 
Roumanian  warnings,  we  should  have  been  wiser  to 
insist  upon  the  Thracian  arrangement  remaining  un- 
altered. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  indifference  of  the 
Entente  Powers  to  Bulgaria's  plight  contributed  very 
materially  to  the  failure  of  Mr.  Malinov  to  form  a  new 
Russophil  Cabinet  in  succession  to  that  of  Dr.  Danev. 
On  17th  July  his  place  was  definitely  taken  by  Mr. 
Radoslavov,  who  for  a  whole  generation  past  has  con- 
sistently represented  Austrophilism  in  Bulgaria  and 
whose  attitude  to  Russia  may  be  summed  up  in  the 
famous  phrase  of  Cankov  : — "We  want  neither  your 
honey  nor  your  sting."  The  influence  of  Count  Tar- 
nowski,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  in  Sofia,  thus 
became  more  powerful  than  ever,  and  to  the  very  last 
it  was  hoped  that  a  situation  favourable  to  Austrian 
intervention  might  arise.  The  main  factor  in  preventing 
this  was  undoubtedly  Roumania,  who,  after  being  the 
faithful  vassal  of  Vienna  for  a  whole  generation  past, 


280     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

seemed  now  on  the  point  of  self-assertion  and  who,  there- 
fore, had  to  be  treated  with  special  consideration  and 
tact.  Much  then  as  Austria-Hungary  would  have  liked 
lo  reinstate  Bulgaria  at  the  expense  of  the  Serbs,  she 
still  hesitated  to  take  any  action  which  might  alienate 
Roumania  from  the  orbit  of  the  Monarchy. 

The  Bulgars,  realising  the  hopelessness  of  resistance, 
did  not  oppose  the  Roumanian  advance;  and  by  20th 
fuly  four  army  corps  had  been  rapidly  thrown  across 
the  Danube  and  were  holding  a  line  within  forty  miles 
of  Sofia  itself.  This  new  threat  forced  the  Bulgars  to 
withdraw  their  First  and  Third  Armies,  which  in  accord- 
ance with  Savov's  original  plans,  but  at  least  a  week  too 
late  to  be  really  effective,  had  invaded  northern  Serbia. 
On  8th  July  Kutincev  had  occupied  Knjazevac  in  the 
Timok  valley  and  even  threatened  Zajecar,  while  General 
Raco  Petrov  attacked  Pirot,  on  the  main  line  of  the  Orient 
Express,  and  for  a  short  time  held  the  railway  station 
and  seemed  about  to  cut  the  connection  between  Belgrade 
and  Skoplje.  On  the  17th  both  armies  withdrew  once 
more  into  Bulgarian  territory,  and  some  regiments,  get- 
ting completely  out  of  hand,  sacked  the  town  of  Knja- 
zevac,  murdered  and  outraged  many  innocent  civilians 
and  even  killed  the  Serbian  wounded  in  cold  blood. 
The  Serbs  followed  them  as  far  as  the  border  fortresses 
of  Belogradcik  and  Vidin,  but  soon  took  up  a  waiting 
attitude  and  contented  themselves  with  occasionally 
shelling  the  latter  town. 

By  23rd  July  Bulgaria's  enemies  were  closing  in  upon 
all  sides.  The  Fifth  Roumanian  Army  occupied  the 
Turtucaia-Balcik  line,  while  the  main  forces  arrived 
within  cannon  shot  of  Sofia.  On  the  same  day  the 
Turks  reoccupied  Adrianople  with  very  considerable 
forces.  They  had  employed  the  first  half  of  1913  in 
making  good  their  military  deficiencies  and  were  now 
able  to  put  into  the  field  larger  armies  than  those  which 


THE   SECOND   BALKAN  WAR  281 

had  been  engaged  in  the  First  Balkan  War.1  Fortunately 
the  Greeks  had  landed  troops  at  Kavala  and  pushed 
them  eastwards  along  the  coast  as  far  as  Dedeagac ;  and 
the  Turks  hesitated  to  provoke  the  international  com- 
plications which  an  attack  upon  them  would  have  in- 
volved. 


By  21st  July  the  struggle  on  the  Serbo-Bulgar  front 
had  passed  its  height  and  assumed  the  character  of  a 
war  of  positions  in  mountainous  country,  where  envelop- 
ing movements  were  not  easy  and  both  armies  held 
strongly  fortified  points  of  vantage.  The  Serbs  had 
attained  their  object  and  were  disinclined  to  increase 
their  already  heavy  losses  by  operations  on  a  large  scale  : 
while  the  Bulgars,  after  launching  fierce  assaults  for 
five  consecutive  days  (22nd-27th  July)  upon  the  Serbian 
positions  near  Egri  Palanka  and  also  to  the  east  of 
Kocana,  finally  renounced  the  hope  of  breaking  through 
towards  Veles  or  Skoplje  and  devoted  their  whole  efforts 
to  crushing  the   Greeks. 

On  2 1 st  July  King  Constantine  opened  an  attack 
upon  the  Bulgarian  defensive  positions  which  lay  across 
the  mouth  of  the  Kresna  Pass,  Pehcevo  forming  thr 
link  with  the  upper  Bregalnica  valley.  The  Greek  aim 
was  to  outflank  Kresna  from  the  east,  and  thus  force 
back  the  Bulgars  within  their  old  frontiers,  while  tie 
latter  hoped  to  draw  on  the  Greeks  towards  Dzumaja 
and  then  by  an  encircling  movement  to  cut  off  their 
retreat  down  the  Struma  valley.  With  this  end  in  view, 
a  new  army  was  formed  under  the  command  of  General 
Savov,  both  Ivanov  and   Kutincev  being  placed  under 

1  The  Eastern  Army,  under  Ahmed  Abuk  Pasha,  held  Kirk 
Kilisse  with  80,000  men,  the  Western,  under  Hurshid  Pasha,  held 
Adrianople  and  Dimotika  with  90,000  men,  while  60,000  more, 
under  Djavid  Pasha,  were  concentrated  in  Constantinople  and 
Gallipoli  (see  Immanuel,  op  cit..  V.  pp.  7S  80). 


282     THE  RISE  OF  NATIONALITY  IN  THE  BALKANS 

him  ;  and  as  the  result  of  a  steady  flow  of  reinforcements 
from  the  north,  the  Bulgarians  for  the  first  time  gained 
a  numerical  superiority  over  the  Greeks.  On  24th  July 
the  Fourth  Greek  Division  stormed  the  lofty  mountain 
position  of  Rujen,  and  the  Second  Division  took  pos- 
session oT  Susitsa.  But  after  a  couple  of  days  of 
position  warfare  in  the  mountains,  the  Bulgars  swiftly 
assumed  the  offensive,  moving  simultaneously  south- 
eastwards  up  the  Bregalnica  and  south-westwards  from 
Belica.  Their  plan,  which  aimed  at  bottling  six  Greek 
divisions,  was  thwarted  by  the  timely  arrival  of  re- 
inforcements, and  after  fierce  fighting  the  Bulgars  retired 
on  the  27th  to  the  outskirts  of  Dzumaja.  Next  day  the 
decisive  battle  began.  At  first  the  Greek  right  captured 
certain  positions,  but  it  was  gradually  forced  back  by 
the  advancing  Bulgars,  who  occupied  Mehomija  and 
Banjska,  while  the  Greek  left,  consisting  of  the  Third 
and  Tenth  Divisions,  was  seriously  threatened  by  Bul- 
garian forces  advancing  up  the  Bregalnica,  and  found 
it  necessary  to  withdraw  to  Pehcevo.  On  the  29th  a 
counter-attack  was  ordered  by  King  Constantine,  and 
the  Second  and  Fourth  Divisions  made  a  determined 
effort  to  ease  the  situation  for  their  comrades  of  the 
Third  by  attacking  their  assailants  in  the  rear.  None 
the  less  the  Bulgarian  offensive  continued,  and  on  30th 
July  Colonel  Gesev  occupied  Pehcevo  and  other  points 
and  seemed  to  be  threatening  the  Greek  main  position 
on  the  Kadijica  hill.1  Moreover,  the  Serbs,  who  had 
renewed  their  activity  in  order  to  lighten  the  task  of 
the  Greeks,  met  with  a  decided  check  between  Kocana 
and  Carevoselo. 

Desperate  fighting  still  continued,  when  late  in  the 
evening  of  30th  July  hostilities  were  suspended  by  the 
news  that  a  five  days'  armistice  had  been  concluded  at 
Bucarest.     Not    unnaturally   an    acute  controversy    has 

'   Immanuel,  p.   89. 


THE  SECOND   BALKAN   WAR  283 

raged  over  the  respective  positions  and  prospects  of  the 
opposing  armies,  and  the  material  for  a  definite  judg- 
ment is  not  as  yet  at  our  disposal.  The  Bulgars  claim 
that  their  enveloping  movement  was  on  the  very  point 
of  succeeding,  while  the  Greeks  assert  that  the  fall  of 
Hasan  Pasha  and  Leska,  two  important  strategic  points, 
was  imminent,  and  that  five  Bulgarian  brigades  would 
then  have  been  caught  between  two  fires  by  Greeks  and 
Serbs  and  forced  to  surrender.1  While  the  orders  issued 
by  King  Constantine  for  a  fresh  offensive  next  day  cer- 
tainly prove  that  the  Greeks  were  not  yet  exhausted,  it 
has  been  alleged  by  Sofia,  and  as  vigorously  denied  by 
Athens,  that  the  Greek  headquarters,  alarmed  at  their 
unfavourable  situation,  begged  the  Roumanians  to  insist 
upon  an  immediate  suspension  of  hostilities.  What 
truth  there  is  in  this  allegation,  and  whether  it  was  in- 
vented as  a  sop  to  Bulgaria's  wounded  ^pride  or  was 
merely  a  perversion  of  the  undoubted  fact  that  the 
Roumanians  threatened  to  enter  Sofia  unless  'he 
armistice  were  accepted  by  the  night  of  30th  July,  time 
alone  can  show. 

1  Crawfurd    Price,   <>p.   cit.,   p.    340. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


9- 
10. 
ii. 

[2. 


[Unfortunately  Mr.  Seton-Watson  was  unable  to  finish  his 
bibliography,  and  he  left  it  in  my  hands.  I  have  made  his 
scheme  as  complete  as  1  could. — George  Glasgow.] 

i.  General    Histories   and   Textbooks 

>.  Geographical,  Ethnographical,  Statisticai 

3.  Turkey 

4.  The  Eastern   Question 

5.  Serbia,  Mo\tenegro,  and  the  Southern  Slavs 

6.  Bulgaria 

7.  Roumania 

8.  Greece      

Albania     

Books  of  Travel 
Diplomatic  and  Biographical 
The  Balkan  Wars       

[Books  marked  with  a  *  are  specially  recommended.] 

1.  General  Histories  and  Textbooks. 

*Bamberg,     F.,     Geschichte    der    orientals schen    Angelegenheiten. 
Leipzig,  1888. 
Forbes,  Nevill,  and  others,  The  Balkans:  a  History,  Oxford,  1915. 
*Iorga,  Prof.  N.,  Histoire  des  Etats  balcaniques,   Bucarest,   1914. 
*Miller,  W.,  The  Balkans,  London,  1896. 

The  Ottoman  Empire,  1801-1913,  Cambridge,  1913. 
Roth,   K.,   Geschichte  der  christlichen   Balkanstaaten,    1907. 
Sax,   Carl   Ritter  von,    Die    Wahrheit  iiber  die   Serbische   Frage 

und  das  Serbentum  in  Bosnien,   Leipzig,    1909. 
Seignobos,  Charles,  A  Political  History  of  Contemporary  Europe 
since   18 14  (translated  from  the  French),  London,   190 1. 

2.  Geographical,  Ethnographical,  Statistical. 

Brancoff,    D.    M.,    La    Macedoine    et    sa    Population    Chritienne, 
Paris,  1905.     Contains  elaborate  statistics ;  but  no  Macedonian 
statistics  are  of  any  real  value,  save  as  illustrating  the  psycho- 
logy of  the  respective  claimants. 
Grothe,  Hugo,  Zur  Landeskunde  von  Rumanien,   Halle,   1907. 
Jirecek,  K.,   Die  Heerstrasse  von  Belgrad  nach   Konstantinopel, 
Prag,   1877. 

285 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Jirecek,    K.,    Die    Handelsstrassen   und   Bergwerke    von    Serbieu 
und   Bosnien   wahrend   des    Mittelalters,    Prag, 
1879. 
Lyde,    L.    W.,    and    Mockler-Ferryman,   A.    F.,   A    Military   Geo- 
graphy   of    the    Balkan    Peninsula,    London,     1905.     A    most 
admirable  textbook. 
Murgoci,   G.,   and  Popa-Burra,    I.,    Rom&nia  si   'Terile  locuite  de 
Romdni,  Bucarest,  1902. 
"Newbigin,  Marion  I.,  Geographical  Aspects  of  Balkan  Problems 
in  their  Relation  to  the  Great  European   War,  London,   1915. 
Robert,  Cyprien,   Les  Slaves  de  Turquie,  Paris,   1862. 

3.  Turkey. 

Berard,  Victor,  La  Turquie  et  I'Helle'nisme  Contemporain,  Paris, 
1897. 
Pro     Macedonia:     L' Action     Austro-Russe,     etc., 

Paris,   1904. 
Le  Sultan,  I' I  slam  et  les  Puissances,  Paris,  1907. 
La  Revolution  Turque,  Paris,  1909. 
La  Mort  de  Stamboul,  Paris,  1913. 
*Brailsford,    H.    N.,    Macedonia:    Its    Races    and    their    Future, 
London,  1906. 
Creasy,    Sir   Edward,    History   of   the   Ottoman    Turks,    London, 

1878. 
Draganof,   P.,  La  Macidoine  et  les  Reformes,  Paris,   1906. 
*Eliot,    Sir   Charles,    Turkey   in    Europe,    2nd   ed.,    London,    1908 
(1st  ed.,  1900). 
Gfrorer,  A.,  Byzantinische  Geschichten,  3  vols.,  Graz.,   1872-7. 
*Hammer-Purgstall,  J.  von.,  Geschichte  des  Osmanischen  Retches, 
2nd  ed. ,  4  vols.,  Pest,   1840.     Will  always  remain  a  standard 
work 
Hertzberg,  G.,   Geschichte  der  Byzantiner  und  des  Osmanischen 
Reiches,  Berlin,  1883. 
-Iorga,    Prof.    N.,   Geschichte  des   Osmanischen   Reiches,   5  vols., 
Gotha,  1908-14. 
The     Byzantine      Empire     (Temple     Primers), 
London,  1906. 
*Jonquiere,  Vicomte  de  la,  Histoire  de  V Empire  Ottoman,  2  vols., 

Paris,  1914. 
Juchereau  de  St.    Denys,   Histoire  de   I'Empire   Ottoman   depuis 

1792  jusqu'en  1844,  4  vols.,  Paris,  1844. 
Lane-Poole,  Stanley,  Turkey,  London,  1888. 
Midhat,  Ali  Haidar,  Life  of  Midhat  Pasha,  London,   1903. 
Midhat  Pasha,  La  Turquie,  son  passe",  son  avenir,  Paris,   1878. 
Pears,  Sir  Edwin,  Turkey  and  its  People,  191 1. 
Rosen,  Georg,  Geschichte  der  Tiirkei,  2  vols.,  Leipzig,  1866-7. 
St.    Priest,   Comte  de,   Mimoire  sur  I'Ambassade  de   France   en 

Turquie,  Paris,  1878. 
Sax,   Carl   Ritter  von,   Geschichte  des   Machtverfalls  der   Tiirkei 
bis      Ende     des      19     Jahrhunderts     und     die     Phasen     der 
"  orientalischen  Frage  "  bis  auf  die  Gegenwart,  Vienna,  1913. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  287 

Urquhart,    David,    The    Military    Strength    of    Turkey,    London, 
1869. 
*Zinkeisen,    J.,    Geschichie    des    Ostnanischen    Reiches.    7    vols. 
Gotha,  1840-63. 


4.  The  Eastern  Question. 

Abeken,  Das  religiose  Leben  im  Islam,  Berlin,   1854. 

Der   Eintritt   der    Tiirkei  in   die   europaische    Politik    des 
XVIII.  Jahrhunderts,  Berlin,  1858. 
Bengescu,  G.,  Essai  d'une  Notice  Bibliogrnphique  sur  la  Question 

d'Orient,  Brussels,  1897. 
Cahuet,  Alberic,  La  Question  d'Orient,  Paris,  1905. 
Choublier,  Max,-  La  Question  d'Orient,  Paris,  1905. 
Djuvara,  T.   G.,   Cent  Projets  de  partage  de  la  Turquie,   Paris, 

1914. 
Driault,    Edouard,    La    Question    d'Orient    depuis    ses    origines, 

5th  ed.,  Paris,  1912. 
Eichmann,   F. ,  Die  Reformen  des  Osmanischen  Reiches,   Berlin, 

1858. 
Engelhardt,  A.,  La  Turquie  et  le  Tandmet,  ou  Histoire  des  rt- 
formes   dans   V Empire    Ottoman   depuis    1826,   2    vols.,    Paris, 
1882-4. 
*Goryainov,   Serge,   Le  Bosphore  et  les  Dardanelles,   Paris,    1910. 
Jovanovi6,   V     M.,    English    Bibliography   on    Eastern   Question. 
Belgrade,   1908. 
The  Emancipation  and   Unity  of  the  Serbian 
Nation,    1871. 
Juchereau    de    St.    Denys,    Les    Revolutions    de    Constantinople, 

2  vols. 
Lecomte,  F.,  La  Guerre  d'Orient  en  1876-7,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1879. 
MacColl,   Canon  M.,   The   Eastern  Question,  its   Facts  and   Fal- 
lacies, London,  1877. 
Mischev,  P.  H.,  La  Mer  Noire  et  les  Ditroits  de  Constantinople. 
Paris,  1899. 
*Pinon,  Rene,  L 'Europe  et  I' Empire  Ottoman,  Paris,   190Q. 
L'Europe  et  la  Jeune  Turquie,  Paris,  191 1. 
Roepell,   Rich.,    Die  orientalische  Frage  in  Hirer  geschichtlichen 

Entwickelung,  Breslau,  1854. 
Schopoff,   A.,    Les   Reformes   et   la   Protection   des    Chritiens   en 
Turquie  (1673-1904),  Paris,  1904. 
*Sorel,  Albert,  La  Question  d'Orient  au  XVIII6  siecle,  Paris,  1878. 
Thouvenel,   L.,    Trois  Anne'es  de   la   Question  d'Orient   (1856-9), 

Paris,  1897. 
Lbicini,  A.,  La  Question  d'Orient  devant  I'Europe,   Paris,    1854. 
Lettres  sur  la  Turquie,   Paris,    1854. 
Les  Serbes  de  Turquie,  Paris,   1865. 
*Villari,  Luigi  (ed.),  The  Balkan  Question,  London,  1905. 
Zinkeisen,  J.  W.,  Osmanisches  Reich  in  Europa  (Geschichte  der 
europdischen  Staaten),   Gotha.    1840-63. 


288  BIBLIOGRAPHY 


5.  Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  the  Southern  Slavs. 

Berard,  Victor,  Heroic  Serbia,  London,  1910. 
Civis  Italicus,  Italy  and  the  Jugoslav  Peoples,  London,  1915. 
Coquelle,  F.,  Histoire  du  Montenegro  et  de  la  Bosnie,  Paris,  1895. 
Cuhibert,  B.   S.,  Essen  historique  sur  la  Revolution  el  I'lndtpen- 

dance  de  la  Serbie,  2  vols.,  Leipzig,  1855. 
Cvijic,  Prof.  Jovan,  I  .'Annexion  de  la  Bosnie  et  la  Question  Serbe, 

Paris,  1909. 
Denis,  E.,  La  Grande  Serbie,  Paris,  1915. 

Denton,    Rev.    \Y.,    Montenegro:    its    People    and    their    History, 
London,  1877. 
Servia  and  the  Servians,  London,  1862. 
Diplomatist,  A,  Nationalism  and   War  in  the  Near  East,  Oxford, 

I9I5- 
Engel,  J.,  Geschichte  von  Serwien  und  Bosnien,  Halle,  1801. 
Evans,   Sir  Arthur,   lllyrian   Letters,   London,    1878. 
Fournier,  Prof.  A.,   Wie  wir  zu  Bosnien  kamen,  Vienna,  1909. 
Gavrilovic,  M.,  Milos  Obrenovic,  2  vols.,  Belgrade,  1908-9. 
Georgewitsch,   Vladan,    Les   Albanais  et  les  grandes  puissances, 

Paris,   1913. 
Gopcevic,  Spiridion,  Serbien  und  die  Serben.  Leipzig,   1888. 
Hilferding,    A.,    Geschichte   der   Serben   und    Bulgaren,    2    vols., 

Bautzen,  1856. 
-Jirecek,    C.,    Die    Romanen    in    d.    Studten    Dahnatiens,    Berlin, 
1902-4. 
Serben      (Geschichte     der      eurohdischen      Staaten), 
Gotha,    191 1. 
Kallay,  Benjamin  von,  Geschichte  der  Serben,  Budapest,  1878. 
Kanitz,  F.,  Das  Konigreich  Serbien,  2  Bde.,  Leipzig,  1904-9. 
*Klaie,  Prof.  V.,  Povjest  Hrvata  (History  of  the  Croats),  5  vols., 
Zagreb,    1899-1913.      The   standard    modern 
history. 
Geschichte  Bosniens,  Leipzig,  1885. 
Lanux,  Pierre  de,  La  Yougoslavie,  Paris,   1916. 
Leger,  L.,  Le  monde  Slave,  Paris,  1873  and  1902. 
Loiseau,  Charles,  Le  Balkan  slave  et  la  Crise  autrichienne,  Paris, 

1898. 
Mallat,  J.,  La  Serbie  contemporaine,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1902.    Colour- 
less. 
Mijatovic,  Chedo,  Servia  of  the  Servians,   London,    1908. 

A  Royal  Tragedy,  London,  1906. 
Mijatovic,  E.   L.,  History  of  Modern  Servia,  London,   1872. 
Novakovie,    Stojan,     Die     Wiedergeburt    des    serbischen    Staates 

(1804-1813),  Sarajevo,  1912. 
*Picot,  Emile,  Les  Serbes  de  la  Hongrie,  Prague,  1873. 
Pirocanac,    M.,    Knez   Mihajlo    i   zajednicka    Radnja    balkanskih 

Naroda,   Belgrade,    1895. 
Pr^zzolini,  G.,  La  Dalmazia,  Rome,  1915. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  289 

Racic,  F.,  Le  Royaume  de  Serbie,  Paris,   190 1. 
*Ranke,  Leopold  von,  History  of  Servia,   London,    1853  (2nd  ed.. 

German,  1879). 
Ristic,     Jovan,     Diplomatska    Istorija    Srbije,     1875-8,     2    vols., 
Belgrade,  1896-8. 
Spoljasnji     Odnosaji    Srbije    novijega     Vremena 
3  vols.,  Belgrade,  1887-1901. 
Ruzicid,     N.,     Das     kirchlich-religiose     Leben     bei    den    Serben 

Gottingen,  1896. 
St.    Rene"   Taillandier  :    Kara   Georges  et  Milosch :  La  Serbie  au 
XIXe  Steele,  Paris,  1873. 
*Savic,    V.    R.,    The    Reconstruction    of    South-Eastern     Europe, 

London,  1917. 
*Seton-Watson,  R.  W.  The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the  Habs- 

burg  Monarchy,  London,  191 1. 
The     Balkans,     Italy,     and     the     Adriatic, 

London,  1915. 
German,  Slav,  and  Magyar :  a  Study  in  the 
Origins    of    the    Great    War,    London, 
1916. 
Sisic,   Prof.    F.,   Hrvatska  Povijest  (Croatian  History)  (to    1847), 

3  vols.,  Zagreb,  1908-12. 
Southern  Slav  Library,  The,  I.,  The  Southern  Slav  Programme, 
II.,  The  Southern  Slavs:  Land  and  People,  III.,  A  Sketch  of 
Southern  Slav  History,   IV.,  Southern  Slav  Culture,   London, 
1915,  V.,  Idea  of  Southern  Slav   Unity,  London,   1916. 
Spa!ajkovi<5,  M.,  La  Bosnie  et  I'Herzegovine,  Paris,  1899. 
Stead,  Alfred  (Ed.),  Servia  by  the  Servians,  London,  1909. 
Stevenson,  F.  S.,  A  History  of  Montenegro,  London,   1912. 
*Temperley,  H.  W.  V.,  History  of  Serbia,  London,  1917. 
Thiers,  H.,  La  Serbie,  son  Passe  et  son  Avenir,  Paris,  1862. 
Urquhart,  David,  A  Fragment  of  the  History  of  Servia,  London, 

1843- 
Vivian,  Herbert,  Servia,  the  Poor  Man's  Paradise,  London,  1897. 
Wyon,  R.,  The  Balkans  from   Within,  London,   1904. 
Yakshitch  (Jaksic),  G.,  L'Europe  et  la  Resurrection  de  la  Serbie, 

Paris,  1907. 


6.  Bulgaria. 

Avril,  Baron  d',  La  Bulgarie  chretienne,  Paris,  1867. 
Beekmann,  Jos.,  Die  Wahrheit  iiber  Bulgarien,  Leipzig,  1898. 
Crispi,  Francesco,  Politica  Estera,  Milan,  1913. 
Dicey,  Sir  Edward,  The  Peasant  State:  Bulgaria  in  1894,  London, 

1894. 
Drandar,  A.,  Les  Evinemcnts  Politiques  en  Bulgarie,   Brussels, 
1896. 
La    Bulgarie   sous    le    Prince    Ferdinand,    Brussels, 
1904. 

U 


290  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Gladstone,   VV.    E.,   Bulgarian   Horrors   and   the  Question  of   the 

East,  London,  1876. 
Huhn,  A.  E.  von,  Kampf  d.  Bui  gar  en  um  ihre  N  ationaleinheit : 
Gesch.   d.    bid  gar. -rum  el,   Ereignisse,    1885, 
Leipzig,  1886. 
The   Struggle   of   the   Bulgarians  for   National 
Independence :  History  of  the  War  between 
Bulgaria  and  Servia  in  1885,  London,  1886. 
Hulme-Beaman,  A.  G.,  Twenty  Years  in  the  Near  East,  London, 
1898. 
*Jirecek,  K.,  Geschichte  der  Bulgaren,  Prag,  1876. 

Das  Fiirstentum  Bulgarien,  Leipzig,  1891. 
Koch,  A.,  Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg,  London,  1887. 
Lamouche,    L. ,   La   Bulgarie  dans  le  passi  et  le  present,   Paris, 

1892 
Launay,  Louis  de,  La  Bulgarie  d'hier  et  de  detnain,  Paris,  1907. 
Mach,  Richard  von,  The  Bulgarian  Exarchate,  London,  1907. 
Minchin,    J.    G.    C.,    The    Growth   of   Freedom    in    the    Balkan 

Peninsula,  London,  1886. 
Samuelson,  James,  Bulgaria,  Past  and  Present,  London,  1888. 
Weiss-Bartenstein,   W.    R.,    Bulgarien:   Land,   Leute  und    Wirt- 
schaft  zur  Zeit  des  Balkankrieges,  Leipzig,  1913. 


7.  Roumania. 

Arion,  V.,  Parvan,  Papahagi,  and  others,  Romdnia  §i  Popoarele 

Balcanice,  Bucarest,  1913. 
Barbulescu,    Hie,   Relations  des   Roumains   avec  les  Serbes,   les 

Bulgares,  les  Grecs  et  la  Croatie,   Iasi,    1912. 
Bibesco,   Prince  Georges,   Le  Regne  de  Bibesco,  2  vols.,   Paris, 

1893 
Bratter,  C.  A.,  Die  Kutzoivalachische  Frage,  Hamburg,  1907. 
"Charles  L,  King  of  Roumania,  Aus  dem  Leben  Konig  Karls  von 

Romanien,  4  vols.,   Stuttgart,    1894-1900.     One  of  the  most 

authoritative  volumes  of  memoirs  in  modern  times. 
*Dam£,  F.,  Histoire  de  la  Roumanie  Contemporaine,  Paris,  1900. 

Contentious,  but  highly  instructive. 
Dragu,  T.,   La  Politique   Roumaine  apres   les   troubles   agraires 

de  1907,  Paris,   1908. 
Fiedler,  J.,  Die   Union  der   Walachen  in  Siebenbiirgen,  Vienna, 

1858  (Akademie  der  Wiss.,  Bd.  XXVII.). 
Hauterive,  Comte  d',  Mdmoire  sur  VEtat  ancien  et  actuel  de  la 

Moldavie,  Bucarest,   1902. 
Hintz,    J.,    Geschichte   des    Bistums   der   griechisch-nichtunierten 

Glaubensgenossen  in  Siebenbiirgen,   Hermannstadt,   1850. 
*Honfalvy,  Paul,  Die  Rumanen  und  ihre  Anspriiche ,  Vienna,  1883. 

The  best  presentment  of  the  Magyar  case. 
Hungaricus,     Das     magyarische     Ungarn    und    der     Dreibund, 

Munich,    1899.     A  very  able  Roumanian  plaidoyer. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  291 

Hurmuzaki,     Baron      E.,     Fragmente     din     istoria     Rom&nilor, 

Bucarest,   1879-1900. 
*Iorga,    Prof.    N.,    Geschichte   des   rumdnischen    Volkes,   2   vols., 

Gotha,    1905.     The  standard  work. 
Jonescu,     Take,     La     Politique     Etrangere     de     la     Roumanie, 

Bucarest,   1891. 
Mitrany,     D.,     Rumania,     her     History     and     Politics     [Oxford 

Pamphlet],   19 15. 
Murnu,    G.,     Vlahia    Mare    (980-1259).      Istoria    Romanilor    din 

Pind,  Bucarest,  1913. 
Pic,  J.  L.,   Ueber  die  Abstammung  der  Rumanen,  Leipzig,   1880. 
Picot,  Emile,  Les  Roumains  de  la  Macidoine,  Paris,  1875. 
Rubin,  A.,  Les  Roumains  de  Macidoine,  Bucarest,   1913. 
Salaberry,  Comte  de,  Essai  sur  la  Valachie  et  la  Moldavie,  Paris, 

1821. 
Samuelson,  James,  Roumania,  Past  and  Present,   London,   1882. 
Seton-Watson,   R.  W.,  Roumania  and  the  Great   War,  London, 

I9I5- 

Racial    Problems    in     Hungary,    London, 
1908. 
Slavici,  loan.,   Die  Rumanen  in   Ungarn,  Siebenburgen  und  der 

Bukowina,  Vienna,   1887. 
Sturdza,    Demeter,    Le   Roi    Charles    I.    de   Roumanie,    2    vols., 

Bucarest,   1900-4.     Documentary. 
Ubicini,  J.  H.  A.,  La  Question  des  Principautes  devant  I'Europe, 

Paris,   1858. 
Verax,  La  Roumanie  et  les  Juifs,  Bucarest,  1903. 
Wace,    A.    J.    B.,    and   Thompson,    M.    S.,    The   Nomads   of   the 

Balkans,    London,    1914. 
Witte,  Baron  Jean  de,  Quinze  Ans  d'Histoire  (1866-1881)  d'apres 

les  Memoires  du  Roi  de  Roumanie,  Paris,   1905 
*Xenopol,    Prof.    A.    D.,    Histoire   des   Roumains,   2   vols.,    Paris, 

1894.       An    admirable    abridgement 
from  the  Roumanian  original. 
Les  Roumains,  Paris,  1909.     A  brilliant 
course  of   lectures. 


8.  Greece. 

About,  Edmond,  La  Grece  Contemporaine,  4e  ed.,  Paris,   i860. 
*Finlay,  G.,  History  of  Greece,  2  vols.,  London,   186 r. 
Gordon,  Thomas,   History  of  the  Greek   Revolution.   Edinburgh, 

1832. 
Grenier,  A.,  La  Grece  en  1863,  Paris,  1863. 
Jebb,  Sir  Richard,  Modern  Greece,  London,  1880. 
Martin,    Percy    F.,    Greece   of   the   Twentieth    Century,    Pref.    by 

A.  Andreades,  London,   1913. 
Nikolaides,  Dr.  K.,  Griechenlands  Antcil  an  den  Balkankriegen, 

Vienna,  1913. 

U    2 


292  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Phillips,  W.  Alison,   The   War  of  Greek  Independence  (1821-33), 

London,    1897. 
Pouqueville,  F. ,  Rdgdndration  de  la  Gre.ce,  4  vols.,  Paris,  1826. 
Rodd,  Sir  Rennell,  Customs  and  Lore  of  Modern  Greece,  London, 

1892. 
Sergeant,  L.,  Greece,  1821-97,  London,  1897. 

New  Greece,  London,   1878. 
Toynbee,    A.    J.,    Greek    Policy   since    1882    [Oxford   Pamphlet], 

1914. 

9.  Albania. 

Balkanicus,   Le  Probleme  Albanais,  la  Scrbie  et  VAutriche-Hon- 

grie,  Paris,  1913. 
Boppe,  C,  L'Albanie  et  Napoldon,  Paris,  1913. 
Chlumecky,     Baron     Leopold,     Osterreich-Ungarn    und    Italien. 
Das  westbalkanische  Problem,   1907. 
•Durham,  M.  Edith,  High  Albania,  London,   1909. 
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Woods,  H.  C.,  The  Danger  Zone  of  Europe.    Changes  and  Prob- 
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Boue\  Ami,  La  Turquie  d'Europe,  2  vols.,  Pnris,  1840. 
Cambon,  V.,  Autour  des  Balkans,  Paris,   1890. 
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Fortis,  Alberto,  Travels  into  Dahnalia,   London,   1778. 
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1873- 
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294  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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12.  The  Balkan  Wars. 

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1913- 
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I9I3- 
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1913- 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY  295 

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I9I5- 
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1914. 
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Berlin,  1913 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abdul    Hamid,    105,    106, 

137,  146,  172 
Abdulla  Pasha,   170,   173,   1 
Abdul   Medjid,    100 
Achmet   Riza,    136 
Acropolis,  52 
Adrianople,  8,  33,  71,   74, 

159.     170,     174,     176, 

191,     207,    235,    273, 

280 
Adriatic,    34,    76,   236 
/Egean,   44 
Aehrenthal,    Count,     133, 

153 
Albania,    23,     28,    48,    72, 

138,  139,  140,  151,  158, 
Alessio,    175,    196 
Alexander   I.    Tsar,   50,    89 

II.,    103,    105,    115,    117 
III.,    115,    118,    121 
of  Battenberg,    116,    120, 
Prince  Regent  of  Serbia, 

243.  250 
Karageorgevitch,   41 
the  Good,  59. 

Alfold,  34 

AH  Pasha,  48,  51 

AH   Riza   Pasha,    189 

Andrassy,  Count,   103,   115, 

Antivari,    no,    175 

Apulum,  57 

Arabs,  7 

Arbanasi,   78 

Armenians,    84,    127,    160 

Arsenius,    Patriarch,    13,  22 

Asenid  Dynasty,  4 


106, 
186, 
278, 


149. 


147 
173, 


119 


Athos,   Mt.,  45,   46,   219 
Atrocities,  276 
Aurelian,    Emperor,    57 
Austro-Russian    Relations,     15, 
85-93,   "5 


B 


Bagdad    Agreement,    127 
Bakurna    Gumna,    191 
Balance  of  Power,  96 
Baldwin,   Emperor,  74 
Balkan   League,    141,    176,   206, 

233,   240 
Ballads,   Serbian,   4 
Banat,    16,  41 
Banffy,   Baron,   137 
Banica,    192,   200 
Bardanjolt,    175 
Baring,   Mr.   84 
Basil  II,  2,  4,  73 
Batak  Massacre,  84 
Bavaria,    18 
Belaiica,  Battle  of,  73 
Belgium,  30 

Belgrade,  13,  33,  36,  38,  40,  49, 
61,  88 
Treaty  of,  15 
Belisarius,  3 
Berana,  159 
Berat,  195,  217 
Berlin,  Treaty  of,   109-112,   141, 

J43.  l63 
Ber'in-Bagdad,  2 
Berchtold,  Count,   141,   162,  240 
Be^sa,   139 
Bessarabia,   60,  61,  62,  87,   99, 

107,  in 


THB   BALKANS 


300 


INDEX 


Beihlen,  Gabriel,   12 

Beust,  Count,  103 

Bismarck,  67,  92,  99,  103,  108 

Black  Sea,  62,  74 

Blar.c,  Louis,  144 

Bloodtax,  9 

Bogomils,  29,  73 

Bohemia,  5,  103 

Bojanovic,  General,  250 

Bojevic,  General,  187,  215,  216 

Boris,  Tsar,  4,  72 

Boris,   Crown   Prince,    124,    157 

Borodino,  181 

Bosnia,    4,    14,    29,    36,   42,    46, 
79,  104,  105,  107,  112,  234 

Bosphorus,   i,  29 

Botjov,   84 

Botzaris,  52 

Bourchier,  Mr.  J.  D.,  154,   162, 
245,   2S°,  252,    253,   271 

Boyars,   Roumanian,  60 

Brailsford,  Mr.   H.  N.,  277 

Bratianu,  Ion,  64,  67,  88 
Mr.   Ion  C,    153 

Brdica,    214 

Bregalnitza,  261,  267,  276,  281, 
^282 

Bucarest,  33,  58,  60,  62,  63,  65, 
82,  145,  148 
Treaties  of  (1812,   1913),  89 

Budapest,  26,   35,  60 

Bukovina,   58,  61 

Bulair,   186,  203,  208 

Bulgarian    Committee    in    Bu- 
carest, 42 

Bulbars,  Origin  of,  70 

Bunar  Hissar,    179 

Burney,   Admiral,  2x8 

Burov,   Mr.,   267 

Byron,  Lord,  48,  52 

Bvzantium,    1,    21,    25,    44,    71, 
74.  76 


Calvinists,    12 
Campulung,  58 
Cankov,  82,   118,  279 
Canning-,  George,   53,  91,  95 
Capo  d'Istria,  Count,  52,  53,  54 


Carasso,   136 

Carikov,    123,   150,   157 

Carp,   Mr.,   153 

Carpathians,  59,  71 

Car  Vrh,  263,  266 

Castlereagh,   85 

Catherine  the  Great,  18,  32,  37, 

47,  85 
Catholicism,   14,  27,  29,  35 

Cattaro  (Kotor),   28,  215 
Cavour,   98,  99 
Cernajev,  General,    105 
Cetinje,    164 

Charles,    King    of    Roumania, 
42,  67-8,   106,  in,  122,   144 
Charles  V,    14 
Charles  X,  40 
Chios,  49,   C2,  213 
Chum,  27 

Church,  Sir  Richard,  52 
Cochrane,  Admiral,   52 
Codrington,   Admiral,   53 
Concert  of  Europe,  53,  87,  96, 

99,   113,   141 
Conference  of  London,  205 
Congress  of  Berlin,  64,  90,  114, 
144 

Paris,  64,  65,  90,  98-101 

Vienna,  49,  62,  64,  90 
Constantine,   3 

V.,   71 

XII.,  K.  of  Greece,  185,  199, 
213,  244,  2715,  276,  283 

Grand   Duke,  88 
Constantinople,    1,    14,    21,    28, 
34,   106,    179,   183,   193,   235 
Constitution,    Serbian,   43 
Cordova,  3 
Corfu,    173 
Cossacks,  46 
Cracow,   96 

Crete,  8,  53,   102,  125,   149,   165 
Crimean  War,  63,  64,  97,  99 
Croatian  Military  Frontiers,   12 
Croats,  8,  25,  44,  80,   104,   106, 

152 
Crusades,  8,  44 
Curtea  d'Arges,  58 
Cuza,  Alexander,  42,  43,  65,  144 
Cyprus,  8,   114 
Cyril,   St.,   26,  71 


INDEX 


301 


D 


Dacia,  57 

Dahis,  38,  74 

Dalmatia,    26,    27,    44,    61,    88, 

104 
Danev,  Dr.,  150,  155,  205,  242, 

252-6,  257,  267,  279 
Danilo,  Crown  Prince,  175 

Vladika,   31,   42 
Danube,  57,  62,  99,   109 
Dardanelles,  8,  96 
Debidour,   M.,  90 
Decani,   28 
Decid,  175 

Dedeagac,   186,  200,  203,  281 
Demirhissar,  275 
Denmark,  King  of,  55 
Derkos,   184 
Deutsche  Bank,  127 
Dibra,  107,  130,  197,  218,  236 
Dimitriev,    General,     171,    179. 

181,   258,    270 
Dimotika,    186 
Diocletia,  27 
Disraeli,   105,   114,   119 
Divine  Right,  93 
Djakovo,   196 
Djavid  Bey,    136 

Pasha,    188,     192,    200,     217, 
281 
Dn jester,  59 

Dobrudja,    107,    in,    153 
Dojran,    275,   276 
Dondukov-Korsakov,   116 
Dragoman  of  the  Fleet,  47 
Drama,   132 
Drang  nach  Osten,  56 
Drin,    196 
Dnna,   13 
Duahsm,   103 
Dubrovnik,  Republic  of,  9,  23, 

28,   31,  32-3,  77 
Dulcigno,    no 
Dumba,  Dr.,  48 
Dunmehs,   135 
Durazzo,  73,  75,  140,   196,  217, 

2^8 
Dushan,     Stephen,    4,    28,    29, 
105 


Dutton,  Professor,  277 
Dynastic  interests,  20 
Dzumaja,  282 


Eastern  Empire,  2 

Question,   15,  23,  86 
Edinburgh,   Duke  of,  55 
Edward  I.,  69,   120 

VII.,   132,   141 
Egri    Palanka,     173,    187,   231, 

267,  271,  272,  281 
Egypt,  6 
Elassona,   198 
Elbassan,    139,    197 
Entente,  Anglo-French,  96 
Enver  Bey,  134,  136,  206,  208, 

278 
Epirus,  53,    108,  201 
Ergene,    208 

Essad  Pasha,  201,  213,  215,  217 
Eugene,   Prince,   13,   14,  35,  59 
Evans,  Sir  Arthur,  33 
Exarchate,   Bulgarian,  83,   102, 

128 


Fatimite  Caliphs,  6 

Ferdinand,  King  of  Bulgaria, 
71,  122,  124,  150,  230,  233, 
243,  248,  251,  255,  267,  270 

Ferizovid,   139. 

Fethi   Pasha,  191,    195 

Ficev,  General,   160,  245 

Finlay,  52 

Flanders,  Count  of,  67 

F'orina,    193,  200 

Forgach,  Count,  152 

Francis  I.,    11,  88 

Francis  Joseph,  103 

Franzensbad,   118 

Frederick  the  Great,  15,  17,  36, 

85 
French  Influence  in  Balkans,  63 
Friedjung  Trial,   157 
Fiirstenberg,  Prince,  268 


302 


INDEX 


Gabrovo,  81 

Gallipoli,    186,   203,  208 

GaraSanin,   Ilija,  42,   144,    145 

Gavrilovic,  Col.,  211 

Genadiev,  M.,  182,  255,  270 

Gennadios,  Patriarch,  21 

Gennadius,   M.,   205 

Geography,  2 

George  I.,  King  of  Greece,  55, 

102,  122,  230,  244 
GeSov,  M.,    118,    153,   243,  249, 

267 
Ghazi  Mukhtar  Pasha,  140,  158, 

162 
Giers,  de,  118 
Gjevgjeli,  265,  275 
Gladstone,  55,  84,   104,    106 
Glagolitic  rite,  71     77 
Godard,  M.,  277 
Goltz,  Baron  von  der,  127,  170, 

222,  228 
Goluchowski,  Count,   132 
Gordon,  52 
Gracanica,   28 
Grahovo,  102 
Granicari,  34 

Greco-Bulgarian   War,    161 
Greco-Turkish  War,   125 
Gregory  V.,  Patriarch,  52 
VII.,  Pope,  26 
Ghika,  61 
Grey,     Sir     Edward,    127,    215, 

246,  278 
Gribovo,  201 
Guiscard,   Robert,  26 
Gundulic,  Ivan,  33 


Hassan   Riza   Pasha,    175,   213, 

214 
Hellenic  revival,  49 
Hellenisation,  22 
Hetairia,  Greek,  50,  82 
Hilmi  Pasha,   131,   137 
Hochwaechter,   Major  von,    183 
Holy  Alliance,  49,  86,  91 
Hospodars,  61,  64 
Howell,  Major,   171,  229 
Hungary,   11,  28,  93,  94,  105 
Hunyady,  John,  5,  59 
Hurshid  Pasha,  208,  281 
Hydra,  49 


I 


Ibrahim   Pasha,   52 
Ignatiev,  123 
Ilarion,   Metropolitan,  81 
Illyria,  88 

Immanuel,  Col.,  194 
Indian  Moslems,   108 
Innocent  III.,  28,  74 
Ionescu,  M.  Take,  268 
Ionian  Islands,  50,  55,  88,  102 
Iorga,  Professor,  123 
Ipek,  22,  35,  78,  158,   162,   iq6 
Iron  Gates,  58 
Islam,  3,  7,  10,  21,  29,  60 
Istip,    157 
Italian  Artists,  28 
Green  Book,  140 
Ivanov,  General,   176,   185,  209, 

257.  258,  262,  265,  272,  273, 

276,  281 
Ivo  Crnojevic\  31 
Izvolsky,  M.,  149,  241 


H 

Jamboli,  171,  177 
Habsburg,  House  of,  11,  12,  16,     Janina,  48,  52,  195,  204,  213 


33.  64 
Haiduks,  47 
Hakki  Pasha,  162 
Hammer-Purgkstall,  7 
Hartwig,   M.,    123 
Hasapcev,    General,    230,    257 

259.  275 


Janissaries,  9,  30,  38,  47,  77 
Jankovie,     General,     187,     195, 

196,  260,  265,  267 
Jassy,  58,  62,  65 
Jenidje-Vardar,  198 
Jerusalem,  97 
Jesuits,   35 


INDEX 


303 


John  Asen  II.,  74 
Joseph  II.,  18,  37,  61,  62, 
Jugoslav  ideal,  42 


K 


Kalojan,  74 

Karadzic,  Vuk,  So 

Karagatch,   179 

Kara  George,  38,  39,  79,  88,  144 

Karagjorgjevic      Dynasty,     39, 

149 
Karavelov,  83,   118 
Karlowitz,  13,  23,  36 
Karlsburg,  57 
Katie,  38 

Kaulbars,  General,   122 
Kaunitz,   Prince,    16,   18 
Kavala,   185,   281 
Khevenhiiller,  Count,    120 
Kiamil  Pasha,  158,  206,  219 
Kinglake,  22 
Kirk  Kilisse,  108,  170,  174,  177. 

190,  223,  228,  278 
Kizilagatch,    180 
Klapka,  General,  144 
Klephts,  47,  51,  52,  79 
Knin,  26 
Knjazevac,  280 
Kocana,  159,  259,  266,  271 
Kogalniceanu,  64,  65 
Kohary,  Princess,   122 
Kolokotrones,  52 
Komitadjis,   131,   132 
Kopitar,  81 
Koprivltica,  78 
Korais,  50,  80 
Koran,  101,  136 
Koritza,  107 
Kosovo,  4,  29,  31,  75,  107,  152, 

162,  187,  190,  234 
Kossuth,     Louis,    42,   93,    106, 

137.  144  00 

Kovacev,     General,     208,     258, 

261,  263,  266,  270,  273 
Kragujevac,  40 
Kresna  Pass,  276,  281 
Krivolak,   261,  265 
Kroja,   196 
Krum,  4,  71 


Krupp,   228 

KruSevo,  78 

Kuku§,  275 

Kulpa  River,  34 

Kumanovo,   185,   188,   199,  212, 

231 
Kurdjalias,  79 
Kustendil,   185,  263 
Kutchuk  Kamardji,   19 
Kutin£ev,     General,     178,    258, 

280 


Lahana,  275 
Lamartine,  144 
Lamsdorff,  Count,  132 
Lansdowne,   Lord,   131 
Laudon,  37,  62 
Lazar,  Tsar,  29 
Lazarevic,  Luka,  38 
Leopold  I.,  13,  35,  53 

II.,  2,  37 

of  Hohenzolltrn,  67 
Lepanto,  Battle  of,   33 
Lesbos,  213 

Levant,  Commerce  in,  45,  49 
Levski,  83,  85 
Ljubica,  Princess,  40 
Ljuma,  218 
London,    Treaty    of,    219,    230, 

278 
Lorraine,  Duke  of,   13,  35 
Louis  of  Baden,  35 
Louis  I.  of  Bavaria,  54 
Louis  Philippe,  122 
Louis  the  Great,  59 
Lov£en,  Mount,  215 
Lule    Burgas,     179,     180,     i8q, 


223,  278 


M 


Macedonia,    72,    no,    128,    129, 

148,  160,  172 
Magyars,  5,  16,  26,  57,  76,  103 
Mahmud  Mukhtar  Pasha,    178, 

181 
Mahmud    Shevket    Pasha,    140, 

158,  169,  207,  222. 


304 


INDEX 


Maiorescu  Cabinet,  256,  268 
Malinov^  M.,  279 
Malissori,    175 
Maria  Theresa,    15,    17,   36 
Maritza,  8,  30,   177 
Marko,  King,  76,  192 
Markolev,  General,  210 
Marschall       von       Bieberstein, 

Baron,  127 
Matthias  Corvinus,  5,  59,  77 
Matthiopoulos,   Colonel,   200 
Mazzini,  64,    144 
Medua,   175,  234 
Mehemet  AH,  52,  96 
Methodius,  St.,  26,  71 
Metternich,  51,  85,  91,  93 
Michael  the  Brave,  60 
Michael  Obrenovic,  41,  82,  120, 

144 
Michelet,   144 

Midhat  Pasha,  82,  104,   146 
Midia,  219 
Miklosich,  81 
Milan  I.,  40 

King,  43,  105,  116,  119 
Military  Frontiers,  34 
League,  Greek,   155 
Miljukov,  Professor,  277 
Millets,  21 

Milo§  Obrenovi6,  39,  41 
Milovanovic,  Dr.,  152,  154,   158 
Mines,  Medieval  Serbian,  28 

Mircea  the  Old,  59,  76 

Mirdites,  175,  196 

Missolonghi,  52 

Mitrovica,  158,   162 

MiuSkoyic,   M.,   205 

Mohacs,   B?ttle  of,  34 

Mohammed  II.,  2,  21,  29,  51,  83 

v.,  137 

Beg,  77 
Moldavia,  23 
Monastir,     132,     139,    140,    158, 

171,  191,   194.  23i 
Montenegro,   28,   31-2,  46,    106, 

116,   174 
Morava,   13,  30,  140 
Morea,  45,  47,  51 
Morocco,   132 
Moscopolis,  48 
Moscow,    105 


Miiller,   Wilhelm,  51 
Miinchengratz,  Conference,  92 
Munkacs,  51 
Murad  I.,   29 

V.,    104 
Miirzsteg,    132 
Mustafa  Pasha,  177 


N 


Nagoricano,    188 
Napoleon  I.,   1,  33,  62,  88,  89, 
197 

III.,  65,  67,  97,  99,  119 
Narses,  3 

Nathalie,  Queen,  120 
Nationality,  Principle  of,  20 
Nauplia,  54 
Navarino,  53,  55 
Navy,  Greek,  202,  203,  237 
Nazim    Pasha,     140,    158,    170, 

171,  178,  206 
Neisse,   Interview,    18 
Nekljudov,   244 
Nemanja  Dynasty,  26 
Nenadovi6,  Aleksa,  37 

Jakob,  38 
Niazi  Bey,  34,   139,   200 
Nicephorus,   71 
Nicholas  I.,  Tsar,  93,  96,  97 

II.,   132,  251 

Prince  of  Greece,  243,  259 

King  of  Montenegro,  31,  120, 
145.   164,   175,  215 
Nicopolis,  Battle  of,  5,  76 
Nigrita,  259 
Nikolid,  M.,  205 
Niksic,  no 
Nis\    173 
Nitra,  72 
Normans,    71 
Novakovi6,  M.,  205,  241 
Novibazar,   78,    107,    in,    195 
Novi  Sad  (Neusatz),  23,  82 


Oblakovo,   193 
Odessa,  50,  81 


INDEX 


305 


Odvsseus,  54 

Ohrida,  22,  72,  73,  78,  107,  130, 

197,   231 
Olt,  13 

Olympos,  168,  198 
Omladina,  43,  82 
Orthodox   Church,    16,    19,    22, 

32,  35,  48,  60 
Osman  Nizami  Pasha,  205 
Osrrovo,  200,  201 
Oito,  King  of  Greece,  54 
Ottoman  Bank,   102 

Poetry,  7 
Ovcepolje,   172,  262 


Pacu,    M.,   247 

Paisi,   the  Monk,  80 

Palestine,  97 

Palikari,   47 

Panas,    154 

Panghaion,   259 

Panin,   Count,    18 

Pannonia,  72 

Panslavism,    105,    106 

Papacy,    11,  27 

Paris,  Treaty  of,    109-111 

Parthenius,    Patriarch,   45 

PaSic,   M.,    158,   238,    240,   242, 

247,  249,   255,  260 
Passarowitz,   14,  36 
Pasvan  Oglu,  79 
Paulus  Jovius,  77 
Pears,   Sir  Edwin,  84 
Pec,  see  Ipek 
Pehcevo,   272,   281 
Perister,  Mount,   195 
Peter  the  Great,  ic,  32 

HI.,  32 

I.,  King  of  Serbia,   105,   119, 
150,   190,  251,  265 
Petchenegs,  70 
Petra,  178 

Petrov,  General,  250,  280 
Petrovic-N  jegos"     Dynasty,     3 1 , 

149 
Phanariots,   22,  46,  50,  61,  78 
Philhellenism,   50 


Phi'.ike  Hetairia,  50 
Philippopolis,    107,    118 
Piedmont,  q8 
Pindus,  48,   78 
Piraeus,  54 
Pirot,   no,  280 
Pius    II.,    5 

IX.,   82 
PlaSkovica  Planina,  266 
Plevlje,    195 
Plevna,   106,    146,  210 
Podolia,  8 
Poincare,    M.,    163 
Poland,   16,    19,  37,  60,  91,  93, 

t.      II5 

Pouqueville,  79 

Preslav,  72 
Prespa,  72 
Prevesa,  202 

Price,  Mr.  Crawfurd,  243 
Prilep,  76,   172,   192,  231 
Prisat,   191 
Priltina,   173,   190 
Prizren,  33,    196 
Prochaska  Affair,   230,  240 
Prussia,    15,    17,  37 
Pruth,    14 
Psara,  219 
Puka,    196 

Putnik,  General,  212,  214,  238, 
259,  260,  262 


Ouinet,   144 


Q 


Radoslavov,   Dr.,   270 
RadoviSte,   259,   261,   263 
Radulescu,  80 
Ragusa,   see  Dubrovnik. 
Rajac'16,    Patriarch,   41 
Rajcanski  Rid,  266 
Rakoczy,   Francis,    13 
Rakovsky,   George,  82 
Ranke,  Leopold  von,  27 
Rastislav  of  Moravia,  72 
Ravanica,  28 

X 


306 


INDEX 


Rayahs,   21,  30,   37 

Redifs,    178 

Redki  Buki,  262 

Reformation,    11 

Regency,  Serbian,  43 

Reglement  Organique,  63,  92 

Reichspost,    183 

Renaissance,  6 

Reshid  Pasha,  205 

Resna,   139,   193 

Revolution,    French,    47,   48,   63 

Rhigas,  48,  80 

Rhodope,   185 

Ristid,  Jovan.  43,  82,   121,    146 

Rizov,   M.,   237 

Rodosto,  205,  235,   271 

Rosetti,  64 

Roumelia,    Eastern,    107,     no, 

118 
RuScuk,  82 
Russell,  Lord,  55 
Russia   and   Balkan    Slavs,    19, 

3^-2,  45 
Russo-Turkish  Wars,  47 
Ruthenes,  in 


Said  Pasha,   140,   158 
Salisbury,  Lord,  99,  106,  118 
Salonica,  26,  30,  107,   in,   132, 

134,  163,  171,  185,  193,  199, 

234.  243 
Samos,  53,  213 
Samuel,  Tsar,  73 
Sandjak,   107,   in,  268 
S.  Sofia,  95 
S.    Stefano,    Treaty    of,    107-9, 

143.  233 
Sapundzakis,  General,  201 
Sar,  Mts.,  231 
Sarajevo,  33 
Sava,  St.,  27 
Save,  13 
Savov,   General,    160,    177,    179, 

189,  235,  245,  246,  249,  257, 

261,  264,  270,  281 
Sazonov,  M.,  241,  244,  249,  255, 

271 
Scanderbeg,  76 


Schwarzenberg,   Prince,  98 

Seignobos,  M.,  104 

Selim   II.,   77 

Serbo-Bulgar  Treaty,    159 

Serbo-Greek  Treaty,  248 

Seres,   132,  276 

Serfidje,  Battle  of,  200 

Sevnica,   194 

Shemshi  Bey,  139 

Sheriat,   101 

Shevket  Torgut  Pasha,  139 

Shipka,   106 

Shukri    Pasha,     180,    .'.85,    209, 

211 
Sick  Man,  2 

Sigismund,  Emperor,  76 
Silesia,   15 
Silistria,    112,    116 
Simeon,  Tsar,  72 
Sisman,  Tsar,  75 

Skoplje,  33,  130,  132,  162 
Skup§tina,  40,  252,  256 
Skutari,  174,  195,  205,  214,  216 

Slav  Language  in  Turkey,  77 

Slavonia,  35 

Slivnica,   120 
Slovenec,  236 

Smyrna,   169,  203 

Sobieski,  John,  13 

Sofronij,  Bishop,  80 

Sokol,  42 

Sokolovid,  Mohammed,  77 

Sokolski,  82 

Sorovid,  200 

Spalajkovi6,  M.,  156,  242 

Spalato,   26 

Snanish  Succession,   14 

Spas,   196 

Spizza,  no 

Stahremberg,  13,  35 

Stambulov,   n8,    121,   123,   147 

Stanislas,   King  of  Poland,    17 

Stara  Zagora,  84 

Stepanovic,    General,    185,    187, 

211,    260 

Stephen  the  Great,  5,  59 

the   Little,   32 

the  First  Crowned,  27 

Nemanja,  27 
Stone,   Miss,   131 
Straits,  Question  of,  92,  109 


INDEX 


307 


Stratimirovid,  88 

Stratford  de  RedclitTe,  Lord,  98, 

126 
Streit,  Dr.,  205 
Strossmayer,  Bishop,  42,  120 
Strumnica,  260,  271,  275 
Studenica,  65 
Stuttgart,  65 
Styrian   Estates,   34 
Suceava,  58,  61 
Suleiman  the  Great,  9,   11,  77 
Suliotes,  48 
Sumadija,  25,  38 


Turkophils,  98 
Turtucaia,  280 
Tvrtko,  King  of  Bosnia,  76 


U 


Ukraine,   8,  46 
Una,   13 

Ungnad,   Baron,  77 
Union     and     Progress,     Com- 
mittee of,   134,  136,  140,  150 
Unkiar  Skelessi,  92,  95 
Urach,  77 
Uzice,   27,  42 


Tahsim  Pasha,   198 

Talaat  Bey,   136 

Talleyrand,   91 

Tarnowsky,     Count,    255,    267, 

280 
Tartars,  111 

Tchataldja,   179,   181,  209,  236 
Tcherkeskoj,   183 
Temesvar,  Banat  of,   13 
Tetovo,  191,  218,  231 
Thessaly,  54,   108,   116 
Thirty  Years'  War,   12 
Thrace,  70,   161 
Tilsit,  Treaty  of,  89 
Timars,   The,   9 
Tirana,   139,  217 
Tisza,  Coloman,  137 

Count  Stephen,    103,  253 
Todorov,  General,  199 

Mr.  267,  270 
Tonoev,  General,  258 
Topcider,    145 
To§ev,  General,  263,  269 
Trajan,   57 
Transylvania,   12,  .58 
Trapmann,   Captain,   273-4 
Travunia,  27 
Tricoupis,    147 
Triple  Alliance,   115 
Tripolitan  War,  222 
Tmovo,  74,  75,  78,  81,   154 
Tubingen,  77 
Turkificajtion,    141 
Turkish   Constitution,    135,    150 


Valona,   173,  195 

Vardar    Valley,    30,     173,     191, 

234,  236,  239,  260 
Varna,  5,  72,  76 
Velbuzd,  75 

Veles,   130,   191,   199,  231,  264 
Venelin,  81 
Venice,  44,  61 
Venizelos,    M.,    125,    153,    154, 

205,  242 
Vesnid,  M.,  205 
Vidin,  33,  79 
Vienna,  13,  17,  19 
Vilayets,  Law  of,  101,  163 
Vlachs,  23,  48,  74,  130,  148,  201 
Vlad  the  Impaler,  59 
Vladikas  of  Montenegro,  32 
Vladimirescu,  Tudor,  51,  63 
Vladislav,  King  of  Hungary,  76 
Vladisavid,  31 
Voivodina,  41 
Vojnik  Villages,  78 
Vojnovic,  Count  Louis,  205 
Volga,  70 
Vraca,  80 

W 

Waldemar,  Prince  of  Denmark, 

122 
Wallachia,   23,  45,   58 
Little,    13,  36 


308 


INDEX 


Warsaw,   17 

White,   Sir  William,   126 

William  I.,  67,   103,   115 

II.,  93.  98 
Wittelsbach,   House  of,    i5 


Xenopol,   Professor,  66 

Y 

Yemen,   139 

Young    Turks,     105,    138, 
141,    148,   158 


139. 


Ypsilanti,  Alexander,  50,  51 
Demetrius,   53 


Zadruga  System,  27 

Zajecar,  280 

Zapoh/a,   John,  77 

Zara,  44 

Zekki  Pasha,  171,  173,  188, 195, 

200 
Zivkovic,  General,  187,  195,  196 
Zletovo,  260,  269 
Zupan,  27 


PRINTED   IN    GREAT   BRITAIN    BY    R.    CI.AY   AND   SONS,    LTD., 
BRUNSWICK    ST.,    STAMFORD   ST.,    LONDON,    S.E.     I,    AND    B0M6AY,    SUFFOLK. 


Date  Due 

. 

JUN  1  1  '59 

_ 

FEB  9  >£\ 

a 

iE&i 

|  JAN  1  9 

19GS 

-     • 

FES 

i  1966 

JAN  2  2 

I96G  1 

APR  17 

^1982 

' 

. 



Library  Bureau  Cat.  No.   1137 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


A  A         001  396  049  7 


